Bargaining with the bear: Chancellor Erhard's bid to buy German reunification, 1963–64

Abstract

This article describes West German Chancellor Erhard's vision of reunification and explores Soviet and American reactions to Bonn's opening gesture to Moscow, in 1964. The main argument is that despite Washington's reluctance, Erhard envisaged offering Khrushchev massive economic aid in exchange for more political liberty in the GDR, and eventually for reunification. Evidence suggests that Erhard's objective corresponded in time with Khrushchev rethinking his relations to the FRG. The Soviet leader secretly encouraged Erhard to present a realistic proposal for a modus vivendi and officially accepted the Chancellor's invitation to visit Bonn. However, due to Khrushchev's removal from power in October 1964, the final goals of his German policy remain uncertain.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to Geir Lundestad and the Norwegian Nobel Institute, where I was fortunate to spend several months in 2007. I wish to thank the two anonymous referees and Kristina Spohr Readman for their insightful comments, as well as Jussi Hanhimäki, Jean-Paul Bled, Sven Holtsmark, Svetlana Savranskaya and Alexander Vatlin for their kind advice. Some elements outlined in this article can be found in: Schoenborn, Benedikt. La mésentente apprivoisée. De Gaulle et les Allemands, 1963-1969. Paris: PUF, 2007.

Notes

Benedikt Schoenborn, from Lucerne, Switzerland, has obtained a PhD degree of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, and of the University of Sorbonne (Paris IV). Currently a fellow and lecturer at the University of Tampere, Finland, he is doing research about the implications of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik on German–American relations.

  [1] For extensive studies on Gerhard Schröder, West Germany's Foreign Minister from 1961 to 1966, see Eibl, Bewegung, and Oppelland, Schröder. For general evaluations of Bonn's Eastern policy in the mid-1960s, see e.g. Haftendorn, Aussenpolitik, 148–61, and Kielmansegg, Katastrophe, 160–212.

  [2] Ninkovich, “German Question,” 124; Hanrieder, Germany, 178. Similar statements can be found, e.g., in Banchoff, German Problem, 58–61; Czempiel, “Suche,” 174. Erhard headed a coalition government of the conservative CDU/CSU parties with the liberal FDP.

  [3] Although ‘unification’ would be more appropriate, the politicians of the time always used the term ‘reunification’.

  [4] For the underlying motives of Ostpolitik, see Niedhart, “Ostpolitik”; Vogtmeier, Egon Bahr.

  [5] Sitzungsprotokoll, Deutscher Bundestag, Bonn, 137. Sitzung am 15. Oktober 1964, 6779.

  [6] Nevertheless, Adenauer had established some secret contacts with Moscow, a few years earlier, and in 1962 proposed a German–Soviet Burgfrieden of ten years (see Erhard, Geheimkonzepte).

  [7] Kosthorst, “Geheimpolitik.”

  [8] Osterheld, Aussenpolitik, 108.

  [9] Hentschel, Erhard, 440, 520.

 [10] Stent, Embargo, 115–21; Bender, Ostpolitik, 92–95.

 [11] Rudolph, Wirtschaftsdiplomatie, 195–230 (196 for the quote). While Rudolph amply illustrates Adenauer's contacts with business leaders in 1963, he hardly provides any evidence regarding Erhard's 1964 policy. For West German economic initiatives, see also Berghahn, Quest, although it does not contain a reference to 1964.

 [12] The available boxes in the Russian Government Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI) – the former Central Committee archive – contain formal documents about Khrushchev–Ulbricht meetings. The relevant collections of the Russian Foreign Ministry archives are still classified. Moreover, specialist Alexei Filitov has informed the author that he had not yet seen any document confirming or refuting the ‘highly intriguing thesis’ presented in this article.

 [13] Sodaro, Moscow, 43–71.

 [14] Wolfe, Soviet Power, 126.

 [15] Zubok, “Divided Germany.”

 [16] Khrushchev, On Khrushchev, 133.

 [17] For the 1989–90 unification process, see Forsberg, “Economic Incentives”; Spohr-Readman, Germany; Newnham, “German Unity”; Bierling, Wirtschaftshilfe.

 [18] Newnham, “More Flies”; Spaulding, “German Trade.”

 [19] Namely, a highly politicized international trade regime and a domestic consensus providing the regime with autonomy in setting trade policy.

