Crisis management in the Communist bloc: Romania's policy towards the USSR in the aftermath of the Prague Spring

Abstract

On 21 August 1968, when Soviet tanks were entering Prague liquidating the ‘Prague Spring’, Romanian party leader Nicolae Ceauşescu publicly condemned the intervention as a violation of national sovereignty. Such aggressive attitude lasted only a few days, after which he tried to appease Moscow. This article retraces Ceauşescu's decisions and motivations in the years 1968-1970, which were aimed at eliminating what he perceived as the risk of a similar intervention in Romania. Also, it answers a fundamental question: did the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia determine an abandonment of Romania's policy of autonomy in the Communist bloc?

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research, CNCS - UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-1056.

Notes

Cezar Stanciu is Assistant Professor at the University Valahia of Târgovişte, Romania. He completed a PhD thesis in 2008 focused on the alignment of Romania's foreign policy to the Soviet coordinates in the postwar period. Stanciu is also senior researcher at the ‘Grigore Gafencu’ Center for the History of International Relations in Târgovişte and has published numerous studies on Romania's foreign policy in the UK, USA, Finland and Romania.

1 Mihnea Berindei, ‘Ceauşescu şi discursul din 21 august 1968’. Lettre Internationale 64 (2008).

2 New York Times, 22 August 1968.

3 Ghiţă Ionescu, The reluctant ally: a study of Communist neo-colonialism (Ampersand, 1965), 8.

4 Vladimir Tismăneanu, Fantoma lui Gheorghiu-Dej (Bucureşti: Editura Humanitas, 2008), 138.

5 Vladimir Tismăneanu, Stalinism revisited: the establishment of communist regimes in East-Central Europe (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), 420. For the original text of the Declaration, see: Declaraţie cu privire la poziţia Partidului Muncitoresc Român în problemele mişcării comuniste şi muncitoreşti internaţionale adoptată de Plenara lărgită a CC al PMR din aprilie 1964 (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1964).

6 Former CC member Paul Niculescu-Mizil clearly stated in his memoirs that Ceauşescu's policies were only a continuation of his predecessor's. See: Paul Niculescu-Mizil, O istorie trăită. Memorii, vol II Bucureşti, Moscova, Praga, Bologna (Bucureşti: Editura Democraţia, 2003), 13. About the Sino-Soviet split, see: Elizabeth Wishnick, Mending fences: the evolution of Moscow's China policy, from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 30.

7 Douglas Selvage, ‘Poland, the GDR, and the Ulbricht Doctrine’, in Ideology, politics, and diplomacy in East Central Europe, eds. Mieczysław B. Biskupski, Piotr Stefan Wandycz (University Rochester Press, 2003), 236. Regarding Romania's position in the Six Days War, see: Yaacov Ro'i, The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War (Stanford University Press, 2008), 195.

8 Jaromír Navrátil, ed., The Prague Spring 68: a national security archive documents reader (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), 64.

9 Dennis Deletant, ‘Taunting the Bear: Romania and the Warsaw Pact, 1963–1989, Cold War History 7:4 (2007): 499. The risk of a Soviet intervention directed against Romania, as well, was perceived not only in Bucharest, but also abroad. The idea was previously argued in: Dennis Deletant, Romania under Communist rule (Bucharest: Center for Romanian Studies, 1999), 114–115. Recent works also emphasised that a similar perception also existed in the West, where at various levels the Soviets were warned against an intervention in Romania. See: Günter Bischof, ‘No Action: The Johnson Administration and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968’, in The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, eds. Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, Peter Ruggenthaler (Rowman & Littlefield, 2010): 222.

10 Greg Cashman, What causes war? An introduction to theories of international conflict (Lexington Books, 2000), 104.

11 Most historians and political scientists agree that Ceauşescu's denunciation of the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia played a major role in the regime's efforts to gain domestic legitimacy and that it was manipulated in a nationalistic way, having a great contribution to the advent of Ceauşescu's cult of personality. The most recent study that defends this thesis is Dragoş Petrescu's ‘Legitimacy, Nation-Building and Closure: Meaning and Consequences of the Romanian August of 1968’ in The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968. Forty Years Later, ed. M. Mark Stolarik (Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2010), 243–244. Other authors have defended the same point of view previously. See for example: Vladimir Tismăneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons. A Political History of Romanian Communism (University of California Press, 2003), 202–203.

12 Mihai Retegan, In the shadow of the Prague spring: Romanian foreign policy and the crisis in Czechoslovakia, 1968 (Centre for Romanian Studies, 2000).

13 Mihai Retegan, 1968. Din primăvară până în toamnă (Bucureşti: Editura RAO, 1998), 218.

14 Kristen P. Williams, ‘Romania's Resistance to the USSR’, in Beyond great powers and hegemons: why secondary states support, follow or challenge, eds. Kristen P. Williams, Steven E. Lobell, Neal G. Jesse (Stanford University Press, 2012): 42–43.

