The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality

Abstract

On 1 November 1956 the Hungarian government denounced the Warsaw Pact and unilaterally declared the country's neutrality. At the same time Imre Nagy, the Communist Prime Minister, turned to the United Nations and requested that the four Great Powers help defend Hungary's neutrality. This was an unprecedented act in the whole history of the Soviet bloc, and therefore many students of the Hungarian revolution came to the conclusion that the denouncement of the Warsaw Pact and the declaration of neutrality were inconsiderate and hasty steps that challenged the second Soviet intervention on 4 November. This paper argues that in reality this step was not the cause but the consequence of the forthcoming Soviet showdown; therefore it can be considered a desperate last-ditch effort at saving the revolution, although with no chance to be successful. The paper will also analyze the main challenges facing the Hungarian and Soviet leaderships during the revolt as well as the process of handling the Hungarian crisis and the issue of neutrality by the Western Great Powers during their behind the scenes talks at the United Nations, using Soviet, Hungarian, American, British and French archival sources.

Acknowledgements

Research for this article was supported by the OSZK–MTA 1956-os Dokumentációs és Kutatóhely (Research Group for the History and Documentation of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, National Széchényi Library and Hungarian Academy of Sciences). An earlier, shorter version of this paper was published under the title ‘A magyar semlegesség 1956-ban’ (‘The Neutrality of Hungary in 1956’) in Semlegesség – Illúziók és realitás (Neutrality – Illusions and Reality), (Budapest: Biztonságpolitikai és Honvédelmi Kutatások Központja, 1997).

Notes

 [1] Juhász Gyula, A Teleki-kormány külpolitikája. 1939–1941 (The Foreign Policy of the Teleki Cabinet. 1939–1941). Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1964; see also Juhász Gyula, Magyarország külpolitikája: 1919–1945 (The Foreign Policy of Hungary: 1919–1945).Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1988, Chapter 4.

 [2] On the fumbling for peace by the Kállay cabinet see Juhász Gyula, ed., Magyar–brit titkos tárgyalások 1943-ban (Hungarian–British Secret Talks in 1943). Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1978, and Juhász Gyula, Magyarország külpolitikája 1919–1945, 285–386.

 [3] For a recent collection of essays on the Sovietization of the countries in the region see Stefan Creuzberger and Manfred Görtemaker, Hrsg., Gleichschaltung unter Stalin? Die Entwicklung der Parteien in östlichen Europa, 1944–1949. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöning, 2002.

 [4] Békés Csaba, Európából Európába. Magyarország konfliktusok kereszttüzében, 1945–1990 (From Europe to Europe. Hungary in the Crossfire of Conflicts, 1945–1990). Budapest: Gondolat, 2004, 49.

 [5] On the foreign policy of the Smallholder's party see Vida István, A Független Kisgazdapárt politikája 1944–1947 (The Policy of the Independent Smallholder's Party, 1944–1947). Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1976, Chapter 2; Ferenc Nagy, The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain. New York: Macmillan, 1948, Chapter 3. On the foreign policy of the Communist Party see Békés Csaba, Európából Európába, 37–52.

 [6] On US policy towards Eastern Europe in the 1950s see the following: Benett Kovrig, The Myth of Liberation. East Central Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics since 1941. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973; Bennett Kovrig, Of Walls and Bridges: The United States and Eastern Europe. New York: New York University Press, 1991; David James Marchio, Rhetoric and Reality: The Eisenhower Administration and Unrest in Eastern Europe, 1953–1959. Ann Arbor, MI:University Microfilms International, 1992; Csaba Békés, “The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics.” Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, September 1996. “Working Paper No. 16.” Available from http://cwihp.si.edu; INTERNET. László Borhi, “Rollback, Liberation, Containment or Inaction? U.S. Policy and Eastern Europe in the 1950s.” Journal of Cold War Studies 1 (1999): 67–110, published also in László Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War, 1945–1956. Between the United States and the Soviet Union. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2004, Chapter 6.

 [7] On the Geneva summit see Günter Bischof and Saki Dockrill, eds, The Geneva Summit of 1955. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000.

 [8] Csaba Békés, “Cold War, Détente and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.” In The Cold War After Stalin's Death: A New International History, edited by Kenneth Osgood and Klaus Larres. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.

 [9] Interview conducted by the author with Miklós Vásárhelyi on 2 December 1996.

