Germany, America and the shaping of post-Cold War Europe: a story of German international emancipation through political unification, 1989–90

Abstract

German reunification within NATO in 1990 marked the end of the Cold War. It also cemented America's role as a ‘European power’. By focusing on three key moments in German-American security relations in 1989-90, this essay explains how this outcome materialised. For Chancellor Helmut Kohl, driving the process of unification offered Germans the prospect of international emancipation after four decades of limited sovereignty. For President George H.W. Bush, backing unification proved an opportunity to preserve and transform NATO. Moreover, the new, more political version of the Alliance that emerged became Washington's device to shape the post-Cold War era.

Notes

¹ See Kristina Spohr, “Precluded or Precedent-Setting? The ‘NATO Enlargement Question’ in the Triangular Bonn-Washington-Moscow Diplomacy of 1990–1991”, Journal of Cold War Studies 14, no. 4, (2012): 4–54. Quote from Mary Elise Sarotte, “Not One Inch Eastward? Bush, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbachev and the Origin of Russian Resentment toward NATO Enlargement in February 1990”, Diplomatic History 34, no. 1 (Jan. 2010): 119.

² See Spohr, “Precluded”, 47–54. Cf. Mary Elise Sarotte, “Perpetuating US Preeminence: The 1990 Deals to ‘Bribe the Soviets Out’ and Move NATO in”, International Security 35, no. 1 (Summer 2010): 110–137; Eadem, “Deciding to be Mars”, Policy Review no. 172, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/111966 (accessed 1 Apr. 2014); Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won The Cold War (New York, 1996), 492; Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era (New York, 2002), 6; Ulrich Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa (Stuttgart, 1999), 23–59; Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “The Unraveling of the Cold War Settlement”, Survival 51, no. 6 (Dec. 2009-Jan. 2010): 50; Mark Kramer, “The Myth of the No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia”, Washington Quarterly 23, no. 3 (Apr. 2009): 29–62.

³ On different ideas of ‘ordering moments’ or ‘punctuational moments’, see Mary Elise Sarotte, “The Wall Comes Down: A Punctuational Moment”, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro, Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy after the Berlin Wall and 9/11 (Ithaca and London, 2011), 14. Cf. Deudney and Ikenberry, “The Unraveling”, 42.

⁴ See Mark Kramer, “The Demise of the Soviet Bloc”, The Journal of Modern History 83 (Dec. 2011): 850–2.

⁵ Remarks to citizens in Hamtramck, Michigan, 17 April 1989, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id = 326&year = 1989&month = 4 (accessed 24 March 2014).

⁶ Remarks to the Citizens in Mainz, 31 May 1989, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id = 476&year = 1989&month = 5 (accessed 24 March 2014).

⁷ Ibid. See also Mick Cox and Steven Hurst, “‘His Finest Hour?’ George Bush and the Diplomacy of German Unification”, Diplomacy & Statecraft 13, no. 4 (2002): 132–33 who portray Bush as a bold visionary in his approach to ‘Germany’. For a slightly more cautious assessment of Bush's statements, see Bernard Weinraub, ‘Bush Urges East to Join in Ending Division of Europe – Asks Political Freedom – President in West Germany, Also Calls on Soviet Bloc to Raze Berlin Wall, The Washington Post [henceforth WP], 1 June 1990, 1+A13.

⁸ See Frank Costigliola, “An ‘Arm Around the Shoulder’: The United States, NATO and German Reunification, 1989–90”, Contemporary European History 3, no. 1 (1994): 92–5.

⁹ See US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Developments in Europe, October 1989. 101^st Cong., 1^st sess., 3 Oct. 1989, 14. http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1989-foa-0046?accountid = 12084 (accessed 24 March 2014).

¹⁰ On the sudden opening of the Berlin Wall, see Mary Elise Sarotte, The Collapse: The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall (New York, 2014).

¹¹ James A. Baker III Papers (MC 197) [henceforth BP], Mudd Library, Princeton, Series 8: Sec of State, Box 108, Folder 10, 1989 Oct., ‘JAB notes re press guidance items October 1989: 20.10.1989 Reunification, Reconciliation.’ See also Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton and Oxford, 2009), 54–5.

