Ally or Critic? The United States' Response to South African Nuclear Development, 1949–1980

Abstract

This article analyzes the role of the United States in and reaction to South African nuclear development from its inception in 1949 to the end of the Carter Administration, within the framework of the Cold War objectives of the United States and the anti-communism of the South African Apartheid Government. As early as 1965, South Africa hinted at developing nuclear weapons; yet the response from the United States remained placid and nuclear cooperation between the two countries continued. Thus, when the Ford Administration at the end of 1976 took the first step in the direction of limiting United States' nuclear cooperation with South Africa, it was already too late to stem South Africa's build-up of a nuclear arsenal.

Notes

  [1] Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 369–70.

  [2] Keller, “South Africa Says it Built 6 Atom Bombs,” A1.

  [3] Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” 37–48; Albright, “South Africa Comes Clean,” 3–6.

  [4] Van Wyk, “The 1977 United States Arms Embargo against South Africa.”

  [5] Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 20.

  [6] Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 20; Chicago Daily Tribune, 30 June 1948.

  [7] Bissell, South Africa and the United States, 8; Prinsloo, United States Foreign Policy, 46; Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa, 191–2; SCUSPTSA, South Africa: Time Running Out, 344.

  [8] SCUSPTSA, South Africa: Time Running Out, 347; Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa, 195–6; Prinsloo, United States Foreign Policy, 47.

  [9] National Security Archives, Washington DC (hereafter NSA), Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Scientific Intelligence (hereafter CIAOSI), Scientific Intelligence Research Aid, Volume IV: Asia and Africa, “Nuclear Activities of Foreign Nations,” 30 September 1956; Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 243; NSA, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Science and Technology (hereafter CIADST), Scientific and Technical Intelligence Report, “Atomic Energy Activities in the Republic of South Africa,” March 1971.

 [10] Christian Science Monitor, 9 June 1949, 6.

 [11] Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 243; South African Foreign Affairs Archives, Pretoria (hereafter SAFAA), Nuclear Energy, Top Secret, 1 January 1981–6 May 1981, Memorandum, “South African–United States’ Nuclear Relations,” 20 March 1981.

 [12] NSA, CIAOSI, Scientific Intelligence Research Aid, Volume IV: Asia and Africa, “Nuclear Activities of Foreign Nations,” 30 September 1956; Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 243; NSA, CIADST, Scientific and Technical Intelligence Report, “Atomic Energy Activities in the Republic of South Africa,” March 1971.

 [13] SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, Top Secret, 1 January 1981–6 May 1981, Memorandum, “South African–United States’ Nuclear Relations,” 20 March 1981; NSA, CIAOSI, Scientific Intelligence Research Aid, Volume IV: Asia and Africa, “Nuclear Activities of Foreign Nations,” 30 September 1956.

 [14] Christian Science Monitor, 15 February 1952, 10; Wall Street Journal, 2 April 1952, 6; NSA, CIAOSI, Volume IV: Asia and Africa, Scientific Intelligence Research Aid, “Nuclear Activities of Foreign Nations,” 30 September 1956.

 [15] Loftus, “6 Nations Forming Atom Power Pool,” 1.

 [16] Loftus, “6 Nations Forming Atom Power Pool,” 1, 1; Prinsloo, United States Foreign Policy, 61; SCUSPTSA, South Africa: Time Running Out, 347; Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa, 195–6; Walters, South Africa and the Bomb, 88–9.

 [17] NSA, CIAOSI, Volume IV: Asia and Africa, Scientific Intelligence Research Aid, “Nuclear Activities of Foreign Nations,” 30 September 1956; Richelson, Spying on the Bomb.

 [18] Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 124–5.

 [19] A Zulu word meaning ‘we don't talk about this anymore’.

 [20] The Christian Science Monitor, 21 December 1961, 11.

 [21] Lelyveld, “Reactor started in South Africa”, 7; Prinsloo, United States Foreign Policy, 61–2; Walters, South Africa and the Bomb, 89–90; Purkitt and Burgess, South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction, 36; NSA, CIADST, Scientific and Technical Intelligence Report, “Atomic Energy Activities in the Republic of South Africa,” March 1971.

 [22] Van Wyk, “The 1963 United States Arms Embargo,” 34, 135.

