![Sample our Humanities journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5939/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Humanities.jpg"})
Abstract
A post-war symbol of Big Science in the UK, and primarily built for scientific purposes, the large radio telescope at Jodrell Bank was nevertheless caught up in the politics of the Cold War. This occurred not because the UK government sought to utilise the telescope's potential for space surveillance (for example, to observe satellites or obtain warning of ballistic missiles) but rather as result of Bernard Lovell's struggle to obtain funding to meet the escalating construction costs. Drawing upon files in the UK National Archives, this paper documents the attempts (with limited success) that Lovell made to create military missions for his telescope, and thus gain support.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Donald MacKenzie and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on drafts of this paper. This research was supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council.
Notes
[1] Lovell, The Story of Jodrell Bank. Other works include Agar, Science and Spectacle and CitationEdge and Mulkay, Astronomy Transformed .
[2] See, for example, CitationLeslie, The Cold War and American Science ; CitationLowen, Creating the Cold War University ; CitationForman, “Behind Quantum Electronics”; also see the special issues of Social Studies of Science 31, no. 2 (April 2001) and Radical History Review, no. 63 (Fall 1995).
[3] CitationBud and Gummett (eds.), Cold War, Hot Science ; CitationMacKenzie and Spinardi, “The Technological Impact of a Defence Research Establishment.”
[4] The difficulty with obtaining UK data is described in Langley, Soldiers in the Laboratory.
[5] See Lowen, Creating the Cold War University.
[6] See, for example, CitationWaring, “Cold Calculus,” and CitationHerman, “The Career of Cold War Psychology.”
[7] This has changed in recent years. See CitationLangley, Soldiers in the Laboratory .
[8] See CitationBuderi, The Invention that Changed the World , chapter 13.
[9] The best single account covering the late 1950s is CitationClark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship .
[10] Edge and Mulkay, Astronomy Transformed, 16–19.
[12] CitationAgar, Science and Spectacle , 34.
[13] Ibid., 35.
[14] CitationLovell, The Story of Jodrell Bank , 32–4. See also Edge and Mulkay, Astronomy Transformed, 58–9.
[15] Lovell, The Story of Jodrell Bank, 35.
[16] Nuffield Foundation's ‘biographer’, quoted in Agar, Science and Spectacle, 57.
[17] Lovell, The Story of Jodrell Bank, 36.
[18] Ibid., 51.
[19] Quoted in ibid., 54.
[20] Agar, Science and Spectacle, 64.
[21] Lovell, The Story of Jodrell Bank, 84.
[22] “Air Navigation Committee – Report and Recommendation,” National Archives, AVIA 54/1944. All files marked AVIA, AIR, CAB and DEFE are available in the UK National Archives at Kew.
[23] Letter from A. G. Pugsley, University of Bristol to E. T. Jones, Principal Director of Scientific Research (Air), Ministry of Supply, 5 March 1954. AVIA 54/1944.
[24] R. Cockburn, PDSR(G) to PDLRD, 22 March 1954. AVIA 54/1944.
[25] Ivor Bowen, PDQRD(A) to PDLRD, 3 May 1954. AVIA 54/1944.
[26] PDLRD to PDQP(A), 8 May 1954. AVIA 54/1944.
[27] Lovell, The Story of Jodrell Bank, 127.
[28] Quoted in Agar, Science and Spectacle, 80.
[29] See CitationCole, “British Technical Intelligence”; also Stocker, Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence.
[30] The Times, 7 October 1957, quoted in Agar, Science and Spectacle, 119.
[31] Agar, Science and Spectacle, 119.
[32] Quoted in ibid., 121.
[33] Quoted in ibid., 121.
[34] Quoted in ibid., 121.
[35] Ibid., 121–22.
[36] Ibid., 78
[37] Quoted in ibid., 123.
[38] Quoted in ibid., 123.
[39] Ibid., 74–76.
