Fardella, E.M. (2014). Article, Mao Zedong and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Cold War History. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2014.971017
When the above article was first published online, on pages 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, and 15, the acronym AMAERPC was erroneously used for “Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC” instead of AMFAPRC. This has now been corrected to “AMFAPRC”.
On page 7:
26 At the meeting on 1 December 1962, Che Guevara expressed his complaints to the ambassador of the PRC to Cuba, Shen, about the promises made by the Soviets before the crisis broke out: ‘They even babbled about the intention to send the Baltic Fleet […]; they said that [..] the mighty Soviet Union would have dealt a lethal blow to anyone who dared invade Cuba, etc. At the time we thought that they were sincere.’ In ‘Conversation Between Ernesto Che Guevara and ambassador Shen Jian’, 1 December 1962, PRC embassy in Havana to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC [AMAERPC], No. 111-00353-06; for an English version, see Hershberg and S. Radchenko, The Global Cuban Missile Crisis at 50, 103–107. (The number of the document quoted here does not match the one analysed by the author at the Central Archives of the Ministry).
28 ‘From the beginning of the Revolution, the Soviets tried to control Cuba politically and militarily,’ in ‘The situation in Cuba: new developments,’ 31 October 1962, Embassy of Cuba to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AMAERPC, No. 111-000342-04.
On page 8:
29 ‘Analysis of the current situation in Cuba,’ 25 October 1962 Embassy of Cuba to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AMAERPC, No. 111-000342-04.
30 In the document written by the Chinese embassy, mention is even made of rumours of a conspiracy orchestrated by the Soviets to overthrow (搞掉, gaodiao) Fidel and replace him with President Roa. ‘Opinions on the current situation in Cuba,’ 24 November 1962, Embassy of Cuba to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AMAERPC, No. 111-000342-04. See also the analysis written by the Chinese Embassy in Moscow: ‘Opinion towards the Khrushchev negotiations on the Cuban issue’, 31 October 1962, PRC Embassy in Moscow to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AMAERPC, No. 111-00342-12.
31 ‘The Cuban leaders, and especially Che Guevara, are trusting us Chinese more and more’ Ibid. In the days following the meeting between Che Guevara and Shen Jian, this analysis was confirmed. Che shared his disappointment at the Soviet betrayal with Shen and apologised for having been too naive in the past and having believed the promises made by Moscow. It is interesting to note that someone at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had paid particular attention, underlining it several times, to a moment in the conversation in which Che referred to the meeting he had recently had with Mikoyan: ‘I told him [...] that a defeat is a defeat and calling it a victory is simply wrong. He said that the United States does not have the courage to inspect Soviet ships because they are afraid. I started to laugh and he became furious.’ In ‘Conversation Between Ernesto Che Guevara and Ambassador Shen Jian’, 1 December 1962, PRC Embassy in Havana to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AMAERPC, No. 111-00353-06.
On page 10:
35 ‘The assistant foreign minister Qiao Guanhua asked opinion of Zhou Enlai and Foreign Minister Chenyi about supporting Cuba to do three kind of things, and Zhou and Chen reply’, 1 November 1962, AMAERPC, No. 111-00595-03.
On page 12:
44 ‘Notes on the problem of the Sino-Indian border’ 15 November 1962, Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the envoy Huang Wenyou at the PRC embassy in Havana, AMAERPC, No. 111-00596-01. In the document approved by Zhou Enlai, the ministry suggested not to ask for clarification on the Cuban position on this issue. Probably the instructions received later by ambassador Shen Jian – who was visiting Beijing in November – would have been different. It should be noted that on 18 November, the Chinese would launch the final offensive against the Indians and the next day they declared a unilateral ceasefire. As demonstrated by Shen's words in his meeting with Roa on 30 November, this manoeuvre could be used in diplomatic relations with Cuba.
On page 13:
46 ‘Report on news obtained on the occasion of the national holiday of the Soviet Union’, 8 November 1962, the PRC Embassy in Havana to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AMAERPC, No. 111-00601-05.
On page 15:
55 ‘According to military experts, it would take 7 battalions, from 3 to 6 months, and 50,000 US casualties to invade Cuba. If the United States remains involved in Cuba, the situation around the world will become more tense especially in Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea, Laos, and West Germany. However, since their war strategy is based on naval landings, if it were to engage in Cuba, it would end up being exposed elsewhere,’ in Telegram of PRC Embassy in DDR to the 2nd Office of the General Staff, 10 November 1960, AMAERPC, No. 109-03157-01.
Furthermore, on page 10, the Chinese titles of the documents are mistakenly translated to Italian language. These are now translated to English language.
36 ‘Sulle relazioni tra Cuba e USSR’ 2 November 1962 in ‘La situazione delle relazioni tra Unione Sovietica e Cuba prima e dopo il ritiro dei missile da parte dell'USSR da Cuba, il nostro approccio (contiene anche le opinion di Chen Yi e Zhou Enlai)’ AMAERPC, No. 111-00601-05.
37 ‘Risposta al precedente telegramma sulle relazioni tra Cuba e l'USSR e il nostro foreign statement’ 4 November 1962, in Ibid.
The author of this article apologise for these errors.