Un-Finnished Business: Archival Evidence Exposes the Diplomatic Aspect of the USSR's Pre-planning for the Six Day War

Abstract

Recently published Soviet Foreign Ministry documents provide the first archival corroboration for other evidence already presented by the authors, indicating that the USSR pre-planned and precipitated the outbreak of the 1967 Six Day War. In particular, a hitherto unknown cover letter for a protest note sent to Israel on the first day of the war shows that it was intended for delivery via Finland, after diplomatic relations with Israel were severed. As developments in the field obviated this move and the note was transmitted directly to Israel, the authors demonstrate that Moscow's purported response to Israel's pre-emptive attack was actually prepared in advance, as part of a larger political and military plan in the Cold War context.

Acknowledgements

A shorter version of this paper was presented by the authors at the Sixth Nordic Conference on Middle Eastern Studies, Copenhagen, 9 October 2004. Dr. Ginor, a fellow of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, thanks the Institute for a research grant on the Soviet military involvement in the Arab–Israeli conflict, which facilitated the research for and writing of this paper. The authors thank Dr. Stefan Meining of Munich for granting access to the Stasi version of L. Brezhnev's speech; Brook Lapping Productions for permission to quote from material relating to The 50 Years War: Israel and the Arabs, a six part television documentary made by Brian Lapping Associates, 1998; and the Trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London for granting of access to, and permission to quote from, interview transcripts from this material.

Notes

 [1] For a detailed and fully sourced critical discussion of this conventional approach and present-day Russian efforts to preserve it, see Ginor, “The Cold War's Longest Cover-up.” The following citations are examples from the leading studies in the field.

 [2] E.g., Parker, Politics, 4.

 [3] E.g., Oren, Six Days of War, 54.

 [4] E.g., Quandt, Peace Process, 26.

 [5] E.g., ‘There is adequate documentation to state that the Soviets did not want the war, nor did they think that their acts would cause one.’ Shamir, “The Origin of Escalation in May 1967,” 73. See also Shamir's presentation in Parker, The Six-Day War, 34.

 [6] E.g., Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, 60–61; Brecher with Geist, Decisions in Crisis, 12.

 [7] E.g., Parker, Politics, 12, 30, 32–3; Brecher with Geist, Decisions in Crisis, 283; Golan, Soviet Policies in the Middle East, 66.

 [8] Ginor, “The Cold War's Longest Cover-up”, “The Russians Were Coming.”

 [9] Der Rede von L.I. Breschnev auf dem Juniplenum des ZK der KpdSU, Uber die Politik der Sowjetunion im Zusammenhang mit der Agression Israels im Nahen Osten (The Speech of L.I. Brezhnev at the June Plenum of the CP of the USSR in Connection with the Israeli Aggression in the Middle East), 20 June 1967. SAPMO = NA ZPA IV 2/1/362. This document is quoted with the kind permission of Dr. Stefan Meining, Munich, who discovered it in the Stasi archives. A virtually identical Polish version, published and annotated by Uri Bar-Noi, is accessible at the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) website: http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id = 1409&fuseaction = topics.publications&doc_id = 35467&group_id = 13349.

[10] Department of State incoming telegram 19499, Ambassador in Paris (Bohlen) to Secretary of State, 31 May 1967, Secret. LBJ Library, Arab-Israeli Crisis, box 9. (Kindly provided by Michael Oren.)

[11] Parting from Badran on 28 May, Grechko confirmed: ‘Our fleet is in the Mediterranean, near your shores. We have destroyers and submarines with missiles and arms unknown to you. Do you understand fully what I mean? … I want to confirm to you that if something happens and you need us, just send us a signal. We will come to your aid immediately.’ Parker, Politics, 31–2, citing Heikal, 1967 – al-Infijar, p.625, quoting minutes of this talk and stating that it includes a ‘barely legible photocopy in the appendix’. The document is signed by Badran and apparently translated by Parker, emphasis added. For a full discussion of Badran's talks in Moscow and the letter to Nasser, see Ginor, “The Cold War's Longest Cover-up.”

[12] Department of State incoming telegram 027005, US Mission UN to Secretary of State, confidential, 25 May 1967. Cf. ‘It almost seemed as though the Soviet Union had been aware in advance of the coming Near Eastern crisis’ – State Department official Raymond Garthoff on 26 May, in Department of State Memorandum of conversation G/PM:RLGarthoff:pep:5-29-67, confidential. LBJ Library, Pol-Arab-Israel. (Kindly provided by Michael Oren.)

[13] For the Egyptian ‘Conqueror’ plan, see Oren, Six Days of War, 65; for the Syrian ‘Victor’ plan, including documents in Russian, see Hame'iri, Mishnei Evrei Haramah.

[14] Ben-Tzur, Gormim Sovietiim, 157–73.

[15] Hame'iri, Mishnei Evrei Haramah, 58.

[16] Cherkashin, Povsednevnaya zhizn' rossiyskikh podvodnikov, 173–8, quoting the commander of Soviet nuclear submarine K-172, (later) Vice-admiral Nikolai Shashkov. There are similar accounts from three such submarines.