[40] A. C. B. Lovell, “Note on Jodrell Bank Telescope,” 22 October 1957, sent with letter from Sir Robert Renwick to Harold Macmillan, 22 October 1957. PREM 11/2484.
[41] Letter from Sir Robert Renwick to Harold Macmillan, 22 October 1957. PREM 11/2484.
[42] Lovell to Renwick, 12 November 1957. PREM 11/2484.
[43] Renwick to P. S. de Zuleueta, 14 November 1957. PREM 11/2484.
[44] H. W. Melville, Secretary of Department of Scientific and Industrial Research to Professor W. Mansfield Cooper, Vice-Chancellor, Manchester University, 29 January 1958. PREM 11/2484.
[45] Lovell, The Story of Jodrell Bank, 217–29 and 244.
[46] Ibid., 209–212.
[47] Ibid., 222.
[48] Mr Young, Ministry of Defence to Dr. J. C. Kendrew (Chairman of the new Scientific Advisory Panel on Intelligence), 31 July 1961. DEFE 7/1389.
[49] See CitationLovell, Out of the Zenith , 69–73.
[50] Mr Young, Ministry of Defence to Dr. J. C. Kendrew (Chairman of the new Scientific Advisory Panel on Intelligence), 31 July 1961. DEFE 7/1389.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] For a full account of the UK BMEWS development, see CitationSpinardi, “Golfballs on the Moor.”
[54] Peter Hudson, Air Ministry to E. G. Cass, Ministry of Defence, 24 February 1960. DEFE 7/1388.
[55] S. Zuckerman to Chief of the Defence Staff, 29 April 1960. DEFE 7/1389.
[56] Use of Jodrell Bank for research on this topic had been approved, but not carried out, before the launch of Sputnik. See “The Radar Detection of the Russian Earth Satellites and Carrier Rocket and its Bearing on the Missile Detection Problem” by A. C. B. Lovell, Advisory Council on Scientific Research and Technical Development, Ministry of Supply, 10 March 1958. WO 195/14270.
[57] “Possible Use of Jodrell Bank Radio Telescope in Emergency,” D. G. Morris, ACAS(AD), 29 September 1958. AIR 2/13380.
[58] Letter from E. V. Truefitt to Professor A. C. B. Lovell, Jodrell Bank Experimental Station, 20 June 1958. AIR 2/13380.
[59] A. C. B. Lovell to E. Truefitt, Air Ministry, 21 July 1958. AIR 2/13380.
[60] F. A. Cunnold, “Jodrell Bank Radio Telescope – Capability in the Detection of Ballistic Missiles and Aircraft,” Science 2 Memo No 287, Scientific Advisor to the Air Ministry, 11 August 1958. AIR 77/82.
[61] E. V. Truefitt to Professor A. C. B. Lovell, 16 October 1958. AIR 2/13380.
[62] Ibid.
[63] “Jodrell Bank,” E. C. Huddleston, VCAS to SAAM, 10 October 1960. AIR 2/13380.
[64] Ibid.
[65] “Jodrell Bank,” H. I. Roberts, Deputy Scientific Advisor to VCAS, 19 October 1960. AIR 20/11427.
[66] “Jodrell Bank,” letter from VCAS E. C. Hudleston, 7 November 1960. AIR 2/16074.
[67] “Proposal to Use Jodrell Bank in Emergency for Ballistic Missile Early Warning,” note from E. C. Huddleston, VCAS to the Secretary of State, 16 January 1961. AIR 20/11427.
[68] Letter from Secretary of State for Air to Minister of Defence, 30 January 1961. DEFE 7/1389.
[69] E. G. Cass to Mr Chilver, 3 February 1961. DEFE 7/1389.
[70] Some of this correspondence is in CAB 124/1777.
[71] Secretary of State for Air (JA) to Minister for Science, 21 March 1961. AIR 2/13380.
[72] HW, Minster of Defence to Secretary of State for Air, 8 May 1961. AIR 20/11427.
[73] “Jodrell Bank,” R. C. Kent, AUS(A) to VCAS, 11 May 1961. AIR 20/11427.
