Arms control as a part of strategy: the Warsaw Pact in MBFR negotiations

Abstract

New archival materials have become available that allow us to test the conventional interpretation of Warsaw Pact policy towards conventional arms reductions in Europe. They shed new light on the objectives of the Eastern side in talks on mutual and balanced arms reductions, how it approached the dispute over the assessments of the military balance and sought to preserve its advantages while constraining West German military capabilities, and demonstrate that Soviet military leaders perceived a shift in the conventional military balance in favour of the West in the 1980s.

Notes

Christoph Bluth is Professor of International Studies at the University of Leeds. He has published widely on Cold War history, in particular NATO nuclear strategy and Soviet military policy, including The Collapse of Soviet Military Policy (Dartmouth, 1995).

 [1] Sheehan, ‘A More Inane Congress’; Ranger, Arms & Politics.

 [2] The achievement of nuclear parity was accompanied in Soviet military thought with a recognition of the mutual vulnerability of the superpowers and thus the reduced likelihood of nuclear escalation by either side. See the article of Ivanov, ‘Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy’.

 [3] For more detail on the NATO doctrine of ‘flexible response’, see Bluth, Britain, Germany and Western Nuclear Strategy.

 [4] Vojetech Mastny cites Michael MccGwire's opinion that ‘the strategy of defeating NATO by conventional means was adopted at the plenary meeting of the Soviet party central committee in December 1966. This author however disputes this account as speculation based on an overly mechanistic view of Soviet decision-making. See Mastny, ‘Imagining War in Europe’, 29; MccGwire, Military Objectives, 381–405; Bluth, ‘The Evolution of Soviet Military Doctrine’.

 [5] Information from Raymond L. Garthoff, cited in Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, 203.

 [6] For more detailed discussion, see Bluth, ‘The Evolution of Soviet Military Doctrine’.

 [7] See for example the account of the Yug-78 exercise, VA-Straußberg 29371, 22.

 [8] For an exposition of the strategic rationales, see MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy.

 [9] Garthoff, ‘Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation’.

[10] Pravda, 31 March 1971.

[11] Those like Senator Kennedy who argued for a connection between these two events took the view that the Soviets would be as alarmed as the West Europeans by a precipitate large-scale withdrawal for US forces from Europe. Keliher, The Negotiations, 28.

[12] Bluth, ‘Détente and Conventional Arms Control’.

[13] Borawski, ‘Mutual Force Reductions in Europe’.

[14] Mastny, ‘Imagining War in Europe’, 33.

[15] See Haftendorn, Sicherheit und Entspannung, 530; Müller, Politik und Bürokratie, 120.

[16] Bericht über den Stand der vorbereitenden Konsultationen für Verhandlungen über die Reduzierung von Streiktkräften und Rüstungen, 16 March 1973, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, doc. 8068, vol. 1, 174–5.

[17] Zum gegenwärtigen Stand der Konsultationen in Wien, 10 April 1973, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv doc. 8068, p.238 f.; the document describes the possible to use the ‘Hungarian question’ tactically in the future.

[18] Mailinger, MBFR.

[19] Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, doc. 8068, vol. 1, 176. One consequence was that Romania would have uncontrolled informal dealings with the Western delegations and could thus obtain information which was not immediately available to the other WTO delegations.

[20] Vermerk über ein Gespräch mit den Genossen Kitzwinki und Popow am 6.2.1973 19.00 Uhr in der sowjetischen Botschaft, 6 February 1973, in Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, doc. 8068, vol. 1, 109.

[21] Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, doc. 8068, vol. 1, 179.

[22] Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, doc. 8068, vol. 1, 179–81.

[23] Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, doc. 8068, vol. 1, 181.

[24] Diskussionsbeitrag des Ministers für Nationale Verteidigung vor dem Politbüro des Zentralkomitees der SED zum Stand der Wiener Verhandlungen (1973), Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, Akte Strgb., AZN 8069.

[25] Diskussionsbeitrag des Ministers für Nationale Verteidigung vor dem Politbüro des Zentralkomitees der SED zum Stand der Wiener Verhandlungen (1973), Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, Akte Strgb., AZN 8069, 4; emphasis added.

[26] Diskussionsbeitrag des Ministers für Nationale Verteidigung vor dem Politbüro des Zentralkomitees der SED zum Stand der Wiener Verhandlungen (1973), Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, Akte Strgb., AZN 8069, 6.

[27] Thesen, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, Akte Strgb., AZN 8070, vol. 2, 492–9.

[28] Thesen, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, Akte Strgb., AZN 8070, vol. 1.

[29] Thesen, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, Akte Strgb., AZN 8070, 6.

[30] Thesen, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, Akte Strgb., AZN 8070, 1.

[31] Thesen, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, Akte Strgb., AZN 8070, 8–9.