 [20] Under Secretary of State George Ball was the first to use the term ‘buy reunification’, in a memorandum for President Kennedy, dated 26 October 1963 (63 619).

 [21] Mierzejewski, Erhard, 28–9, 182–3.

 [22] For a sound analysis of Erhard's ideas: Mierzejewski, Erhard, 27–41, 169–86. See also Hentschel, Erhard; Laitenberger, Erhard; Lappenküper, “Bau,” 240–42.

 [23] Erhard, Wohlstand, 10.

 [24] Müller-Armack, Weg, 81–90: “Die Stellung der Wirtschaftspolitik in der politischen Zielsetzung der Moskauer Gespräche, 23. August 1955.” Müller-Armack also mentions that the FRG's economic leaders firmly supported the ideas expressed in this draft.

 [25] Brandt, Erinnerungen, 79.

 [26] Erhard, Gedanken, 790–91: Interview by H.U. Kempsi (Süddeutsche Zeitung), 5 February 1963.

 [27] National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), College Park, Maryland, Central Foreign Policy Files (hereafter CFPF) 1964–66, Box 2195, Telegram Bonn Embassy to Rusk, 10 September 1964; FRUS 1961–63, XV, 578–80, Conversation Kennedy–McGhee, 19 September 1963.

 [28] FRUS 1961–63, XV, 586, Conversation Erhard–McGhee, 3 October 1963.

 [29] Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (hereafter AAPD), edited by H.-P. Schwarz. 1963, III, 1360, Conversation Erhard–McGhee, 22 October 1963.

 [30] AAPD 1963, III, 1493–95, and FRUS 1961–63, XV, 634–9: Conversation Johnson–Erhard, 26 November 1963.

 [31] AAPD 1963, III, 1564, Conversation Erhard–Smirnov, 6 December 1963.

 [32] NARA, CFPF 1964–66, Box 2195, Telegram Bonn Embassy (Hillenbrand) to Rusk, 10 September 1964. Hillenbrand notably referred to a report of 2 December 1963, written by a Moscow based journalist of Die Welt. See also Der Spiegel, 30 September 1964, 68.

 [33] For the speeches by William Borm and Erich Mende, on 29 and 30 November 1963, see NARA, CFPF 1963, Box 3914; AAPD 1963, III, 1585. For the FDP's policy in the 1960s, see Siekmeier, Restauration.

 [34] Like other Western politicians of the time, Erhard believed that Walter Ulbricht's regime would collapse as soon as the Soviet soldiers had left, the people's call for reunification then becoming too strong to be contained.

 [35] FRUS 1961–63, XV, 658–77 (677 for the border issue), and AAPD 1963, III, 1672–9, 1701–8 (1708): Conversations Johnson–Erhard, 28 and 29 December 1963. So far, no West German leader had officially given up claims to the formerly German land beyond the Oder–Neisse line, which in 1945 had become the border between Germany and Poland.

 [36] Ibid.

 [37] Ibid.

 [38] FRUS 1961–63, XV, 672, and AAPD 1963, III, 1703: Conversation Johnson–Erhard, 29 December 1963, 11.30 am.

 [39] AAPD 1963, II, 1192–9, Conversation Adenauer–de Gaulle, 21 September 1963. For a good analysis of positive and negative economic sanctions, see Newnham, “More Flies.”

 [40] E.g., Hanrieder, Germany, America, 176–81; Banchoff, German Problem, 58–60.

 [41] Costigliola, “Johnson, Germany,” 177, for the quote (statement by Johnson, 10 April 1964); Banchoff, German Problem, 58; Hacke, “German Question,” 18.

 [42] FRUS 1961–63, XV, 587, Telegram Bonn Embassy (McGhee) to DepState, 3 October 1963.

 [43] FRUS 1961–63, XV, 619–20, Memo Ball to Kennedy, 26 October 1963.

 [44] FRUS 1961–63, XV, 586–7, Conversation Erhard–McGhee, 3 October 1963; NARA, CFPF 1963, Box 3915, Conversation Johnson–Erhard, 28 December 1963, 11 am.

 [45] Archives Nationales (hereafter AN), Paris, 5AG1, Box 161, Conversation de Gaulle–Adenauer, 5 July 1963, 3.30 pm.

 [46] AAPD 1963, II, 1198, Conversation Adenauer–de Gaulle, 21 September 1963.

 [47] The National Archives/Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), London, FO 371/172134, Prime Minister's conversation with Dean Rusk, 26 November 1963.