 [23] After the Sharpeville incident, Pretoria directed its defence expenditure mainly to the suppression of internal unrest and the curbing of potential insurgency movements. This led to an international outcry, especially by the newly independent African states, which had found a voice through the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was formed in 1963. The Kennedy administration thus came to a crossroads: on the one hand it had to decide on action against South Africa if it wanted to preserve its influence with the newly independent African states. On the other hand, Kennedy still feared losing the long-standing strategic importance and anti-communistic support of South Africa. The answer was a compromise decision, i.e. the institution of a voluntary arms embargo against South Africa (Van Wyk, “The 1963 United States arms embargo against South Africa,” 20–23; McWilliams, Armscor, 10–11, 13).

 [24] Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 243.

 [25] Walters, South Africa and the Bomb, 90; NSA, CIADST, Scientific and Technical Intelligence Report, “Atomic Energy Activities in the Republic of South Africa,” March 1971; Prinsloo, United States Foreign Policy, 62.

 [26] De Onis, “Nuclear Treaty Endorsed in U.N.,” 1, 2.

 [27] Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 277.

 [28] Rich, “United States Containment Policy,” 183–4; SCUSPTSA, South Africa: Time Running Out, 350–52.

 [29] Rich, “United States Containment Policy,” 184.

 [30] Rich, “United States Containment Policy”, 183–4; SCUSPTSA, South Africa: Time Running Out, 350–52.

 [31] The US decision to fulfil this request was done in secret, in an effort to avoid publicity and further deterioration of a politically sensitive situation in the Congo, another vital source of uranium for the US (Walters, South Africa and the Bomb, 90).

 [32] Los Angeles Times, 14 April 1975, 2.

 [33] NSA, CIAOSI, Weekly Surveyor, “South Africa seeks Uranium Hexafluoride Technology,” 4 March 1970; NSA, CIAOSI, Scientific and Technical Intelligence Report, “Atomic Energy Activities in the Republic of South Africa,” March 1971.

 [34] NSA, CIAOSI, Weekly Surveyor, “South Africa Release Further Information on their Isotope Separation Process,” 12 October 1970.

 [35] A Zulu word meaning ‘We don't talk about this at all’.

 [36] New York Times, 19 August 1970, A4.

 [37] NSA, CIADST, Scientific and Technical Intelligence Report, “Atomic Energy Activities in the Republic of South Africa,” March 1971.

 [38] Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 244; Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” 41; Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” 56; Albright, “South Africa Comes Clean,” 3–6.

 [39] In addition to General Electric, Pretoria also invited Canadian, British, West German and French firms to bid on the project; US National Archives, College Park, MD, Nixon Presidential Materials (hereafter NPM), National Security Council (hereafter NSC), Country Files – Africa (hereafter CFA), Box 744, South Africa, Jan. 1972, Vol. II [Jan ‘72–May ‘74], Memorandum, Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. to Henry Kissinger re “General Electric's Request to ExIm for Nuclear Power Reactors Sale to South Africa,” 10 January 1972.

 [40] NPM, NSC, CFA, Box 744, South Africa 1969–1971, Vol. I (1 of 2), Memorandum, Michael A. Guhin to Dr. Kissinger re “Proposed Nuclear Fuel Agreement with South Africa,” 19 November 1971.

 [41] Nye, “U.S. Nuclear Exports to South Africa”, 240; SCUSPTSA, South Africa: Time Running Out, 361.

 [42] NPM, NSC, CFA, Box 744, South Africa, Jan. 1972, Vol. II [Jan. ‘72–May ‘74], Telegram, US Embassy Pretoria to Secretary of State re “South African Nuclear Enrichment Project: Dr. Teller's on Possible Cooperation,” 31 October 1973.

 [43] NPM, NSC, CFA, Box 744, South Africa, Jan. 1972, Vol. II [Jan. ‘72–May ‘74], Telegram, US Embassy Pretoria to Secretary of State re “South African Nuclear Enrichment Project: Dr. Teller's on Possible Cooperation,” 31 October 1973

 [44] NPM, NSC, CFA, Box 744, South Africa, Jan. 1972, Vol II [Jan. ‘72–May ‘74], Telegram, US Embassy Pretoria to Secretary of State re “South African Uranium Enrichment Project: Approach by General Electric to Roux,” 6 February 1974.

 [45] NPM, NSC, CFA, Box 744, South Africa, Jan. 1972, Vol II [Jan. ‘72–May ‘74], Telegram, US Embassy Pretoria to Secretary of State re “South African Uranium Enrichment Project: Approach by General Electric to Roux,” 6 February 1974

 [46] Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” 56.

 [47] Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 218.

 [48] NSA, CIAOSI, Weekly Surveyor, “South Africa not Currently in Position to Produce Nuclear Weapons,” 22 July 1974.

