‘Footnoting’ as a political instrument: Denmark's NATO policy in the 1980s

Abstract

The intensification of the Cold War in the 1980s bred tensions within both the NATO alliance and its member states. Criticism of NATO's policy was pronounced among the social democratic parties in Northern Europe and found extraordinary expression in Denmark during the so-called footnote period of 1982–88. Here a coalition of centre-left opposition parties was able to control NATO policy by way of parliamentary resolutions which forced the government to take increasingly critical positions in NATO, mainly by ‘footnoting’ communiqués. The government chose to ‘live with’ footnoting in order to keep power. The result was domestic strife, allied criticism and a policy which moved Denmark away from NATO's mainstream.

Notes

Nikolaj Petersen is Professor Emeritus of International Relations, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University. He has written extensively on Danish foreign policy, Arctic politics, NATO and the EU, as well as foreign policy theory. Recently he has co-edited Dansk Udenrigspolitiks Historie [History of Danish Foreign Policy], published in seven volumes 2001–2008, and authored vol. 6, Europæisk og globalt engagement 1973–2006 (2nd ed. 2006). He is currently focusing on Danish foreign policy after the Cold War and the political implications of Arctic warming.

 [1] According to Snyder, ‘The Security Dilemma’, the alliance dilemma consists of the choice between alliance solidarity and relative independence. The former choice involves the ‘good’ of avoiding abandonment and the ‘bad’ of possible entrapment by the alliance leader. The latter choice involves the ‘good’ of political autonomy and the ‘bad’ (risk) of abandonment. For an application to Danish NATO policy, see Petersen, Denmark and NATO.

 [2] The first report, on Greenland during the Cold War (DUPI, Grønland) was commissioned from the Danish Foreign Policy Institute in 1995 and delivered in early 1997. In the sequel, former Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (Lib.) demanded a follow-up report on the Warsaw Pact's nuclear plans against Denmark and its contacts with Danish politicians. The demand for a historical investigation focused on the ‘internal threat’ was repeated by the new Liberal leader Anders Fogh Rasmussen in 1998–99 when the Folketing set down a commission to investigate the activities of PET, the internal intelligence service, during the Cold War, but was only partially met (Rasmussen's foreword to Haarder, Hvem holdt de med?). The PET Commission took until 2009 to give in its report ( PET-kommissionens beretning ). In the meantime the non-socialist parties renewed their pressure for a historical investigation and succeeded partially in 2001, when the Poul Nyrup Rasmussen government commissioned a report from the Danish Foreign Policy Institute, DUPI (later: DIIS). But the opposition parties remained critical of the remit and expanded it when they came to power in late 2001. The focus now shifted from the external threat to the internal aspects with a concentration on the footnote period and the ‘internal threat’ from party and organisation contacts with Warsaw Pact authorities. When the four-volume report (DIIS, Danmark) was published in 2005, it failed to live up to expectations, however, as it took a rather balanced view of the footnote period and failed to disclose foul play with the enemy by the opposition parties. Consequently the report was denounced as only ‘preliminary’ by the Liberal and Conservative government parties and their ally, the Danish People's Party, and a new temporary Centre for Cold War Research was set up to provide an alternative report. The report which is due in 2011, was entrusted to Professor Bent Jensen, a long-time advocate of a ‘right revisionist’ interpretation of Danish foreign policy and a leading critic of the DIIS Report as well as of the PET Report, when it was published in 2009 (see Petersen, ‘Kampen’; Villaume, ‘Confronting’).

 [3] Speech at the University of Copenhagen 23 September 2003, Prime Minister's Office, http://www.stm.dk.

 [4] These missiles – the Pershing II ballistic missile and the Tomahawk cruise missile – were originally termed LRTNF (Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces), but were renamed INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) in 1981. Here INF is used throughout.

 [5] Norden connotes the five Nordic countries: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland.

