The last Soviet offensive in the Cold War: emergence and development of the campaign against NATO euromissiles, 1979–1983

Abstract

Ever since NATO existed, the Kremlin was keen to eliminate it. In 1966–68, there appeared to be a window of opportunity which, however, was closed when the USSR crushed Czechoslovak reform communism. From 1969 onward, Brezhnev sought ‘political détente’ with the West to initiate a process of ‘military détente’ intended to allow for a Soviet first strike capability against Western Europe. The campaign designed to promote this policy by generating public pressure in Western countries gained momentum only when NATO decided to counter crucial SS-20 armament. Massive anti-NATO ‘peace’ opposition resulted, but failed to achieve its purpose. The stage was set for the breakdown of the Soviet empire.

Notes

 [1] Final Document of the International Communist Parties Conference in Moscow, 5–17 June 1969, ‘Zadachi bor'by protiv imperializma’.

 [2] Report by Ceauşescu to the Romanian Politburo on the PCC Meeting in Budapest, 18 March 1969, in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, 332. Ceauşescu was critical of the Soviet argument.

 [3] Zagladin, Mezhdunarodnoe kommunisticheskoe dvizhenie.

 [4] Jegorow, Friedliche Koexistenz und revolutionärer Prozess; Ponomarjow, ‘Die Rolle des Sozialismus’; Morozov, Obshchestvennost' i problemy voiny i mira; Zagladin, Europe and the Communists.

 [5] Sagladin, Neue Erscheinungen im revolutionären Weltprozess.

 [6] Soviet documents quoted by Bukowski, Abrechnung mit Moskau, 423, 427.

 [7] For details see Ploetz, ‘Breshnews Langzeitstrategie im Spiegel von SED-Dokumenten’; Ploetz, ‘NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation’, 201–21; Schlaga, Die Kommunisten in der Friedensbewegung, 263–96. Cf. Rose, The Soviet Propaganda Network.

 [8] See the internal documents quoted by Ploetz, Wie die Sowjetunion, 130–39; and Decision by the CPSU Secretariat, 26 September 1969, in Bukowski, Abrechnung, 432–33; Nekrasov, ‘Volia miroliubovoi obshchestvennosti’, 106, 109–10, 113; Symms and Snow, ‘Soviet Propaganda and the Neutron Bomb Decision’; Haslam, The Soviet Union, 96–100; Müller, ‘Die Friedensbewegung’, 95–100. According to an estimate by the CIA, the Kremlin supported the campaign with $100 million according to statement by Gates, Soviet Active Measures, 7–8.

 [9] Statements by CPSU Secretary-General Brezhnev and Soviet Marshal Kulikov during the Political Consultative Committee meeting, 22–23 November 1978, quoted by Müller, ‘Die Friedensbewegung’, 100–101. The excerpts of Brezhnev's speech in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, 418–21, largely omit the relevant passages.

[10] Speech by Marshal Grechko at the ‘Zapad’ exercise, 16 October 1969 in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, 342–6.

[11] Speech by Soviet Marshal Grechko at the First Meeting of the Warsaw Pact Committee of Defence Ministers, in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, 356–7.

[12] For evaluation by a Soviet expert see Tschertok, Raketen und Menschen, 3, 535–40, 545. NATO assessment is underlying the statements by Nielsen, ‘Das Kräfteverhältnis bei den Nuklearwaffen’. Cf. Haslam, The Soviet Union, 58–62.

[13] Rühl, Mittelstreckenwaffen in Europa, 123.

[14] Bundesarchiv [of the Federal Republic of Germany] – Militärarchiv [Military Section in Freiburg], VA-01/32241, pp. 209–12: Information über die während der Manöver ‘Sapad-81’ vorgeführten Komplexe der strategischen Angriffskräfte der UdSSR [document from the Defence Ministry of the former GDR], undated [September 1981] (translation into English: ‘Information by Marshal Ustinov on Soviet Strategic Offensive Forces, September 1981’, Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, 449–50).

[15] Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva, 269.

[16] Statement by Central Committee Secretary B. Ponomarev in 1973 quoted by Ploetz, Wie die Sowjetunion, 126–7; Statement by KBG General Ivashutin at the Sofia Meeting of the Warsaw Pact Chiefs of Staff in October 1980, quoted by Ploetz, Wie die Sowjetunion, 80. Cf. explanations by Soviet Army General Romanov, 12–14 June 1978, in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, 416; Savelyev and Detinov, The Big Five, 3–4.

