The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the 1954 Geneva Conference: A revisionist critique

Abstract

Drawing upon documentary and other evidence from Vietnam this paper argues that in 1954 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) accepted negotiations and a diplomatic solution to its war against France because it served some of its most vital interests and satisfied its sense of the possibilities of the moment. To be sure, the DRVN leadership responded positively to concerns and pressures from its socialist allies, the Soviet Union and China, on some issues in Geneva. But it was not, as western scholars have maintained, acting against its own better judgement or strategic imperatives.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Chris Goscha for his help in locating a crucial source; the two anonymous reviewers for Cold War History for their thoughtful comments on the original submission; Idus Newby for his painstaking editing of drafts of this article; and Hawaii Pacific University's Grace Cheng, Paul Carlock, Russ Gottwald, Nate Chase, Ed Zelczak, and Mark Snakenberg for their discerning examination of the final version.

Notes

  [1] Besides the works considered below see Cable, Geneva Conference of 1954, which posits that the Geneva Conference ‘provided the last example of an independent British policy exercising significant influence in the resolution of a major international crisis’ (3); Devillers and Lacouture, End of a War; and Randle, Geneva 1954, which focuses on the legal soundness and implications of the Geneva accords.

  [2] Emphasis added. The original reads: ‘Comment, dès lors, ne pas y voir, au moins partiellement, la conséquence d'une pression sino-soviétique’? (Joyaux, La Chine et le règlement du premier conflit d'Indochine, 279).

  [3] Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 57, 62, 64.

  [4] Chen Jian, Mao's China, 62.

  [5] Olsen, Soviet–Vietnam Relations, 45.

  [6] Goscha, Vietnam or Indochina?, 145–6.

  [7] Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam, 13, 23, 50. However, Gaiduk refutes the claim that Paris and Moscow made a secret deal providing for French rejection of the EDC in return for Soviet assistance in expediting the end of the war in Indochina on terms favourable to Paris.

  [8] Turley, Second Indochina War, 17.

  [9] Vickery, Cambodia, 36–8.

 [10] Chen Jian and Shen Zhihua, ‘Geneva Conference of 1954’, 8. Ilya Gaiduk similarly asserts that DRVN President Ho Chi Minh ‘obviously had no other choice but to acquiesce to his allies’ point of view' immediately before and during the Geneva Conference (Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam, 24). See also Young, Vietnam Wars, 38–9; Hess, Vietnam and the United States, 48; and Herring, America's Longest War, 39–40.

 [11] William Duiker and Carlyle Thayer have briefly addressed that role. See Duiker, Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 170–3; Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, Chapter 6; and Thayer, War by Other Means, 1–10.

 [12] Hoang Hong, ‘Nghien cuu phuong phap luan su hoc o Viet Nam’, 15–25.

 [13] For an analysis of the evolution of Vietnamese scholarship on the Franco-Vietnamese War see Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, ‘Vietnamese Historians and the First Indochina War’, 41–55.

 [14] Increasingly in Vietnam, the Van kien Dang series is the chief source on which scholars base works pertaining to the French and American wars. In some cases entire articles rest exclusively on documents drawn for the series. See for example Vu Quang Hien, ‘Su chi dao cua Bo chinh tri trong giai doan cuoi cuoc khang chien chong My’, 5–8, 43.

 [15] The original history is Bo Ngoai Giao, Dau tranh ngoai giao trong Cach mang dan toc dan chu nhan dan (1945–1954), Tap 2: Dau tranh ngoai giao trong khang chien chong thuc dan phan dong Phap xam luoc va Hoi nghi quoc te Gio-Ne-Vo nam 1954 ve Dong-Duong (1947–1954), published in 1976. The reprint, used for this paper, is Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao. I am indebted to Christopher Goscha of Université du Québec à Montréal for sharing his copy of that revealing document with me.

 [16] The Viet Minh was formed by Vietnamese communists during World War II to resist the Japanese. After 1945 the front remained under communist control and contributed to the resistance against France. The term is short for ‘Viet Nam Doc lap Dong minh hoi’, literally, ‘Independence League of Vietnam’.

 [17] On these and related developments see Marr, ‘World War II and the Indochinese Revolution’, 126–58; and Marr, Vietnam 1945.

 [18] ‘Nghi quyet cua Hoi nghi can bo Trung uong, tu 3-4 den 6-4-1947’, Dang Cong san Viet Nam, Van kien Dang, Tap 8: 1945–1947, 173–206.