15 Dennis Deletant defined autonomy as ‘the right to formulate indigenous policy’. See: Deletant, ‘Taunting the Bear…’ 2007, 496.

16 Mihai Retegan, 1968…(1998), 204–206.

17 Scânteia, 22 August 1968.

18 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din ziua de 21 august 1968’, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 133/1968, 8.

19 Deletant, Romania under Communist rule 1999, 114–115.

20 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din ziua de 21 august 1968’, 11.

21 Ana-Maria Cătănuş, ‘Tensiuni în relaţiile româno-sovietice în anul Primăverii de la Praga’, Arhivele totalitarismului 1–2 (2006): 232–233. A series of documents from the Ministry of, Defense and the Securitate indicating the possibility of a Soviet intervention in Romania was published in Romania: Ion Pătroiu and Alexandru Oşca and Vasile Popa, Îngheţ în plină vară. Praga – august 1968 (Bucureşti: Editura Paideia, 1998), 97–98.

22 Liu Yong, Sino-Romanian Relations 1950s–1960s, (Bucureşti: Institutul Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2006) 253–258.

23 Yong, Sino-Romanian Relations, 254–258.

24 Dejan Jović, Yugoslavia: a state that withered away (Purdue University Press, 2009), 138. A similar comparison between Ceauşescu's and Tito's fears of a possible Soviet intervention directed against them was also made by Gabriel Fischer in a classic study on Romania's policy of autonomy. See: Gabriel Fischer, ‘Rumania’, in The Communist States in Disarray, 1965–1971, eds. Adam Bromke, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone (University of Minnesota Press, 1972): 163.

25 Tvrtko Jakovina, ‘Tito, the Bloc-Free Movement, and the Prague Spring’, in The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, 406–407.

26 Lavinia Betea et al., 21 august 1968. Apoteoza lui Ceauşescu (Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 2009), 167.

27 Lavinia Betea et al., 21 august 1968. Apoteoza lui Ceauşescu (Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 2009), 167.

28 Lavinia Betea et al., 21 august 1968. Apoteoza lui Ceauşescu (Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 2009), 170.

29 Retegan 1968, 218. I.Gh. Maurer, at that time premier of Romania and one of Ceauşescu's most important counsellors, in an interview published later declared that Ceauşescu was very impulsive and described his attitude on 21 August as ‘irresponsible’. Lavinia Betea, Maurer şi lumea de ieri. Mărturii despre stalinizarea României (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Dacia, 2001), 186.

30 Retegan 1968, 222–223. For an English version of his research conclusions, see: Mihai Retegan, In the shadow of the Prague spring: Romanian foreign policy and the crisis in Czechoslovakia, 1968 (Centre for Romanian Studies, 2000). Investigations in French archives revealed the fact that the Embassy of France on Bucharest noticed the same change of behaviour starting from 25 August. See: Dan Constantin Mâţă, ‘România, Franţa şi Cehoslovacia lui Dubček. Atitudini şi imagini reciproce’, in România şi sistemele de securitate în Europa 1919–1975, eds. Ioan Ciupercă, Bogdan-Alexandru Schipor, Dan Constantin Mâţă (Iaşi: Editura Universităţii ”Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, 2009): 358–359.

31 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din ziua de 25 august 1968, orele 11.30’ ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 135/1968, 6.

32 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din ziua de 25 august 1968’, 22–23.

33 “Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din ziua de 25 august 1968”, 25.

34 “Scrisoarea Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Român către Biroul Politic al Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist al Uniunii Sovietice”, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 138/1968, 5.

35 Williams 2012, 42.

36 Matthew J. Ouimet, The rise and fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet foreign policy (University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 73.

37 “Stenograma convorbirilor între tovarăşii Nicolae Ceauşescu, secretar general al CC al PCR, preşedintele Consiliului de Stat al RS România şi Iosip Broz Tito, preşedintele RSF Iugoslavia, preşedintele Uniunii Comuniştilor din Iugoslavia”, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section External Relations, dossier no. 3/1969, 80.

38 “Stenograma convorbirilor între tovarăşii Nicolae Ceauşescu, secretar general al CC al PCR, preşedintele Consiliului de Stat al RS România şi Iosip Broz Tito, preşedintele RSF Iugoslavia, preşedintele Uniunii Comuniştilor din Iugoslavia”, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section External Relations, dossier no. 3/1969, 81–82.

39 “Stenograma convorbirilor între tovarăşii Nicolae Ceauşescu, secretar general al CC al PCR, preşedintele Consiliului de Stat al RS România şi Iosip Broz Tito, preşedintele RSF Iugoslavia, preşedintele Uniunii Comuniştilor din Iugoslavia”, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section External Relations, dossier no. 3/1969, 83–86.

40 ‘Protocol nr. 45 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC al PCR din ziua de 11 septembrie 1968’, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 149/1968, 3.