[17] See e.g. Savelyev and Detinov, The Big Five, 9–10, 13; Helmut Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte, 62–4 (explanation by Secretary-General Brezhnev during a conversation with Chancellor Schmidt in October 1974).

[18] Kulish, Voennaia sila i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 71; Brezhnev, Leninskim kursom: Rechi i stat'I, 211; Mil'shtein, ‘Amerikanskie voennye doktriny’, 40–1; Proektor, ‘European Stability and Military Strength’, 77.

[19] Savelyev and Detinov, The Big Five, 3.

[20] Arbatov, Voenno-strategicheskii paritet i politika SShA, 282.

[21] To this end, the Kremlin permanently demanded renunciation of nuclear first use under any circumstance (i.e. also when West European defences would be shattered by a Warsaw Pact assault). When this bid was rejected, it attempted to make the United States accept non-use of nuclear weaponry in mutual relations to undermine extended deterrence, cf. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 276–9; Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva, 232.

[22] Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 958–74.

[23] Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis, 164–5, 169–73.

[24] Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte, 79–88; Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis, 164–8.

[25] Speech by Helmut Schmidt at the London International Institute of Strategic Studies, 28 October 1977, 2–10.

[26] Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis, 174.

[27] Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte, 90–4; Brezhnev's remarks in his speech at the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee Meeting in Moscow, 22 November 1978, in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle, 421.

[28] Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte, 99; Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Policy of Nuclear Weapons, 100–1; Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis, 162–4, 252–7; North Atlantic Assembly, Second Interim Report on Nuclear Weapons in Europe; Herff, War by Other Means, 45–66.

[29] Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte, 100–1; Kornienko, Kholodnaia voina, 293–4.

[30] Soviet intelligence assessment at the conference of Eastern secret services in Sofia, 23–29 May 1977, as quoted by Süss, Asymmetrische Kooperation; Marshal Ogarkov's analysis of the ‘Zapad’ Exercise, 30 May–9 June 1977, in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, 406–12.

[31] B.N. Ponomarëv to H. Axen, 25–25 January 1979, quoted by Ploetz, Wie die Sowjetunion, 136–7.

[32] Address by B.N. Ponomarëv at a CPSU–SED consultation in East Berlin, 3–5 July 1979, quoted by Ploetz, Wie die Sowjetunion, 137.

[33] Speech by Brezhnev at the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee Meeting in Moscow, 22 November 1978, in Mastny and Byrne A Cardboard Castle?, 418–21.

[34] Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis, 178–9, 256–7.

[35] Wiegrefe, Das Zerwürfnis, 257–9.

[36] Assessment by KGB Army General Ivashutin, 31 October 1980, quoted by Ploetz, Wie die Sowjetunion, 82; Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, 292, 324.

[37] See e.g. B.N. Ponomarëv to H. Axen, 23–24 January 1980, quoted by Ploetz, ‘Breschnews Langzeitstrategie im Spiegel’, 54–5; explanations by Ustinov during the ‘Zapad’ exercise in September 1981, quoted by Ploetz, ‘NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organisation’, 218–9.

[38] Ponomarëv statement in 1973 quoted by Ploetz, Wie die Sowjetunion, 126–7; statement by KGB General Ivashutin in October 1980, quoted by Ploetz, Wie die Sowjetunion, 80. Cf. explanations by Soviet Army General Romanov at the Meeting of the Warsaw Pact Chiefs of General Staff in Sofia, 12–14 June 1978, in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, 416.

[39] CPSU Secretary-General Andropov in a conversation with SED Secretary-General Honecker, 4 May 1983, quoted by Staadt, ‘Die Westarbeit der SED und ihre Wirkungen’, 2267.

[40] Savelyev and Detinov, The Big Five, 57–8.

[41] ‘Rech' tovarishcha Leonida Il'icha Brezhneva’, Pravda, 7 October 1979. Cf. Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte, 101–2; Haslam, The Soviet Union, 102–3.

[42] 20,000 soldiers and 100 tanks were less than five per cent of the overall number deployed in East Germany alone. Moreover, they were withdrawn on an individual basis, i.e. they were taken out of their units all of which remained in place.

[43] Statement by Ustinov at a session of the Military Council of the Warsaw Pact forces, 3–6 December 1979, quoted by Ploetz, Wie die Sowjetunion, 108.

