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Abstract
This article analyses the first Bush administration's policy toward the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), finding that as with Soviet-American relations and US policy toward Eastern Europe, the administration diverged from the foreign policy of its predecessor. Whereas previously the CSCE had been a forum to encourage progress on human rights, promote reform in Eastern Europe, and encourage cooperation with the Soviet Union, under Bush it became a tool to manage the transformation of Europe and preserve the Atlantic alliance. This new approach was guided by uncertainty about the CSCE's usefulness as a multilateral forum, scepticism about Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, and a preference for stability.
Notes
1 The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was a multilateral conference structure made up of 35 North American and European countries that facilitated confidence building measures, human contacts, and other types of interaction despite the East-West division of Europe.
2 For more on Reagan's CSCE policy, see Sarah B. Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 135–216.
3 Bush's CSCE policy has not yet received sustained attention in the scholarship on the period.
4 Don Oberdorfer, ‘Baker Wary of Soviet Rights Meeting’, Washington Post 19 January 1989, A7. Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott suggest there was early evidence of divergence on Soviet-American relations, arguing that when Reagan visited Gorbachev, Bush declared, ‘The Cold War isn't over’ and reportedly questioned Reagan's ‘sentimentality’ for Gorbachev. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 9. The term Helsinki process refers to the initial Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1972–75) and all of the related, international meetings that followed.
5 Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War, 212.
6 Press Release, 9 February 1990, Folder 20, Box 161, James A. Baker III Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey. (Hereafter James A. Baker III Papers.)
7 Herbert S. Parmet, George Bush: The Life of a Lone Star Yankee (New York: Scribner, 1997), 212.
8 George Bush, All the Best, George Bush: My Life in Letters and Other Writings (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), 416. See also Andrew Preston, ‘The Politics of Realism and Religion: Christian Responses to Bush's New World Order’, Diplomatic History 34:1 (January 2010): 104.
9 Bush's most emotional response to human rights violations came in relation to the Cambodian genocide. Jeffrey A. Engel, ed. The China Diary of George H. W. Bush: The Making of a Global President (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 81, 251, 282.
10 David F. Schmitz, Brent Scowcroft: Internationalism and Post-Vietnam War American Foreign Policy (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011), 57, 63.
11 James A. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: G. P. Putman's Sons, 1995), 68.
12 Derek H. Chollet and James M. Goldgeier, ‘Once Burned, Twice Shy? The Pause of 1989’, in William C. Wohlforth, ed. Cold War Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 149.
13 National Security Review – 3, 15 February 1989, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/nsr.php (accessed 2 June 2011).
14 Christopher Maynard, Out of the Shadow: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2008), 15.
15 Bush, All the Best, 418.
16 For further discussion, see Chollet and Goldgeier, ‘Once Burned, Twice Shy?’ 143; Sarah B. Snyder, ‘Through the Looking Glass: The Helsinki Final Act and the 1976 Election for President,’ Diplomacy and Statecraft 21:1 (March 2010): 87–106; Schmitz, Brent Scowcroft, 54; and Leo P. Ribuffo, ‘Is Poland a Soviet Satellite?: Gerald Ford, the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine, and the Election of 1976’, Diplomatic History 14 (Summer 1990): 385–403. Donald Rumsfeld's memoirs are also particularly revealing on this point. For example, discussing the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) negotiations, Rumsfeld wrote: ‘I was concerned that the Soviet Union had not proved to be true to its word in previous negotiations. The Soviets were not forthcoming about the level of their defense expenditures. They also appeared to have been violating at least the spirit of the first SALT by concealing missile silos and other military infrastructure.’ Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), 229.
17 See Schmitz, Brent Scowcroft, 95
18 David Hoffman, ‘Gorbachev Seen as Trying to Buy Time for Reform’, Washington Post January 23, 1989, A9.
19 Schmitz, Brent Scowcroft, 11.
20 George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 53–4. In addition, the Bush White House began to think about what a Soviet Union would look like without Gorbachev as its leader. To that end, in an address at the Coast Guard Academy shortly thereafter, Bush again emphasised the need for institutionalisation of reform in the Soviet Union. Parmet, George Bush, 386, 388–9; and Maynard, Out of the Shadow, x. 39. Many observers, however, were frustrated by the slow pace of the pause and the lack of political innovation it produced.
21 Marlin Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!: Reagan and Bush, Sam and Helen: A Decade with Presidents and the Press (New York: Random House, 1995), 230–3.