 [48] PRO, FO 371/172134, Memo by Lord Hood, 9 December 1963; see also ibid., Memo by F. Roberts, 6 December 1963.

 [49] From the beginning, Washington, London and Paris agreed that the four-power committee ‘peace plan’ was a ‘non-plan’ and a pure waste of time (PRO, Prem 11/4818, Memo for the Prime Minister, 27 December 1963; FRUS 1964–68, XV, Documents 3, 17, 30). See also note 89. Most historians have perceived this well documented ‘peace plan’, followed by a similar initiative in 1965, as the main reunification idea of the Erhard government.

 [50] FRUS 1961–63, XV, 652–3, Memo Bundy to Johnson, 24 December 1963; Lyndon B. Johnson Library (hereafter LBJL), Austin, National Security Files (hereafter NSF), Box 1, Memo Bundy to Johnson, 27 December 1963.

 [51] NARA, CFPF 1964–66, Box 2195, Telegram McGhee to Rusk, Ball and Kohler, 21 January 1964; McGhee, Creation, 128–33.

 [52] NARA, CFPF 1964–66, Box 2195, Telegram McGhee to Rusk, Ball and Kohler, 12 February 1964.

 [53] NARA, CFPF 1964–66, Box 2195, Telegram McGhee to Rusk, Ball and Kohler, 21 January 1964.

 [54] FRUS 1964–68, XV, 13–15, Telegram Moscow Embassy (Kohler) to DepState, 24 January 1964.

 [55] FRUS 1964–68, XV, 17–18, Telegram Rusk to Bonn Embassy, 30 January 1964.

 [56] Zubok, “Divided Germany,” 278.

 [57] Knight, Beria, 191, paraphrasing Beria's signed draft of 2 June 1953; see also Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside, 161–3; Kramer, “Declassified,” 10, 23, criticizes Knight's account and argues that Beria did not intend to abandon the GDR.

 [58] Zubok, “Divided Germany,” 281–91.

 [59] Lévesque, L'URSS, 201–3; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside, 282.

 [60] Sodaro, Moscow, 44–9.

 [61] Crampton, Eastern Europe, 307–8; Taubman, Khrushchev, 587–8, 606–8.

 [62] Khrushchev, Superpower, 701.

 [63] Sodaro, Moscow, 51.

 [64] Ministère des Affaires étrangères (hereafter MAE), Paris, Secrétariat général, Entretiens et messages, Box 20, Conversation de Gaulle–Vinogradov, 2 January 1964. See also Khrushchev's statements in Egypt and Denmark, later that year (Taubman, Khrushchev, 609; Der Spiegel, 24 June 1964, 59–60).

 [65] Crampton, Eastern Europe, 307–8; Sodaro, Moscow, 55–7; Zubok, “Divided Germany,” 290, 296. For Moscow's financial help and concern about the GDR's economic situation, see Fursenko, Prezidium, II, 310–20, Memo Saburov, 14 June 1956.

 [66] Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (hereafter PAAA), Berlin, Bestand MfAA (Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten), C843/75, Conversation Khrushchev–Ulbricht, 30 May 1964.

 [67] Bonwetsch and Filitow, “Dokumentation,” 166–70 (analysis by the authors), 174–9 (translation of Gomulka's and Novotny's speeches on 4 August 1961).

 [68] Sodaro, Moscow, 54, quoting Ulbricht.

 [69] AAPD 1963, I, 240–44, 486–91; for a description of the ‘pipeline embargo’, see Stent, Embargo, ch. 5, and Rudolph, Wirtschaftsdiplomatie, ch. 7.

 [70] Shevchenko, Breaking, 103. An eight-year USSR–FRG trade treaty expired in 1963.

 [71] Sodaro, Moscow, 50. The treaty of Rapallo, signed near Genoa on 22 April 1922, was a bilateral agreement between Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, including a secret annex on military co-operation. In the West, ‘Rapallo’ had a highly negative connotation.

 [72] AAPD 1963, I, 91–2, Aufzeichnung Barzel, 17 January 1963; Brandt, Begegnungen, 112–13. Brandt's memoirs indicate that he later regretted the withdrawal.

 [73] Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, Depositum Bahr, 431B.

 [74] AAPD 1963, I, 502–5, Aufzeichnung Kroll, 29 April 1963.

 [75] AAPD 1963, I, 645, Aufzeichnung Kroll, 21 June 1963.

