Chancellor Erhard's silent rejection of de Gaulle's plans: the example of monetary union

Abstract

In the 1960s, French president de Gaulle's ambition to create a ‘European Europe’ depended heavily on German support. This article illustrates and reinterprets the crucial attitude of Ludwig Erhard by focusing on his role after the signing of the Elysée treaty in January 1963, and his reaction to a secret (and since forgotten) French proposal for monetary union in March 1964. The evidence shows that Erhard, fundamentally a moderate Atlanticist, was profoundly affected by the pressure of the Kennedy administration not to harbour Gaullist ideas. Indeed, as German chancellor Erhard feared that America might cease to defend Europe if de Gaulle's idea of a more independent Europe were to gain ground in Germany. Hence Erhard simply ignored any French move perceived to be contradictory to US policy. The article adds an element to the complexity of Franco-German relations in the 1960s while providing an example of how American power was exercised during the Cold War.

Notes

¹ Ulrich Lappenküper, Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 bis 1990 (München: Oldenbourg, 2008), 84 (quote); and Klaus Hildebrand, Von Erhard zur Großen Koalition 1963–1969 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1984), 231–3.

² A first outline of the monetary proposal of 1964 was presented by Benedikt Schoenborn, La mésentente apprivoisée: de Gaulle et les Allemands, 1963–1969 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2007), 116–9.

³ Charles de Gaulle, ‘Conférence de presse du 23 juillet 1964’, in Discours et Messages (Paris: Plon, 1970), 4: 225–31; Frédéric Bozo, ‘France, “Gaullism”, and the Cold War’, in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, eds. Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 2: 164–6.

⁴ Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 113.

⁵ On Erhard's early life, see Alfred C. Mierzejewski, Ludwig Erhard: A Biography (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 4–5.

⁶ Erhard, ‘Die atlantische Gemeinschaft’, Die Zeit, 11 November 1960, 1; ‘Erhard im Bundestag, 29.11.61’, and ‘Erhard in Die Welt, 27.12.62’, Archiv der Gegenwart: Deutschland 1949 bis 1999, CD-Rom (Siegler, 2000), 16175, 17561–2.

⁷ Erhard, Gedanken aus fünf Jahrzehnten (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1988), 770–80 (quote 773); Mierzejewski, Ludwig Erhard, 29–32, 170–1; Hildebrand, Von Erhard, 31–40.

⁸ On economic cooperation, see Schoenborn, La mésentente apprivoisée, 91–112.

⁹ Horst Osterheld, ‘Ich gehe nicht leichten Herzens …’: Adenauers letzte Kanzlerjahre – ein dokumentarischer Bericht (Mainz: Grünewald, 1986), 174, 192.

¹⁰ See for example Jeffrey Glen Giauque, Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955–1963 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 185–9, 209–14; Erin R. Mahan, Kennedy, de Gaulle, and Western Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 143–7; Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), 332–5; Sebastian Reyn, Atlantis Lost: The American Experience with de Gaulle, 1958–1969 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 141–94; N. Piers Ludlow, Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 206–26; and Oliver Bange, The EEC Crisis of 1963: Kennedy, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer in Conflict (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 129–233.

¹¹ See especially the arguments by Daniel Koerfer, Kampf ums Kanzleramt: Erhard und Adenauer (Berlin: Ullstein, 1998), 749–53 (quote 750); Ulrich Lappenküper, Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1949–1963 (München: Oldenbourg, 2001), 2: 1788–92; Mierzejewski, Ludwig Erhard, 171; Volker Hentschel, Ludwig Erhard: Ein Politikerleben (München: Olzog, 1996), 414–5; Franz Eibl, Politik der Bewegung: Gerhard Schröder als Außenminister 1961–1966 (München: Oldenbourg, 2001), 179–89; most recently: Patricia Commun, ‘Ludwig Erhard und Charles de Gaulle: Zwei ungleiche Europäer’, Orientierungen zur Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik, 133 (2012): 30. Quite tellingly, in the 140 pages covering the period from 14 to 28 January 1963 in the German diplomatic documents, Erhard is not even mentioned once: Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1963 (München: Oldenbourg, 1994), 67–207 (hereafter AAPD, followed by appropriate year).

