Researching détente: new opportunities, contested legacyNoam Kochavi holds a Ph.D. in American history from the University of Toronto (1999). A Lecturer of international relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, he is the author of A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy during the Kennedy YearsPraeger2002Conservative Partnership: Nixon and the Consolidation of the American-Israeli Relationship (SUNY Press, forthcoming).

Noam Kochavi holds a Ph.D. in American history from the University of Toronto (1999). A Lecturer of international relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, he is the author of A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy during the Kennedy YearsPraeger2002Conservative Partnership: Nixon and the Consolidation of the American-Israeli Relationship (SUNY Press, forthcoming)

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Notes

Noam Kochavi holds a Ph.D. in American history from the University of Toronto (1999). A Lecturer of international relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, he is the author of A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy during the Kennedy YearsPraeger2002Conservative Partnership: Nixon and the Consolidation of the American-Israeli Relationship (SUNY Press, forthcoming)

 [1] See, for instance, Westad, Global.

 [2] See Goh, Constructing.

 [3] For this argument, see, for instance, Hanhimäki, Flawed Architect, 28–31 and chap. 7.

 [4] Suri, Power and Protest.

 [5] For the articulation of these questions, see Jeremi Suri's response to a roundtable review of his Kissinger and the American Century, H-Diplo, 17 April 2008.

 [6] Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War; Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars.

 [7] Pipes, Vixi, 125–129.

 [8] Bowker and Williams, Superpower Détente, 155, 161. For a partial concession of this point by one of Kissinger's most trusted lieutenants, see Rodman, Oral History.

 [9] Critical assessments of the Nixon–Kissinger modus operandi abound. Some examples include Garrison, Games; Mayers, Ambassadors, 221–227; Caldwell, ‘U.S. Domestic Politics’, 104; Nelson, ‘Nixon, Kissinger’.

[10] Hanhimäki, ‘“Dr. Kissinger” or “Mr. Henry”?’, 643.

[11] Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 28–57; Westad, Global, 195.

[12] This was much in evidence, for instance, in the SHAFR roundtable on ‘Henry Kissinger: Cold War Villain, International War Criminal, or Conventional Cold War Statesman’, SHAFR conference, 2007.

[13] This line of inquiry follows the suggestion of Hanhimäki, ‘“Dr. Kissinger” or “Mr. Henry”?’, 676.

[14] In terms of cooperation with Europe and sensitivity to European senses of identity, Kissinger the practitioner did not meet the policy advice of Kissinger the scholar. See Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, 7–8.

[15] See Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 79; Kissinger, Diplomacy, 44–55.

[16] Kissinger, White House Years, 191.

[17] Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 343.

[18] Suri, Kissinger, 185.

[19] For more on this debate, see Wenger, Origins.

[20] For the state of the art on this issue, see Barbieri, Illusion; Mansfied and Pollins, Economic Interdependence; Press-Barnathan, ‘The Neglected Dimension’; Davis, The Art of Economic Persuasion.

[21] Suri in this volume; Gaddis, Cold War, 217; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 353.

[22] Wilson, ‘How Grand’.