 [19] Ho Chi Minh, Toan tap, 168.

 [20] France established the SOVN in Saigon in March 1949 under former emperor Bao Dai as chief of state and Tran Van Huu as president. A stereotypically puppet regime, the SOVN gained a veneer of legitimacy when the French national assembly voted in April 1949 to repeal the ‘département’ status of Cochinchina and grant autonomy to Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina) within the French Union (Union française). Under that arrangement, the SOVN government became ostensibly responsible for domestic and some foreign affairs of Vietnam, and had an army under its own flag.

 [21] The text of the agreement is reproduced in United States Senate – Committee on Foreign Relations, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia, 50–62.

 [22] The ‘Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference: On Restoring Peace in Indochina, 21 July 1954’ and the ‘Statement by the Under Secretary of State at the Concluding Plenary Session of the Geneva Conference, 21 July 1954’ are reproduced in United States Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, 164–6.

 [23] Vu Quang Hien, Tim hieu chu truong doi ngoai cua Dang, 170. The Party reiterated its commitment to ‘complete victory’ repeatedly after 1946, including in late 1951. See ‘Thong tri cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 24 thang 12 nam 1951, ve thai do cua ta voi Nghi quyet cua Hoi dong hoa binh the gio, ve cuoc chien tranh o Viet Nam’, Dang Cong san Viet Nam, Van kien Dang, Tap 12: 1951, 621.

 [24] On the overall military situation in Indochina see Fall, Street without Joy.

 [25] Hoang Minh Thao, ‘Chien thang Dien Bien Phu voi Hoi nghi Gionevo’, 41.

 [26] ‘De hoan thanh nhiem vu va day manh cong tac truoc mat’, Dang Cong san Viet Nam, Van kien Dang, Tap 15: 1954 [hereafter referred to as VKD: 1954], 175.

 [27] National Archives Center 3, Hanoi, Vietnam [hereafter referred to as NAC3]/Phong Phu Thu Tuong [hereafter referred to as PPTT]/Ho so [hereafter referred to as HS] 1865: Bao cao cua doan Dai bieu Viet Nam di du Hoi nghi Hoi dong hoa binh the gioi lan thu 2 o Vien nam 1953/‘Bao cao cua doan Dai bieu Viet Nam tai Hoi nghi Hoi dong hoa binh the gioi lan thu 2’/23 November 1953. See also Vu Quang Hien, Tim hieu chu truong doi ngoai, 171; and ‘Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 2 thang 12 nam 1953: Ve viec giai thich loi tuyen bo cua phai doan Viet Nam o Hoi nghi Hoi dong hoa binh the gioi (11-1953)’, Dang Cong san Viet Nam, Van kien Dang, Tap 14: 1953, 521–2.

 [28] Quoted in Cameron (ed.), Vietnam Crisis, 218.

 [29] Ho Chi Minh, Toan tap, 169.

 [30] Ho Chi Minh, Toan tap, 192.

 [31] NAC3/Phong Quoc Hoi [hereafter referred to as PQH]/HS 1684: Bao cao thanh tich ve quan su trong 8 nam khang chien (1946–1954)/‘So thao bao cao quan su o Quoc hoi lan thu 3 (12-1953)’/undated (December 1953), 1–5.

 [32] NAC3/ PPTT/HS 1886: Ban nhan xet cua TW ve Hoi nghi Gionevo truoc luoc ban ve van de dinh chien o Dong Duong ngay 27.02.1954/‘May nhan xet cua Trung uong ve Hoi nghi Gio-ne’/27 February 1954, 1.

 [33] ‘So thao bao cao quan su o Quoc hoi lan thu 3 (12-1953)’, 5.

 [34] Nguyen Phuc Luan, ‘Ngoai giao Ho Chi Minh’, 6.

 [35] Cao Van Luong, ‘Chien thang Dien Bien Phu’, 18.

 [36] Thayer, War by Other Means, 3.

 [37] ‘May nhan xet cua Trung uong ve Hoi nghi Gio-ne’, 1.

 [38] Vu Duong Ninh, ‘Hiep dinh Geneva’, 14.

 [39] Chen Jian, Mao's China, 139.

 [40] Without the involvement of the PRC in this process, one VWP document from this period contended, the ‘Indochina problem’ would ‘not be resolved’ (‘May nhan xet cua Trung uong ve Hoi nghi Gio-ne’, 1).

 [41] Vu Duong Ninh, ‘Hiep dinh Geneva’, 12.