[32] Delegation Wien, Aktennotiz über ein Gespräch mit den Vertretern der Polnischen Armee zu den Wiener Verhandlung am 13.2.1974, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, Akte Strgb., AZN 8070, 123.

[33] ‘Presseerklärung des Delegationsleiters der Niederlande, Brian Quarles van Ufford, am 14. Januar 1974’, in Mutz, Die Wiener Verhandlungen.

[34] ‘Presseerklärung des Delegationsleiters Polens, Tadeusz Strulak, am 9. April 1974’, in Mutz, Die Wiener Verhandlungen, 126–30.

[35] ‘Presseerklärung des Delegationsleiters der Niederlande, Willem de Vos van Steenwijk, am 12.Dezember 1974’, in Mutz, Die Wiener Verhandlungen, 145–8.

[36] See the press statement by the leader of the Dutch delegation on 17 April 1975, ‘Presseerklärung des Delegationsleiters der Niederlande, Willem de Vos van Steenwijk, am 12.Dezember 1974’, in Mutz, Die Wiener Verhandlungen, 153–7.

[37] Delegation der DDR, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv Bundesarchiv, Akte Strgb., AZN 8074, 10.

[38] Argumentation zur Einbeziehung von Kernwaffeneinheiten, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, Akte Strgb., AZN 8075, 74–8,

[39] International Herald Tribune, 6 September 1975; the brief Western press statement on 18 December 1975 did not divulge any of the details other than that the proposal included the reduction of an unspecified number American nuclear weapons. See ‘Westliche Presseverlautbarung am 18. Dezember 1975’, Mutz, Die Wiener Verhandlungen, 172; Western press releases gradually contained more concrete information about the proposed reductions. The first substantial briefing in the official press statements which went into quite some detail was given by Willem de Vos van Steenwijk on 21 July 1976; see ‘Presseerklärung des Delegationsleiters der Niederlande, Willem de Vos van Steenwijk, am 21. Juli 1976’, in Mutz, Die Wiener Verhandlungen, 182–6.

[40] Keliher, The Negotiations, 69–73; Freedman, Arms Control, 90–91; Hall, The M.B.F.R. Talks, 27–31.

[41] The concession with regard to the ‘two-phase’ concept was emphasised in the press statement of the leader of the Czech delegation, Tomas Lahoda, on 8 April 1976. See ‘Presseerklärung des Delegationsleiters der Tschechoslowakei, Tomas Lahoda, am 8. April 1976’, in Mutz, Die Wiener Verhandlungen, 178–82.

[42] Kwizinskij, Vor dem Sturm, 276. Kvitsinkii was second in the WTO MBFR delegation until 1974.

[43] Delegation Wien, Aktennotiz, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv Akte Strgb AZN 8073.

[44] Delegation Wien, Aktennotiz, 21 March 1975, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, Akte Strgb AZN 8073, 44.

[45] Delegation Wien, Aktennotiz, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, Akte Strgb AZN 8077.

[46] Ruehl, ‘Probleme des Truppenabbaus in Europa’.

[47] Delegation Wien, Aktennotiz, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, Akte Strgb AZN 8077, 2–3.

[48] Delegation Wien, Aktennotiz, Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, Akte STRGb AZN 8078.

[49] The final communique is reprinted in Arms Control Reporter, 401.B.205, 1989.

[50] Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, VA-Straußberg 32651, 136. The precise document cited is a summary of statements by the Soviet Defence Minister Army General Yazov about questions relating to the military–technical side of the military doctrine of the member states of the Warsaw Pact on 26 November 1987.

[51] Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, VA-Straußberg 32651, 137.

[52] Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, VA-01/39588, 167.

[53] Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, VA-Straußberg 32651, 139.

[54] Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, VA Straußberg 32659, 67.

[55] Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, VA Straußberg 32659, 70.

[56] Another document from 1987 which discusses the reasons for formulating a joint Warsaw Pact military doctrine, quite different figures are used. It declares that the number of combat ready divisions and independent brigades are as follows: NATO has 71 divisions and 76 brigades, the Warsaw Pact 73 divisions 16 brigade. By this calculus NATO had a 1.5-fold superiority, taking into account that WTO divisions have fewer troops. Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, VA Straußberg 30834, 91.

[57] This means 1400 more aircraft than the WTO.

[58] Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv, VA Straußberg 32661, 86.

[59] Kardashevskiy, ‘Rol' nauki v sovremennoi voine’, 14; see also Schweitzer, ‘The Soviet Military goes high-tech’.

[60] Bluth, The Collapse of Soviet Military Power, chap. 3; Garthoff, ‘New Thinking’.

[61] It is beyond the scope of this paper to defend this assertion, but see Bluth, The Collapse of Soviet Military Power, chap. 1; Shenfield, The Nuclear Predicament.

[62] Freedman, ‘The Politics of Conventional Arms Control’.

[63] Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Annex II of the Concluding Document of the 1986–1989 Vienna Meeting of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.