22 Maynard, Out of the Shadow, 41. Similarly, the event offered Bush the opportunity to reassure the Soviet Politburo that he would not capitalise on instability in the Soviet sphere of influence. William Forest Harlow, ‘And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Bush's Rhetoric of Silence during German Reunification’, in Martin J. Medhurst, ed. The Rhetorical Presidency of George H. W. Bush (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2006), 43.
23 Bush, All the Best, 433.
24 Bartholomew H. Sparrow, ‘Resumption of History: The Rise and Fall of the New World Order’, (paper presented at the Society of the History of American Foreign Relations annual meeting, June 2011).
25 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 144.
26 Theme Paper: US-Soviet Priorities in 1990, 20 November 1989, 2008-1240-MR, Bush Library.
27 Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 158; JAB Notes from 12/2-3/89 Malta Meetings, Folder 12, Box 108, Baker Papers; Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 162–3; White House Fact Sheet on the Meeting With Soviet Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta, 4 December 1989, bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1989/89120400.html (accessed 22 May 2006); and Press Themes: Washington Summit, 22 May 1990, www.foia.state.gov/documents/foiadocs/1539.pdf (accessed 6 June 2011).
28 Parmet, George Bush, 410–1; and Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 261.
29 Bush, All the Best, 448. Fitzwater disagrees with press characterisations of Bush lacking ‘vision,’ arguing his conduct of the Malta summit demonstrated otherwise. Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 245–6, 255.
30 Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters in Malta, 3 December 1989, bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1989/89120304.html (accessed 26 March 2006).
31 Maynard, Out of the Shadow, 51; Chollet and Goldgeier, ‘Once Burned, Twice Shy?’ 158; and Notes, Malta Summit, 2–3 December 1989, in Munteanu, ed. ‘The End of the Cold War.’
32 Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom trans. Catherine Fitzpatrick (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991), 98.
33 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 38.
34 National Security Review – 4, 15 February 1989, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/nsr.php (accessed 2 June 2011).
35 Backgrounder for Press Briefing, President's Trip Files to Poland/Hungary 7/89 [1 of 2], OA/ED: CF00716, Subject Files, Condoleezza Rice – 1989–1990, NSC, Bush Library.
36 Remarks to the Citizens in Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, 31 May 1989, American Presidency Project. For more on Gorbachev's use of the term ‘common European home’, see Marie-Pierre Rey, ‘‘Europe is our Common Home’: A Study of Gorbachev's Diplomatic Concept’, Cold War History 4:2 (January 2004): 33–65.
37 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 115.
38 Gregory F. Domber, ‘Skepticism and Stability: Reevaluating US Policy during Poland's Democratic Transformation in 1989’, Journal of Cold War Studies 13:3 (Summer 2011): 70–1.
39 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 123.
40 Domber, ‘Skepticism and Stability’, 73.
41 Press Release, 11 July 1989, President Bush's Trip to Poland, Hungary, and the Netherlands 7/9-18/89 [1 of 2] OA/ID: CF 00868, Roman Papadiuk Files, Bush Library; and Parmet, George Bush, 406.
42 Parmet, George Bush, 406.
43 Beyond not wanting to accelerate the course of reform, Domber has argued the Bush administration took ‘steps to slow the pace of change when the democratic revolutions in Poland and Hungary were nearing a crescendo.’ Domber, ‘Skepticism and Stability’, 54.
44 This priority fit with Scowcroft's interpretation of the dangers of humiliating a defeated enemy, such as happened in the aftermath of World War One. Schmitz, Brent Scowcroft, 120.
45 Sterling Kernek, ‘Realism in the Post-Cold War Era’ in Kenneth W. Thompson, ed. The Reagan Presidency: Ten Intimate Perspectives of Ronald Reagan (MD: University Press of America, 1997). Gorbachev appreciated that the United States refrained from exploiting Soviet problems for its own gain. For more on Reagan's quiet diplomacy, see Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War, 164–6.
46 Press Release, 13 July 1989, President's Trip to Poland, Hungary, Paris Economic Summit and the Netherlands (7/89) [1 of 4], OA/ID: CF 00867, Roman Papadiuk Files, Bush Library.
47 Domber, ‘Skepticism and Stability’, 54, 78.
48 Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 262; Maynard, Out of the Shadow, 42; Harlow, ‘And the Wall Came Tumbling Down’, 43; and Michael Cox and Steven Hurst, ‘‘His Finest Hour?’ George Bush and the Diplomacy of German Unification’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 13:4 (December 2002): 125–7. Scowcroft supported this approach. Schmitz, Brent Scowcroft, 119–20.