[44] Russian State Archive of Most Recent History (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii, RGANI), fond 89, god 1979, perechen’ 31, 19-1, pp. 1–2: O propagandistskikh meropriiatiiakh v sviazi c dopol'nitel'nymi voenno-politicheskimi merami po ogranicheniiu gonki vooruzhenii v Evrope (excerpt of Protocol No. 179 § 34gs of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat), 8 October 1979.

[45] Ploetz and Müller. Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung?, 203–4.

[46] D. Ustinov, ‘Voennaia razriadka – velenie vremeni’, Pravda, 25 October 1979.

[47] [V. Zagladin and V. Falin,] ‘Unsere Raketen zielen nicht auf Bonn’, Der Spiegel, 5 November 1979, 38, 40, 42, 45, 47, 49, 52, 54, 56, 58, 61, 63.

[48] Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte, 102–6.

[49] Press-konferentsiia A.A. Gromyko v Bonne, 23 November 1979, Izvestiia, 25 November 1979.

[50] ‘Andrei Gromyko an die NATO-Länder: Sofort Verhandlungen beginnen!’, Neues Deutschland, 6 December 1979.

[51] Report on the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers meeting, 5–6 December 1979, to the SED Politburo, mentioned by Ploetz and Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung?, 142.

[52] For the text of the NATO decision see Bettzüge, Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 469–72.

[53] ‘“Net!” amerikanskim raketam’ [authorized press statement], Pravda, 15 December 1979.

[54] Gromyko when talking to GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer, 20 February 1980, quoted by Ploetz and Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung?, 143.

[55] Decision by the CPSU Politburo, 1 February 1980, printed in: Bukowski, Abrechnung mit Moskau, 414.

[56] B.N. Ponomarëv in a conversation with Hermann Axen, 23–24 January 1980, quoted by Ploetz, Wie die Sowjetunion, 210.

[57] Shaposhnikov, ‘O nekotorykh problemakh antivoennogo dvizheniia’, 21–2.

[58] Schmidt's address to the social democratic parliamentary caucus, 13 November 1979, Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik (mimeographed information service issued by the Federal Press and Information Office), 12/1979, 7.

[59] D. Ustinov in a conversation with Marshal Kulikov, 14 June 1982, in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, 464; Gromyko, Pamiatnoe, 471–4; Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva, 196.

[60] B.N. Ponomarëv in a conversation with H. Axen, 23–24 January 1980, in: Ploetz, Wie die Sowjetunion, 211–12; Gromyko in a conversation with GDR Foreign Minister O. Fischer, 20 February 1980, quoted by Ploetz and Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung?, 143–4; B.N. Ponomarëv at a secret conference of communist parties' international secretaries, 26 February 1980, in Ploetz and Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung?, 213–14.

[61] Gromyko in a conversation with East German Foreign Minister O. Fischer, 20 February 1980, quoted by Ploetz and Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung?, 143–4; statement by B.N. Ponomarëv at a secret conference of communist party international secretaries, 26 February 1980, in Ploetz and Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung?, 213–14.

[62] ‘Sowjetische Friedenskampagne in Europa’, IPZ-Information (West German information bulletin based on information by Western intelligence), no. K/9 (December 1982), 77. For confirmation of the announced policy direction see [V. Zagladin,] ‘Unsere Losung: Keine Raketen’, Der Spiegel, 8 June 1981, 119.

[63] Baer and Storm, no title [report from Helsinki], Allgemeiner Deutscher Nachrichtendienst (ADN) [the GDR's news agency), 18 December 1979; Gerd Prokot, ‘Den entspannungsfeindlichen Kräften gilt es eine Abfuhr zu erteilen’, Neues Deutschland, 19 December 1979; Günther Drefahl, ‘Koordinierte Aktionen der Völker gegen den NATO-Konfrontationskurs’, Horizont, 28 January 1980. Drefahl was the President of the GDR Peace Council.

[64] RGANI, fond 89, god 1980, perechen' 39, dok-no. 1, pp. 1–2, ‘O dopolnitel'nykh meropriiatiiakh po aktivizatsii vystuplenii obshchestvennosti protiv resheniia NATO o proizvodstve i razmeshchenii novykh amerikanskikh raket v Zapadnoi Evrope’, 15 April 1980. The instruction was approved by all CC secretaries (Suslov, Gorbachëv, Ponomarëv, Kapitonov, Dolgykh, Zimianin) on the same day and then submitted to the CPSU Politburo which ratified it.