¹² Thomas L. Friedman, “US Enthusiastic, but has Concerns: New Order in Eastern Europe Astonishes Washington”, The New York Times [henceforth NYT], 11 Nov. 1989, 1.

¹³ Melvyn P. Leffler, “Dreams of Freedom, Temptations of Power”, in Jeffrey A. Engel, The Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Revolutionary Legacy of 1989 (New York, 2009), 136–8; Cf. Timothy Naftali, George H. Bush (New York, 2007), 85; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 105.

¹⁴ See Craig R. Whitney, “Redefining Europe: As the Revelry Goes On, Politicians Ponder The Ramifications of Changes in Germany”, NYT, 11 Nov. 1989, 1.

¹⁵ George Bush, All the Best, George Bush: My Life in Letters and Other Writings (New York, 2013), pp. 446, 451; Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, pp. 148–9.

¹⁶ Hanns Jürgen Küsters und Daniel Hofmann, eds., Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit – Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramts 1989/90 (München, 1998) [henceforth DESE], Dok. Nr. 93, p. 539.

¹⁷ See US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, The Future of Europe, 101^st Cong., 2^nd sess., 17 Jan. 1990, 79, 80. See also US Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Threat Assessment; Military Strategy; and Operational Requirements, 101^st Cong., 2^nd sess., 25 Jan. 1990, 229.

¹⁸ DESE, Dok. Nr. 93, pp. 539–40.

¹⁹ Helmut Kohl's Ten-Point Plan for German Unity (November 28, 1989), http://www.germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id = 223 (accessed 25 March 2014)

²⁰ Keith Hamilton and Patick Salmon, eds., Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III, Vol 7, German Unification 1989/90 (Abingdon, 2009) [henceforth DBPO III, VII GU 1989/90], doc. 59, p. 140.

²¹ According to TheWashington Post, State Department spokesman Margaret Tutwiler said ‘it would be going too far’ to say the US endorsed Kohl's plan, but unification as the German people’ deepest aspiration was of ‘a goal hat we and [West Germany]have long shared.’ Marc Fisher, “Kohl Propss Broad Program For Reunification of Germany”, WP, 29 Nov. 1989, 1.

²² DBPO III, VII GU 1989/90, doc. 76, p.173, fn 2. See also Karl Kaiser, Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die internationalen Aspekte – mit den wichtigen Dokumenten (Bergisch Gladbach, 1991), Dok. Nr. 14, p. 169.

²³ DBPO III, VII GU 1989/90, doc. 76, p. 173.

²⁴ DBPO III, VII GU 1989/90, doc. 76, p. 174.

²⁵ DBPO III, VII GU 1989/90, doc. 76, p. 175.

²⁶ Costigliola, “Arm”, 87.

²⁷ Engel, The Fall, 26–9. See also Don Oberdorfer, “Eased East-West Tensions Offers Chances, Dangers”, WP, 7 May 1989, 1

²⁸ Bush, All the Best, 433; George H.W. Bush Presidential Library [henceforth GBPL], “First Expanded Bilateral Session with Chairman Gorbachev of the Soviet Union”, 10:00–11:55 a.m., 2 Dec. 1989, 1–2, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Malta%20_Summit–Copies_from_HW_Bush_Archives.pdf (accessed 25 March 2014); Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 131. See also Bill Keller, “Bush Will Meet Gorbachev to Get ‘Better Acquainted’ in Talks at Sea Next Month”, NYT, 1 Nov. 1989, 1.

²⁹ GBPL, “First Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman Gorbachev of Soviet Union”, 12:00–1:00pm, 2 Dec. 1989, 5, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Malta%20_Summit–Copies_from_HW_Bush_Archives.pdf (accessed 25 March 2014). Cf Aleksandr Galkin und Anatolij Tschernjajew, eds., Michail Gorbatschow und die deutsche Frage: Sowjetische Dokumente 1986–1991 (München, 2011) [henceforth MGDF:SD], Dok. Nr. 759, p. 251.