[10] On Austria's role see Günter Bishof, Austria in the First Cold War. The Leverage of the Weak 1945–1955. London: Macmillan, 1999. On Austrian neutrality during the Hungarian revolution see Catherine C. Nielsen, “Neutrality vs. Neutralism: Austrian Neutrality and the 1956 Hungarian Crisis.” In Die Ungarnkrise 1956 und Österreich, edited by Erwin A. Schmidl. Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2003, 215–34. For a recent study on the impact of Austrian neutrality on Hungarian society and politics see Bianca L. Adair, “The Austrian State Treaty and Austro-Hungarian Relations 1955–56,” in ibid., 201–13.

[11] The Five Basic Principles of International Relations and our Foreign Policy.” In Imre Nagy, On Communism. In Defence of the New Course. London: Thames and Hudson, 1957. The study was written as a result of talks and discussion with Miklós Gimes and Miklós Vásárhelyi. While Nagy sent many of his writings to the party center for consideration in 1955–56, this paper was not one of them. Interview conducted by the author with Miklós Vásárhelyi on 2 December 1996.

[12] For the international context of the revolution see Csaba Békés, “The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics.”

[13] Magyar Honvéd, 31 October 1956.

[14] Magyar Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archives) (hereafter MOL) XX-5-h, “The Trial of Imre Nagy and his Associates.” Investigations reports, vol. I/1, Imre Nagy's interrogation, 2 July 1957, 117–18.

[15] For the English text of the Soviet government declaration see Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne and Janos M. Rainer, eds, The 1956 Hungarian Revolution. A History in Documents. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2002, 300–2.

[16] For the full text of the English translation of the Malin notes on the debates in the CPSU Presidium see the “Malin notes” on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956, translated and annotated by Mark Kramer, CWIHP Bulletin 8–9 (Winter 1996–Spring 1997): 385–410.

[17] Békés et al., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 295–99.

[18] This position has been taken most firmly by Mark Kramer, “New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises.” CWIHP Bulletin 8–9 (Winter 1996–Spring 1997): 358–85. An essentially similar position is held by Vlad Zubok, who writes, “We can be sure that if the power setup around Khrushchev had developed differently and if a leader less given to violence than he had headed the Kremlin, Soviet tanks would not have rolled into Budapest and the history of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, would have developed otherwise.” Vladislav M. Zubok, “Hatalmi harc a Kremlben és a magyar válság” (Power Struggle in the Kremlin and the Hungarian Crisis). In Évkönyv 1996–7 (Yearbook, 1996–7). Budapest: os Intézet, 1997, 65.

[19] The “Malin notes” on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956, 392.

[20] Ibid., 394.

[21] For a detailed elaboration of this interpretation see Csaba Békés, “Cold War, Détente and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.” Working Paper No. 7, Project on the Cold War as Global Conflict, International Center for Advanced Studies, New York University, 2002.

[22] Magyar Nemzet, 1 November 1956.

[23] Békés et al., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 307–10.

[24] Az igazság a Nagy Imre ügyben (The Truth in Imre Nagy's Case). Budapest: A Századvég Kiadó–Nyilvánosság Klub, 1989, 86–87.

[25] Important new evidence concerning Imre Nagy's position can be found in the report presented by János Kádár on 2 November 1956 at the meeting of the CPSU Presidium. According to it right before the decision was made on the declaration of neutrality, Nagy ‘was convinced that a strike against Budapest is being prepared’. Equally telling is Kádár's report about the other members of the cabinet: ‘The whole cabinet, other than Kádár declared that the Sov. gov't is deceiving the Hungarian gov't’. Békés et al., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 338.

[26] The official minutes of the meeting published first in 1989 did not contain point 12 including the quote cited above. See Glatz Ferenc, ed., “A kormány és a párt vezető szerveinek dokumentumaiból 1956. október 23–november 4” (From the Documents of the Government and the Leading Bodies of the Party, 23 October–4 November 1956). História 11 (1989): 4–5. Thus up to the late 1990s we had only indirect evidence that there was a discussion of the issue at the morning session of the cabinet on 1 November, and a political decision was made on the declaration of neutrality. However, the present author discovered a one page minutes fragment in the documents of the Imre Nagy trial to be found in Géza Losonczy's contemporary records which basically corresponds to the text of the second part of point 11 of the official minutes, but it also contains a point 12 on the issue of neutrality: ‘For the sake of both putting an end to the armed fighting and ensuring the full and final independence of the country the Cabinet discussed the question of neutrality. The cabinet unanimously agreed with the position that the government should declare the country's neutrality. For the time being (the Cabinet) refrains from deciding which form of neutrality should be chosen (Switzerland, Austria or Yugoslavia). This very day, Géza Losonczy will prepare a draft communiqué for public announcement, together with a simultaneous information note for the diplomatic corps, a draft telegram to the General Secretary of the UN, and finally an announcement for the press and radio’. MOL, XX-5-h, “The Trial of Imre Nagy and his Associates.” Investigations reports, vol. 12, Géza Losonczy's records. For the English text of the minutes see Békés et al., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 321–23.

