Cold War co-operation: New Chinese evidence on Jawaharlal Nehru's 1954 visit to Beijing

Abstract

Drawing on declassified Chinese records of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's conversations with Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai when he visited Beijing in 1954, this essay examines the conceptual underpinnings of Sino-Indian co-operation. The Cold War fostered co-operation between two countries that might have been expected to become rivals. In exploring the nature and limitations of the relationship, the essay shows how these leaders failed to understand that Asian countries might be as averse to Chinese or Indian hegemony as they were to Western imperialism.

Acknowledgements

For assistance in Beijing, my gratitude to Christian Ostermann, Li Danhui, Shen Zhihua, Liu Xiaoyuan, and the archivists at the FMPRC, especially Hao Weihua. For their feedback, I thank John Lewis Gaddis, Jonathan Spence, and Anna Beth Keim.

Notes

Sulmaan Wasif Khan is a graduate student at Yale University.

 [1] Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China (hereafter FMPRC), File Number 204-00007(1), ‘Memorandum of the conversation of Chairman Mao Zedong's first meeting with Indian prime minister Nehru’, p.1. I obtained the documents cited here while conducting research in the FMPRC archives from 2007–8. All translations from Chinese to English are my own.

One of the issues peculiar to this project is that of translating quotations from Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru was speaking in English; the sources used here have his words translated into Mandarin, which I am translating back into English. Ideally, one would compare the Chinese memoranda of conversations with Indian records, but without declassification of Indian records that is unfeasible. Nevertheless, I do not think much has been lost in translation and retranslation. Nehru's words, as I have them here, are consistent with other pronouncements he made on the issues under discussion. S. Gopal, who did have access to papers at the Nehru memorial library, gives some quotations from Nehru's visit to Beijing which are similar to the ones given here in Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 226–32. On the crucial issue of Chinese maps (which was left unresolved), no significant change in meaning appears to have been wrought by the translation process or linguistic differences; Gopal's quotations do not conflict with the Chinese record or the translations given here. Gopal also notes that Nehru acknowledged that the Indian notes of the conversations were not quite accurate (see Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, 230, n.15). Under these circumstances, a translation of the Chinese sources is probably as close as we can get to what Nehru actually said.

 [2] Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China (hereafter FMPRC), File Number 204-00007(1), ‘Memorandum of the conversation of Chairman Mao Zedong's first meeting with Indian prime minister Nehru’, 2.

 [3] Garver, Protracted Contest, provides a superb overview of the relationship, but, as its title suggests, is not focused on the amity that existed between the two countries in the mid 1950s. Zhang, ‘Constructing “Peaceful Co-existence”’, which contains some discussion of Nehru's visit, argues that China sought to portray itself as seeking ‘peaceful co-existence’ in Asia; this essay differs in that it focuses on the bilateral relationship, sees peaceful co-existence as just one part of Chinese grand strategy, and emphasises the hints of imperialism the discussions give. Yang Kuisong's contribution is in Roberts, Behind the Bamboo Curtain; the essay is not concerned chiefly with the Sino-Indian relationship. Chen Xiaolu's account is in Michael Hunt and Niu Jun, Toward a History of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy. Chen tends to overemphasise Zhou's importance to the five principles; those principles were the product of negotiations at lower levels between China and India on the Tibetan issue. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru is valuable for having had access to Indian sources, but ultimately dissatisfying and simplistic in its analysis of the relationship.

Most studies on China's Cold War policies – studies to which this essay aims to add – focus on relations with the Soviet Union, the United States, and on the conflicts in Korea and Indochina. An excellent account of China's foreign policy is provided by Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War. India's Cold War policy receives some treatment in McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence remains the best work on the Sino-Indian border conflict. The dispute is also discussed in Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split. Studies of Tibet's role in the Cold War, such as those presented in a special issue of the Journal of Cold War Studies 8, no. 3 (Summer 2006) discuss Sino-Indian relations, but, once again, focusing chiefly on the rivalry between the two countries.

 [4] Nye, The Paradox of American Power.

 [5] Chen, Mao's China and the Cold War; Christensen , Useful Adversaries; Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split.

 [6] Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 474. In addition to Goldstein, see Garver, Protracted Contest, and Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation.