¹² George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York: Norton, 1982), 271.

¹³ Memorandum, Charles Bohlen, 2 March 1963, Central Foreign Policy File (hereafter CFPF) 1963, Box 3910, Record Group 59 (RG 59), National Archives at College Park (NACP), College Park, MD.

¹⁴ Hentschel, Ludwig Erhard, 412.

¹⁵ For the relation of trust between Reston and Kennedy, see James Reston, Deadline: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1991), 294.

¹⁶ Telegram, Rusk to AmEmbassies, 21 January 1963, Regional Security (RS), Box 212, National Security Files (NSF), John F. Kennedy Library (Kennedy Library), Boston, MA.

¹⁷ Telegram, Dowling to Rusk, 23 January 1963, ibid.

¹⁸ For a discussion of ‘the choice issue’ in the literature (albeit not including the events of 29 January 1963 and Erhard's role), see especially Geir Lundestad, ‘Empire’ by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 68–72; more recently, Reyn, Atlantis Lost, 170–3.

¹⁹ Telegram, Rusk to AmEmbassies, 22 January 1963, RS, Box 212, NSF, Kennedy Library; Telegram, Dowling to Rusk (quote), 24 January 1963, ibid.

²⁰ Telegramm Knappstein (quoting Lucius Clay), 28 January 1963, AAPD, 1963, 200. For a detailed account, see Osterheld, Adenauers letzte Kanzlerjahre, 182–97.

²¹ Telegram, Rusk to Dowling, 24 January 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1994), 13: 152 (hereafter FRUS, followed by appropriate year).

²² Gespräch Adenauer-Dowling, 24 January 1963, AAPD, 1963, 174–5; Aufzeichnung Carstens, 24 January 1963, Nachlass Carstens 650, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz. For the general conclusion that the ‘Germans refused to choose between France and the United States’, see for example Giauque, Grand Designs, 209–18 (quote 210). The archivally most detailed analysis is that presented by Bange, EEC Crisis, 185–6, who argues that the reasoning of the Reston article ‘backfired’ in Bonn, which resulted in a change in course of the American diplomacy by 25 January. I argue that Washington did not change course, but rather the target of pressure.

²³ Telegram, Dowling to Rusk, 24 January 1963, Central Decimal File (CDF) 1960–63, Box 1342, RG 59, NACP.

²⁴ Stichwortprotokoll, Fraktionsvorstandssitzung am 25.1.63, Bestand 08-001-1504/1, Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik (ACDP), Sankt Augustin. On the meeting of the Bundesrat Committee, see Bange, EEC Crisis, 199–200.

²⁵ Heinrich Krone, Tagebücher: 1961–1966 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2003), 153, entry of 25 January 1963.

²⁶ Memorandum, AmEmbassy Paris (quoting Michael Butler), 22 January 1963, RS, Box 212, NSF, Kennedy Library.

²⁷ Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting, 25 January 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 13, 491.

²⁸ Memorandum, Tyler to Rusk, 27 May 1963, CFPF 1963, Box 3912, RG 59, NACP.

²⁹ Telegram, Steel (Bonn) to London, 29 January 1963, cited in Bange, EEC Crisis, 146 (quote); Ludlow, Dealing with Britain, 215–9; Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, 332–4. For a detailed description of British diplomacy in January 1963, see Rolf Steininger, ‘Great Britain's First EEC Failure in January 1963’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 7:2 (1996): 404–35. See also Geoffrey Warner, ‘Why the General Said No’, International Affairs 78:4 (2002): 869–82.

³⁰ Memorandum, Bundy to Kennedy, 30 January 1963, cited in Mahan, Kennedy, de Gaulle, 143.