 [42] Nguyen Phuc Luan, ‘Ngoai giao Ho Chi Minh’, 8.

 [43] Phan Doan Nam, ‘Hiep dinh Gionevo 1954’, 7.

 [44] From Circular 92/TT/TP quoted in Nguyen Phuc Luan, ‘Ngoai giao Ho Chi Minh’, 6; and Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 486.

 [45] French military commander Henri Navarre designed the plan that bore his name to preclude an immediate Viet Minh victory and improve the long-term prospects for French victory in Indochina. According to the plan, from the spring of 1953 to the autumn of 1954, French and allied military units would pacify the country below the Col des Nuages located on the eighteenth parallel, and consolidate their positions there. In the north, they would prevent Viet Minh intervention and assault in Laos while avoiding large-scale confrontations and maintaining a ‘defensive mentality’. Then, with supremacy attained in the south, from late 1954 into 1956 French and allied forces would launch a general offensive against enemy strongholds in the northern perimeter. In this second stage, the French would be looking for what Navarre called ‘la bataille générale’, a decisive battle. See Navarre, Agonie de l'Indochine, 80–2. In the estimation of Laurent Césari, ‘the object of the [Navarre] plan was only to provide France with a ‘graceful exit’ from Indochina’. See Césari, ‘Declining Value of Indochina’, 189.

 [46] Quoted in Nguyen Phuc Luan, ‘Ngoai giao Ho Chi Minh’, 6.

 [47] For the standard interpretation of the ‘meaning’ of Dien Bien Phu by writers affiliated with the armed forces see Vo Nguyen Giap, ‘Tinh than Dien Bien Phu’, 3–11, which highlights the importance military historians continue to place upon the battle.

 [48] Vu Duong Ninh, ‘Chien cuoc Dien Bien Phu’, 28.

 [49] Quoted in ‘Contributions to the History of Dien Bien Phu’, 51.

 [50] Tran Do, Stories of Dien Bien Phu, 27.

 [51] Quoted in Cao Van Luong, ‘Chien thang Dien Bien Phu’, 20.

 [52] Duiker, ‘Ho Chi Minh and the Strategy of People's War’, 172.

 [53] Joyaux, La Chine et le règlement du premier conflit d'Indochine, 66. See also Gurtov, First Vietnam Crisis, 188.

 [54] Chen Jian, ‘China and the First Indo-China War’, 102, 104.

 [55] On the siege of Dien Bien Phu see Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place; Roy, La bataille de Dien Bien Phu; and Windrow, Last Valley.

 [56] From the letter reproduced in Vo Nguyen Giap, Dien Bien Phu, 8.

 [57] ‘De hoan thanh nhiem vu va day manh cong tac truoc mat’, 173–4.

 [58] Valette, La guerre d'Indochine, 183–92.

 [59] ‘Dien cua Trung uong gui don chi Pham Van Dong ngay 27.5.1954’ quoted in Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 500.

 [60] NAC3/PPTT/HS 1887: Tap tai lieu ve cac cuoc hop bao cua Phai doan Viet Nam va cac phai doan khac tai Hoi nghi Gio-ne-vo nam 1954/‘Nhung diem can nghien cuu trong bai noi chuyen nhan ngay 19 thang 5’/19 May 1954, 1.

 [61] See for instance the statement by William Turley cited above.

 [62] Vu Duong Ninh, ‘Hiep dinh Geneva’, 14.

 [63] Vu Duong Ninh, ‘Chien cuoc Dien Bien Phu’, 28.

 [64] The National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom [hereafter referred to as TNAUK]/FO 959-143/British Consulate, Hanoi to British Embassy, Saigon/2 June 1954, 2.

 [65] Thayer, War by Other Means, 3.

 [66] Devillers and Lacouture, End of a War, 149; Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, 153; Duiker, Communist Road to Power, 170; and Roy, La bataille de Dien Bien Phu, 568.

 [67] From ‘Dien cua Trung uong gui don chi Pham Van Dong ngay 27.5.1954’, 634.

 [68] Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 501.

 [69] Bui Dinh Thanh, ‘Dau tranh ngoai giao tai Hoi nghi Geneve 1954’, 525.

 [70] ‘May nhan xet cua Trung uong ve Hoi nghi Gio-ne’, 1.

 [71] From a confidential MOFA report quoted in Phan Doan Nam, ‘Hiep dinh Gionevo’, 6.

 [72] Khac Huynh, ‘Doi dieu suy nghi ve tu tuong, nghe thuat ngoai giao Ho Chi Minh’, 5.

