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Abstract
Ronald Reagan's 1980 election represented the apex of the conservative intellectual movement's political success in America. While historians have thoroughly examined the movement's effect on domestic American politics, international historians have been more reluctant to evaluate conservative intellectuals’ influence on Reagan's foreign policy. This essay seeks to determine what can be better understood about America's foreign affairs by examining Reagan's reaction to the conservative intellectual movement's views on the Reagan–Gorbachev summits.
Acknowledgements
Mr Samuel would like to thank his wife Mary Jordan for all her support and Dr Alan Sked for his tremendous help advising the dissertation.
Notes
Robert Samuel earned an AB from Duke University, a MSc from the London School of Economics, and is currently a JD candidate at Wake Forest University. This article was adapted from Mr Samuel's dissertation, which won the Medlicott Prize for best master's dissertation in International History at the LSE.
[1] CitationStrober and Strober, The Reagan Presidency, 9–10.
[2] Will, ‘Foreign Policy That Bewilders’.
[3] For the most recent work of American history that chronicles the influence of the conservative movement on the Reagan administration, see CitationWilentz, The Age of Reagan; for the most recent intellectual history, see CitationDiggins, Ronald Reagan.
[4] As quoted in CitationKirk, The Conservative Mind, 476.
[5] For a history of the publication, see CitationHart, The Making of the American Conservative Mind.
[6] CitationBuckley, God and Man at Yale.
[7] For the various types of conservatives in the conservative movement, see CitationNash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945.
[8] For a chronicle of Reagan's and the majority of conservative intellectuals' disaffection with realist ideas and policies, see Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan, 3–59.
[9] For various definitions of realism in international relations, see CitationDonnelly, Realism and International Relations, 9–10.
[10] CitationMorgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 161.
[11] Vaughn, Ronald Reagan in Hollywood, 130.
[12] CitationCannon, Citation Reagan , 74–5.
[13] CitationVaughn, Ronald Reagan in Hollywood, 132.
[14] Diggins, Reagan, 268–75.
[15] Chambers, Witness, 361.
[16] CitationHayek, The Road to Serfdom.
[17] Reagan, A Life in Letters, 705.
[18] As quoted in Diggins, Reagan, 270.
[19] CitationHobbs, ‘How Reagan Governed California’; CitationBuckley, ‘Put Me Down for Reagan’, 859.
[20] ‘Congratulations’, National Review, 13 June 1980, 700.
[21] CitationNuechterlein, ‘George Will and American Conservatism’, 35.
[22] Diggins, Reagan, 212.
[23] Harvard historian Richard Pipes was placed in charge of East European and Soviet Affairs on the National Security Council; Georgetown professor Jeane Kirkpatrick was named Ambassador to the United Nations.
[24] CitationFischer, The Reagan Reversal.
[25] Ronald Reagan, ‘The President's News Conference’, 29 January 1981, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/12981b.htm.
[26] As quoted in Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended, 3.
[27] Reagan administration often used the phrase ‘negotiate from strength’ to describe their Soviet policy. For one example see Ronald Reagan ‘Radio Address to the Nation on Foreign Policy’, 20 October 1984, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid = 39294.
[28] National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 75, 17 January 1983, 1, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-1956t.gif.
[29] National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 75, 17 January 1983, p. 1, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-1956t.gif
[30] Reagan, An American Life, 611; for additional evidence of Reagan's desire for a first-term summit with the Soviets, see Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, 152; Reagan, A Life in Letters, 741, 742–3.
[31] NSDD 75, 8, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-1963t.gif.
[32] As quoted in Ibid., 70.
[33] CitationReagan, The Reagan Diaries, 186.
[34] Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. See also, Anderson and Anderson, Reagan's Secret War, 93–109.
[35] Reagan, An American Life, 588–9.
[36] CitationBuckley, ‘Exit Gromyko’.
[37] NSDD 75, 1, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-1956t.gif.
[38] President Ronald Reagan Letter to Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, 11 March 1985, http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/index.htm.
[39] President Ronald Reagan Letter to Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, 11 March 1985, http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/index.htm
[40] ‘Exit Chernenkoism?’ National Review, 19 April 1985, 54.
[41] For a discussion of Reagan's and the majority of conservative intellectuals' rejection of the Nixon-Kissinger détente policy, and Nixon's and Kissinger's disaffection with Reagan's policies, see CitationMann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan, 3–59.
[42] CitationBethell, ‘Mugger's Deal in Geneva’, 28.