³¹ Telegram, Rusk to Tuthill, 28 January 1963, CDF 1960–63, Box 652, RG 59, NACP.

³² Telegrams 18313, 18631 and 18554, Tuthill to Rusk, 29 January 1963, ibid.

³³ The speech is quoted in Koerfer, Kampf ums Kamzleramt, 749–50.

³⁴ ‘Gespräch in Brüssel’, 29 January 1963, Depositum Bahr, Box 399, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Bonn.

³⁵ In August 1939, Nazi Germany had secretly signed a treaty of non-aggression with the Soviet Union, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

³⁶ Krone, Tagebücher, 155 (quote), entry of 30 January 1963; Aufzeichnung, ‘Kabinettssitzung vom 30. Januar 1963’, Nachlass Adenauer, Bestand III/7, Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, Rhöndorf.

³⁷ For Schröder's position, see ‘Runderlass des Bundesministers Schröder’, 30 January 1963, AAPD, 1963, 225–6; and Eibl, Politik der Bewegung, 188–90.

³⁸ Ludwig Erhard, ‘Das französische Veto: Interview mit Hans Ulrich Kempski’, in Gedanken, 789–91.

³⁹ Brief, Erhard an von Brentano, 28 February 1963, Korrespondenz I2.14, Nachlass (NL) Erhard, Ludwig-Erhard-Stiftung (LES), Bonn.

⁴⁰ Krone, Tagebücher, 153, entry of 25 January 1963; and Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Ära Adenauer: Epochenwechsel, 1957–1963 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1983), 292–3.

⁴¹ Telegram, Dowling to Rusk, 4 February 1963, CFPF 1963, Box 3913, RG 59, NACP.

⁴² Tagebuch Blankenhorn, 2 February 1963, NL Blankenhorn 153b, Bundesarchiv; Telegramm, Knappstein an Schröder, 25 January 1963, B150, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PAAA), Berlin; and Lundestad, United States, 87–8 (quote).

⁴³ NSC Meeting, 31 January 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 13, 161; NSC Meeting, 5 February 1963, ibid., 178 (quote); and Mahan, Kennedy, de Gaulle, 146–7.

⁴⁴ NSC Meeting, 5 February 1963, 4.30 p.m., FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 13, 175–9; Memorandum of Conversation, Carstens and Rusk, 5 February 1963, 6 p.m., ibid., 186; NSC Meeting, 31 January 1963, ibid., 162.

⁴⁵ Telegram, Rusk to Bruce (quotes), 5 March 1963, CFPF 1963, Box 3912, RG 59, NACP; Memorandum of Conversation, Rusk and von Brentano, 22 March 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 13, 191. On the debates in Bonn, see especially Lappenküper, Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen, 1795–1822. For a cogent assessment of Schröder's attitude, whom George Ball and Franz Josef Strauss incorrectly described as the initiator of the preamble, see Eibl, Politik der Bewegung, 198–9. For an account emphasising the German readiness to add a preamble, see Matthias Schulz, ‘Die politische Freundschaft Jean Monnet - Kurt Birrenbach, die Einheit des Westens und die “Präambel” zum Elysée-Vertrag von 1963’, in Interessen verbinden: Jean Monnet und die europäische Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ed. Andreas Wilkens (Bonn: Bouvier, 1999), 299–327. Yet the first German initiatives were taken on 31 January, or ten days after Kennedy's decision to impose a choice on Bonn. Jean Monnet, sometimes referred to as the inspirateur of the preamble by French authors, sketched a first draft only on 26 February (see AMK 57/5/3, Fondation Jean Monnet, Lausanne). Overall, most scholars agree on the decisive American role concerning the preamble. For overviews, see De Gaulle en son siècle: Actes des Journées internationales tenues à l'Unesco Paris, 19–24 novembre 1990, ed. Institut Charles-de-Gaulle (Paris: Plon, 1992), 5: 304–428; and Dokumente: Zeitschrift für den deutsch-französischen Dialog. Sondernummer 50 Jahre Elysée-Vertrag (Winter 2012): 5–85.