 [6] In the 1980s this role centred round the Thule early warning radar, the hub of the US Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). Attempts by the socialist parties to question the modernisation of the radar in the mid-1980s failed to win the support of the Social Democrats. Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement, 334–45; Minutes of the Social Democratic Parliamentary Group. Folketingets Arkiv, Copenhagen (SD), 20 January 1987.

 [7] See e.g. exchange of letters between US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and his Danish colleague Poul Søgaard, January–May 1980, in Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog (1980): 261–5.

 [8] Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement, 237–40. In DIIS, Danmark, this is the main explanation of footnote policy. This analysis focuses heavily on the US ‘clandestine war’ on the Soviet Union in the early 1980s and such occurrences as the Able Archer exercise in October 1983. These activities were not commonly known, however, and certainly not by the Danish opposition parties. On the external vs. internal explanations of footnote policy, see Borring Olesen, ‘Noter’.

 [9] Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement, 237–40. The Americans were especially irked by Anker Jørgensen's tendency to draw parallels between the situations in Poland, Turkey and El Salvador. Secretary Alexander Haig's deputy, Lawrence Eagleburger, twice complained in person to Ambassador Otto Borch, who concluded, in a personal letter to Permanent Secretary Eigil Jørgensen on 3 May 1982, that he now met an unusual degree of scepticism towards Denmark in Washington (Washington amtel 539, 3 May 1982, General Files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen (UM) 5.D.32.a).

[10] The regular Danish participants were Lasse Budtz as leader of the delegation, Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen, and Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen (see Petersen, ‘Scandilux’).

[11] The most detailed analysis of doctrinal developments in the Social Democratic Party is Boel, Socialdemokratiets.

[12] Aktuelt, 18 April 1978.

[13] The dual-track decision had an official as well as an unofficial rationale. The official rationale focused on the need for a stronger coupling between the United States and Europe while the unofficial rationale aimed at improving the nuclear balance in Europe.

[14] Interview with Pierre Lellouche in Le Point, 26 April 1982.

[15] Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement, 194–21; DIIS, Danmark, vol. 3, 77–104.

[16] Letter Permanent Secretary Eigil Jørgensen to Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen, March 1982, UM 105.I.40.e/3.a.

[17] Press statement 18 March 1982, Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1982, 227.

[18] Washington amtel 353, 20 March 1982, UM 105.I.40.e/3.a.

[19] Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement, 279–80.

[20] See Table in Petersen and Svensson, Valgenes, 37.

[21] Petersen, Inden for systemet, 311.

[22] Hedtoft was Prime Minister 1947–50 and 1953–55; Hansen from 1955 to 1959, and Krag 1962–68, 1971–72.

[23] See Mariager, ‘Den brede enigheds’.

[24] Poul Villaume has a different interpretation, as he claims that the Social Democratic opposition was basically triggered by Ellemann-Jensen's determination to turn Denmark into a core country in NATO (see his ‘Confronting’, 43).

[25] Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1979, 372; Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1983, 429.

[26] Interpellation debate 7 December 1982, Folketingstidende 1982–83 (Parliamentary Records, Debates), Forhandlinger, col. 2864ff.

[27] Ellemann-Jensen on press conference, 10 December 1982, Danato reptels 713 and 718, 13 and 14 December 1982, UM 105.G.152.

[28] Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement, 298–9.

[29] Speech at party conference in Silkeborg, 28–29 January 1983; Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1983, 216–17.

[30] Folketingstidende 1982–83, Forhandlinger, 8 February 1983, col. 5566ff.

[31] Uffe Ellemann-Jensen on TV, 3 February 1983; Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1983, 218f.

[32] The committee was proposed by Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen in an effort to rein in the two Conservative ministers. He was not at that time member of the government's ‘inner cabinet’ (Ellemann-Jensen letter to Prime Minister Schlüter, 3 January 1983, UM 105.I.40.e/3b. Cf. Ellemann-Jensen, Fodfejl, 129–31).

[33] Reports on meetings in the ‘rocket committee’, 20 January and 2 February 1983, UM 105.I.40e/3b; Schlüter in Minutes of the Conservative Parliamentary Group, Folketingets Arkiv, Copenhagen (KF), 2 February 1983.