³⁰ GBPL, “Second Expanded Bilateral Session”, 4:35–6:45 p.m., 3 Dec. 1989, 6, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Malta%20_Summit–Copies_from_HW_Bush_Archives.pdf (accessed 25 March 2014). Cf. MGDF:SD, Dok. Nr. 60, 253.

³¹ Ibid.

³² GBPL, “Second Expanded Bilateral Session”, 4:35–6:45 p.m., 3 Dec. 1989, 9–10, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Malta%20_Summit–Copies_from_HW_Bush_Archives.pdf (accessed 25 March 2014).

³³ GBPL, “Second Expanded Bilateral Session”, 4:35–6:45 p.m., 3 Dec. 1989, 2, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Malta%20_Summit–Copies_from_HW_Bush_Archives.pdf (accessed 25 March 2014).

³⁴ GBPL, “First Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman Gorbachev of Soviet Union”, 12:00–1:00pm, 2 Dec. 1989, 5, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Malta%20_Summit–Copies_from_HW_Bush_Archives.pdf (accessed 25 March 2014).

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ GBPL, “Second Expanded Bilateral Session”, 4:35–6:45 p.m., 3 Dec. 1989, 7, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Malta%20_Summit–Copies_from_HW_Bush_Archives.pdf (accessed 25 March 2014).

³⁷ See Alan Riding, “Bush Says Soviets Merit West's Help to Foster Reform – Tells Allies That US Will Keep Significant Forces in Europe”, NYT, 5 Dec. 1989, A17.

³⁸ On the border issue, and the Helsinki principle on the inviolability / peaceful changeability of boundaries and Kohl's thinking, see DESE, Dok. Nr. 120, p. 639.

³⁹ DESE, Dok. Nr. 109, pp. 602–4.

⁴⁰ Quote from Sarotte, 1989, 79.

⁴¹ Alan Riding, “Bush Says Soviets Merit West's Help to Forster Reform: Tells Allies that US Will Keep Significant Forces in Europe”, NYT, 5 Dec. 1989, 1.

⁴² Idem, A17.

⁴³ Werner Weidenfeld et al., Geschichte der deutschen Einheit. Vol 4, Auβenpolitik für die deutsche Einheit: Die Entscheidungsjahre 1989/90 (Stuttgart, 1998), 179–87. See also Craig R. Whitney, “4 Powers to Meet on German Issues – Bonn-East Berlin Ties Prompt First Such Talks Since ‘72’”, NYT, 11 Dec. 1989, 1+A7.

⁴⁴ DESE, Dok. Nr. 120, pp. 639, 641.

⁴⁵ James A. Baker, Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York, 1995), 171.

⁴⁶ Quotes from Thomas L. Friedman, “Baker in Berlin, Outlines Plan To Make NATO a Political Group”, NYT, 13 Dec. 1989, 1+A18. Italics are mine.

⁴⁷ Baker wrote a letter of apology to Kohl, in which he stated: ‘I very much regret that my press conference remark created a problem for you. I intended just the opposite result – because I thought the question was politically sensitive for you domestically. I certainly intended no criticism. I hope you know the great importance that I attach to the US-FRG relationship (and particularly the relationship with you) – and the efforts that I have made to advance it - beginning early this year. Those efforts will only intensify as we move into the all important year of 1990.’ BP, Box 104, Folder 1, 1989 Oct.-December, ‘12/17/1989, Letter Baker to Kohl.’

⁴⁸ DESE, Dok. Nr. 125, p. 658 and esp. its fn. 1; Baker, Politics, 171–2. For the speech, see Lawrence Freedman, ed., Europe Transformed: Documents on the End of the Cold War (London, 1990), 397–8.

⁴⁹ See Serge Schmemann, “Leaders of the 2 Germanies Meet – Symbolic Reconciliation Cheered”, NYT, 20 Dec. 1989, 1+A16.

⁵⁰ Sarotte, 1989, 87.

⁵¹ Andreas Hilger, ed., Diplomatie für die deutsche Einheit: Dokumente des Auswärigen Amts zu den deutsch-Sowjetischen Beziehungen 1989/90 [Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte] (Munich: 2011) [henceforth DDE:DAA], Dok Nr. 8, pp. 44–45. Italics are mine. Note: Baker publicly outlined in Berlin on 12 Dec. (three weeks after Genscher spoke to Bush) plans to make NATO a more political group. Friedman, “Baker in Berlin”, A18.