⁴⁶ Brief, Erhard an von Brentano, 28 February 1963, Korrespondenz I2.14, NL Erhard, LES.

⁴⁷ Entretien Adenauer-Peyrefitte, 10 May 1963, carton 161, Présidence Charles de Gaulle 5AG1, Archives Nationales (AN), Paris; and Koerfer, Kampf ums Kanzleramt, 723–37.

⁴⁸ ‘Editorial note on Bruce report of 9 February 1963’, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 13, 188.

⁴⁹ Memorandum, Charles Bohlen, 2 March 1963, CFPF 1963, Box 3910, NACP; Conversation, Rusk and von Brentano, 22 March 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 13, 192.

⁵⁰ Memorandum, Ball to Kennedy, 20 June 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 13, 208–11.

⁵¹ Ansprache des Bundeskanzlers, 22 November 1963, Erhard 1, NL Osterheld, ACDP (quotes); Ludwig Erhard, ‘Regierungserklärung vom 18. Oktober 1963’, in Gedanken, 814–46; Alain Peyrefitte, C'était de Gaulle (Paris: Fayard, 1997), 2: 249.

⁵² Entretiens franco-allemands des 21–22 novembre 1963, EM 19, SG, AMAE. Couve de Murville had also confronted Kennedy, Rusk and Ball with the reported choice imposed on Bonn, and received the rather hypocritical answer that no American official had ever encouraged such a choice (EM 19, 7–8 October 1963, SG, AMAE).

⁵³ Télégramme Lucet aux ambassades, 23 November 1963, EM 19, SG, AMAE; Tagebuch, Herbert Blankenhorn, 24 June 1963, NL Blankenhorn 158a, Bundesarchiv.

⁵⁴ Tim Geiger, Atlantiker gegen Gaullisten: Außenpolitischer Konflikt und innerparteilicher Machtkampf in der CDU/CSU 1958–1969 (München: Oldenbourg, 2008), 12–6; Reiner Marcowitz, Option für Paris? Unionsparteien, SPD und Charles de Gaulle, 1958 bis 1969 (München: Oldenbourg, 1996), 182–3.

⁵⁵ Gespräch Erhard-McGhee, 18 February 1964, AAPD, 1964, 261 (quote); Geiger, Atlantiker gegen Gaullisten, 264.

⁵⁶ Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963–1969 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), 23–4 (quote); Thomas Alan Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 14; and Reyn, Atlantis Lost, 195–205.

⁵⁷ E.g., Erhard used the term ‘bad joke’ upon his return from Paris in November 1963, in his Bundestag speech of 9 January 1964, and during the Franco-German consultations of mid-February 1964.

⁵⁸ Entretien de Gaulle-Krone, 23 January 1964, SG, EM 20, AMAE. For more detail, see Pierre Gerbet, La Construction de l'Europe (Paris: Armand Colin, 2007), 175–83; and N. Piers Ludlow, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 32–6.

⁵⁹ Deutsch-französische Regierungsgespräche, 14–5 February 1964, AAPD, 1964, 230, 250–5; ‘Communiqué des Bundeswirtschaftsministeriums, 15.2.64’, Archiv der Gegenwart, 18846–8.

⁶⁰ In the German original: ‘De Gaulle hat mir ausdrücklich gesagt, dass er eine einheitliche EWG-Währung für erforderlich hält.’

⁶¹ Brief Schmücker an Erhard, 24 March 1964, Korrespondenz I2.23, Bestand Bundeskanzler, NL Erhard, LES.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Aufzeichnung Lahr, 6 April 1964, AAPD, 1964, 387–92.

⁶⁴ A common currency would co-exist with former currencies, while a single currency would replace them.

⁶⁵ Aufzeichnung Lahr, 6 April 1964, AAPD, 1964, 387–92.

⁶⁶ Aufzeichnung Gemünd, 24 April 1964, AAPD, 1964, 477–80.