[34] Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement, 302–3.

[35] Conversation Prime Minister Schlüter, Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen and Assistant Secretary of State Kenneth Dam, 23 March 1983, UM 105.I.40.e/3a.

[36] SD 26 May 1983.

[37] Folketingstidende 1982–83, Forhandlinger, 26 May 1983, col. 11922ff; SD, 26 May 1983; Budtz, Brudstykker, 119ff.

[38] Meeting in the ‘rocket committee’, 27 May 1983. UM 105.I.40e/3b.

[39] Communiqués from DPC meeting 1–2 June 1983 and NATO Council meeting 9–10 June 1983, Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1983, 343ff.; Engell's statement in DPC 2 June, UM 105.G.153; Ellemann-Jensen's statement in NATO Council, UM 105.105.I.40.e/3a; Danato reptel 376, 27 June 1983, UM 105.G.153.

[40] Prime Minister Schlüter chose his opening speech to the new parliamentary session to proclaim the May resolution part of government policy (Folketingstidende 1983–84, 1; samling, Forhandlinger, 4 October 1983, col. 18ff.).

[41] Folketingstidende 1983–84, 1, samling, Forhandlinger, 5 November 1983, col. 1355ff.

[42] Folketingstidende 1983–84, 1, samling, Forhandlinger, 3 December 1983, col. 2641ff.

[43] Folketingstidende 1983–84, 1, samling, Forhandlinger, 1 December 1983, col. 2553ff.

[44] Foreign Ministry notice, 8 December 1983, UM 105.G.154; Texts in Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Årbog 1983, 292, 293.

[45] See Krasner and Petersen, ‘Peace’; Hein Rasmussen, Sære alliancer.

[46] The Social Democratic Party sent a high-ranking delegation to Moscow in October 1984 for consultations on the zone proposal with the CPSU, but had to return empty-handed.

[47] Text in Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement, 312.

[48] Both proposal and comment demonstrated a lack of elementary knowledge as the placement of nuclear weapons in space had been outlawed since 1966.

[49] Folketingstidende 1983–84, 2, samling, Forhandlinger, 3 May 1984, col. 5265ff.

[50] Politiken, 6 June 1984. The proposal was inspired by a similar compromise in Norway between the Labour Party and the non-socialist government. See Innstilling fra utenriks- og konstitutionskomiteen nr. 225, Stortinget, Oslo.

[51] Dyvig-rapporten 1985 ; Faurby, ‘Sikkerhedspolitisk consensus’, 70.

[52] Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement, 329–31.

[53] Folketingstidende 1984–85, Forhandlinger, 26 March 1985.

[54] In a subsequent meeting in the Foreign Policy Committee on 12 April 1985. Prime Minister Schlüter explained that a footnote would have been a manifestation of defeat, and that by avoiding it Denmark had been able to influence the wording of the NATO communiqué. See Minutes of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee (UPN) (Foreign Policy Committee), 12 April 1985, UM 3.E.92.

[55] Folketingstidende 1984–85, Forhandlinger, 14 May 1985, col. 9944ff.

[56] See Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement, 242.

[57] Depeche X/1984 in Washington amtel 891, 15 June 1984, UM 5.D.32.a.

[58] Washington amtel 609, 22 April 1985, the Foreign Minister's talking points for press conference 20 April 1985, both UM 5.D.32.b; UPN 25 April 1985, UM 3.E.92.

[59] Washington amtels 1321 (11 September 1985) and 1337 (12 September 1985), UM 5.D.32.b; UPN, 13 September 1985, UM 3.E.92.

[60] Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement, 333–4.

[61] UPN (Foreign Policy Committee), 17 December 1986, UM 3.E.92.

[62] DIIS, Danmark, vol. 3, 447.