49 Harlow, ‘And the Wall Came Tumbling Down’, 38.
50 Fitzwater, Call the Briefing!, 264.
51 Harlow, ‘And the Wall Came Tumbling Down’, 47.
52 The Bush administration's uncertainly about the utility of the CSCE stands in contrast to Schmitz's characterisation of Scowcroft was the ‘biggest advocate’ in the Ford administration for American attendance at the CSCE summit in Helsinki. Schmitz, Brent Scowcroft, 46.
53 United States representatives also met informally with Soviet officials at several points during the Paris meeting to try to resolve individual cases. William Korey, The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process and American Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 283–5.
54 Remarks to the Citizens in Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, 31 May 1989, American Presidency Project.
55 Remarks to the Citizens in Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, 31 May 1989, American Presidency Project, 280; and Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, From Vienna to Helsinki: Report on the Inter-Sessional Meetings of the CSCE Process, 102nd Congress/2nd Session. Shultz, however, had not attended the 1985 CSCE Experts Meeting in Ottawa or the 1986 CSCE Experts Meeting in Bern, which were comparable to the conferences on the human dimension.
56 Korey, The Promises We Keep, 281.
57 CSCE/CDHP.1, 14 June 1989, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Archives, Prague, Czech Republic; CSCE/CDHP.2, 14 June 1989, Korey, The Promises We Keep, 281ibid; CSCE/CDHP.6, 16 June 1989, ibid; CSCE/CDHP.8, 16 June 1989, ibid; CSCE/CDHP.29, 19 June 1989, ibid. (Hereafter OSCE Archives.)
58 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Hearing, ‘Paris Human Dimension Meeting: Human Rights in the Helsinki Process’, 18 July 1989, 100th Congress/First Session.
59 CSCE/CDHP.33, 20 June 1989, OSCE Archives.
60 Although had the delegations desired a concluding document, Romania would have been an impediment. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, ‘Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe’, October 1990, CSCE Folder, Box 1 Unprocessed, Joint Baltic American National Committee, Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Arie Bloed, ed. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972–1993 (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), 92–4. (Hereafter JBANC.)
61 Document of the Bonn Conference, http://www.osce.org/eea/14081 (accessed 11 November 2012).
62 George Bush, ‘Remarks at the University of South Carolina Commencement Ceremony in Columbia’, 12 May 1990, American Presidency Project.
63 Statement, Pertti Paasio (Finland), 5 June 1990, CSCE, Conference on the Human Dimension, Copenhagen, Statements, 1990 [1 of 3], Box 8, OSCE/CSCE Files, Records of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Open Society Archives. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, João de Deus Pinheiro also eloquently outlined similar ideas. Statement, João de Deus Pinheiro (Portugal), 6 June 1990, CSCE, Conference on the Human Dimension, Copenhagen, Statements, 1990 [3 of 3], Box 9, OSCE/CSCE Files, Records of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Open Society Archives.
64 Press Release, 11 June 1990, C.S.C.E. Ministerial 10/1/90, Chronological File, 1989–93, Speech File Backup Files, Speechwriting, White House Office of, George Bush Library. Under pressure from the Commission, Baker attended the opening of the Copenhagen meeting. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, From Vienna to Helsinki: Report on the Inter-Sessional Meetings of the CSCE Process, 102nd Congress/2nd Session.
65 CSCE/CHDC.2, 5 June 1990, OSCE Archives; and Statement, Steny Hoyer (United States), 15 June 1990, in Commission on Security and Cooperation Hearing, ‘Copenhagen CSCE Meeting on the Human Dimension’, 18 July 1990, 101st Congress/Second Session.
66 CSCE/CHDC.16, 8 June 1990, OSCE Archives.
67 CSCE/CHDC.Inf.4, 14 June 1990, OSCE Archives. See also CSCE/CHDC/Inf.2, 11 June 1990, OSCE Archives; CSCE.CHDC/Inf.5, 18 June 1990, CSCE/CHDC.16, 8 June 1990, OSCE Archives
68 Telegram, AmEmbassy Copenhagen to SECSTATE, 27 June 1990, Box 35, Max M. Kampelman Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota (Hereafter Max M. Kampelman Papers).
69 Thomas Buergenthal, ‘The Copenhagen CSCE Meeting: A New Public Order for Europe’, Human Rights Law Journal 11 (1990): 217 − 31.