[27] Ibid., 322.

[28] Az igazság a Nagy Imre ügyben, 87–88. According János Kádár's report presented in Moscow on 2 November Andropov first sated that ‘these are railroad workers’; later he said it was merely a redeployment of troops, then he explained the surrounding of airports by saying that they were transporting the injured. Békés et al., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 338.

[29] Andropov's report on the cabinet meeting is published in English in ibid., 330–31.

[30] For the text of the declaration of neutrality see ibid., 334.

[31] MOL XX-5-h, “The Trial of Imre Nagy and his Associates.” Investigations records, vol. I/1, Imre Nagy's interrogation, 1 July 1957, 172.

[32] The telegram is published by: Békés et al., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 333.

[33] On the debates on Hungary in the UN see the last chapter.

[34] The Hungarian version of the telegram, including the omitted paragraph is published by Kiss József-Ripp and Zoltán-Vida István, eds, “Források a Nagy Imre-kormány külpolitikájának történetéhez” (Sources on the History of the Foreign Policy of the Imre Nagy Cabinet). Társadalmi Szemle 48 (1993): 86.

[35] MOL, XX-5-h, “The Trial of Imre Nagy and his Associates.” Investigations records, vol. III, records of the hearing of witness Pál Felix on 3 July 1957, 263.

[36] Andropov's report on the meeting is published by Gál Éva, HegedŰs B. András, Litván György and Rainer M. János, eds, A “Jelcin dosszié.” Szovjet dokumentumok 1956-ról (“The Yeltsin files.” Soviet Documents on 1956). Budapest: Századvég Kiadó-1956-os Intézet, 1993, 81.

[37] Nagy's telegram of 2 November is published by Békés et al., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 346.

[38] János Szabó, assistant secretary of the Hungarian UN delegation, was put in charge of leading the Hungarian mission on 29 October, to replace Péter Kós, who was relieved.

[39] Order issued by Prime Minister Imre Nagy to János Szabó, acting Hungarian UN representative on 3 November 1956, MOL XIX-J-1-j, Foreign Ministry, documents of the ministry secretariat, box no. 66. The telegram is published in English by Békés et al., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 362.

[40] Statement by János Szabó at the Security Council meeting on 3 November 1956, MOL XIX-J-1-j, Foreign Ministry, documents of the ministry secretariat, box no. 66. Szabó similarly sabotaged an instruction from the foreign ministry on 2 November – which was probably not discussed with Imre Nagy – to request in writing that the issue of Hungarian neutrality be put on the agenda of the special General Assembly convened to discuss the Suez crisis. He reported that he had not had a chance to deliver the speech received from Budapest for, following a previous order, he did not take the floor in the Middle East debate. Ibid.

[41] On the reaction of the Polish leadership to the Hungarian revolution see János Tischler, ed., Az 1956-os magyar forradalom lengyel dokumentumai (Polish Documents on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution). Budapest: 1956-os Intézet–Windsor Kiadó, 1996.

[42] Békés et al., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 299.

[43] For a recent study on China's role see Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2001, 145–62.

[44] On the role of Yugoslavia see Zoltán Ripp, Belgrád és Moszkva között A jugoszláv kapcsolat és a Nagy Imre-kérdés (1956 november–1959 február) (Between Belgrade and Moscow: The Yugoslavian Connection and the Imre Nagy Issue (November 1956–February 1959)). Politikatörténeti Alapítvány, 1994; Kiss József, Ripp Zoltán and Vida István, szerk., Top Secret. Magyar–jugoszláv kapcsolatok 1956–1959. Dokumentumok (Top Secret. Hungarian–Yugoslavian Relations, 1956–1959. Documents), vol. 1. Budapest: MTA Jelenkorkutató Bizottsága, 1995; Leonid Gibianskii, "Soviet–Yugoslav Relations and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.” CWIHP Bulletin 10 (March 1998): 139–48.