[63] This was a different procedure from the one usually used by the alternative majority. Over the years, the favourite vehicle of footnote politics had been interpellation debates in the Folketing, concluded by the adoption of a resolution. These debates normally lasted a couple of hours, were quite informal without committee work and often concluded with improvised draft resolutions. The procedure around parliamentary decisions is much more formal and the outcome more binding than resolutions. The procedure is initiated by presenting a text, which then has two plenary hearings with a committee stage in between. Instead of a single afternoon such proposals may be on the agenda for a whole parliamentary season.

[64] The United States had broken off defence cooperation with New Zealand in 1985 after NZ demands for guarantees against port calls of naval ships carrying nuclear weapons.

[65] Folketingstidende 1987–88, Forhandlinger, 27 November 1987, col. 2871ff.

[66] Collet's notice on talk with Ambassador Todman 7 December 1987, UM 55.Dan.10. Collet had succeeded Engell as Defence Minister in 1987.

[67] SD 22 March 1988; Information, 23 March 1988.

[68] Notice by Per Poulsen-Hansen, head of NATO Office; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 March 1988, UM 55.Dan.10.

[69] ‘Neither confirm nor deny’ the presence of nuclear weapons was an ingrained doctrine with the US and British navies.

[70] Budtz in Information, 21 April 1988, Heltberg, Hvor der handles, 90, 12 April 1988.

[71] In meeting in the Liberal parliamentary group, 14 April 1988, at 15.45. Minutes of the Liberal Parliamentary Group. Venstre, Søllerød (V), 14 April 1988.

[72] SD, 12 April 1988.

[73] Umtel 263 to Washington, 12 April 1988, UM 55.D.10.

[74] Umtel 267 to Washington, 13 April 1988; Washington amtel 538, 13 April 1988, both UM 55.Dan.10.

[75] The normal procedure in interpellation debates where various competing draft resolutions were presented, was that the draft which appeared to have the largest backing, would be voted upon first.

[76] SD, 13 April 1988; Auken in Larsen, Auken, 160; Heltberg: Hvor der handles, 90ff.; Schlüter, Sikken et liv, 321ff; Kristiansen and Larsen, Niels Helveg Petersen, 187; Schlüter in KF, 14 April 1988 at 15.45.

[77] SD, 14 April 1988.

[78] Auken's own characteristic of his mood in interview with DIIS, November 2004 (DIIS, Danmark, vol. 3, 298).

[79] Subsequently Svend Auken has maintained that he fell into a trap deliberately set up by the Prime Minister and Niels Helveg Petersen, the Social Liberal party leader. See his review of Ellemann-Jensen, Fodfejl, in Politiken, 11 November 2004.

[80] Aktuelt, 15 April 1988.

[81] Uffe Ellemann-Jensen in Foreign Policy Committee 17 December 1991 and 17 January 1992, UM 3.E.92.

[82] Umtel 314 to Danato, 15 April 1988, UM 55.D.10.

[83] I have calculated that the NATO issue moved a few percent of the voters from the opposition to the government side. The losses of the alternative parties – 7 mandates – did not accrue to the four government parties, which stayed at 70 mandates, but to the rightist Progress Party. After the election the alternative majority still commanded a slim majority in the Folketing of 89 against the government's 86 mandates (Petersen, ‘Sikkerhedspolitikken’).

[84] Rynning, ‘Denmark as a Strategic Actor’.

[85] Berlingske Tidende, 27 February 1997. The article singled out Anker Jørgensen as the most prominent representative of this view.

[86] ‘Right revisionism’ explains Denmark's footnote policy as appeasement of the Soviet Union or worse on the part of the Danish Social Democrats and leftist forces. This understanding is close to the political programme of the Fogh Rasmussen government (see Petersen, ‘Kampen’).

[87] According to the concept of Common Security which had been developed by Egon Bahr in the so-called Palme Commission in 1982, security can only be found through cooperation with the enemy, not by one-sided armament.

[88] Comment in DIIS, Danmark, vol. 4, 96 on the proposed Nordic nuclear-free zone.

[89] Jensen, Tryk og tilpasning.

[90] Lidegaard, A Short History, 318–19.