Old politics, new diplomacy: the Geneva accords and the Soviet withdrawal from AfghanistanArtemy Kalinovsky is writing his PhD thesis at the London School of Economics and is a research assistant at the Cold War Studies Centre. The title of his PhD is ‘The Soviet Disengagement from Afghanistan: 1980–1992’. He has an MA from the London School of Economics and a BA from the George Washington University.

Artemy Kalinovsky is writing his PhD thesis at the London School of Economics and is a research assistant at the Cold War Studies Centre. The title of his PhD is ‘The Soviet Disengagement from Afghanistan: 1980–1992’. He has an MA from the London School of Economics and a BA from the George Washington University.

Abstract

While much has been written about the origins of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, little is known about the Soviet effort to disengage. This article sheds new light on the diplomatic efforts under Mikhail Gorbachev to engage the US and secure an ‘honourable’ withdrawal for Soviet troops. Drawing on declassified Russian and US documents, it also explores the internal Soviet debates as well as Moscow's relationship with its client in Kabul on the eve of withdrawal.

Notes

Artemy Kalinovsky is writing his PhD thesis at the London School of Economics and is a research assistant at the Cold War Studies Centre. The title of his PhD is ‘The Soviet Disengagement from Afghanistan: 1980–1992’. He has an MA from the London School of Economics and a BA from the George Washington University.

  [1] See, Westad, Global Cold War, 316–326.

  [2] The sole exception Mendelsohn, Changing Course. Medelsohn, a scholar of international relations used a series of interviews, primarily with Gorbachev's closer advisors, to evaluate the relation of the withdrawal to change within the USSR.

  [3] Andrei Grachev, International Department official, Gorbachev aide and press secretary in September–December 1991. Author's interview, London, 1 February 2008.

  [4] The United States and several other countries had been supplying cash and arms to the resistance throughout the war via the Pakistani ISI.

  [5] Zubok A Failed Empire, 284; Gorbachev, Zhizn' i Reformy, Vol.1, 276.

  [6] Politburo notes, 25 September 1986, Gorbachev Foundation Archives, Politburo notes, 1986, 171. Hereafter GFA PB From 1980–84 onwards, Soviet–Pakistani contacts mostly took place before United Nations General Assembly sessions, but were discontinued in 1984. Khan Untying the Afghan Knot, 180.

  [7] Liakhovsky and Nekrasov, Citizen, Politician, Warrior, 153. Author's interview with Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov, Moscow, 11 September 2007.

  [8] Politburo meeting, 21 January 1987, GFA PB 1987, 60.

  [9] Politburo meeting, 21 January 1987, GFA PB 1987, 60.

 [10] Politburo meeting, 23 February 1987, GFA PB 1987, 114.

 [11] Politburo meeting, 11 June 1987, GFA PB 1987, 342.

 [12] Politburo meeting, 21 May 1987, GFA PB 1987, 309.

 [13] Politburo meeting, 22 May 1987, GFA PB 1987, 319.

 [14] Record of Conversation of MS Gorbachev with Com Najib, 20 July 1987, National Security Archive, Washington, DC READ/RADD Box 9.

 [15] Record of Conversation of MS Gorbachev with Com Najib, 3 November 1987 NSA READ/RADD Box 9

 [16] Kornienko, Kholodnaia voina, 254.

 [17] Plastun and Adrianov, Najibullah, 75.

 [18] See Mendelsohn, Changing Course, 120.

 [19] Authors' interview with General Alexander Liakhovsky, Moscow, July 2006.

 [20] Kornienko and Ahromeev, Glazami Marshala, 148.

 [21] Politburo meeting 22 May 1987 GFA PB, 319.

 [22] Minutes of Politburo meeting, 13 November 1986, Sowjetische Geheimdokumente, 445–447.

 [23] Marshall S.F. Ahromeev, ‘Memorandum. Afghanistan: The Position of the USSR’, 3 December 1987. GFA Document #944.

 [24] Politburo meeting, 21 May 1987 GFA PB 1987, 309.

 [25] ‘Gorbachev's thoughts while on vacation in August–September 1987’, GFA PB 1987, 471.

 [26] Minutes of Politburo meeting, 13 November 1986, Sovjetische Geheimdokumente, 440.