 [76] AN, 5AG1, Box 161, Conversation Adenauer–de Gaulle, 5 July 1963, 3.30 pm; AAPD 1963, I, 683, Aufzeichnung Kroll, 25 June 1963; Kroll, Lebenserinnerungen, 577–8.

 [77] Fursenko, Prezidium, I, 733, Protocol 101; see also the interpretation by the editor: Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev, 525. Ambassador Malik was in charge of taking notes at the Presidium meetings.

 [78] MAE, RFA, Box 1571, Telegram Bonn Embassy (de Margerie) to Paris, 1 December 1963: Report by Per Haekkerup; ibid., Note de la sous-direction d'Europe orientale, 11 December 1963.

 [79] Selvage, “Warsaw Pact,” 10–11.

 [80] MAE, Europe généralités, URSS 1961–65, Box 1916, Note au sujet des relations Est-Ouest, 31 March 1964; Sodaro, Moscow, 52–3.

 [81] LBJL, NSF, Box 1, Telegram Copenhagen Embassy (Blair) to SecState, 3 March 1964.

 [82] AAPD 1964, I, 332–41, Conversation Erhard–Smirnov, 11 March 1964.

 [83] Sodaro, Moscow, 52. According to this deal of late March 1964, Krupp would also send a permanent representative to Moscow.

 [84] Kosthorst, “Geheimpolitik,” 264.

 [85] NACP, CFPF 2230; PRO, FO 371/177912; Centre des archives diplomatiques de Nantes (hereafter CADN), Bonn Ambassade, 220.

 [86] PRO, FO 371/177912, Memo by Ledwidge, 16 April 1964.

 [87] NARA, CFPF 1964–66, Box 2230, Telegram Ball (Washington) to Bonn Embassy, 17 April 1964.

 [88] FRUS 1964–68, XV, 54, Conversation Erhard–McGhee, 10 April 1964. See also McGhee's telegrams to Washington, on 21 January, 12 February, 11 April, 21 July, and 15 October 1964 (NACP, CFPF, 2195, 2231).

 [89] PRO, Prem 11/4818, Foreign Secretary (Washington) to Prime Minister (London), 29 April 1964. For the German ‘peace plan’ discussed in the Ambassadorial Group, see AAPD 1964, I, Documents 3, 10, 53, 101, 124, and FRUS 1964–68, XV, Documents 2, 3, 5, 13, 16, 17, 18, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 37, 48. See also note 49.

 [90] On 16 May 1964, Ambassador McGhee noted that ‘we have hit the Germans very hard in recent weeks’ (FRUS 1964–68, XV, 87).

 [91] Kosthorst, “Geheimpolitik,” 289.

 [92] For the West German perception of Johnson's speech, see Osterheld, Aussenpolitik, 86.

 [93] AAPD 1964, I, 603, Telegram Carstens to Groepper, 4 June 1964; AAPD 1964, I, 629–30, Sprechzettel für Botschafter Groepper, 8 June 1964.

 [94] PAAA, B150, Telegram Carstens to Groepper, 7 June 1964.

 [95] LBJL, NSF, Box 183, Telegram Bonn Embassy (Hillenbrand) to SecState, 5 June 1964; PRO, FO 371/177912, Memo by Holmer, 9 June 1964; MAE, RFA 1572, Telegram Bonn Embassy (d'Aumale) to Paris, 5 June 1964.

 [96] PRO, FO 371/177912, Handwritten comment by Lord Hood, 10 June, on Memo by Holmer, 9 June 1964.

 [97] LBJL, NSF, Box 183, Telegram Bonn Embassy (Hillenbrand) to SecState, 5 June 1964.

 [98] NARA, CFPF, Box 2228, Memo, President's meeting with Erhard, 9 June 1964.

 [99] AAPD 1964, I, 657, and FRUS 1964–68, XV, 114, Conversation Johnson–Erhard; McGhee, Creation, 148.

[100] PAAA, MfAA, C843/75, Conversation Khrushchev–Ulbricht, 11 June 1964.

[101] Kosthorst, “Geheimpolitik,” 269–72, convincingly shows that the agreement of 12 June remained far behind Ulbricht's wishes, while Bender, Neue Ostpolitik, 93–4, stresses the GDR's improved status through the treaty. This latter argument was in fact used by Khrushchev, but in a rather rhetorical sense. See also: Khrushchev, Superpower, 714–15; Stent, Embargo, 118; Sodaro, Moscow, 60, quoting the official texts published by Pravda.