70 AmEmbassy Copenhagen to SecState, 27 June 1990, Box 35, Max M. Kampelman Papers.
71 Press Release, 29 June 1990, Box 35, Max M. Kampelman Papers.
72 Statement by the President, 29 June 1990, Box 35, Max M. Kampelman Papers.
73 Helsinki Commission Staff to EUR/RPM, 28 March 1990, Box 35, Max M. Kampelman Papers. The CSCE states turned their attention to dilemmas such as ethnic tension, the future role of European military alliances, and CSCE institutionalisation. The rising tension and violence in Yugoslavia, in particular, presented a considerable crisis for the CSCE, which did not have an effective deterrent mechanism, raising questions about possible modifications to the CSCE framework.
74 Press Briefing Transcript, 4 June 1990, Folder 16, Box 163, James A. Baker III Papers.
75 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 236–7.
76 Jacques Levesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 227. The Warsaw Pact formally dissolved on 1 July 1991.
77 Korey, The Promises We Keep, 309.
78 Elizabeth Pond, ‘An Overview’, in Samuel J. Wells, Jr. ed. The Helsinki Process and the Future of Europe (Washington, DC: The Wilson Center Press, 1990), 2.
79 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 274.
80 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 274; Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–1991 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 417, 427, 429; Telegram, 19 May 1990, www.foia.state.gov/documents/foiadocs/000053DC.pdf (accessed 10 May 2006); Chronology, ‘CSCE Meeting and Conferences, 1989–90’, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Box 1, Subject Files, Press Office, Bush Library; and Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 251–2, 254–5.
81 Human Rights, 1 June 1990, Washington Summit June 1990, OA/ID: CF0717 [2 of 4], Subject Files, Condoleezza Rice Files, NSC, Bush Library.
82 Press Themes: Washington Summit, 22 May 1990, www.foia.state.gov/documents/foiadocs/1539.pdf (accessed 22 May 2006); Notes, 2 June 1990, Folder 1, Box 109, James A. Baker III Papers; Bush to Summit Press Corps, May 1990, FO 006-06 Case No. 143344SS, White House Office of Record Management, Bush Library; and Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, 217.
83 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 258; and Pavel Pazchenko, My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 160, 186.
84 Korey, The Promises We Keep, 354.
85 Korey, The Promises We Keep, 355.
86 Communiqué of the New York Meeting of the CSCE Foreign Ministers, 2 October 1990, CSCE, Box 1 Unprocessed, JBANC.
87 Press Release, Remarks by George Bush, 1 October 1990, CSCE NY Ministerial Meeting ‘Statements’, Box 45 Unprocessed, JBANC.
88 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 231–2, 473.
89 Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 173.
90 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 515, 548; Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 407; and Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe, 136; Speech By Mikhail S. Gorbachev to a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 9 December 1989, Vojtech Mastny, ed. The Helsinki Process and the Reintegration of Europe, 1986–1991 (New York: Institute for East–West Security Studies, 1992), 195.
91 Statement, Francois Mitterrand, 19 November 1990, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Box 1, Subject Files, Press Office, Bush Library; and Melvin Croan ‘Germany and Eastern Europe’, in Joseph Held, ed. The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the 20thCentury (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 388.
92 Bush, All the Best, 488.
93 Croan ‘Germany and Eastern Europe’, 388; and Gorbachev, Memoirs, 548.
94 The negotiations that produced the Vienna Document on CSBMs had been in session since 9 March 1989 and were the second phase of the Stockholm conference held from 1984–1986.
95 Charter of Paris for A New Europe, November 1990, http://www.osce.org/mc/39516 (accessed 9 November 2012); and Rob Zaagman, ‘The Second Basket of the CSCE: History, Helsinki-II and Afterwards’, in Bloed, ed. The Challenges of Change, 181.
96 Charter of Paris for A New Europe, November 1990, http://www.osce.org/mc/39516 (accessed 9 November 2012); Press Briefing, 1 July 1992, National Security Council, Walter Kanskiner Trip Files 6/92-7/92 President's Trip to…[8] Pre-Summit Prep., Box 2 of 5, 2000-1333-F, George Bush Library; and Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, ‘The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: An Overview of the CSCE Process, Recent Meetings and Institutional Development’, February 1992; Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe, 137; and Korey, The Promises We Keep, 357. At the same time, the United States advocated a slow process of institutionalisation and wariness about establishing too much bureaucracy due to its belief that much of the vibrancy of the CSCE was found in the involvement of NGOs and private individuals. Press Briefing Transcript, 14 November 1990, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe OA 6788, Box 6, Alpha File, Subject File, Fitzwater Files, Press Office, Bush Library. The Paris summit also set a schedule of meetings of foreign ministers every year and meetings of heads of state or government every two years.