[65] RGANI, fond 89, god 1980, perechen' 31, dok-no. 61, p. 1, ‘Vypiska iz protokola No. 214 § 74gs Sekretariata TsK’, 9 April 1980.

[66] Address by V. Shaposhnikov, 6 May 1980, quoted by Ploetz and Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung?, 215–6.

[67] Address by B.N. Ponomarëv, 15 July 1980, quoted by Ploetz and Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung?, 217–20.

[68] Paper by the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, undated (summer 1980), quoted by Bukowski, Abrechnung, 436–7.

[69] Report to the SED Politburo on the World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace, 23–27 September 1980, as summarized by Ploetz and Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung?, 221–2. For Soviet preparations for the Sofia World Parliament see RGANI, fond 89, god 1980, perechen' No. 39, dok.-no. 14-11s, pp. 1–2, ‘Postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK KPSS’, 8 August 1980.

[70] Quoted by Bukowski, Abrechnung, 437–40.

[71] Müller, ‘Die Friedensbewegung’, 96–8.

[72] van Hüllen, ‘Der “Krefelder Appell”’, 216.

[73] This party had been founded by SED envoys and West German communists in 1960 as an allegedly independent organization to rally all kinds of ‘bourgeois’ and other people behind their cause. It was both financed and controlled by the SED. See in more detail Baron, ‘Das KOFAZ, die Grünen und die DKP in der Friedensbewgung’, 201, 202–5; van Hüllen, ‘Der “Krefelder Appell”’, 217–9; Baron, Kalter Krieg, 44–60.

[74] Deutscher Bundestag, 9. Wahlperiode, ed., ‘Antwort der Bundesregierung auf eine Kleine Anfrage’, Drucksache 9/466, 22 May 1981, 2; van Hüllen, ‘Der “Krefelder Appell”’, 221.

[75] ‘Budapester Appell des Weltfriedensrates: Achtung Kriegsgefahr!’, 128.

[76] Baron, ‘Das KOFAZ, die Grünen und die DKP in der Friedensbewgung’, 200.

[77] The fact that he was subsequently awarded the Soviet Order of Lenin rather than an East German order, indicates that he was directly connected to Moscow.

[78] Baron, ‘Das KOFAZ, die Grünen und die DKP in der Friedensbewegung’, 202–7; Baron, Kalter Krieg und heisser Frieden, 44–66, 86–93; van Hüllen, ‘Der “Krefelder Appell”’, 223–7, 245; Ploetz and Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung?, 301–4; Ploetz, ‘Die Rolle des DDR’, 261–3; Wagenlehner, ‘Die Auseinandersetzung des PVS’, 283–5; Wettig, High Road, Low Road, 88–93; Horchem, Auch Spione werden pensioniert, 32–4.

[79] Text: Linn, Die Kampagne gegen die NATO, 76–8.

[80] Ploetz and Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung?, 303–4; van Hüllen, ‘Der “Krefelder Appell”’, 231–2, 236–46; Knabe, ‘MfS und Friedensbewegung’, 312–3; Wettig, High Road, 91–2. The lists with the signatures collected were stored at Weber's office where no one was allowed to take a look at them. It appears as if the signatures by major representatives of groups and organizations were counted as all members' individual signatures.

[81] Cf. D. Ustinov, ‘Otstoiat’ mir', Pravda, 22 June 1981. The thesis was disseminated by propaganda brochures worked out in the USSR such as Proektor, ed. (on behalf of Sovetskii komitet evropeiskoi bezopasnosti i sotrudnichestva and Nauchnyi sovet issledovaniia po voprosam mira i razoruzheniia), Europa in Gefahr; Proektor, ed. (on behalf of Sovetskii komitet evropeiskoi bezopasnosti i sotrudnichestva), December is Near.

[82] This can be inferred from the authority he enjoyed among fellow communists, his exclusive power to dispose of their resources, and his being awarded the Order of Lenin afterwards.

[83] Baron, ‘Das KOFAZ’, 205–11; Baron, Kalter Krieg, 217–9; Baron, ‘Die Deutschlandpolitik’; Ploetz and Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung, 305–6; Knabe, ‘MfS und Friedensbewegung’; Knabe, ‘Was erfuhr Honecker vom MfS über die Grünen’; Knabe, ‘Die Westarbeit der Stasi bei den Bonner Grünen’. For the communists' impact on decision-making on the big mass demonstrations in 1981–83 see Wettig, High Road, 93–8.