 [27] Mikhail Gorbachev's Replies to Questions Put By The Indonesian Newspaper ‘Merdeka’, 21 July 1987, Novosti (Moscow, 1987). As late as November 1986 Soviet officials publicly said that a Soviet withdrawal would begin only two years after it was clear interference had stopped. Gankovsky, ‘Afghanistan’, 135.

 [28] Coll, Ghost Wars, 168.

 [29] Brown, Gorbachev Factor, 235.

 [30] Shultz, Turmoil, 987.

 [31] Gates, From the Shadows, 425.

 [32] Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 233.

 [33] Record of conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and Najibullah, 3 November 1987, NSA READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.

 [34] Shultz, Turmoil, 1087; Coll, Ghost Wars, 177.

 [35] Memorandum from S.F. Akhromeev, Afghanistan: The Position of the USSR, 3 December 1987, GFA #944.

 [36] Memorandum of Conversation in the Oval Office, 9 December 1987, NSA End of the Cold War Collection, Box 3.

 [37] US Memorandum of Conversation of Working Luncheon, 10 December 1987, NSA End of the Cold War Collection, Box 3; see also the Russian record: Excerpt from conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and President Reagan on Afghanistan, 10 December 1987, NSA READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.

 [38] Coll, Ghost Wars, 177.

 [39] ‘Aid to Rebels Would End With Soviet Pullout’. Washington Post, 14 December 1987.

 [40] This is the opinion of long-time Soviet ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin, who at the time was serving on the Afghanistan commission of the Politburo. See Halliday, ‘Soviet Foreign Policymaking’, 687.

 [41] Only a general statement on cooperation in third world conflicts was made. See ‘Joint US–Soviet Summit Statement’, USSR–US Summit Washington December 7–10, 1987, Documents and Materials (Moscow: Novosti, 1987), 67.

 [42] ‘Shevardnadze in Kabul for talks with Najibullah, sees good prospects for Soviet troops withdrawal within 12 months’, Pravda, 7 January 1988, Current Digest of the Soviet Press XL, no. 1 (1988), 13.

 [43] ‘Interview with the Bakhtar News Agency’, Pravda, 7 January 1988, CDSP XL, no. 1 (1988), 14.

 [44] Liakhovsky interview, July 2006.

 [45] Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, 69.

 [46] The UN had become involved in the Afghan conflict soon after the Soviet invasion. Diego Cordovez acted as the UN Secretary General's special representative, holding talks with the Pakistani, Afghan, Soviet, US, and Iranian representatives, although the latter were not formally involved. The talks led to the ‘Geneva accords’. See Harrison and Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan.

 [47] Diary notes of Politburo meeting. Vorotnikov, A Bylo Eto Tak, 219.

 [48] Shultz, Turmoil, 1087.

 [49] ‘Sud'ba i Sovest’' (Interview with General Valentin Varennikov) (Moscow: Paleia, 1993), 51.

 [50] Liakhovsky interview.

 [51] Harrison and Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 323. Kornienko believes that Pakistan's new stubbornness had to do with Shevardnadze encouraging Afghanistan to use Indian attitudes toward Pakistan as justification for Afghan positions at negotiations. The effect, as he puts it, was to ‘wave the red flag before the bull’. Kornienko, ‘The Afghan Endeavor’, 14. But Riaz M. Khan, the chief Pakistani negotiator at Geneva, believes that it had more to do with Pakistan president's Zia ul Haq's fear of isolation should a US–Soviet rapprochement on Afghanistan make him an unnecessary ally. See Khan, Afghan Knot, 236–237.

 [52] Kornienko, Kholodnaia voina, 257.

 [53] Kornienko, Holodnaya Voyna, 257.

 [54] ‘Statement on Afghanistan by M.S. Gorbachev’, Pravda, 9 February 1988, p.1, CDSP XL, no. 6 (1988), 1–2.

 [55] ‘Statement on Afghanistan by M.S. Gorbachev’, Pravda, 9 February 1988, p.1, CDSP XL, no. 6 (1988), 1–2., 335.

 [56] Harrison and Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 334.

 [57] Kozyrev, ‘Zhenevskie Soglashenie’, 21.

 [58] Kozyrev, ‘Zhenevskie Soglashenie’, 21., 22.

 [59] Kozyrev, ‘Zhenevskie Soglashenie’, 21.