[17] Interview with Captain Yuri Khripunkov; Ginor, “The Russians Were Coming”; Khaldeev, “Nesostoyavshiisya Desant.”

[18] Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), 22 June 1967: 1; Benn, “The First Nuclear War,” partial English text in Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 257, 410 n. 3.

[19] Vasili Reshetnikov, transcript of interview for The 50 Years War: Israel and the Arabs, a six part television documentary made by Brian Lapping Associates, 1998; and the Trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London, 7, 9. Reshetnikov retired as Colonel-General and Hero of the Soviet Union. For a full discussion of Soviet air force activity during the crisis and war, See Ginor, “The Russians Were Coming” and “The Cold War's Longest Cover-up.”

[20] Evgeny Pyrlin, 50 Years War, transcript, 1, 4.

[21] Fyodorov, “Neizvestnaya voyna ‘yegiptyanina’ Shevchenko.”

[22] ‘In vain would historians later search for documents and minutes from the so-called Politburo files, as keys to turning points in Soviet policy. To no avail. There are none such.’ Grinevsky, 1001 den' Nikity Sergeyevicha, 162–3. See also Troyanovski, Cherez gody I rasstoyaniya, 236, giving the example of the undocumented decision to erect the Berlin wall.

[23] Naumkin et al., Blizhnevostochnyy konflikt, vol. II: 577–8, doc. #263.

[24] Zak, 40 shnot du-si'ah im Moskva, 334; Gilbo'a, Shesh shanim, shisha yamim, 210–11; Dagan, Moscow and Jerusalem, 227–9.

[25] Naumkin et al., Blizhnevostochnyy konflikt.

[26] Naumkin et al., Blizhnevostochnyy konflikt

[27] Max Jakobson, Helsinki: personal communication to the authors, 17 March 2004.

[28] The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961, article 45, states:

If diplomatic relations are broken off between two States, or if a mission is permanently or temporarily recalled:

1. the receiving State must, even in case of armed conflict, respect and protect the premises of the mission, together with its property and archives;

2. the sending State may entrust the custody of the premises of the mission, together with its property and archives, to a third State acceptable to the receiving State;

3. the sending State may entrust the protection of its interests and those of its nationals to a third State acceptable to the receiving State.

United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) Nos. 7310–12, vol. 500: 95–239; http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multilaterals.html.

[29] Muistiinpano (Finnish: memorandum) from M. Salomies, Foreign Ministry, Helsinki, to the President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and others, 11 June 1967. Obtained courtesy of the Finnish Embassy, Tel Aviv, 14 April 2004. The writers wish to thank Mr. Semy Kahan for the translation of this and other Finnish-language documents. The original letter from the Finnish Embassy to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, requesting the Ministry's consent for Finland's appointment as the USSR's protecting power, dated 11 June, is in the Ministry's archives. Israel State Archive, division HZ, box 4048, file 27. It was delivered on 12 June, as recorded by the receiving official; box 4083, file 2.

[30] Naumkin et al., Blizhnevostochnyy konflikt, vol. II: 587, doc. #269.

[31] Israel Foreign Ministry, memorandum to the Minister from Arieh Ilan, Director of East European Division, 13 June 1967. Israel State Archive. (Kindly provided by Michael Oren.)

[32] Finland, in view of its special relationship with the USSR, was indeed extraordinarily prompt in delivering the note at any time on the same day. The Netherlands, which undertook the parallel role representing Israel toward the USSR, took four days (16 to 20 June) to transmit the first Israeli note to Moscow. Dagan, Moscow and Jerusalem, 239.

[33] Naumkin et al., Blizhnevostochnyy konflikt, vol. II: 579, doc. #265, n. 1. The present authors' hypothesis is that the supposed transmission of the 7 June note through Finland was inferred by the editors of the Russian volume from the cover letter of the previous note (of 5 June) rather than from any independent evidence.

[34] Katz, “Yamim aharonim be-Moskva.”

[35] Oren, Six Days of War, 252.

[36] Pyrlin, Trudny I dolgiy put' k miru, 67.

[37] Naumkin et al., Blizhnevostochnyy konflikt, vol. II: 580–81, doc. #267.

[38] Gilbo'a, Shesh shanim, shisha yamim, 244.

[39] Naumkin et al., Blizhnevostochnyy konflikt, vol. I: 183, doc. #112, n. 1.

[40] For more on the motivation for Romania's move, see below.

[41] Naumkin et al., Blizhnevostochnyy konflikt, vol. II: 560, doc. #252 (emphasis added).

[42] See Ginor, “The Cold War's Longest Cover-up.”

[43] Naumkin et al., Blizhnevostochnyy konflikt, vol. II: 577, doc. #263. Dagan gives an obviously erroneous and grammatically incorrect English translation of this phrase, influenced apparently by hindsight: ‘the treacherous aggression by Israel against the neighboring Arab States, the United Arab Republic’. Dagan, Moscow and Jerusalem, 227 (emphasis added).

[44] Message from Premier Kosygin to President Johnson, 5 June 1967, 7:47 a.m. (EDT, that is, 3:47 p.m. in Moscow). FRUS, doc. #156, p. 300. These and other details of the Soviet hotline messages were checked by the writers against the Russian-language originals in Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington–Moscow “Hot-Line” exchange 6/5-10/67.