[84] Ploetz, Wie die Sowjetunion, 88–91. Cf. Chancellor Schmidt's assessment of Brezhnev's and Gromyko's views on the Reagan administration in his conversations with them in Bonn on 22–24 November 1981 in Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte, 125–6.

[85] Arbatov, Voenno-strategicheskii paritet, 142–3, 148–9, 152, 167, 179.

[86] Conversation Iu. Andropov – E. Mielke, 11 July 1981, quoted by Ploetz, Wie die Sowjetunion, 91–6. Talking to Marshal Kulikov on 14 June 1982, Ustinov expressed concern over the U.S. intention of ‘bringing us to our knees economically by using the arms race’ but assured him that the USSR would ‘by no means allow NATO to surpass us in the nuclear field’ (excerpts in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, 464–5).

[87] M.A. Suslov at the Politburo meeting, 19 December 1981, quoted by Kramer, ‘Poland 1980–1981’, 137; Kramer, ‘Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union’.

[88] D. Ustinov, ‘Delu partii verny’, Pravda, 22 January 1981.

[89] D. Ustinov, ‘Otstoiat’ mir', Pravda, 22 June 1981; D. Ustinov, ‘Otvesti ugrozu iadernoi voiny’, Pravda, 12 June 1982.

[90] Speech by Andropov at the Political Consultative Committee Meeting in Prague, 4–5 January 1983, in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, 472–4. Given notably Ceauşescu's reserved, often openly negative attitude to Soviet policy, the wording was shaped by a perceived need to persuade his audience.

[91] Süss, Asymmetrische Kooperation.

[92] East German report on a speech by Soviet Marshal Ogarkov at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Chiefs of Staff, 8–10 September 1982, in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, 466–8.

[93] Statement by Andropov at the Political Consultative Committee Meeting in Prague, 4–5 January 1983, in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, 474.

[94] Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte, 108–25; Ploetz and Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung?, 117; Kornienko, Kholodnaia voina, 299–300. Schmidt's suggestion was reflected in the Federal Government force comparison: Chlad, Es geht um unsere Sicherheit, 65.

[95] Savelyev and Detinov, The Big Five, 56.

[96] Wettig, ‘Die Instrumentalisierung von Bedrohungsvorstellungen und Streitkräftedaten’; Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, 321. See also Savelyev and Detinov, The Big Five, 56–61.

[97] ‘Otchët Tsentral'nogo komiteta KPSS XXVI s-ezdu Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza I ocherednye zadachi partii v oblasti vneshnei i vnutrennei politiki [speech by L. I. Brezhnev], Izvestiia, 24 February 1981; [Georgii Arbatov,] ‘Prüfen Sie uns, ob wir guten Willens sind’, Der Spiegel, 23 March 1981, 128–9, 132–4; [Vadim Zagladin,] ‘Unsere Losung: Keine Raketen’, Der Spiegel, 6 June 1981, 118–20; [Vadim Zagladin,] ‘Wir sind gegen alle Raketen, gegen alle Atomwaffen’, Unsere Zeit, 12 June 1981.

[98] Leonid Brezhnev,] ‘Versetzen Sie sich einmal in unsere Lage…’, Der Spiegel, 2 November 1981, 34–5, 37, 39, 42, 45, 47, 51, 53–4, 57, 60, 63; Letter by the CPSU Central Committee to socialist and social democratic parties in Europe, News Release (issued by the Information Department of the [British] Labour Party), PS 58/81.

[99] Schmidt, Menschen und Mächte, 125–6; Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot Kollontai do Gorbachëva, 195–8.

[100] Speech by Andropov at the Political Consultative Committee Meeting in Prague, 4–5 January 1983, in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, 474–6.

[101] Savelyev and Detinov, The Big Five, 61–3; Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, 291; Nitze, ‘Briefing on Theater Nuclear Force’.

[102] ‘Impuls für Genfer Verhandlungen: UdSSR legt konstruktive Verhandlungsvorschläge vor’ [TASS statement, 9 February 1982], Neues Deutschland, 11 February 1982.

[103] ‘Zaboty o liudiakh truda, zaboty o proizvodstve’ [speech by L. I. Brezhnev], Pravda, 17 March 1982.

[104] Statement by Richard Burt, a leading State Department official, on 30 June 1982 as reported inter alia in the following newspaper articles: [no author given], ‘USA: Angaben falsch’, General-Anzeiger (Bonn), 1 July 1982; [no author given], ‘Moskau stationiert weiter SS 20 in Europa’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 July 1982.