⁵² DDE:DAA, Dok. Nr. 13, p. 75. Italics are mine.

⁵³ DDE:DAA, Dok. Nr. 11, 12 and 13, pp. 56–80.

⁵⁴ On ‘Genscherism’, see Josef Joffe, “The Secret of Genscher's Staying Power: Memoirs of the Slippery Man”, Foreign Affairs 77, no. 1 (Jan. /Feb. 1998): 148–54.

⁵⁵ “Bahr: ich weiβ gar nicht, wieviel Zeit wir haben”, Die Zeit, 9 Feb. 1990; “Bahr: ‘Bei der Ausweitung der NATO gibt es keine Einheit’”, Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 2 Feb. 1990.

⁵⁶ DESE, Dok. Nr. 158, pp. 754–55. See also Serge Schmemann, “Vote Is Moved Up By East Germans; Coalition Widened: Ballot Is Set For March – All Parties Agree on the Early Election, Showing Anxiety About Public's Mood”, NYT, 29 Jan. 1990, 1.

⁵⁷ See William H. Webster, statement, January 23, 1990, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Threat Assessment; Military Strategy; and Operational Requirements, 101st Cong., 2^ndsess, 57–61.

⁵⁸ Marcus Mabry, Twice as Good: Condoleezza Rice and Her Path to Power, 117–18. See DBPO III, VII GU 1989/90, doc. 109, p. 231; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 158–60.

⁵⁹ On cautiousness, gradualism and a kind of ‘Slamlomfahrt’ towards unity, DESE, Dok Nr. 120, p. 637.

⁶⁰ DESE, Dok. Nr. 141, 151, 157+157A, 158, pp. 700, 727–35, 749–51, 753–6.

⁶¹ DESE, Dok. Nr. 153, p. 741, Teltschik, 329 Tage, 123. See also DBPO III, VII GU 1989/90, doc. 105, pp. 223–4, DBPO III, VII GU 1989/90, doc. 109, p. 231.

⁶² Richard Kiessler, and Frank Elbe, Ein runder Tisch mit scharfen Ecken: Der diplomatische Weg zur deutschen Einheit (Baden-Baden, 1993), 79–80. See also Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of US Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Washington, DC, 1997), 111; Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: HUP, 1997), 177.

⁶³ See Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen (Berlin, 1991), 299–323. For an evolution of Genscher's CSCE ideas in his public speeches, idem, Unterwegs zur Einheit: Reden und Dokumente aus bewegter Zeit (Berlin: Siedler, 1991).

⁶⁴ Quoted from the Tutzing speech as printed in, Freedman, ed., Europe Transformed, 440. On Central-Eastern European troop withdrawal demands, see also DBPO III, VII GU 1989/90, doc. 129, p. 263.

⁶⁵ Kaiser, Deutschlands Vereinigung, Dok. Nr. 23, p.191; see also Freedman, ed., Europe Transformed, 440–1. See also Kiessler and Elbe, Ein runder Tisch, 246.

⁶⁶ Quoted from DESE, Dok. Nr. 141, p. 699.

⁶⁷ See Costigliola, “Arm”, 95; cf. Cox, “His Finest Hour?”, 136.

⁶⁸ Quote from Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, MA, 1997), 176. The italics are mine to emphasise the specifics.

⁶⁹ See DESE, Dok. Nr. 159, p. 756. ‘Genscher habe bekräftigt […]. Deutschland werde in der NATO bleiben. Die NATO solle nicht auf das Gebiet der DDR ausgeweitet werden. Dies solle gegenüber der Sowjetunion versichert werden.’ It must be noted, however, that in Genscher's subsequent talks with his British counterpart Douglas Hurd (on 6 Feb.) and Soviet colleague Eduard Shevardnadze (on 10 Feb.) he made more far-reaching comments on NATO's potential future territorial delimitation, namely ‘that when he talked about not wanting to extend NATO, that applied to other states besides the GDR’. See Spohr, ‘Precluded’, 18–32. See also, BP, Mudd Library, Princeton, Box 108, Folder 14, ‘JAB notes from 2/2/90 press briefing following 21/2 mtg w/FRG FM Genscher, WDC – handwritten note.’