⁶⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, Johnson and Erhard, 12 June 1964, 11.30 a.m., Country File 191, NSF, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (Johnson Library), Austin, TX.

⁶⁸ Quoted in Horst Osterheld, Außenpolitik unter Bundeskanzler Ludwig Erhard, 1963–1966 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1992), 311–2.

⁶⁹ Mr. Giscard d'Estaing granted me a one-hour, recorded interview on 16 March 2005. At the beginning of the interview, he read the passage of Schmücker's transcript quoted above and then started to comment, not knowing what other information was available. In my estimation, his spontaneous explanations were convincing.

⁷⁰ On the competition between Giscard and Rueff in 1962–5, see also Francis J. Gavin and Erin Mahan, ‘Giscard, Ball, and the 1962 Gold Standstill Proposal’, Journal of European Integration History 6:2 (2000): 73–4 and 83.

⁷¹ Interview with the author.

⁷² See the passage quoted above.

⁷³ André de Lattre cited in Gavin and Mahan, ‘Giscard, Ball’, 72. See also de Lattre, Servir aux finances (Paris: CHEFF, 1999), 152–4.

⁷⁴ Interview with the author. The quote is significant also because it contradicts the widespread view that de Gaulle planned every move according to a pre-established master-plan.

⁷⁵ Interview with the author. See also de Gaulle, ‘Conférence de presse du 4 février 1965’, in Discours, 4: 330–4.

⁷⁶ In the archives of the French Foreign Ministry, indications can be found that a Franco-German meeting took place on 23 March 1964, but no record is available (see e.g. série Europe 1961–1970, RFA, cartons 1496, 1603, 1636, 1651). No trace has been found in the Archives Nationales (see notably Fonds 5AG1, cartons 162 and 248), or the Centre des Archives Economiques et Financières (see especially Fonds Trésor, cartons B55813-4 and B59503-4).

⁷⁷ Maurice Vaïsse, La grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958–1969 (Paris: Fayard, 1998), 385; and Edgard Pisani, Le Général indivis (Paris: Albin Michel, 1974), 105–13.

⁷⁸ De Gaulle, ‘Allocution du 16 avril 1964’, in Discours, 4: 205–6; Peyrefitte, C'était de Gaulle, 2: 321–55; Témoignage, Etienne Burin des Roziers, 28 October 1987, Archives orales 30, AMAE.

⁷⁹ The debate was mainly initiated by Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (London: Routledge, 1999), 176–97; see also ‘Forum: de Gaulle’, Journal of Cold War Studies 14:1 (Winter 2012): 48–95. While the present article supports the significance of economic matters for de Gaulle, it also shows the limits of Moravcsik's maximalist claim that EEC and transatlantic policies should be viewed separately.

⁸⁰ For the proposals by Robert Triffin, Pierre Wigny, Pierre Werner, Jean Monnet and Jean Guyot, see Pierre Du Bois, Histoire de l'Europe monétaire 1945–2005 (Paris: PUF, 2008), 36–40.

⁸¹ EWG-Kommission, Aktionsprogramm der Gemeinschaft für die zweite Stufe (Brüssel: EWG-Kommission, 1962), 73–8. See also Ivo Maes, ‘Macroeconomic and Monetary Thought at the European Commission in the 1960s’, EUI Working Papers 1 (2004): 10–3.

⁸² Mémorandum F. Boyer, November 1964, carton B17712, CEE 1958–75, Fonds Trésor, Centre des Archives Economiques et Financières, Savigny-le-Temple.

⁸³ ‘Empfehlung des Rats’, Bulletin der EWG, 1964, no. 6: 16–19; and Du Bois, Histoire monétaire, 42–3 and 51 (quote).

⁸⁴ Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, A Europe Made of Money: The Emergence of the European Monetary System (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 22.

⁸⁵ For more detail, see Daniel Gros and Niels Thygesen, European Monetary Integration (Harlow: Longman, 1998), 8–14.