[102] PAAA, B150, Telegram Groepper (Moscow) to Schröder (Washington), 12 June 1964.

[103] PAAA, B150, Telegram Groepper to Schröder, 12 June, and Carstens (Washington) to Groepper, 12 June 1964. For Groepper's posture, see Spiegel, 18 March 1964, 25–7, and 30 September 1964, 68.

[104] AAPD 1964, I, 659–67, Conversation Khrushchev–Groepper, 13 June 1964; PAAA, B150, Telegram no. 477 from Moscow Embassy (Groepper) to Bonn, 13 June 1964.

[105] Oppelland, Schröder, 590–91.

[106] AAPD 1964, I, 667–9, Telegram Groepper to Schröder, 14 June 1964, and Telegram Jansen (Bonn) to Moscow Embassy, 14 June 1964.

[107] LBJL, NSF, Box 183, Telegram Moscow Embassy (Kohler) to SecState, 14 June 1964; PRO, FO 371/177912, Telegram Moscow Embassy (Trevelyan) to London, 14 June 1964; CADN, Bonn Ambassade 220, Telegram Moscow Embassy (Laboulaye) to Paris, 15 June 1964.

[108] Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik, St. Augustin, Nachlass Osterheld, Erhard 1, Message from Nikita Khrushchev, 16 June 1964; Sodaro, Moscow, 60–61; see also Stent, Embargo, 120.

[109] PAAA, B150, Telegram Moscow Embassy (Groepper) to Bonn, 22 July 1964. Groepper did not mention the name of his visitor but indicated that they had met before.

[110] Kosthorst, “Geheimpolitik,” 274, quoting Lathe's report to Erhard, dated 19 June 1964. Wolfe, Power, 123, further mentions a statement by an official of the Soviet Embassy in Bonn, in early June: ‘Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev would be very glad to receive Dr. Erhard in Moscow. … such a visit could produce a significant contribution to the solution of the German question through reunification.’

[111] PAAA, B150, Aufzeichnung Major Holtorff (London), 29 July 1964.

[112] PAAA, B150, Soviet memo, 27 July 1964.

[113] AAPD 1964, II, 880, Conversation Erhard–Smirnov, 27 July 1964.

[114] PAAA, B150, Aufzeichnung Carstens, 30 July 1964. Other apparent motives for Erhard's move were his general concern – shared by all West German politicians – that Washington and Moscow might agree on a scheme at the FRG's expense, as well as his political rivalry with Brandt.

[115] For a detailed description of Adzhubei's visit to the FRG, see Kosthorst, “Geheimpolitik,” 274–85.

[116] Foreign Minister Schröder deleted this passage in the final protocol (AAPD 1964, II, 901, footnotes 19 and 20; see also Kosthorst, “Geheimpolitik,” 281).

[117] AAPD 1964, II, 896–904, Conversation Erhard–Adzhubei, 28 July 1964.

[118] Der Spiegel, 5 August 1964, 18, Interview with Alexei Adzhubei; PRO, FO 371/177913, Conversation Carstens–Roberts, 30 July 1964. For detailed accounts of Adzhubei's statements, see Bundesarchiv (hereafter BA) Koblenz, B136/2088, and LBJL, NSF, Germany IV, Box 184.

[119] E.g. BA, B136/2088, Conversation Adzhubei–Meyers, 24 July 1964.

[120] Spiegel, 30 September 1964, 80.

[121] The Russian edition of the book listed Alexei Adzhubei, Valeri Lednev, Nikolai Polianov and Jevgeni Pralnikov as co-authors. A German translation was published shortly thereafter (Adschubej, Westdeutschland).

[122] Wolfe, Power, 125, for the quote from Neues Deutschland, 9 August 1964; Sodaro, Moscow, 62–3; see also Spiegel, 9 September 1964, 17–19.

[123] PRO, FO 371/177913, Memo by Holmer, 30 July; ibid., Telegram FO to British Embassies, 30 July 1964.

[124] LBJL, NSF, Box 184, Telegram Bonn Embassy (McGhee) to SecState, 29 July 1964; NARA, CFPF, Box 2231, Telegram Rusk to Bonn Embassy, 13 August 1964.

[125] CADN, Bonn 220, and AAPD 1964, II, 1008, Conversation Erhard–de Margerie, 10 September 1964 (quote); MAE, EM 22, Aide-mémoire, 17 August 1964; Le Monde, 30 July 1964, 1.