 [49] Walters, South Africa and the Bomb, 91; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA (hereafter RRL), National Security Council Executive Secretariat (hereafter NSCES), System File 8391020, Memorandum, “US–South African Nuclear Problems,” undated; SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, Top Secret, 1 January 1981–6 May 1981, Memorandum, “South African–United States’ Nuclear Relations,” 20 March 1981.

 [50] Simpson, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” 7.

 [51] NSA, DCI, Memorandum, “Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 4 September 1974.

 [52] See text leading to note 48.

 [53] Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 244–5.

 [54] NSA, CIAOSI, Weekly Surveyor, “South African Uranium Enrichment Plant in Operation,” 21 April 1975.

 [55] The uranium was enriched to 93.3 per cent of the fissionable isotope, uranium 235. That was considered weapons-grade material (Los Angeles Times, 14 April 1975, 2).

 [56] See paragraph leading to notes 32 and 33.

 [57] Los Angeles Times, 14 April 1975, 2.

 [58] NSA, CIAOSI, Weekly Surveyor, “Some Aspects of South African Uranium Enrichment Process Revealed,” 5 May 1975; NSA, CIAOSI, Study memorandum, “South African Uranium Enrichment Programme,” August 1977.

 [59] NSA, CIAOSI, Weekly Surveyor, “Some Aspects of South African Uranium Enrichment Process Revealed,” 5 May 1975.

 [60] Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 373.

 [61] Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 291.

 [62] Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 373, 382–3.

 [63] By 1976, there were violent political upheavals against white colonial rule in Southern Africa. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was convinced that Southern Africa had become an important piece in the geopolitical game and needed a new initiative. He therefore decided to try his hand at brokering a settlement to the problem of white minority rule in Rhodesia, amongst other issues. Since US military intervention in Southern Africa was not a viable option, he resorted to diplomacy in an effort to halt the advances of communism in the region and sought to make Pretoria an important partner in the negotiating process with Rhodesia. Basically, what this entailed was that the US would give Pretoria time to enact a mild programme of economic and social reform in exchange for cooperation on the Rhodesian matter. Kissinger spent the following months travelling extensively in an effort to enact his new approach, but it was doomed to failure. He failed to bring Pretoria and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) together for discussions on the independence of South West Africa (Namibia), although he managed to bring the Rhodesian parties together in Geneva in November 1976. These talks continued well into December 1976, but in the end they broke down. Kissinger ascribed the failure to black Africa which refused to be influenced, as well as to the defeat of Gerald Ford by Jimmy Carter in the elections in November (Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 390; SCUSPTSA, South Africa: Time Running Out, 354; Schraeder, United States Foreign Policy toward Africa, 213–14).

 [64] Gerald Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI (hereafter GFL), White House Central Files: Subject Files (hereafter WHCFSF), TA3/CO135–157, Letter, Charles C. Diggs and Yvonne B. Burke to The President, 1 June 1976; Walters, South Africa and the Bomb, 91–2.

 [65] O'Toole, “French get S. African A-Plant Sale,” 1.

 [66] GFL, National Security Advisor, Presidential Country Files for Africa (hereafter NSAPCFA), 1974–77, South Africa (4), Memorandum, D. Elliott to B. Scowcroft re “Reactor Sale to South Africa,” 28 May 1976.

 [67] GFL, National Security Advisor, Presidential Country Files for Africa (hereafter NSAPCFA), 1974–77, South Africa (4), Memorandum, D. Elliott to B. Scowcroft re “Reactor Sale to South Africa,” 28 May 1976

 [68] O'Toole, “French get S. African A-Plant Sale,” 1.

 [69] The Soweto riots started when the South African security forces fired upon 15,000 black school children taking part in a demonstration in Soweto. Two students were killed, and the incident resulted in the worst violent riots and strikes ever in all of the major South African urban areas (De Villiers, US Sanctions against South Africa, 96–7).

 [70] NSA, CIAOSI, Weekly Surveyor, “South Africa again Rumoured to be Working on Nuclear Weapons,” 13 September 1976.

 [71] NSA, CIAOSI, Weekly Surveyor, “South Africa again Rumoured to be Working on Nuclear Weapons,” 13 September 1976

 [72] SCUSPTSA, South Africa: Time Running Out, 358.

 [73] Strulak, “The Nuclear Suppliers Group,” 9.

 [74] Van Slambrouck, “South Africa Prepares to ‘Go Nuclear’,” 1; Walters, South Africa and the Bomb, 91–2.

 [75] Culverson, “The Politics of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United States,” 132.