 [73] NAC3/PQH/HS 75: Ho so phien hop BTTQH khoa I ngay 28.7.1954 ve Hoi nghi Gio-ne-vo va ket qua cua Hiep dinh chien/Handwritten notes of DRVN National Assembly acting chairman Ton Duc Thang/undated (July 1954), 1.

 [74] NAC3/PPTT/HS 1859: Tai lieu ve Hoi nghi Gio-ne-vo nam 1953/‘Politique Extérieure du Government Provisoire de la République Démocratique du Viêt-Nam: Communiqué du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères du Government Provisoire, Hanoi, 30 Octobre 1945’/30 October 1945, 1.

 [75] ‘De hoan thanh nhiem vu va day manh cong tac truoc mat’, 212.

 [76] ‘Hoan thanh nhiem vu chuan bi chuyen manh sang tong phan cong (Bao cao Hoi nghi toan quoc lan thu ba)’, Dang Cong san Viet Nam, Van kien Dang, Tap 11: 1950, 76, 100, 101; Nguyen Xuan Ot, ‘Qua trinh chuan bi thanh lap dang nhan dan cach mang Lao’, 47; and Vu Quang Hien, Tim hieu chu truong doi ngoai, 162.

 [77] Ngoai giao Viet Nam, 144–5; ‘Dien cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 11 thang 5 nam 1954’, VKD: 1954, 106–7; ‘Dien cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 8 thang 6 nam 1954: ve lanh dao phong trao dau tranh cua quan chung o Ha Noi’, VKD: 1954, 126–8; and Chen Jian, ‘China and the Indochina Settlement’, 254.

 [78] Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 500.

 [79] Hoang Minh Thao, ‘Chien thang Dien Bien Phu’, 43; Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 505–6; and The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University [hereafter referred to as VATTU]/Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 13 – The Early History of Vietnam/Box 04/Folder 09/Item Number: 2410409002 (Record #: 250034)/‘The 1954 Geneva Conference, 23 April 1979’, 40, 43.

 [80] Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 505–6; and The Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University [hereafter referred to as VATTU]/Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 13 – The Early History of Vietnam/Box 04/Folder 09/Item Number: 2410409002 (Record #: 250034)/‘The 1954 Geneva Conference, 23 April 1979’, 40–3.

 [81] Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 358.

 [82] VATTU/Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 13 – The Early History of Vietnam/Box 04/ Folder 11/Item Number: 2410411011 (Record #: 250391)/‘Geneva Conference of 1954, USSR and Chinese Objectives and Strategy, 1954’, C-1.

 [83] Prados, ‘Assessing Dien Bien Phu’, 226. Buu Loc resigned on 16 June, Diem arrived in Saigon nine days later, and the new government was installed on 7 July. On Diem's rise to power see Jacobs, America's Miracle Man in Vietnam.

 [84] TNAUK/ FO 959-143/ British Consulate, Hanoi to British Embassy, Saigon/7 July 1954, 1; and British Consulate, Hanoi to British Embassy, Saigon/20 July 1954, 1.

 [85] Ngoai giao Viet Nam, 143–9. On the issue of Cambodia and Laos, the DRVN could have benefited from Chinese and Soviet support. Unfortunately, in the end, the DRVN got no agreement on most issues concerning the rest of Indochina in Geneva because of the lack of enthusiasm for them among the conference participants, including its own allies. See Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 56–7.

 [86] ‘De hoan thanh nhiem vu va day manh cong tac truoc mat’, 211–2.

 [87] Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 506, 571.

 [88] ‘Bao cao tai Hoi nghi lan thu sau cua Ban Chap hanh Trung uong Dang (Khoa II), ngay 15 thang 7 nam 1954’, VKD: 1954, 167, note 1.

 [89] This VWP assessment is quoted in Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 535.

 [90] ‘Bao cao tai Hoi nghi lan thu sau cua Ban Chap hanh Trung uong Dang (Khoa II), ngay 15 thang 7 nam 1954’, 169.

 [91] Quoted in Phan Doan Nam, ‘Hiep dinh Gionevo’, 7.

 [92] From the VWP Politburo cable dated 4 June quoted in Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 530–1.

 [93] ‘Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 3 thang 7 nam 1954: Ve viec bao ho cac thanh pho moi gia phong’, VKD: 1954, 144.

 [94] Bo Quoc Phong, Lich su khang chien chong thuc dan Phap, 473–4; and Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 534–5.