[126] Couve de Murville, Politique, 267 (quote); AN, 5AG1, 166, Memo Dromer, 15 July 1964, Credits for Russia; PAAA, B2/152, Memo Lahr, 3 November 1964, Analysis of de Gaulle's policy towards the USSR.

[127] Alphand, Etonnement, 435–40; CADN, Bonn 216: Conversation Khrushchev–Giscard d'Estaing (27 January 1964), Conversation de Gaulle–Vinogradov (18 June 1964), Message by Khrushchev (dated 18 June 1964). For a detailed account of de Gaulle's reasoning, see Schoenborn, Mésentente, 269–70, 279–83.

[128] BA, B136/2089, Letter from Nikita Khrushchev, 2 September 1964.

[129] MAE, RFA 1572, Telegram Bonn Embassy (de Margerie) to Paris, 18 September 1964.

[130] Archiv für Christlich-Soziale Demokratie (hereafter ACSP), München, Nachlass Strauss, Familie 1119, Intelligence report, 8 September 1964. Former Minister of Defence Franz Josef Strauss still received the reports of the Bundesnachrichtendienst.

[131] Ibid.

[132] PRO, FO 371/177913, Memo on Khrushchev visit to FRG, 29 September 1964.

[133] Osterheld, Aussenpolitik, 108; NARA, CFPF, Box 2195, Telegram Bonn Embassy (McGhee) to SecState, 15 October 1964.

[134] NACP, CFPF, Box 2195, Hillenbrand (Bonn) to DepState, 10 September 1964. For further details on Beitz and Wolff, see Rudolph, Wirtschaftsdiplomatie.

[135] Mierzejewski, Erhard, 80–81, 184–5. The CDU/CSU appointed Erhard Chancellor mainly because of his popularity. Erhard formally joined the CDU only in April 1963 – or even later, in March 1966, according to a report by Die Welt of 4 May 2002 – and had his membership backdated.

[136] MAE, RFA 1572, Telegram de Margerie (Bonn) to Paris, 7 October 1964.

[137] ACSP, Nachlass Strauss, Familie 1117, Note, 29 July 1964, for the quote; AAPD 1964, II, 903, Conversation Erhard–Adzhubei, 28 July 1964. Upon Adzhubei's request, Schröder had to leave the meeting prematurely.

[138] AAPD 1964, II, 1015–16 (Conversation Schröder–McGhee, 15 September), 1017–19 (Conversation Carstens–Lucet, 15 September 1964); BA, B136/2089, Interview with Brandt, 4 September 1964.

[139] AAPD 1964, II, 1004–12, Conversation Erhard–de Margerie, 10 September 1964; PRO, FO 371/177913, Memo by Holmer and Smith, 17 and 18 September 1964.

[140] BA, B136/2089, Aufzeichnung Hohmann, 10 September 1964; NARA, CFPF, Box 2195, Telegram Bonn Embassy (McGhee) to SecState, 10 September 1964; Eibl, Bewegung, 276.

[141] Conversation Erhard–Gruson (Washington Post), quoted by Kosthorst, “Geheimpolitik,” 290.

[142] Sitzungsprotokoll, Deutscher Bundestag, Bonn, 137. Sitzung am 15. Oktober 1964, 6786–7.

[143] For Khrushchev's downfall, see e.g.: Fursenko, Khrushchev, 531–40; Shevchenko, Breaking, 128–9; Soutou, Cinquante, 439–44; Taubman, Khrushchev, 612–22; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside, 272–4.

[144] Tatu, Pouvoir, 423.

[145] Taubman, Krushchev, 615.

[146] Sodaro, Moscow, 68–9.

[147] Kosthorst, “Geheimpolitik,” 275, 282–5; Sodaro, Moscow, 58–62; see also Mastny and Byrne, Cardboard Castle, 25–6.

[148] Selvage, “Poland,” 2.

[149] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 September 1964, 2; Spiegel, 9 September 1964, 17–19; Sodaro, Moscow, 65, quoting articles from Neues Deutschland, Kommunist and Pravda.

[150] Selvage, “Stenographic Protocol.”

[151] BA, B136/2089, Presseberichte, 1 October 1964; PRO, FO 371/177913, Memo, Report in Peking People's Daily, 9 September 1964.

[152] Tatu, Pouvoir, 423. In particular, the 29 August decree rehabilitating the Volga Germans was not published.