 [76] NSA, National Security Council (hereafter NSC), Memorandum for Secretary of State and others, “South Atlantic Nuclear Event,” 22 October 1979.

 [77] Burns, “South Africa's Secret Atom Plant,” 1, 6.

 [78] SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, Report, “1 U.S. Option: Help South Africa Enrich,” in Nuclear Fuel, 8 August 1977, 1–2.

 [79] SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, Dispatch, South African Embassy Washington to Secretary for Foreign Affairs Pretoria, 22 August 1977.

 [80] SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, Report, “1 U.S. Option: Help South Africa Enrich,” in Nuclear Fuel, 8 August 1977, 1–2.

 [81] SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, Report, “1 U.S. Option: Help South Africa Enrich,” in Nuclear Fuel, 8 August 1977, 1–2

 [82] See text leading to note 50.

 [83] SCUSPTSA, South Africa: Time Running Out, 358; New York Times, 7 August 1977, 13.

 [84] Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 279.

 [85] Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 414; Christian Science Monitor, 8 August 1977, 2.

 [86] See text leading to note 50.

 [87] Burns, “Afrikaners Dig In against Threat to their Rule,” 1, 8; SCUSPTSA, South Africa: Time Running Out, 235; Armscor Archives Pretoria (hereafter AAP), State Security Board, Economic Liaison Committee, File 1/15/2/3/2, Volume 5: Main Management: Departmental Committees, Commissions and Management Boards, “Administration Total War: Feedback to the Management Committee,” 11 September 1981.

 [88] NSA, DCI, Interagency assessment, Memorandum, “South Africa: Policy Considerations Regarding a Nuclear Test,” 18 August 1977.

 [89] SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, “Message Conveyed to Minister of Foreign Affairs by US Ambassador W. Bowdler,” 18 August 1977.

 [90] SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, Letter, Cyrus Vance to R. F. Botha, 19 August 1977.

 [91] SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, Untitled memorandum, August 1977; Department of State, “US, South Africa Exchanges on Nuclear Matters,” 797–8; Los Angeles Times, 21 August 1977, 10.

 [92] The Christian Science Monitor, 22 August 1977, 2.

 [93] SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, Memorandum, “Russian Allegations w.r.t. South Africa and Testing of Nuclear Device” (Translated from Afrikaans), undated.

 [94] Pretoria lied to Carter. The nuclear weapons programme had continued unabated, leading to the completion of six and a half nuclear bombs by 1989. Furthermore, in 1987, one of the Kalahari shafts was reopened and inspected. A hangar was erected over it for easy maintenance in case a decision was made to conduct an underground test. However, no nuclear tests were ever conducted there. In late 1991, IAEA inspectors visited the site, where soil samples showed that the site had never been used for the detonation of a nuclear bomb (Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” 56; Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” 37–48).

 [95] SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, Letter, Cyrus Vance to Pik Botha, 15 September 1977.

 [96] SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, Dispatch, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 24 August 1977; Los Angeles Times, 23 August 1977, 6; Walker, “We'll Watch Kalahari ‘A-Site’ says Carter,” 1.

 [97] Goodwin, “South African Atom Bomb”, 1, 22.

 [98] Johnson, “A-Test Story Seen as S. African Ploy”, 6; SCUSPTSA, South Africa: Time Running Out, 358.

 [99] SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, Letter, Cyrus Vance to Pik Botha, 15 September 1977.

[100] SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, Memorandum, “Draft Response to the U.S.A. on Nuclear Policy and NPT,” 22 September 1977.

[101] SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, Letter, R. F. Botha to Cyrus Vance, 12 October 1977.

[102] SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, Letter, R. F. Botha to Cyrus Vance, 12 October 1977

[103] SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, Telegram, S.A. Embassy Washington to Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, re “U.S.–S.A. Relations in the Nuclear Field,” 17 October 1977.

[104] SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, Telegram, SALEG Washington to SECEXTERN Pretoria, 24 October 1977; Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 283.

[105] SAFAA, Nuclear Energy, Telegram, S.A. Embassy Washington to Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 24 October 1977; Telegram, S.A. Embassy Washington to Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, 25 October 1977.

[106] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 418 (1977), 4 November 1977.

[107] Manning, “US–S. Africa Arms Ban,” 29; SCUSPTSA, South Africa: Time Running Out, 361; Department of State, “The Secretary: Issues facing the United States in Africa,” 30.