 [95] Chen Jian, ‘China and the Indochina Settlement’, 257. See also Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 58–60.

 [96] ‘Dien cua Trung uong guy dong chi Le Duan, Nam Bo, ngay 3 thang 7 nam 1954’ quoted in Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 636.

 [97] Vu Duong Ninh, ‘Hiep dinh Geneva’, 13.

 [98] Su that ve quan he Viet Nam-Trung Quoc trong 30 nam qua, 32.

 [99] Joyaux, La Chine et le règlement du premier conflit d'Indochine, 277.

[100] Quoted in ibid., 278.

[101] ‘Bao cao tai Hoi nghi lan thu sau cua Ban Chap hanh Trung uong Dang (Khoa II), ngay 15 thang 7 nam 1954’, 162–72.

[102] The report entitled ‘Fulfilling the Responsibilities and Promoting the Work Ahead’ is cited above as ‘De hoan thanh nhiem vu va day manh cong tac truoc mat’. Its content was reproduced, and possibly vetted, in VKD: 1954, 179–222.

[103] This concern had alarmed Party leaders in one region of Vietnam (Military Region III), and may indeed have been serious. See NAC3/PQH/HS 205: Bao cao tinh hinh trong 6 thang dau nam 1954 cua UBKCHC LK III/‘Bao cao tinh hinh Lien khu III 6 thang dau nam 1954’/undated (1954), 1.

[104] This concern had alarmed Party leaders in one region of Vietnam (Military Region III), and may indeed have been serious. See NAC3/PQH/HS 205: Bao cao tinh hinh trong 6 thang dau nam 1954 cua UBKCHC LK III/‘Bao cao tinh hinh Lien khu III 6 thang dau nam 1954’/undated (1954)

[105] ‘Nghi quyet cua Hoi nghi Ban Chap hanh Trung uong lan thu sau mo rong, tu ngay 15 den ngay 17-7-1954’, VKD: 1954, 223, 225.

[106] The accords did, however, acknowledge the clout of the Pathet Lao in Laos by designating the provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly as regroupment zones for its forces. Effective dates for the cessation of hostilities were as follows: North Vietnam, 27 July; Central Vietnam, 1 August; South Vietnam, 11 August; Laos, 6 August; and Cambodia, 7 August.

[107] VATTU/Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 13 – The Early History of Vietnam/Box 04/Folder 03/Item Number: 2410403033 (Record #: 249472)/‘The Geneva Conference of 1954, Outcome & Significance for DRV, China, USSR, 1954’, D-8.

[108] TNAUK/FO 371-112037/ Ministry of Defense to Foreign Office: ‘Chinese Communist Aid to the Vietminh: Brief for a Perimeter Review on the Subject’/13 August 1954, 2. ‘We have been struck by the absence of provisions [in the Geneva accords] for fixed inspection teams on the Cao Bang and Ha Giang supply routes, particularly since it is believed that about 2/3 of Chinese aid for the Vietminh has travelled on the Cao Bang route’, the British Foreign Office observed in late August. ‘Any question of adequate control of supplies from China is entirely impractical without the location of permanent teams at least at Cao Bang’ (TNAUK/FO 371-112037/Foreign Office to British Embassy, Paris/25 August 1954, 1; and Ministry of Defense to Southeast Asia Department/23 October 1954, 1). Indirectly acknowledging the shrewdness of DRVN negotiators in Geneva an Indian military expert on the international control commission supervising implementation of the accords claimed to be ‘at a loss to know why’ Paris had consented to leaving ‘the entire Chinese frontier between Lao Kay [sic] and Langson completely unsupervised’. Even French officers he contacted ‘do not know why these places were chosen at Geneva instead of Ha Giang and Cao Bang which are obviously more important’. His comments are reported in TNAUK/FO 371-112037/British Legation, Saigon to Southeast Asia Department/2 October 1954, 1.

[109] ‘Bao cao tai Hoi nghi lan thu sau cua Ban Chap hanh Trung uong Dang (Khoa II), ngay 15 thang 7 nam 1954’, 169.

[110] Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 543, 643.

[111] Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 543, 546.

[112] François Joyaux, to illustrate, maintained that while Zhou Enlai had applied sustained pressure on the Vietnamese throughout the negotiations, it was Molotov who prevailed over Pham Van Dong to accept the above terms and conclude the negotiations (Joyaux, La Chine et le règlement du premier conflit d'Indochine, 286).