[45] NSC 5608 stated that under the given political circumstances the United States had very limited possibility to facilitate the break-away of the East–Central European countries from the Soviet Union; therefore, the government should make efforts to assist the national Communist forces to rise into power as an intermediary step on the road to complete independence. The unsanitized text of the document is published by Békés et al., The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 119–28.

[46] On the reconciliatory talks of the highest level preceding the speech of the secretary of sate in Dallas, and on further proposals put forward by Harold E. Stassen, see Csaba Békés, “Demokratikus eszmék és nagyhatalmi érdekek. Egy megvalósulatlan amerikai javaslat az 1956-os magyar forradalom megsegítésére” (Democratic Ideas and Great Power Interest. An Unrealized American Plan to Support the Hungarian Revolution in 1956). Holmi 10 (1993), 1402–8.

[47] On Dulles see Richard H. Immerman, ed., John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.

[48] Records of a telephone conversation between Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles, 26 October 1956, Eisenhower Library, Abeline, Kansas, Dulles Papers, Memoranda of Telephone Conversation Series.

[49] Records of a talk between Harold E. Stassen and John Foster Dulles, 26 October 1956. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, vol. XXV (henceforth FRUS 1955–1957 vol. XXV). Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990, 305.

[50] Records of a talk between Eisenhower and Edward T. Wailes, US minister to Budapest, 30 October 1956, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, D. D: Eisenhower Diaries Series.

[51] This statement on negative information is based on the author's extensive research in the Eisenhower Library.

[52] FRUS 1955–1957 vol. XXV, 357.

[53] Documents diplomatique français 1956, Tome III (24 octobre–31 decembre). Paris: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, 1990, 91; Telegram no. 1459 of the Foreign Office to the New York UN Mission of the United Kingdom, 1 November 1956. The document is published in Csaba Békés, “A magyar kérdés az ENSZ-ben és a nyugati nagyhatalmak titkos tárgyalásai 1956. október 28–november 4 (Brit külügyi dokumentumok)” (The Hungarian Issue in the UN and the Secret Negotiations of the Three Western Great Powers – British Diplomatic Records). In Évkönyv II. 1993. Budapest: 1956-os Intézet (Yearbook, 1993, 1956 Institute), 58. On the conflict of interests between the Western Great Powers on the Hungarian issue see more in: Csaba Békés, “A brit kormány és az 1956-os magyar forradalom” (The British Government and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution). In Évkönyv, 1992. Budapest: 1956-os Intézet (Yearbook, 1992, 1956 Institute). Budapest: 1992, 19–38.

[54] Telegrams nos 474 and 476 sent by Henry Cabot Lodge, American UN representative to the State Department, 3 November 1956, National Archives, Washington, DC, Department of State, Central Decimal Files, 764.00/11-356. Leslie Fry, British minister to Budapest, who explicitly sympathized with the goals of the Hungarian revolution, told the Hungarian foreign ministry on 2 November – though he was not authorized to do so by London – that the British government would endorse putting the Hungarian issue of neutrality promptly on the agenda in UN. The minister believed that in case the Soviet Union vetoed the issue in the Security Council, ‘the Hungarian issue would be passed on to the General Assembly’. Finally Fry – in a manner quite unusual in diplomacy – promised that he would later pass on the instructions sent to the British UN delegate from London which he himself also received in copies. MOL XIX J-1-j, Foreign Ministry, box 66. Records made by János Forián, 2 November 1956. Published in “Források a Nagy Imre-kormány külpolitikájának történetéhez,” 91.

[55] FRUS 1955–1957 vol. XXV, 372. The same policy is manifested by the fact that when mentioning briefly the neutrality declaration of the Hungarian government at the special session of the UN General Assembly on the Middles East crisis on 1 November Secretary of State John Foster Dulles deemed it important to emphasize that the Hungarian situation should continue to be a matter to be considered and dealt with in the Security Council, implying that it should by no means be transferred to the General Assembly.

[56] United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, First and Second Emergency Special Sessions, 1–10 November 1956. Plenary Meetings and Annexes, New York, 1956. Minutes of the plenary meeting on 4 November 1956, A/3286.

[57] FRUS 1955–1957 vol. XXV, 322.