Preventing ‘peace’: The British Government and the Second World Peace Congress

Abstract

The Cold War demonstrated that perception was critical in the decision making of states as it underpinned the reasoning behind many of the decisions made during the Cold War. This paper examines the British Government's response to the Second World Peace Congress. The response was influenced by the understanding of Communist ideology related to the peace movement, the possible effect of the Congress on other NATO members, and the legal limits on the response to the Congress. These factors combined to create a reaction that was based on the Government's perception of this episode as part of a greater Communist ideologically motivated security threat, not only to Britain, but to the West in general.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Professor Anita Prazmowska for her encouragement in researching and writing this article, Kokila Kinry for her editorial comments, and the reviewers for their helpful comments.

Notes

 [1] Parrish, ‘The Marshall Plan’, The Establishment of Communist Regimes, 267–71. The security dilemma has been covered extensively in international relations literature. In particular see Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, who offer an expansive discussion of the subject, and Collins, The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War, who raises the interesting point that the security dilemma can be avoided by a ‘special statesman’.

 [2] The subject of perception is tied into that of the security dilemma. See Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. The idea that the peace movement was viewed as offensive is of great importance, as it was seen as undermining Western populations and defences. This is discussed later with reference to differences of opinion in reacting to the Congress.

 [3] Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, 43–63. Planning at the War Office with the USSR in mind had been taking place since 1939, with institutions such as MI3c in the midst of the attack on the USSR in 1941 known to be openly anti-Russian.

 [4] Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, 44–8. The Government had been initially divided on the topic of post-war planning regarding the Soviets, with the military pessimistic and the FO optimistic. See also Cradock, Know Your Enemy, 25–49.

 [5] FO371/56832, ‘The Warner Memorandum’, 2 September 1946, quoted from Lewis, Changing Direction, 363. Interestingly, Warner, as had most of the FO, had been one of the optimists regarding the Soviets.

 [6] CAB 130/17, JIC(46) 70, 23 September 1946.

 [7] Hennessy, The Secret State, 12.

 [8] Hennessy, The Secret State, 20.

 [9] Suny, The Soviet Experiment, 348.

[10] Hennessy, The Secret State, 21.

[11] National Archives of the United Kingdom (UKNA): CAB 130/17, CM(47) (not numbered) 3 February 1947. (Archival documents are from the UKNA unless otherwise noted.)

[12] CAB 130/17, CM(47) (not numbered), 11 February 1950.

[13] CAB 130/17, JIC(46) 70, 23 September 1946.

[14] CAB 130/17, JIC(46) 70, 23 September 1946

[15] CAB 158/3, JIC(48), 9, 23 July 1948. Quoted from Cradock, Know Your Enemy, 8.

[16] It was also far harder with liberal-capitalist ideology to use the idea of peace for geo-strategic ends; Communist ideology and rhetoric, with its prediction of war between capitalist powers, was far better suited to such a task.

[17] FO 975/49, ‘The Soviet Peace Campaign’, n.d.

[18] FO 1110/271, ‘The World Congress of the Partisans for Peace’, 9 July 1950.

[19] FO 975/49, ‘The Soviet…’, n.d.

[20] FO 975/49, ‘The Soviet…’, n.d

[21] FO 975/49, ‘The Soviet…’, n.d, FO 1110/271, ‘The World Congress…’, 9 July 1950. FO 1110/271, 975/49 and 975/33 deal almost exclusively with the peace movement, underlining the importance it held within the FO.

[22] FO 1110/271, ‘The World Congress…’, 9 July 1950.

[23] FO 975/49, ‘The Soviet…’, n.d. Among these was the organization that became the British Peace Committee (BPC).

[24] FO 1110/271, Telegram: Czechoslovakia to FO, 14 March 1949; FO 1110/271, Draft Telegram: FO to embassies, 14 March 1949; FO 1110/271, Circular Telegram, 25 March 1949.

[25] FO 1110/271, Letter: P.F.D. Tennant to R. Murray, 6 April 1949.