[113] Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 64; and Olsen, Soviet–Vietnam Relations, 45. Chen Jian refers to adoption by Moscow and Beijing of a ‘realistic strategy’ at Geneva (Chen Jian, Mao's China, 140).

[114] Recent scholarship is challenging that understanding. See, among other works, Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, and Connelly, Diplomatic Revolution.

[115] Bui Dinh Thanh, ‘Dau tranh ngoai giao’, 530.

[116] Joyaux, La Chine et le règlement du premier conflit d'Indochine, 373.

[117] Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 53. See also Shu Guang Zhang, ‘Constructing “Peaceful Coexistence”’, 510, 518. At least one member of the Chinese delegation at the Geneva Conference recalled later that Beijing's foremost concern with regards to the situation in Indochina at that juncture was the possibility that ‘after the DRV drove the French out, the United States would come in’ (quoted in Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 54).

[118] Hoang Van Hoan, A Drop in the Ocean, 285.

[119] See, for example, Le Kinh Lich (ed.), 30-Year War, 368; and Ban chi dao Tong ket chien tranh – Truc thuoc Bo chinh tri, Tong ket cuoc khang chien chong thuc dan Phap, 216–7, 368.

[120] Nguyen Ngoc Mao and Vu Thi Hong Chuyen, ‘Nhin lai quan he Xo-Viet’, 60; Vu Duong Ninh, ‘Chien cuoc Dien Bien Phu’, 28–9.

[121] Vu Duong Ninh, ‘Hiep dinh Geneva’, 14.

[122] Phan Doan Nam, ‘Hiep dinh Gionevo’, 7.

[123] Nguyen Hong Thach, ‘Vietnam between China and the United States’, 47–8.

[124] Nguyen Hong Thach, ‘Vietnam between China and the United States’, 43.

[125] Nguyen Hong Thach, ‘Vietnam between China and the United States’

[126] Su that ve quan he Viet Nam-Trung Quoc trong 30 nam qua, 30; and Nguyen Hong Thach, ‘Vietnam between China and the United States’, 44.

[127] Ngoai giao Viet Nam, 156.

[128] The proximate nature of the Vietnamese-Indian relationship was revealed in the aftermath of the signing of the agreement when Nehru became the first foreign head of state to visit Hanoi (Nguyen Canh Hue, ‘Vai net ve quan he Viet Nam – An Do’, 53).

[129] Zhou's message is quoted in Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 523–4.

[130] Zhou's message is quoted in Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 524.

[131] ‘De hoan thanh nhiem vu va day manh cong tac truoc mat’, 185.

[132] Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 640, 642.

[133] Specifically, the DRVN lacked ‘enough cadre force, means of activity and did not yet have experience in multilateral negotiations with large countries’ (Nguyen Phuc Luan, ‘Ngoai giao Ho Chi Minh’, 8).

[134] The MOFA cynically remarked later that even if ‘we had secured a demarcation at the 16th parallel or farther into the South, that still would not have precluded the American imperialists from jumping into [nhay vao] southern Vietnam after the Geneva Conference’ and cause the collapse of the accords (Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 642).

[135] The MOFA cynically remarked later that even if ‘we had secured a demarcation at the 16th parallel or farther into the South, that still would not have precluded the American imperialists from jumping into [nhay vao] southern Vietnam after the Geneva Conference’ and cause the collapse of the accords (Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 642), 639.

[136] The MOFA cynically remarked later that even if ‘we had secured a demarcation at the 16th parallel or farther into the South, that still would not have precluded the American imperialists from jumping into [nhay vao] southern Vietnam after the Geneva Conference’ and cause the collapse of the accords (Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 642), 638.

[137] The MOFA cynically remarked later that even if ‘we had secured a demarcation at the 16th parallel or farther into the South, that still would not have precluded the American imperialists from jumping into [nhay vao] southern Vietnam after the Geneva Conference’ and cause the collapse of the accords (Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 642), 640.

[138] ‘The Geneva Conference of 1954, Outcome & Significance for DRV, China, USSR, 1954’, D-5.

[139] ‘The Geneva Conference of 1954, Outcome & Significance for DRV, China, USSR, 1954’, D-5, D-9.

[140] On the latter issue see Asselin, ‘Choosing Peace’, 99–100.

[141] British Consulate, Hanoi to British Embassy, Saigon/2 June 1954, 3. ‘It cannot be said’, the consulate observed shortly thereafter, ‘that the morale of the French Union troops in the North has been seriously shaken by the precarious military situation which has prevailed in the [Red River] Delta since the fall of Dien Bien Phu’ (TNAUK/FO 959-143/British Consulate, Hanoi to British Embassy, Saigon/15 June 1954, 2).