[108] Myers et al., U.S. Business in South Africa, 131; Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA (hereafter JCL), White House Central File (hereafter WHCF), CO141, Box CO-53, Letter, Z. Brzezinski to P. J. Mitchell, 24 April 1978; NSA, Microfiche collection: South Africa: The Making of United States Policy, 1962–1989, Memorandum, P. Tarnoff to Z. Brzezinski, 19 June 1978; JCL, WHCF, CO141, Box CO54, Letter, J. Carter to D. A. Fraser, 20 June 1978.

[109] Burt, “U.S. Tells South Africa to Accept Atomic Curbs or Face Fuel Cut-Off,” 10; Manning, “US-S. Africa Arms Ban,” 29.

[110] Van Slambrouck, “South Africa Prepares to go Nuclear,” 11.

[111] Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” 56; Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” 37–48; Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 283.

[112] Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” 53–4; Albright, “South Africa Comes Clean,” 3–6; Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 284.

[113] Richelson, Spying on the Bomb, 284.

[114] Gay, “U.S. National Security Policy and Sanctions,” 8; Burns, “South Africa Ousts 3 U.S. Embassy Aides”; Los Angeles Times, 13 April 1979, 1; Burns, “South Africans Say Seized Film Proves U.S. Made Aerial Survey.”

[115] Burns, “South Africa Ousts 3 U.S. Embassy Aides,” A1; Chicago Tribune, 14 April 1979, 1; Gwertzman, “U.S. Expelling 2 South Africans After Ouster of American Aides”; Kempster, “U.S. to Expel 2 S. African Defense Aides.”

[116] AAP, Sanctions and Arms Embargoes (hereafter SAE), Box 6, File 11, Study document, “Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM)/SA ANC Activities regarding Arms Embargoes against the RSA,” 13 December 1979.

[117] NSA, CIAOSI, Weekly Surveyor, “South Africa: Military Personnel at the Valindaba Uranium Enrichment Plant,” 30 April 1976.

[118] Albright and Gay, “A Flash from the Past,” 15–17; Los Angeles Times, 26 October 1979, 1; NSA, Microfiche collection: South Africa: The Making of United States Policy, 1962–1989, Cable, Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy Addis Ababa, 5 November 1979.

[119] JCL, Vertical File, South Africa, Minutes of the Mini-Special Coordinating Committee on Possible Nuclear Detonation in South Africa, 23 September 1979.

[120] NSA, NSC, Memorandum for Secretary of State and others, “South Atlantic Nuclear Event,” 22 October 1979.

[121] Los Angeles Times, 26 October 1979, 1; Chicago Tribune, 27 October 1979; Kempster and Johnston, “Burst of Light Raised Issue of S. Africa Test,” 1.

[122] This of course was a lie. South Africa had a nuclear weapons programme, as noted above.

[123] Albright and Gay, “A Flash from the Past,” 15–17; Chicago Tribune, 26 October 1979, 5; Los Angeles Times, 26 October 1979, 1; Foisie, “Nuclear Projects Peaceful, South Africans Insist”; Los Angeles Times, 28 October 1979, 5.

[124] NSA, DCI, Interagency Intelligence Assessment, “The 22 September 1979 Event,” December 1979; NSA, Briefing Book, “The Vela Incident: Nuclear Test or Meteoroid?,” 5 May 2006; Chicago Tribune, 22 February 1980, 1; Cooley, “New US Concern: Repercussions over Nuclear-type Flash”; Manning and Talbot, “The Case of the Mystery Flash”; Goldfield and Obenzinger, “South Africa: The Israeli Connection,” 123; Albright and Gay, “A Flash from the Past,” 15–17; Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” 45.

[125] JCL, Vertical File, South Africa, Memorandum, “Mini-Special Coordinating Committee on Possible Nuclear Detonation in the South Atlantic,” 9 January 1980.

[126] Albright and Gay, “A Flash from the Past,” 15–17; Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” 45.

[127] Manning and Talbot, “The Case of the Mystery Flash,” 7; Cooley, “New US Concern: Repercussions over Nuclear-type Flash,” 1; Federation of American Scientists, BMD List, Subject: RSA Flash, 29 July 1997. Internet: http://www.fas.org; Manning, “US–S. Africa Arms Ban,” 29; AAP, SAE, Box 1, File 2, Note verbale, Representative of the United States of America to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established by Resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa, 14 April 1980.

[128] See text leading to note 88.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Martha S. van Wyk

Martha van Wyk is a Post-doctoral Research Fellow in the Department of Historical Studies, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. She earned her DPhil from the University of Pretoria in 2005. Her current research entails United States–South African relations during the Cold War, with specific reference to military and nuclear aspects. She is working on a comprehensive book on the topic, utilizing both international and South African archival sources.