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Abstract
Despite his prominent positions in the Soviet Union's hierarchy, the history of Yuri Andropov's crisis decision-making is patchy. Several historians claim Andropov's response to crises was influenced by his experience in 1956 Budapest. Some attribute to him a ‘Hungarian Complex’ – a conviction that only armed force could save states at risk from internal dissent. This paper examines the legend by assessing Andropov's advice during crises in Czechoslovakia (1968), Afghanistan (1979) and Poland (1980–81). The documentary record shows Andropov did not instinctively favour the use of armed force. Instead, when faced with crises in fraternal states, he first sought an internal solution before advocating armed force.
Notes
Timothy Andrews Sayle recently completed his MA at the University of Toronto, where he held a Department of National Defence SDF MA Scholarship and was a Junior Fellow at Massey College. He owes a debt of thanks to Robert Johnson and Cold War History's two anonymous reviewers for their sound advice.
[1] CitationWest, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, 765.
[2] CitationAndrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 5.
[3] CitationSteele and Abraham, Andropov in Power, 63.
[4] CitationSolovyev and Klepikova, Yuri Andropov, 46.
[5] CitationGarthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 1035.
[6] Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 5.
[7] Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, 13.
[8] CitationArbatov, The System, 266.
[9] Steele and Abraham, Andropov in Power, 48.
[10] Steele and Abraham, Andropov in Power, 76.
[11] Steele and Abraham, Andropov in Power, 115.
[12] Steele and Abraham, Andropov in Power
[13] Steele and Abraham, Andropov in Power, 120.
[14] For an examination of the competing news analysis, see CitationMedvedev, Andropov. For a biting analysis of Andropov see Solovyev and Klepikova, Yuri Andropov. For a more generous overview, see Steele and Abraham, Andropov in Power.
[15] CitationGaddis, The Cold War, 152.
[16] Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 256.
[17] CitationKramer, ‘The Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia’, 8.
[18] CitationKramer, ‘The Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia’, 7.
[19] Steele and Abraham, Andropov in Power, 117–18.
[20] ‘Remarks by Leonid Brezhnev at a Meeting of Top CPCz Officials, in Prague, December 9, 1967’, in CitationNavatil, ed., The Prague Spring 1968, 19.
[21] ‘Letter from Leonid Brezhnev to Alexander Dubèek Proposing Another Bilateral Meeting, June 11, 1968’, in ibid., 159.
[22] ‘Letter of the CPSU CC Politburo to the CPCz CC Presidium, July 4, 1968’, in ibid., 196.
[23] The ‘Two Thousand Words’ was a widely published manifesto signed calling on the people of Czechoslovakia to hold their government to account. It was signed by 60 citizens and viewed in Moscow as particularly incendiary. ‘Letter of the CPSU CC Politburo to the CPCz CC Presidium, July 4, 1968’, in ibid., 197.
[24] ‘Letter of the CPSU CC Politburo to the CPCz CC Presidium, July 4, 1968’, in ibid.
[25] ‘Speech by Leonid Brezhnev to the CPSU Central Committee on the Proceedings and Reports of the Warsaw Meeting, July 17, 1968’, in ibid., 258.
[26] Brezhnev and the CPSU continue to make an issue of mass media in several further communications with the Czechoslovak leadership. See ‘CPSU CC Politburo Message to Alexander Dubèek, August 13, 1968’ and ‘Transcript of Leonid Brezhnev Telephone Conversation with Alexander Dubček, August 13, 1968’, in ibid.
[27] ‘The Soviet Politburo's Resolution on the Final decision to Intervene in Czechoslovakia, August 17, 1968’, in ibid., 377.
[28] In 1989, the CPSU estimated Soviet losses at 13,310 dead, 35,478 wounded, and an annual expenditure of 5 billion roubles. ‘CC CPSU Letter on Afghanistan, May 10, 1988’, in CitationSavranskaya, Volume Ii: Afghanistan.
[29] CitationColl, Ghost Wars, 40.
[30] ‘Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo discussions on Afghanistan, 17–19 March 1979’, in ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, Citation1978/1989: Documents from the Russian and East German Archives’, 136–45.
[31] ‘Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo discussions on Afghanistan, 17–19 March 1979’, in ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, Citation1978/1989: Documents from the Russian and East German Archives’, 139.
[32] ‘Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo discussions on Afghanistan, 17–19 March 1979’, in ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, Citation1978/1989: Documents from the Russian and East German Archives’, 140.
[33] ‘Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo discussions on Afghanistan, 17–19 March 1979’, in ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, Citation1978/1989: Documents from the Russian and East German Archives’, 141.
[34] ‘Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo discussions on Afghanistan, 17–19 March 1979’, in ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, Citation1978/1989: Documents from the Russian and East German Archives’, 142.
[35] ‘Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo discussions on Afghanistan, 17–19 March 1979’, in ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, Citation1978/1989: Documents from the Russian and East German Archives’
[36] ‘Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo discussions on Afghanistan, 17–19 March 1979’, in ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, Citation1978/1989: Documents from the Russian and East German Archives’, 144.
[37] ‘Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo discussions on Afghanistan, 17–19 March 1979’, in ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, Citation1978/1989: Documents from the Russian and East German Archives’
[38] ‘Personal Memorandum, Andropov to Brezhnev’. No date, early December 1979 in ‘Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo discussions on Afghanistan, 17–19 March 1979’, in ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, Citation1978/1989: Documents from the Russian and East German Archives’, 159.
[39] Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 992–9.
[40] Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 1034.
[41] Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation
[42] ‘Personal Memorandum, Andropov to Brezhnev’. No date, early December 1979’, in ‘The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978/1989: Documents from the Russian and East German Archives’, 159.
[43] Gaddis, The Cold War, 218.
[44] ‘CPSU CC Politburo Decision Setting Up Suslov Commission, August 25, 1980’, in Virtual Archive Citation 2.0 .
[45] ‘Special Dossier on the Polish Crisis of 1980, August 29, 1980’, in ibid.
[46] ‘CPSU CC Politburo Report ‘On Theses for the discussion with representatives of the Polish leadership, September 3, 1980’, in ibid.
[47] ‘Session of the CPSU CC Politburo on ‘Materials for a Friendly Working Visit to the USSR by Polish Leaders’, 29 October 1980’, in ibid.
[48] ‘Session of the CPSU CC Politburo, 02 April 1981 (excerpt)’, in ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] ‘Session of the CPSU CC Politburo, 09 April 1981 (excerpt)’, in ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] CitationKramer, ‘Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis’, 123.
[54] ‘Session of the CPSU CC Politburo, 29 October 1981 (excerpt)’, in Virtual Archive 2.0.
[55] ‘Session of the CPSU CC Politburo, 10 December 1981’, in ibid.
[56] Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 1091.
[57] ‘Session of the CPSU CC Politburo, 02 April 1981 (excerpt)’, in Virtual Archive 2.0.
[58] ‘KGB Annual Report for 1981 (excerpts)’, in ibid.
[59] CitationDostoevsky, The Devils, 270.
[60] Steele and Abraham, Andropov in Power, 89.
[61] Kramer, ‘Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis’, 123.
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