 [7] FMPRC 204-00007-05, Memorandum of the Second Conversation between Premier Zhou En-lai and Nehru, 20 October 1954. I will discuss the question of the maps in more detail later in this essay; on the activities of the Dalai Lama's brother in India and why these did not really trouble China, see Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet.

 [8] For an excellent account of Zhou's diplomacy in Geneva, see Zhai Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars.

 [9] McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery.

[10] Memcon, Mao–Nehru, first talk, 2–3.

[11] FMPRC, File number 204-00007-03(1), Memorandum of first conversation between Zhou En-lai and Nehru, 19 October 1954, 1.

[12] Memcon, Mao–Nehru, first talk, 3.

[13] Memcon, Mao–Nehru, first talk, 4.

[14] FMPRC, File Number 204-00007-05(1), Memcon, Zhou-Nehru, second talk, 20 October 1954, 10.

[15] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru, second talk, 2.

[16] Memcon, Mao–Nehru, first talk, 2.

[17] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru first talk, 2.

[18] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru first talk, p. 2 The record notes that Zhou gave Nehru a copy of Chinese tabulations of these flights, but the available Chinese records do not contain the document.

[19] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru first talk, p. 2

[20] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru first talk, p. 2, 2–3. The special forces in Qinghai were, for the most part, Tibetan Khambas who saw themselves as being engaged in an independence struggle. The story is told in Dunham, Buddha's Warriors.

[21] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru first talk, p. 2, 3.

[22] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru first talk, p. 2, 3–4.

[23] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru first talk, p. 2

[24] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru first talk, p. 2, 4–5.

[25] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru first talk, p. 2, 5–6.

[26] FMPRC, File Number 204-00007-15(1), Memcon, Mao-Nehru second talk, 23 October 1954, 6.

[27] FMPRC, File Number 204-00007-15(1), Memcon, Mao-Nehru second talk, 23 October 1954, 7.

[28] FMPRC, File Number 204-00007-15(1), Memcon, Mao-Nehru second talk, 23 October 1954

[29] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru first conversation, 9–10.

[30] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru first conversation, 2–3

[31] Memcon, Mao–Nehru, first talk, 8.

[32] Memcon, Mao–Nehru, first talk, 5.

[33] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru, second talk, 8.

[34] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru, second talk, 9.

[35] FMPRC, File Number 204-00007-09, Memcon, Zhou–Nehru third talk, 21 October 1954, 18.

[36] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru second talk, 4–6.

[37] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru third talk, 3–4.

[38] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru first talk, 8.

[39] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru first talk, 6–7.

[40] Memcon, Mao–Nehru second talk, 14. Mao referred to it as the war of the three eight line. For Mao's thinking on the Korean War, see Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War; and Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism.

[41] Memcon, Mao–Nehru second talk, p. 14. Mao referred to it as the war of the three eight line. For Mao's thinking on the Korean War, see Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War; and Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 7–8.

[42] Memcon, Mao–Nehru second talk, p. 14. Mao referred to it as the war of the three eight line. For Mao's thinking on the Korean War, see Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War; and Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 18.

[43] Memcon, Mao–Nehru second talk, p. 14. Mao referred to it as the war of the three eight line. For Mao's thinking on the Korean War, see Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War; and Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 11.

[44] Memcon, Mao–Nehru second talk, p. 14. Mao referred to it as the war of the three eight line. For Mao's thinking on the Korean War, see Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War; and Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 18.

[45] Chen Jian and James Hershberg give an excellent account of Chinese signalling behaviour in their contribution to Behind the Bamboo Curtain. My discussion of this particular Chinese signal differs in that it sees an attempt to reach out to the US to achieve some form of reconciliation as part of the message.

[46] Lorenz Luthi argues that the Second Taiwan Straits crisis was launched by Mao for domestic reasons, but tellingly, also cites Zhou En-lai announcing China's war aims as the resumption of the Warsaw talks. Domestic mobilisation is also the reason offered by Christensen.

[47] On ‘flexible response’, see Gaddis, Strategies of Containment. I am grateful to Mike Morgan for pointing out the parallel.

[48] Notably during the Korean War.