⁷⁰ DESE, Dok. Nr. 159, pp. 756–7. See also Teltschik, 329 Tage, 128–9.

⁷¹ DBPO III, VII GU 1989/90, Doc. 124, p. 255; MGDF:SD, Dok. Nr. 71, p. 312.

⁷² MGDF:SD, Dok. Nr. 71, p. 312.

⁷³ DESE, Dok Nr. 170, pp. 784–5.

⁷⁴ See Bush, All the Best, 460–1. See also Costigliola, “Arm”, 101–2. According to Costigliola who referred US House of Representatives - Committee of Armed Services meetings in Feb. March and April 1990, the Bush administration also believed that a ‘robust US military role through NATO, particularly with nuclear weapons, helped counter any German temptations to develop a full panoply of modern armaments.’

⁷⁵ Cf. BP, Box 108, Folder 14, 1990 Feb., ‘JAB notes from 2/6/90 MTG. w/Czech. Pres. Havel, Hradcany Castle, Prague, Czech.’

⁷⁶ Karl Kaiser, Deutschlands Vereinigung, Dok. Nr. 27, pp. 197–99. Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, 204; Teltschik, 329 Tage, 151–2; DBPO III, VII GU 1989/90, Doc. 154, p. 307, fn. 6. See also Spohr, “Precluded”, 33–6.

⁷⁷ DBPO III, VII GU 1989/90, Doc. 154, pp. 307–8. Italics are mine.

⁷⁸ DESE, Dok. Nr. 192, 860–73; Sarotte, 1989, 126–7.

⁷⁹ DDE:DAA, Dok. Nr. 22, pp. 109–113.

⁸⁰ DESE, Dok. Nr. 228, pp. 973–4.

⁸¹ On the WEU speech, see Teltschik, 329 Tage, 182–3, 186.

⁸² For the speech, see Genscher, Unterwegs, 258–68, especially 265–6. See also Hoover Institution Archives, Zelikow-Rice Papers 1989–1995, Box 1, Letter, Zelikow to Genscher, 24 January 1995, 5.

⁸³ Teltschik, 329 Tage, 182–3.

⁸⁴ DBPO III, VII, GU 1989/90, doc. 180, p. 353.

⁸⁵ Bush, All the Best, 460–1.

⁸⁶ DESE, Dok. Nr. 278, 1130. Cf. the US record which is distinctly shorter on these points, GBPL, “Memorandum of Conversation, Kohl and Bush, May 17, 1990 11:40–12:55 p.m.”, 4, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/memcons_telcons/1990-05-17–Kohl%20[2].pdf (accessed 1 April 2014).

⁸⁷ Note the common theme in Gorbachev's actions regarding the German question in 1989/90 to refer to and concede to the Germans the right (à la Helsinki) to self-determination [i.e. unification] and to choose their alliance membership. Note also Genscher's suggestion on 17 May as per the previous footnote.

⁸⁸ Spohr, “Precluded”, 46.

⁸⁹ DESE, doc. 350, p. 1345; DBPO III, VII, GU 1989/90, doc. 218, pp. 434–5. On the question of cheque-book diplomacy, see also Sarotte, “Perpetuating”, 133–5. That chancellor Kohl had already been well aware of his special political lever - the ‘power’ of (West) German cash - in February 1990, see DESE, Dok. Nr. 192, pp. 868–9.

⁹⁰ Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of US Policy in Europe, 1989–1992 (Washington, DC, 1997), 135.

⁹¹ For the London Declaration, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23693.htm (accessed 1 April 2014). See also, Asmus, Opening NATO's Door, 11–17.

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Notes on contributors

Kristina Spohr

Kristina Spohr is Associate Professor in International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science. She is currently finishing a book for OUP entitled ‘West Germany Comes of Age: Helmut Schmidt and the Reshaping of the International Order in the 1970s’ and a co-edited volume, also for OUP, on ‘Cold War Summitry: Transcending the Division of Europe, 1970–1990’. Email: [email protected]