[43] Podhoretz, ‘Kissinger Reconsidered’, 24.
[44] CitationCrozier, ‘Arms Control Morass’.
[45] CitationPodhoretz, ‘Kissinger Reconsidered’, 25.
[46] CitationBurnham, Suicide of the West; CitationRevel, How Democracies Perish.
[47] CitationBuckley, ‘Slouching Towards Reykjavik-I’.
[48] CitationBuckley, ‘A Summit in the Air’.
[49] ‘The Compliance Question’, National Review, 12 July 1985, 18.
[50] Buckley, ‘Summit in the Air’.
[51] Buckley, ‘Summit in the Air’
[52] Buckley, ‘Summit in the Air’
[53] ‘Mid-Summit Notes’, National Review, 13 December 1985, 12.
[54] CitationWill, ‘Diplomatic Junk Food’.
[55] ‘Struggle over Agenda’, National Review, 19 November 1985, 13.
[56] ‘Struggle over Agenda’, National Review, 19 November 1985
[57] CitationCrozier, ‘Conditional Talks’.
[58] CitationNovak, ‘Tell Gorbachev for Me’.
[59] ‘Why Wasn't Weinberger Invited? Conservatives Jittery as Summit Approaches’, Human Events, 16 November 1986, 1.
[60] Anderson and Anderson, Reagan's Secret War, 230.
[61] ‘Memorandum of Conversation’, Reagan–Gorbachev Meetings in Geneva, First Private Meeting, 19 November 1985, 4–5, http://www.gwu.edu/∼ nsarchiv/NSA Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), EBB/NSAEBB172/index.htm.
[62] ‘Memorandum of Conversation’, Reagan–Gorbachev Meetings in Geneva, First Private Meeting, 19 November 1985, pp. 4–5, http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/NSA Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), EBB/NSAEBB172/index.htm, Second Plenary Meeting, 19 November 1985, 5, http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/index.htm.
[63] ‘Memorandum of Conversation’, Reagan–Gorbachev Meetings in Geneva, First Private Meeting, 19 November 1985, pp. 4–5, http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/NSA Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), EBB/NSAEBB172/index.htm, Third Plenary Meeting, 20 November 1985, 3, http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/index.htm.
[64] ‘Memorandum of Conversation’, Reagan–Gorbachev Meetings in Geneva, First Private Meeting, 19 November 1985, pp. 4–5, http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/NSA Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), EBB/NSAEBB172/index.htm, Second Private Meeting, 19 November 1985, 2, http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/index.htm.
[65] Anatoly Chernyaev, diary entry, 24 November 1985, http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/index.htm.
[66] Reagan, Reagan Diaries, 371.
[67] ‘Realism in Geneva’, National Review, 31 December 1985, 16–17.
[68] ‘How to Gauge the Summit’, Human Events, 30 November 1985, 1.
[69] CitationSafire, ‘The Fireside Summit’.
[70] CitationWill, ‘Luckily, Little “Progress”’.
[71] ‘Post-Summit Sentiments’, The Wall Street Journal, 27 November 1985, 31.
[72] Will, ‘Reeling Toward Reykjavik’.
[73] CitationKrauthammer, ‘A Bad Deal Gets Worse; and the Past Gets Erased’.
[74] CitationWill, ‘Reeling Toward Reykjavik’.
[75] ‘Gorbachev's Plan’, National Review, 14 February 1986, 17.
[76] CitationWill, ‘The Illusion of Arms Control’.
[77] CitationBuckley, ‘Slouching Towards Reykjavik-II’, 63.
[78] CitationBuckley, ‘Slouching Towards Reykjavik-II’
[79] ‘On to the Summit’, National Review, 24 October 1986, 16.
[80] Transcript of Reagan–Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik, Russian version. First Meeting, 11 October 1986, 3–4, http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/index.htm.
[81] Transcript of Reagan–Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik, Russian version. First Meeting, 11 October 1986, pp. 3–4, http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/index.htm, Third Meeting, 12 October 1986, 4, http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/index.htm.
[82] Transcript of Reagan–Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik, Russian version. First Meeting, 11 October 1986, pp. 3–4, http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/index.htm, Fourth Meeting, 12 October 1986, 6, http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/index.htm.
[83] Transcript of Reagan–Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik, Russian version. First Meeting, 11 October 1986, pp. 3–4, http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/index.htm, 4.
[84] Transcript of Reagan–Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik, Russian version. First Meeting, 11 October 1986, pp. 3–4, http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/index.htm, 7.