41 Mastny, A cardboard castle, 323–324.

42 Wishnick, Mending Fences, 34–35.

43 Sergey Radchenko, Two suns in the heavens: the Sino-Soviet struggle for supremacy, 1962–1967 (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009), 44.

44 ‘Protocol nr. 10 al şedinţei Comitetului Executiv din ziua de 16 martie 1969’, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 39/1969, 2.

45 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din ziua de 16 martie 1969’, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 39/1969, 14.

46 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din ziua de 18 martie 1969’, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 40/1969, 7–8.

47 ‘Notă de propuneri referitor la vizita ministrului afacerilor externe al R.S. România în URSS’, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 34/1969, 97.

48 ‘Raport referitor la vizita ministrului afacerilor externe al Republicii Socialiste România în URSS’, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 65/1969, 26.

49 ‘Raport referitor la vizita ministrului afacerilor externe al Republicii Socialiste România în URSS’, 27. As a proof of good relations, Ceauşescu insisted many times that Brezhnev himself should visit Romania, in order to sign the new version of the Romanian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, negotiated with great difficulty after the previous version, signed in 1948, had expired in 1968.

50 ‘MAE Notă de convorbire’, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 65/1969, 40–41.

51 ‘MAE Notă de convorbire’, 49.

52 ‘MAE Notă de convorbire’, 56-58.

53 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din 16 mai 1969”, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 75/1969, 6.

54 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din 16 mai 1969’, 6.

55 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din 16 mai 1969’, 7.

56 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din 16 mai 1969’, 8.

57 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din 16 mai 1969’, 9.

58 Mike Bowker, ‘Brezhnev and Superpower Relations’, in Brezhnev Reconsidered, eds. Edwin Bacon, Mark Sandle (New York, 2002), 90–91.

59 Qiang Zhai, ‘Beijing and the Vietnam Peace Talks, 1965–1968: New Evidence from Chinese Sources’, Cold War International History Project Working Paper 18 (1997), 17.

60 Sergey Radchenko, Two suns in the heavens: the Sino-Soviet struggle for supremacy, 1962–1967 (Washington DC, 2009), 72.

61 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Plenare a Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Român din ziua de 21 mai 1969’, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 77/1969, 19.

62 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Plenare…’, 23–26.

63 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din ziua de 18 iunie 1969’, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 91/1969, 2–3.

64 ‘Declaraţia tovarăşului Nicolae Ceauşescu în cadrul consfătuirii’, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 89/1969, 3–4.

65 ‘Protocol nr. 24 al şedinţei Comitetului Executiv din ziua de 18 iunie 1969’, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 91/1969, 2–3. The full text is available in: International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties, Moscow 1969 (Peace and Socialism Publishers, t. Rudé právo, 1969).

66 Richard Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics: A Study of Political Change and Communication (Cambridge MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1980), 157.

67 Concerning Romania's failed mediation attempt in the Vietnam War, see: Dumitru Preda, ‘Foreign Policy of the United States and Romania. New Evidences 1963–1969’. Totalitarianism Archives 1–2 (2002): 265.

68 Joseph F. Harrington, Bruce J. Courtney, Tweaking the nose of the Russians: fifty years of American-Romanian relations, 1940–1990 (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1991), 290–292.

69 Concerning Moscow's policy on the Vietnam War and its limited influence on the north Vietnamese leadership, see: Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996).

70 Harriton and Courtney, 292.

71 Scânteia, 3 August 1969.

72 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din ziua de 4 august 1969’, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 109/1969, 3–10.

73 Congresul al X-lea al Partidului Comunist Român 6–12 august 1969 (Bucureşti, 1969), 87.

74 Congresul al X-lea al Partidului Comunist Român 6–12 august 1969 (Bucureşti, 1969), 745.

75 ‘Stenograma discuţiilor avute cu ocazia primirii de către tovarăşul Nicolae Ceauşescu a conducătorului delegaţiei PCUS la Congresul al X-lea al PCR, K.F. Katuşev, secretar al CC al PCUS’, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section External Relations, dossier no. 52/1969, 11–12.

76 Scânteia, 5 December 1969.

77 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din ziua de 5 decembrie 1969, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 145/1969, 9–10.

78 ‘‘Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din ziua de 5 decembrie 1969, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 145/1969, 10.

79 ‘Protocol nr. 9 al şedinţei Comitetului Executiv din ziua de 17 mai 1970’, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 57/1970, 2–3.

80 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din ziua de 20 mai 1970’, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 59/1970, 7.

81 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv al CC al PCR din ziua de 20 mai 1970’, ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 59/1970, 11.

82 ‘Stenograma şedinţei Comitetului Executiv…’, 22–24.

83 ‘Protocol nr. 31 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent din ziua de 1 iulie 1970', ANIC, fund CC al PCR, section Chancellery, dossier no. 75/1970, 2.

84 Retegan, 1968, 218.