[26] FO 1110/271, Telegram: Paris to FO, 8 April 1949.

[27] FO 1110/271, Minute: R. Murray, 9 April 1949.

[28] FO 1110/271, Minutes: R. Murray, R.M.A. Hankey, C.P. Mayhew. 18 March 1949.

[29] FO 975/49, ‘The Soviet…’, n.d.

[30] FO 975/49, ‘The Soviet…’, n.d; FO 1110/346, FO to Washington, 17 March 1950. This was also distributed to Whitehall; FO 1110/346, Minute: P.S. Falls, 10 March 1950.

[31] PREM 8/1150, ‘Brief for the UK Delegation…’, n.d.

[32] PREM 8/1150, ‘Brief for the UK Delegation…’, n.d

[33] The documents pertaining to the Congress from March–August 1950 are in FO 1110/346–7.

[34] FO 1110/346, Minute: P.S. Falls, 10 March 1950. This is in clear contrast to the decision to block entry to delegates. The difference was scale, and the need to appear to NATO that they were acting against Communist influence.

[35] FO 1110/346, Minute: J.H. Watson, 16 March 1950.

[36] FO 1110/346, Minute: J.H. Watson, 16 March 1950

[37] While the Communist Party of Great Britain was weak in the political sphere, it did retain influence among trade union members, and through MI5, the Government was aware of this. See Andrews, In Defence of the Realm.

[38] FO 1110/346, Telegram: FO to Paris. 22 May 1950.

[39] FO 1110.346, Telegram: FO to Paris. 22 May 1950

[40] FO 1110/346, Memorandum: R. Murray to C.F.A. Warner, 25 May 1950.

[41] FO 1110/347, ‘Developments in the World Peace Campaign’, 19 July 1950.

[42] FO 1110/347, ‘Developments in the World Peace Campaign’, 19 July 1950

[43] FO 1110/347, ‘Developments in the World Peace Campaign’, 19 July 1950

[44] Specifically, see the following section relating to Sir David Kelly.

[45] FO 975/33, ‘The Communist Peace Offensive’, 30 August 1949. Emphasis added.

[46] FO 1110/347, Letter: Sir David Kelly to C.F.A. Warner, 30 August 1950.

[47] FO 1110/349, Letter: Sir David Kelley to E. Bevin, 8 December 1950. While this letter was written after the Congress and could not have influenced the decisions of the Cabinet, it is unlikely Kelly formed this rather intricate thesis in the weeks following the Congress. Indeed, such a position is visible in his correspondence prior to the conference. See: FO 1110/347, Letter: Sir David Kelly to C.F.A. Warner, 30 August 1950.

[48] PREM 8/1150, Letter: J.M. Smith to Clement Attlee, 3 August 1950; FO 1110/347, F.R.H. Murray, ‘Proposal to Hold the Second World…’, 26 August 1950. It was initially planned for Genoa, Italy. However, delegates were denied entry permits due to the Italian Peace Committee's assertion that South Korea was responsible for the start of the Korean War.

[49] FO 1110/347, Letter: C.F.A. Warner to Sir David Kelly, 6 August 1950.

[50] FO 1110/347, Letter: C.F.A. Warner to Sir David Kelly, 6 August 1950

[51] FO 1110/347, Minute: R. Murray, 31 August 1950.

[52] FO 1110/347, F.R.H. Murray, ‘Proposal to Hold the Second World…’, 26 August 1950. This was discussed at the meeting of the FO, HO, MI5 and MI6 of 29 August 1950.

[53] FO 1110/347, F.R.H. Murray, ‘Proposal to Hold the Second World…’, 26 August 1950. This was discussed at the meeting of the FO, HO, MI5 and MI6 of 29 August 1950

[54] FO 1110/347, F.R.H. Murray, ‘Proposal to Hold the Second World…’, 26 August 1950. This was discussed at the meeting of the FO, HO, MI5 and MI6 of 29 August 1950

[55] PREM 8/1150, Minute: D.W.S. Hunt to C. Attlee 5 September 1950.