[142] NAC3/PPTT/HS 1684: Bao cao thanh tich ve quan su trong 8 nam khang chien (1946–1954)/‘Tam nam dau tranh sau lung dich’/undated (1954), 6.

[143] NAC3/PPTT/HS 1684: Bao cao thanh tich ve quan su trong 8 nam khang chien (1946–1954)/‘Tam nam dau tranh sau lung dich’/undated (1954), 16.

[144] ‘De hoan thanh nhiem vu va day manh cong tac truoc mat’, 211–2.

[145] Chen Jian, ‘China and the Indochina Settlement’, 254. On French military deployments to Indochina in 1953–54 see Valette, La guerre d'Indochine, 183–92.

[146] Thayer, War by Other Means, 3.

[147] Joyaux, La Chine et le règlement du premier conflit d'Indochine, 270.

[148] Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 521.

[149] ‘De hoan thanh nhiem vu va day manh cong tac truoc mat’, 174.

[150] Trinh Thi Dinh, ‘Ve am muu can thiep quan su cua My’, 40.

[151] Quoted in American Imperialism's Intervention in Viet Nam , 21.

[152] ‘Bao cao tai Hoi nghi lan thu sau cua Ban Chap hanh Trung uong Dang (Khoa II), ngay 15 thang 7 nam 1954’, 166, 164.

[153] Military Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam , 4.

[154] NAC3/PPTT/HS 1698: Bao cao dien mat cua VPTW Dang LDVN ve tinh hinh dich va ta trong vung tam lai chien nam 1954/‘Bao cao ve tinh hinh dich-ta trong vung tam bi chien tu thang 3.1954 – 01.05.1954’/undated (May 1954), 1.

[155] NAC3/PQH/HS 143: Cap thu kien nghi cua tap the va cac co quan ve viec lap lai hoa binh o Dong Duong va Hoi dong Gio-ne-vo nam 1954/‘Kien-Nghi cua QDQG Viet Nam – Tinh Doi Ha-Dong, ngay 11, thang 6, 1954’/11 June 1954, 1; and ‘May nhan xet cua Trung uong ve hoi nghi Gio-ne’, 1.

[156] ‘Bao cao tai Hoi nghi lan thu sau cua Ban Chap hanh Trung uong Dang (Khoa II), ngay 15 thang 7 nam 1954’, 163.

[157] Trinh Thi Dinh, ‘Ve am muu can thiep quan su cua My’, 40.

[158] Bui Dinh Thanh, ‘Dau tranh ngoai giao’, 530.

[159] Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 640.

[160] ‘We [in Vietnam; chung toi] do not understand clearly the situation in France and the world’, it stated (‘Dien cua Trung uong gui don chi Pham Van Dong ngay 27.5.1954’ quoted in Ibid., 501).

[161] ‘We [in Vietnam; chung toi] do not understand clearly the situation in France and the world’, it stated (‘Dien cua Trung uong gui don chi Pham Van Dong ngay 27.5.1954’ quoted in ibid., 501), 648.

[162] ‘We [in Vietnam; chung toi] do not understand clearly the situation in France and the world’, it stated (‘Dien cua Trung uong gui don chi Pham Van Dong ngay 27.5.1954’ quoted in ibid., 501), 642.

[163] Anderson, Trapped by Success, 38.

[164] Duiker, Sacred War, 94.

[165] ‘The Geneva Conference of 1954, Outcome & Significance for DRV, China, USSR, 1954’, D-6.

[166] Military Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam , 9–10.

[167] Bui Dinh Thanh, ‘Dau tranh ngoai giao’, 530.

[168] ‘De hoan thanh nhiem vu va day manh cong tac truoc mat’, 186–7.

[169] NAC3/PQH/HS 143: Cap thu kien nghi cua tap the va cac co quan ve viec lap lai hoa binh o Dong Duong va Hiep dinh Gio-ne-vo nam 1954/‘Dien van Cong doan Ton Duc Thang 19.8.1954’/19 August 1954, 1.

[170] Chen Jian, ‘China and the Indochina Settlement’, 254.

[171] ‘De hoan thanh nhiem vu va day manh cong tac truoc mat’, 187.

[172] Césari, ‘Declining Value of Indochina’, 189.

[173] Tertrais, La piastre et le fusil, 183.

[174] ‘So thao bao cao quan su o Quoc hoi lan thu 3 (12-1953)’, 1, 5.