97 Andrew J. Pierre, ‘The United States and the New Europe’, Current History 89:550 (November 1990): 354.
98 Press Briefing, 15 November 1990, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Box 1, Subject Files, Press Office, Bush Library.
99 Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Box 1, Subject Files, Press Office, George Bush Library; and Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe, 144–5.
100 Bush, All the Best, George Bush, 530.
101 William Safire, ‘After the Fall’, 29 August 1991 New York Times.
102 Parmet, George Bush, 495–6.
103 Memorandum of Conversation, 21 August 1991, USSR Coup Attempt 1990 [1], OA/ID: CF01308-012, Subject Files, R. Nicholas Burns Files, NSC, Bush Library.
104 The United States threatened to boycott the Moscow meeting, to open the following month, if the coup succeeded.
105 The Soviets questioned going forward with the Moscow meeting given the turmoil in the Soviet Union, but CSCE ambassadors in Moscow argued that it would offer support to the reforms undertaken by the Gorbachev government. Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 390.
106 Korey, The Promises We Keep, 393.
107 CSCE/CHDM.33, 25 September 1991, OSCE Archives; CSCE/CHDM.36, 25 September 1991, Korey, The Promises We Keep, 393ibid; CSCE/CHDM.37, 26 September 1991, ibid; CSCE/CDHM.46, 26 September, ibid; CSCE/CHDM.47, 26 September 1991, ibid; and Jeri Laber, The Courage of Strangers: Coming of Age with the Human Rights Movement. New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 365.
108 DeConcini and Hoyer to Petrovskiy, 14 June 1991, Box 36, Max M. Kampelman Papers; and Laber, The Courage of Strangers, 366–9.
109 CSCE/CHDM.49/Rev.1, 3 October 1991, OSCE Archives.
110 Korey, The Promises We Keep, 414. Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs Boris D. Pankin reminded delegates of the long and troubled course of the Moscow conference proposal: ‘The doubts about how sound was our choice of Moscow as the venue for the finale of the all-European symphony on the theme of the human dimension in modern politics continued to haunt our offer to convene this Meeting in the Soviet Union since the time when that offer was made five years ago in November 1986. And we today have every reason to feel gratified that the holding of the Meeting at this juncture of transition has justified our confidence in the powerful democratic potential of our people and in its commitment to the ideals of freedom, justice and human dignity.’ Statement, Boris Pankin (USSR), CSCE, Conference on the Human Dimension Moscow – Statements, 1991 [2 of 2], Box 10, OSCE/CSCE Files, Records of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Open Society Archives.
111 For example, Baker repeatedly reported that he had raised issues such as emigration in his bilateral conversations with Shevardnadze. Press Release, 7 March 1989, Folder 10, Box 157, James A. Baker III Papers; Press Release, 12 May 1989, Folder 17, Box 158, Korey, The Promises We Keep, 414ibid; and Press Release, 26 September 1989, Folder 32, Box 159, ibid.
112 Schifter to Laber, 18 October 1991, New York – United States – Foreign Policy – USSR – Correspondence (1991–1992), Box 21, Country Files, Chris Pancio Files, Record Group 7, Human Rights Watch Records, Center for Human Rights Documentation and Research, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University Library; and Anatoly Adamishin and Richard Schifter, Human Rights, Perestroika, and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 144, 149.
113 Considerable progress has been made in releasing Bush administration records since Executive Order 13489 eased access to presidential papers, but much work remains.
114 Maynard, Out of the Shadow, 128. In Jeffrey Engel's view, Bush intended ‘to keep the world moving in the right direction’ rather than to transform the role of the United States in the world. Jeffrey A. Engel, ‘A Better World – but Don't Get Carried Away: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush Twenty Years On’, Diplomatic History 34:1 (January 2010): 45.
115 Memorandum of Conversation, 5 July 1989, in Munteanu, ed. ‘The End of the Cold War.’
116 Former secretary of defense James Schlesinger suggested the Bush administration was ‘lost without its Cold War map.’ Quoted in Sparrow, ‘Resumption of History’.
117 In Sarotte's view, the ‘prefab model’ promoted stability but led to continuing tension in Europe. Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 8.