[56] FO 1110/347, CM(50) 56, 6 September 1950.

[57] FO 1110/347, CM(50) 56, 6 September 1950

[58] PREM 8/1150, Letter: R.E. Barclay to D.H.F. Rickett, 6 September 1950.

[59] PREM 8/1150, Letter: E.G. Cass to the Secretary of the BPC, 13 September 1950.

[60] PREM 8/1150, Letter: W.R.T. Gore to E.G. Cass, 26 August 1950.

[61] PREM 8/1150, Letter: BPC to Undersecretary of State, 28 September 1950.

[62] PREM 8/1150, Memorandum attached to Letter from BPC to the Undersecretary of State, 28 September 1950.

[63] FO 111/348, Minutes: P.A. Wilkinson, 30 September 1950.

[64] FO 1110/348, Letter: Ashley Clarke to W.S. Murrie, 2 October 1950.

[65] FO 975/49, ‘The Soviet…’. n.d. (Content indicates that it was written in October 1950.)

[66] FO 975/49, ‘The Soviet…’. n.d. (Content indicates that it was written in October 1950.) The same policy, largely held by the Government since 1949, was expressed in FO 975/33; ‘The Communist…’, 30 August 1949.

[67] FO 975/49, ‘The Soviet…’. n.d. (Content indicates that it was written in October 1950.)

[68] Claudin, The Communist Movement, 472.

[69] FO 975/49, ‘The Soviet…’, n.d.

[70] FO 1110/348, Memorandum: F.R.H. Murray, 10 October 1950.

[71] FO 1110/348, Memorandum: F.R.H. Murray, 10 October 1950

[72] FO 1110/348, Minutes: D.P. Reilly and F.R.H. Murray. 10–11 October 1950. This again points to the fact that the Government perceived a threat from the Congress not merely because it was Communist, but because of the security threat it represented to allies as well.

[73] PREM 8/1150, Letter: Phillip Jordan to C. Attlee, 12 January 1950; PREM 8/1150, Letter: C. Attlee to H. Morrison, 17 October 1950. The BBC was felt to be unbiased, and therefore, Jordan suggested having the Lord President Herbert Morrison ‘speak’ with William Haley, head of the BBC beforehand in an effort to ensure favourable coverage. Attlee approved of Jordan's suggestions and contacted Morrison to this effect asking him to speak with Haley. Attlee also mentions that arrangements to distribute the speech abroad had been made should the BBC agree to broadcast it.

[74] PREM 8/1150, Minute: E. Bevin to C. Attlee, 25 October 1950.

[75] PREM 8/1150, Minute: E. Bevin to C. Attlee, 25 October 1950

[76] PREM 8/1150, ‘Aims of the World Peace Movement’, 25 October 1950.

[77] FO 1110/348, COS(50) 167, 11 October 1950.

[78] FO 1110/348, Letter: E. Shinwell to C. Attlee, 12 October 1950.

[79] CAB 130/65, CM(50) (No number), 30 October 1950.

[80] CAB 130/65, CM(50) (No number) 30 October 1950

[81] FO 1110/349, Minute: F.R.H. Murray, 2 November 1950.

[82] FO 1110/349, Draft speech made by Attlee to the Foreign Press Association, 30 October 1950.

[83] FO 1110/349, Draft speech made by Attlee to the Foreign Press Association. 30 October 1950

[84] FO 1110/349, Draft speech made by Attlee to the Foreign Press Association. 30 October 1950

[85] PREM 8/1150, Letter: BPC to Attlee, 2 November 1950.

[86] PREM 8/1150, Minutes: Parliamentary Questions, 9 November 1950.

[87] FO 1110/349, CM(50) 72, 9 November 1950.

[88] FO 1110/349, Minute: J.H. Peck, 10 November 1950.

[89] Deery, ‘The Dove Flies East’, 463–4.

[90] PREM 8/1150, Letter: A.N. Noble to E. Bevin, 13 November 1950; PREM 8/1150, Letter: Sir David Kelly to E. Bevin, 14 November 1950.