[175] Jean Lacouture maintained that the SOVN was a legitimate state whose creation transformed the conflict in Vietnam into a civil war (Lacouture, Vietnam Between Two Truces, 9).

[176] Olsen, Soviet–Vietnam Relations, 46–7.

[177] NAC3/PQH/HS 75: Ho so phien hop BTTQH khoa I ngay 28.7.1954 ve Hoi nghi Gio-ne-vo va ket qua cua Hiep dinh dinh chien/‘Bao cao cua Ban thuong truc Quoc hoi ve hiep dinh dinh chien’/28 July 1954, 5; and ‘De hoan thanh nhiem vu va day manh cong tac truoc mat’, 205–7.

[178] NAC3/PPTT/HS 1696: Thong tri, Chi thi, Bao cao cua Tong Quan uy Tuc dan quan v/v cham chinh cung co phat trien luc luong vu trang nhan dan va tinh hinh xay dung dan quan du kich nam 1954/‘Bao cao tinh hinh hoat dong va xay dung D.Q.D.K. 3 thang dau nam 1954’/undated (1954), 3.

[179] ‘De hoan thanh nhiem vu va day manh cong tac truoc mat’, 205–7; and ‘Bao cao cua Ban thuong truc Quoc hoi ve hiep dinh dinh chien’, 5.

[180] On the shortcomings of the VWP's land reform program (1953–56) see Hoang Van Hoan, A Drop in the Ocean, 302–4; and Moise, Land Reform in China and North Vietnam. According to Moise the poorly executed land reform effort quickly became a growing concern for VWP leaders.

[181] ‘Bao cao cua Ban thuong truc Quoc hoi ve hiep dinh dinh chien’, 4. Within weeks of the signing of the accords the DRVN government had made ‘great efforts’ to ‘organize at least the basis for strengthening the shaky economy of the north’ (TNAUK/FO 371-117093/‘Vietnam: Annual Review for 1954’/24 February 1955, 4).

[182] ‘De hoan thanh nhiem vu va day manh cong tac truoc mat’, 174–5.

[183] British Consulate, Hanoi to British Embassy, Saigon/2 June 1954, 5.

[184] ‘De hoan thanh nhiem vu va day manh cong tac truoc mat’, 175. See also ‘Bao cao cua Ban thuong truc Quoc hoi ve hiep dinh dinh chien’, 5.

[185] NAC3/PPTT/HS 1880: Tap hiep dinh dinh chi chien su o Viet-Lao-Mien ngay 20.21.7.1954/Pham Van Dong handwritten notes – draft of ‘Déclaration de M. Pham Van Dong, Président de la délégation de la République Démocratique du Viêt-Nam à la scéance plenière du 21.7.1954/20 July 1954, 1. The statement quoted above was omitted from the final version of the declaration.

[186] Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 636.

[187] Quoted in Shu Guang Zhang, ‘Constructing “Peaceful Coexistence”’, 514.

[188] Vu Duong Ninh, ‘Hiep dinh Geneva’, 11–6.

[189] Randle, Geneva 1954, 559.

[190] Robert Randle wrote that the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam contributed to the ‘transformation’ of the DRVN ‘from an insignificant force to administrators of an unquestionably sovereign socialist state’ (ibid., 559).

[191] Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam, 57.

[192] Hoc vien quan he quoc te, Dau tranh ngoai giao, 636.

[193] On Vietnamese anti-colonialism see Zinoman, Colonial Bastille; Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism; Marr, Vietnamese Tradition on Trial; and Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism.

[194] ‘Vietnam: Annual Review for 1954’, 5.

[195] ‘Loi kieu goi sau khi Hoi nghi Gionevo thanh cong, ngay 22 thang 7 nam 1954’, VKD: 1954, 229; and ‘Loi kieu goi cua Ban Chap hanh Trung uong Dang Lao dong Viet Nam, ngay 25 thang 7 nam 1954’, 234.

[196] Lawrence, Assuming the Burden, 279.

[197] Nguyen Phuc Luan, ‘Ngoai giao Ho Chi Minh’, 8.

[198] NAC3/PPTT/HS 1887: Tap tai lieu ve cac cuoc hop bao cua Phai doan Viet Nam va cac phai doan khac tai Hoi nghi Gio-ne-vo nam 1954/‘Thu cau Pham Van Dong gui len Bac ve tinh hinh Hiep dinh dinh chien Viet-Phap’/21 July 1954, 1.