[85] Transcript of Reagan–Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik, Russian version. First Meeting, 11 October 1986, pp. 3–4, http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/index.htm, Second Meeting, 11 October 1986, 6, http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/index.htm.
[86] Transcript of Reagan–Gorbachev Summit in Reykjavik, Russian version. First Meeting, 11 October 1986, pp. 3–4, http://www.gwu.edu/ ∼ nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/index.htm, American notes, Fourth Meeting, 12 October 1986, 13, http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/index.htm.
[87] See Anderson and Anderson, Reagan's Secret War, 313.
[88] CitationWill, ‘The President's Finest Hour’.
[89] ‘Conservatives Very Relieved by Close Call At Reykjavik’, Human Events, 25 October 1986, 1.
[90] CitationKrauthammer, ‘It Sounded More Like Poker’.
[91] Reagan, An American Life, 683.
[92] CitationGorbachev, On My Country and the World, 195.
[93] Reagan, A Life in Letters, 419.
[94] As quoted in CitationChernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, 83.
[95] Anderson and Anderson, Reagan's Secret War, 343.
[96] ‘The Proposed Treaty’, National Review, 22 May 1987, 14.
[97] As quoted in Rusher, ‘Reagan's No Suicide’.
[98] CitationKissinger and Nixon, ‘A Real Peace’, 32.
[99] CitationRusher, ‘Reagan's No Suicide’, 36.
[100] CitationWill, ‘The Cult of Arms Control…’.
[101] ‘Confusion Abounding’, National Review, 20 November 1987, 18.
[102] For example, CitationGarrity, ‘Why We Need Nuclear Weapons and Which Ones We Need’.
[103] CitationBuckley, ‘Peacedrunk’.
[104] For the text of the INF Treaty, see http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/inf1.html.
[105] CitationGorbachev, Memoirs, 447.
[106] Reagan, ‘Remarks at a Luncheon Hosted by the Heritage Foundation’, 30 November 1987, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1987/113087c.htm.
[107] CitationMann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan, 52–4.
[108] CitationMann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan, 54.
[109] Reagan, A Life in Letters, 419.
[110] Reagan, ‘Interview with Television Network Broadcasters’, 3 December 1987, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid = 33774&st = &st1 = .
[111] CitationBuckley, ‘Mr. Reagan Misunderstands’, 72.
[112] ‘Letter From Washington’, National Review, 31 December 1987, 11.
[113] As quoted in CitationBrinkley, ‘Is Reagan Now Less Hard on Communism’.
[114] CitationBuckley, ‘Thank God He's Gone’.
[115] CitationBuckley, ‘Thank God He's Gone’
[116] CitationWill, ‘Reagan's Disarmament’.
[117] See CitationSmith, ‘The Right Against Reagan’; CitationBuckley, ‘Senator Helms Is Luckily in the Way’.
[118] See Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 1080–86.
[119] Conservative intellectuals believed a START Treaty would have been far more troublesome than the INF Treaty. See CitationGlynn, ‘Reagan's Rush to Disarm’.
[120] CitationKrauthammer, ‘A Human Rights Success’.
[121] CitationSafire, ‘The Sobersided Summit’.
[122] ‘Reagan Presses “Freedom Offensive” in Moscow’, Human Events, 11 June 1988, 4.
[123] As quoted in CitationCanon, ‘A Blind Spot on Consistency’.
[124] CitationBuckley, ‘So Long Evil Empire’, 57.
[125] CitationWill, ‘Foreign Policy That Bewilders’.
[126] CitationWill, ‘Foreign Policy That Bewilders’
[127] CitationChambers, Witness, 541.
[128] CitationReagan, ‘Speech at the 30th Anniversary of the National Review’, 129.
[129] CitationRonald Reagan, ‘Address to Members of the British Parliament’, 8 June 1982, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/60882a.htm.
[130] See, e.g. CitationAnderson and Anderson, Reagan's Secret War, 3, 350–51.
[131] As quoted in CitationReeves, President Reagan, 14.
[132] For examples of the key roles Reagan's advisers played during the Reagan–Gorbachev Summits, see CitationShultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 586–607, 751–80, 983–1015, 1080–1108; and CitationMatlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 149–73, 215–36, 271–303.
[133] As quoted in Diggins, Reagan, 385.
[134] As quoted in CitationMorris, Dutch, 596.
[135] See CitationGaddis, Strategies of Containment, 342–79.
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