 [60] ‘Statement on Afghanistan’.

 [61] Record of a Politburo meeting chaired by Yakovlev, 22 February 1988, NSA READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.

 [62] Harrison and Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 338.

 [63] Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 287; Shultz, Turmoil, 1089.

 [64] ‘Shultz Sure of Soviets’ Afghanistan Pullout', Washington Post, 24 February 1988.

 [65] Author's interview with Ambassador Jack Matlock, 1 January 2008.

 [66] Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 286.

 [67] Harrison and Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 340.

 [68] The ‘bleeders’ in the administration and congress preferred to see the Soviet Union remain in Afghanistan and take losses from US supplied mujahadeen. See Harrison and Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 339.

 [69] There was very open opposition in the Senate. See Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 285–286.

 [70] ‘The Afghanistan Announcement’, Washington Post, 9 February 1988.

 [71] Record of conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and US Secretary George Shultz, 22 February 1988, NSA READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.

 [72] Record of conversation with K. Pant, 11 February 1988, NSA READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.

 [73] Politburo meeting, 3 March 1988, GB PB 1988, 89.

 [74] Oberdorfer, The Turn , 279.

 [75] Chenayev Diary, 1 April 1988, GFA CD 1988.

 [76] ‘Afghanistan stoil nam 15 milliardov dollarov v god’ [Afghanistan cost us 15 billion dollars a year] (Interview with Nikolai Egorychev) Kommersant Vlast' no. 46, 25 November 2002.

 [77] Liakhovsky interview

 [78] Ekedahl and Goodman, Eduard Shevardnadze, 185.

 [79] Record of a Politburo meeting chaired by Comrade A.N. Yakovlev, 22 February 1988, NSA READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.

 [80] Politburo meeting, 3 March 1988, GFA PB 1988, 89.

 [81] Politburo meeting, 3 March 1988, GFA PB 1988, 89.

 [82] Politburo meeting, 1 April 1988, GFA Vestka v Politburo, 312.

 [83] Chernayev Diary, 1 April 1988, GFA CD 1988.

 [84] Padishev, ‘Najibullah, president Afganistana’, 20.

 [85] The condition of the Afghan armed forces is beyond the scope of this article, but a report made on 9 March by General Varennikov is quite telling and worth citing. Varennikov noted that desertion was on the rise and very little had actually been accomplished in terms of improving the Afghan army during the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. ‘Meeting of political workers and advisers in the Officer's House of the 40^th Army in Kabul’, 9 March 1988, in Plastun and Adrianov, Najibullah, 208–212.

 [86] Oberdorfer, The Turn, 281.

 [87] ‘Record of conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and the president of Afghanistan, Najibullah’, 7 April 1988, NSA READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.

 [88] Harrison and Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 359.

 [89] Harrison and Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan. See also ‘Zalozhniki Istorii’ (Interview with Nikolai Kozyrev) Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 5  March 2004, no. 49, p. 9.

 [90] Record of conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party A. Natta, 29 March 1988, NSA READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.

 [91] Record of telephone conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and F. Castro, 5 April 1988, GFA Document # 20686.

 [92] Record of conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and President of the ChSSR G. Husak (Czechoslovakia), 12 April 1988, GFA Document # 20684.

 [93] Gorbachev's meeting with the third group of Obkom secretaries, 18 April 1988, GFA PB 1988, 191.

 [94] Politburo meeting, 18 April 1988, (Medvedev's Notes) GFA PB 1988 211.

 [95] Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, 69.

 [96] Liakhovsky interview, ‘Sud'ba i Sovest’, 51.

 [97] Politburo meeting, 1 April 1988, GFA Vestka v Politburo, 312.

 [98] Gorbachev, Memoirs, 458

 [99] ‘Record of conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and the president of Afghanistan, Najibullah’, 7 April 1988, NSA READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.

[100] Zubok, ‘Gorbachev’, 61–100.

[101] Chernayev Diary, 1 April 1988, GFA CD 1988 Chernayev notes that he had attached a memorandum to the plan for supplies urging Gorbachev to focus on making Mengistu change his approach to the Eritrean separatists, but Gorbachev simply pulled it off and signed the supply plan.

[102] Politburo meeting, 18 April 1988, GFA PB 1988, 215.