⁸⁶ Assemblée Nationale, Séance du 24 juin 1964, Journal Officiel, 1964, no. 56: 2163.

⁸⁷ Déclaration de Giscard à Tokyo, 9 September 1964, carton 20010086/13, Centre des Archives Contemporaines, Fontainebleau.

⁸⁸ Ulrich Lappenküper, ‘Den Bau des “europäischen Hauses” vollenden: Die Europapolitik Ludwig Erhards, 1963–66’, Historisch-Politische Mitteilungen 7 (2000): 249. EFTA: European Free Trade Association.

⁸⁹ Point emphasised by Tim Geiger, ‘Ludwig Erhard und die Europapolitik seiner Zeit’, Orientierungen für Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik, 132 (2012): 53–60.

⁹⁰ TV-Interview des Bundeskanzlers, 22 November 1963, Box 2059, B136, Bundesarchiv; Telegram, DepState (Ball) to AmEmbassies, 25 January 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. 13, 8–9.

⁹¹ Hans von der Groeben, The European Community: the Formative Years. The Struggle to Establish the Common Market and the Political Union, 1958–66 (Luxembourg: Commission of the European Communities, 1987), 156–8.

⁹² Assessment shared by McGhee, Adenauer and the French government. Telegram, McGhee to DepState, 14 July 1964, FRUS, 1964–68, vol. 13, 63; and Aufzeichnung Jansen, 26 June 1964, B150, PAAA.

⁹³ Peyrefitte, C'était de Gaulle, 2: 257–63; Schoenborn, La mésentente apprivoisée, 158–61, 263–70.

⁹⁴ Entretiens franco-allemands des 3–4 juillet 1964, EM 22, SG, AMAE.

⁹⁵ Pisani, Le Général indivis, 92 (quote); Hermann Kusterer, Le Général et le Chancelier (Paris: Economica, 2001), 387–9; and de Gaulle, ‘Conférence de presse du 23 juillet 1964’, in Discours, 4: 228–30.

⁹⁶ Krone, Tagebücher, 311–2, entry of 10 July 1964. Cf. Erhard's explanation to McGhee, AAPD, 1964, 787–95, 811–7.

⁹⁷ E.g., Telegram, Tuthill to Rusk, 21 January 1963, and Telegram, Rusk to Tuthill, 28 January 1963, Box 652, CDF, RG 59, NACP.

⁹⁸ For Johnson's attitude, see Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, 28–32, 92–9. Some US officials, like George Ball and Dean Rusk, deemed Johnson's attitude toward France too soft.

⁹⁹ Telegram, McGhee to Rusk, 6 July 1964, Country File, Box 184, NSF, Johnson Library. Cf. Gespräch Erhard-McGhee, 6 July 1964, AAPD, 1964, 790–1.

¹⁰⁰ Entretien de Gaulle-Mende, 2 December 1964, 5AG1, carton 162, AN.

¹⁰¹ Maurice Couve de Murville, Une politique étrangère, 1958–1969 (Paris: Plon, 1971), 264.

¹⁰² Memorandum, Karl Carstens, 27 July 1964, AAPD, 1964, 892–3; Aufzeichnung Carstens, 17 November 1964, B150, PAAA; see also Osterheld, Außenpolitik, 101–4. Carstens referred to another proposal by de Gaulle, on military cooperation.

¹⁰³ Brief, Müller-Armack an Erhard, 10 November 1964, NL Erhard I2.22, LES.

¹⁰⁴ Memo to the President, Richard Neustadt, 5 December 1964, Bundy Box 2, NSF, Johnson Library; see also Hildebrand, Von Erhard, 31.

¹⁰⁵ Gespräch Erhard-de Gaulle, 21 July 1966, AAPD, 1966, 955 and 970–1; Osterheld, Außenpolitik, 332; and Marcowitz, Option, 213–5.

¹⁰⁶ Gespräch Erhard-Rusk, 9 June 1966, AAPD, 1966, 783.