[74] “Jodrell Bank,” E. C. Huddleston, VCAS to Secretary of State, 30 May 1961. AIR 20/9982.
[75] R. C. Kent, AUS (A) to PS to S of S, 21 September 1961. AIR 20/11427.
[76] C. B. McGhee, PS to VCAS, 21 September 1961. AIR 20/11427. See also AIR 2/16217.
[77] “Project ‘Changlin’ – Post Design Services Radio Engineering Instruction No. 7034,” F. W. Jenkins for Director of Radio, 9 November 1962. AIR 2/16217.
[78] Air Vice-Marshal Sir Walter P. G. Pretty, Signals Command, RAF to Air Marshal Sir Wallace Kyle, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, 4 April 1962. AIR 20/11427.
[79] Appendix to letter from G. C. Godfrey, Headquarters Signal Command, RAF to C. M. Stewart, Director-General of Signals, Air Ministry, 4 April 1962. AIR 2/13381. Echo 1 was 100 ft in diameter.
[80] “Signals Command Servicing Directive No. 53 (Issue No 1) Servicing Policy – RAF Radio Installation – Jodrell Bank,” 14 November 1962. AIR 2/16217.
[81] C. Dunkerly, “Security – Royal Air Force Jodrell Bank,” Fighter Command to Under-Secretary of State, Air Military, AI(S)I, 31 August 1962. AIR 2/13381.
[82] “Minutes of a Meeting held at Air Ministry on 4 December 1961 to discuss Project ‘Verify’,” H. N. Kitchin, 7 December 1961. AIR 2/16070.
[83] J. F. Mayne, PS to PUS to AUS(A), 10 August 1962. AIR 2/13381.
[84] R. C. Kent, AUS(A) to PS to PUS, 16 August 1962. AIR 2/13381.
[85] Ibid.
[86] “Operation ‘Changlin’ – Regulations and Procedures,” Headquarters Fighter Command, 12 October 1962. AIR 2/16217.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Following a description of Project Verify he says: ‘When the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was resolved I had perhaps more reason than many to be thankful, but during those days particularly any idealism that the telescope had been built solely to study the remote regions of the universe vanished forever.’ CitationLovell, Astronomer by Chance , 322.
[90] AIR 20/12162 and DEFE 21/11 are still closed.
[91] “Record of a conversation between the Chief of the Air Staff, First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff held in the Ministry of Defence at 1430, Saturday, 27 October 1962.” DEFE 13/482. This notes that: ‘The Prime Minister had been adamant that he did not consider the time was appropriate for any overt preparatory steps to be taken such as mobilisation. Moreover, he did not wish Bomber Command to be alerted, although he wished the force to be ready to take the appropriate steps should this become necessary.’
[92] “Result of Project Changlin Training Sessions,” Research Branch Fighter Command, Memorandum No 182, December 1963. AIR 2/16217.
[93] Ibid.
[94] “Project Changlin,” letter from F. R. L. Mellersh, Deputy Director of Operations (Air Defence), Air Ministry to the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command, 27 March 1963. AIR 2/16217.
[95] “Jodrell Bank,” Draft minute from VCAS, September 1963. AIR 2/16217.
[96] Bernard Lovell to Maurice Dean, Air Ministry, 6 September 1963. AIR 2/16217.
[97] M. J. Dean to Sir Bernard Lovell, 29 October 1963. AIR 20/9982.
[98] Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy.
[99] Cole, “British Technical Intelligence.”
[100] See CitationTwigge, “Ground-Based Air Defence and ABM Systems”; Stocker, Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence, Citation 1942 –2002, chapter 4.
[101] See Spinardi, “Golfballs on the Moor.”
[102] These debates are documented in Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy, particularly chapters 7 and 8; also CitationWynn, RAF Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Forces .
[103] Ibid.
[104] Memo from Radio Introduction Unit, RAF to Ministry of Defence, DD Ops (GE), 3 July 1967. AIR 2/16070.