[105] William Beecher, ‘The Next Session in Geneva Open-Ended’, Boston Globe, 31 July 1983; John Barry, ‘Is there a Way Out of Zero-Zero?’, The Times, 1 June 1983; [Paul H. Nitze,] ‘Die Sowjets sind auf Überlegenheit aus’, Der Spiegel, 12 December 1983, 122–4; ‘The INF Negotiations: An Interview with Ambassador Paul Nitze by John Halstead’, Canadian Defense Quarterly, Summer 1984, 13–20; Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, 301–19; Tuschhoff, ‘Der Genfer “Waldspaziergang” 1982’. Being a domestic opponent of the Reagan administration Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits, 116–30, seeks to put the blame of rejection on Washington. His argument was unconvincing from the very start since he had no information whatsoever on decision-making in the Kremlin and hence failed to take into account that, due to lacking positive response from Moscow, Nitze did not commit his authority.

[106] M.A. Suslov at a CPSU Politburo meeting, 19 December 1981, quoted by Kramer, ‘Poland 1980–1981’, 137; Savelyev and Detinov, The Big Five, 66.

[107] Speech by Andropov at the Political Consultative Committee Meeting in Prague, 4–5 January 1983, in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, 472–9.

[108] ‘Shestdesiat’ let’ (speech by Iu. V. Andropov), Pravda, 22 December 1982; [Iurii Andropov,] ‘Otvety na voprosy politicheskogo obozrevatelia Dzh. Kingsberi-Smita’, Pravda, 31 December 1982.

[109] Vadim Zagladin, ‘We are Offering a Disarmament Race’, Newsweek, 7 February 1983, 52.

[110] Press-konferentsiia A.A. Gromyko, Pravda, 3 April 1983.

[111] [Iurii Andropov,] ‘Wo sollen wir eigentlich nachgeben?’, Der Spiegel, 25 April 1983, 134, 136, 139, 140.

[112] ‘V druzhestvennoi obstanovke. Vystuplenie Iu. V. Andropova’, Pravda, 4 May 1983.

[113] Wettig, ‘Andropows neue INF-Vorschläge’.

[114] ‘Zaiavlenie sovetskogo pravitel'stva’, Pravda, 29 May 1983.

[115] Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, 328–9; Ploetz and Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung?, 167; ‘Otvet Iu. V. Andropova na voprosy gazety “Pravda”’, Pravda, 28 August 1983.

[116] Cherniaev, ‘Na Staroi Ploshchadi’, 110–12; Kwizinskij, Nach dem Sturm, 329–51; Savelyev and Detinov, The Big Five, 66–7; [Paul H. Nitze;] ‘Die Sowjets sind auf Überlegenheit aus’, Der Spiegel, 12 December 1983, 120–2, 124–7.

[117] In a conversation with Soviet chief negotiator Kvitsinskii, Gromyko referred to the change of West German government (which had just taken place) only in passing (Kwizinskij, Nach dem Sturm, 316).

[118] While Gromyko in an internal statement on 6–7 April 1983 (quoted by Ploetz and Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung?, 158–61) and leading Central Committee cadre V. Shaposhnikov in his article ‘O nekotorykh problemakh antivoennogo dvizheniia’, 22–24, felt that pressure by the peace movement in the FRG would not allow for NATO deployment, major Soviet leaders concurred with the view expressed by West German communist leader Herbert Mies [in Russian: Gerbert Mis], in his article ‘K edinstvu deistvii v bor'be za mir i trud’, 95–7, that this was rather doubtful. See e.g. the statements by Ustinov on 14 June 1982, in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, 464; and Andropov on 4–5 January 1983, in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, 476.

[119] Statement by Gromyko at the Sofia foreign ministers meeting, 13–14 October 1983, quoted by Ploetz and Müller, Ferngelenkte Friedensbewegung?, 169–74.

[120] Linksextremistische und sicherheitsgefährdende Bestrebungen innerhalb der Kampagne gegen die NATO-Nachrüstung, hier: Aktionsplanung Sommer und Herbst 1983 (prepared by a West German intelligence service), 20 June 1983; ‘DKP beherrscht Planungen für die “Friedenswoche”’, Die Welt, 6 October 1983.

[121] ‘Erklärung von Sowjetbotschafter Semjonow’, Deutsche Presse-Angentur (dpa), 11 November 1983.

[122] Herff, War by Other Means, 202–14; Janning, ‘Die neue Friedensbewegung’, 46.