[153] MAE, RFA 1572, Conversation with Soviet diplomats, De Margerie (Bonn) to Paris, 25 October 1964.

[154] AAPD 1964, II, 1041–4, Conversation Carstens–Smirnov, 21 September 1964; PRO, FO 371/177913, Minutes on Schwirkmann affair, 12 October to 27 November 1964.

[155] Stent, Embargo, 120; Sodaro, Moscow, 66–67.

[156] Selvage, “Poland,” 2; Adjoubei, A l'ombre, 366; Khrushchev, On Khrushchev, 132–3. Selvage indicates that the tape was played in Warsaw for Yuri Andropov on 30 September. Andropov returned to Moscow with a transcript but not with the tape itself.

[157] For the Western documentation, see BA, B136/2088, and LBJL, NSF, Germany IV, Box 184. Furthermore, in the light of Erhard's statement on the border issue (in his talk with Adzhubei), the idea of returning Polish land to Germany would not make sense.

[158] PRO, FO 371/177912, Telegram from Bonn Embassy to London, 13 April 1964: Conversation with George McGhee. For Erhard's general views, see Mierzejewski, Erhard, 27–41, 169–86.

[159] LBJL, NSF, Germany V, Box 184, Letter US mission Berlin (Calhoun) to Klein (Washington), 15 October 1964, referring to Klein's ‘non-paper’ of 11 September.

[160] Ibid., Letter Hillenbrand (Bonn) to Klein (Washington), 24 September 1964. A report by the Policy Planning Council of the State Department, dated 10 August 1964 and prefaced by Walt Rostow, also suggested that West German economic assistance to the USSR be encouraged in order to diminish tensions in Europe (ibid.).

[161] Kosthorst, “Geheimpolitik,” 258, referring to an article published by L'Express in early August 1964.

[162] PAAA, MfAA, C853/75, Conversation Khrushchev–Ulbricht, 11 June 1964.

[163] PAAA, MfAA, C843/75, Conversation Winzer–Semjonov, 16 May 1964.

[164] Fursenko, Prezidium, II, 518, Doc. 99.0.1, 19 January 1957.

[165] Wolfe, Soviet Power, 123, quoting Khrushchev's speech in the Kremlin, as printed in Pravda on 13 June. Khrushchev had made a similar remark in his conversation with Ulbricht.

[166] Khrushchev, On Khrushchev, 132–3.

[167] When receiving Ulbricht in June 1964, Khrushchev did not reveal the details of the ongoing USSR–FRG discussions and deliberately met with Ambassador Groepper after Ulbricht's departure (PAAA, MfAA, C843/75). Khrushchev also proved to be in no hurry to obtain ratification of the ‘friendship treaty’ (Wolfe, Soviet Power, 123). West German and Chinese journalists reported the exclusion of GDR leaders from Khrushchev's early September Prague meeting with East European Foreign Ministers (Spiegel, 9 September 1964, 17; Wolfe, Soviet Power, 125, quoting Peking Review, 11 September 1964, 19). See also Le Monde, 5 September 1964, 1.

[168] Spiegel, 16 September, 18, and 21 October 1964, 27; Sodaro, Moscow, 63–6; AAPD 1964, II, 1041–4.

[169] MAE, RFA 1572, Memo Baudet, 2 December 1964. Gaston Palewski and Philippe Baudet had met with Khrushchev in Gagra, on 13 October 1964.

[170] For the reasons of Erhard's declining authority, see the biographies by Mierzejewski, Hentschel and Laitenberger, as well as Ernst, Kanzlersturz.

[171] AAPD 1970, II, 1201–2, Conversation Brandt–Nixon, 18 July 1970; Kosthorst, “Geheimpolitik,” 293; Soutou, Cinquante, 498.

[172] Bierling, Wirtschaftshilfe, 332–3; Newnham, “German Unity,” 440–41; see also Soutou, Cinquante, 502; Küsters and Hofmann, Deutsche Einheit, 1527–30, 1541–2; Teltschik, 329 Tage, 359–63.

[173] Zubok, “Divided Germany,” 300.

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Benedikt Schoenborn

Benedikt Schoenborn, from Lucerne, Switzerland, has obtained a PhD degree of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, and of the University of Sorbonne (Paris IV). Currently a fellow and lecturer at the University of Tampere, Finland, he is doing research about the implications of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik on German–American relations.