[45] Popov, Tridtsat' sem' let na Blizhnem Vostoke, 105.

[46] Department of State incoming telegram 004387, Amman 4056, 5 June 1967, received at 5:28 a.m. Washington time.

[47] Naumkin et al., Blizhnevostochnyy konflikt, vol. II: 583, doc. #268 (emphases added).

[48] Der Rede von L. I. Breschnev.

[49] Naumkin et al., Blizhnevostochnyy konflikt, vol. II: 578, doc. #264, n. 1.

[50] Vasiliev, Rossiya na Blizhnem i Srednem Vostoke, 80.

[51] Intelligence note #436 to the Secretary from the Director of Intelligence and Research of the State Department, 5 June 1967; Katz, “Yamim aharonim be-Moskva,” gives a similar description of Soviet broadcasts on that day.

[52] Rede von L. I. Breschnev.

[53] Vasyukov, “The Navy” (emphasis added).

[54] Laqueur, The Road to War, 65.

[55] Jakobson, personal communication.

[56] Garthoff, A Journey through the Cold War, 149–51.

[57] In addition to the aforementioned testimony of Gen. Reshetnikov, an officer of the Soviet Navy then in the Mediterranean writes: “On June 4 we were given an order to bring the ship to full battle alert, for which we were given 12 hours.” Kapitanets, Na sluzhbe okeanskomu flotu, 175.

[58] “In the ’60's foreign intelligence received information about Israel's preparations for new aggression against Arab countries, including the date for it to attack Egypt and Syria in 1967. This intelligence was passed on to the leaderships of Arab countries, who, however, undervalued it and overvalued the military potential of their countries.” Available at http://svr.gov.ru/history/stage09.htm (Russian), n.d. The mention of an expected Israeli attack on Egypt as well as Syria indicates that this refers not only to the Soviet warning about Israeli ‘troop concentrations of the Syrian border’ in mid-May 1967.

[59] Gluska, Eshkol, ten pekuda!, 366. Gluska writes that this was in effect a postponement of the attack until 5 June. He bases this on testimony of Gen. Yona Efrat, a participant in the 2 June consultation.

[60] , “Na Zemle Obetovannoy,” 229; in a previous article, Dedyulya states that ‘N’ was given the specific task to report the timing of an Israeli offensive. Dedyulya, “Nash chelovek v Tel'-Avive.” ‘N’ is not an initial, but the Russian equivalent of ‘X’.

[61] Haimovich, “Meragel ba-Memshala?”

[62] Department of State incoming telegram 004387, Amman 4056, 5 June 1967, received at 5:28 a.m. Washington time. For the Soviet evaluation of the military balance between Israel and Egypt, see Ginor, “The Cold War's Longest Cover-up.”

[63] Pyrlin, 50 Years War, transcript, 6.

[64] Schwartz, Sovetskii Soyuz i arabo-izrail'skaya voyna 1967 goda, 110.

[65] Pyrlin, Trudny I dolgiy put' k miru, 64–5.

[66] Intelligence note #436 (see note 51).

[67] Oren, Six Days of War, 251

[68] Former Soviet Attache in Cairo Sergei Tarasenko, Novoe Vremya (New Times), (Russian), Moscow, 1997, #21, 32–3, cited in Zolotaryov et al., Rossiya (SSSR), 183

[69] “Forty Years on, Official Translator Looks Back on Russia-US Hotline” (Russian), Vremya, Moscow Channel One TV, 1700 GMT 6 June 2003.

[70] Naumkin et al., Blizhnevostochnyy konflikt, vol. II: 579, doc. #265, n. 1: ‘To Com. Semyonov, V.S. Request approval. 7/VI. Shchiborin, A.D.’ ‘Confirmed. V. Semyonov.’

[71] Parker, Politics, 23.

[72] Katz, Budapest, Varsha, Moskva, 159–60; Zak, 40 shnot du-si'ah im Moskva, 338–9.

[73] Akopov, 50 Years War, 16. For similar characterizations of Gromyko, see also Israelyan, On the Battlefields of the Cold War, 71–2; Mlechin, MID, 355–7.

[74] Kapitanets, Na sluzhbe okeanskomu flotu, 174.

[75] Bovin, XX vek kak zhizn', 160.

[76] Viktor Sukhodrev, interview for Israel-Plus TV Channel documentary, Moscow July 2002, recording in authors' archive; “Forty Years on, Official Translator Looks Back on Russia-US Hotline,” Moscow Channel One TV in Russian, 1700 GMT 6 June 2003. Translation quoted in Russian Military and Security Media Coverage (RMSMC) #2312 [13 June 2003]. Available at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RMSMC/message/2337. A memoir by one of the hotline operators also indicates that Kosygin made a prior visit to the new communications centre to ensure it was in working order, adding: ‘It is possible that any day now, this channel might be needed for an important government message.’ Turoverova, “Moi nezhnyi angel…”

[77] Sukhodrev, interview, “Forty Years on.”