[49] For an example of that consensus, see the symposium on rethinking the ‘lost chance’ in Diplomatic History 21, no. 1 (Winter 1997), with Chen Jian, Odd Arne Westad, and John Garver, ‘Rethinking America's Lost Chance in China’. Warren Cohen, the round-table moderator, was unconvinced that the ‘lost chance’ was a myth however. Warren Cohen voices some scepticism in his introduction to the symposium; see Waren Cohen, ‘Introduction: Was there a “Lost Chance” in China?’, ibid., 71–5. Chen Jian has suggested, here and in Mao's China and the Cold War, that the problem with the ‘lost chance’ thesis is that it is American-centric. The caution against over-estimating American influence on China is worth making, but the US was the major great power on the stage; the Chinese could not avoid framing policy based on what it did or seemed to be doing. The American-centric view of the world present in the documents examined here is – quite understandably – overwhelming.

[50] Memcon, Mao–Nehru second conversation, 2–3.

[51] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru first conversation, 10. See also Zhang, ‘Constructing Peaceful Coexistence’.

[52] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru first conversation, p. 10. See also Zhang, ‘Constructing Peaceful Coexistence’, 11.

[53] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru first conversation, p. 10. See also Zhang, ‘Constructing Peaceful Coexistence’, 12–13. A similar proposal had been made as India sought to curb Chinese aggression during the early phases of the Korean War; it too failed. See Sulmaan Wasif Khan, ‘Conflicting Principles: Sino-Indian Exchanges on the Korean War’, unpublished manuscript. Evidence available from author.

[54] I am thinking in particular of the forays made from Taiwan against the Qing dynasty by the Ming loyalist Koxinga; see Spence, The Search for Modern China.

[55] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru first talk, 7.

[56] Memcon, Mao–Nehru second talk, 1.

[57] Memecon, Zhou–Nehru first talk, 5.

[58] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru third talk, 9.

[59] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru third talk, 10.

[60] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru third talk, 12.

[61] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru second talk, 13.

[62] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru second talk, 6.

[63] Memcon, Mao–Nehru first talk, 5.

[64] Chen Jian, ‘China and the Bandung Conference’, 134.

[65] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru, second talk, 12–13.

[66] Memcon, Mao–Nehru first talk, 7.

[67] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru fourth talk, 3.

[68] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru second talk, 4.

[69] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru second talk It is worth noting here that the meaning of the Chinese word tuanjie is ambiguous; it could refer to co-operation, but it could also refer to reunification. Zhou, being Zhou, recognised the ambiguity and used the word deliberately.

[70] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru third talk, 6. For Zhou's diplomacy on behalf of the smaller Southeast Asian countries, see Zhai Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars.

[71] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru third talk, p. 6. For Zhou's diplomacy on behalf of the smaller Southeast Asian countries, see Zhai Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars

[72] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru third talk, p. 6. For Zhou's diplomacy on behalf of the smaller Southeast Asian countries, see Zhai Qiang, China and the Vietnam Wars

[73] For a good recent discussion of China's boundaries, see Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, which links China's willingness to negotiate disputed boundaries to concerns with ethnic minorities.

[74] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru, second talk, 11–15.

[75] The literature on the subject of the overseas Chinese is extensive. For an incisive and original discussion of the issue, see Chua, World on Fire. Much later, one of the opening salvos in the third Indochina war would be the Vietnamese expulsion of Chinese huaqiao, at which Beijing would take deep offence.

[76] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru, second conversation, 13–14.

[77] Memcon, Zhou–Nehru, third conversation, 7.

[78] Zhai Qiang is especially good on Mao's warnings against ‘big power chauvinism’. On how that chauvinism crept into Chinese policy, see Roberts, ed., Behind the Bamboo Curtain.

[79] Zhai Qiang is especially good on Mao's warnings against ‘big power chauvinism’. On how that chauvinism crept into Chinese policy, see Roberts, Behind the Bamboo Curtain

[80] Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 14.

[81] Garver, Protracted Contest, is excellent on the geo-political aspect of the rivalry.

[82] I intend to discuss some of these changes in future studies. On the changes in Tibet, Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, Garver, Protracted Contest, and Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation are all valuable. Lorenz Luthi provides a brief, but powerful account, of the connections between the Sino-Soviet rift and the Sino-Indian relationship in his The Sino-Soviet Split. For the shift in India's diplomatic position, see McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery.

[83] Memcon, Mao–Nehru third talk, 6.

[84] See Westad, The Global Cold War.

[85] Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 353.