Re-thinking normalisation between the ROK and the PRC in the early 1990s: the South Korean perspective

Abstract

This article provides the historical explanation for Nordpolitik, which built the foundation for Roh Tae-woo's China policy and the end of Cold War in East Asia. It first discusses Roh's China policy with the process for South Korea and China's diplomatic relationship as well as other factors that affected the rapprochement between the two countries in the early 1990s. Then, the article makes a brief evaluation of current South Korean-Chinese relations and policy suggestions for the future development of the relationship between the two countries. Based on newly discovered archival resources and political records in South Korea and China, this article provides a more exact picture of international relations between the two states in the early 1990s.

Notes

¹ Cited from an interview with Kim Jong-hui, senior secretary of foreign affairs at the time, on 19 November 2011. Lee Keun, ‘Je 5jang: Roh Tae-woo jeongbu'eui bukbangwoegyo: elite minjokjueui'e gibanhan daejeonryak [Roh Tae-woo Government's Nordpolitik: the Grand Strategy based on Elite Nationalism],’ in Roh Tae-woo sidae'eui jae'insik: jeonhwangi'eui hanguksahoe [The New Understanding of the Roh Tae-woo Era: the Korean Society in Transition Period], ed. Kang Won-taek (Seoul: Nana, 2012) 179.

² Jeon Je-seong, ‘Je 6jang: bukbangjeongchaekeui pyeongga: hanguk woegyodaejeonryakeui siwon [The Chapter 6: Evaluation of Nordpolitik: the Origin of South Korea's Grand Foreign Strategies],’ ed. Kang Won-taek (Seoul: Nanam, 2012), 209–210.

³ Cited from an interview with Kim Jong-hui, the then senior secretary of foreign affairs, 19 November 2011, Lee Keun, ‘Roh Tae-woo jeongbu'eui bukbangwoegyo,’ 179.

⁴ Jeon Je-seong, ‘bukbangjeongchaekeui pyeongga,’ 207–208.

⁵ Park Byoung-gwang, Han, Jung'gwangye 15nyouneui pyounggwa'wa gwaje – woegyo, anbojeog cheugmyoun'eul jungsimeuro [Assessment of 15 years of ROK- PRC International Relations and Outstanding Tasks For the Bilateral Relations – Focusing on The Diplomatic and Security Perspectives], Korean Defence Policy 77 (2007): 135–158; Kim Dohee, hanjung munhwa gyoryu'eu hyunhwang'gwa sahoejeok younghyang [Present Status of ROK- PRC Cultural Exchanges and Its Impact On Korean Society], The Korean Journal of Modern China Studies, 9, no. 2 (2008).

⁶ Regarding overall perspectives of the ROK-PRC relationship during this period, see Lee Hee-ok, Cha Jae-bok et al, 1992–2012 hanjunggwanggye eodiggaji watna- seonggwa'wa jeonmang [The Position of ROK-PRC International Relations, 1992–2012, the Achievements and Perspectives], (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2012); For the military studies, see Park Changhee, hanjungsugyo 20junyoun'gwa hanjunggunsagwangye baljeon: hoego'wa jeonmang [20^th Anniversary of ROK-PRC Diplomatic Relationship and Development of ROK-PRC Military Relationship, Jung-so yeongu, 36, no. 1 (2012).

⁷ Hong Liu, ‘The Sino-South Korean Normalisation: A Triangular Explanation’, Asian Survey, 33, no. 11 (November 1993): 1083–1094.

⁸ Kim Hak-joon, ‘The Establishment of South Korean-Chinese diplomatic relations: A South Korean Perspective’, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 13, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 31–48.

⁹ Headline of Dong-a Ilbo, 29 June 1983. Minister Lee stated, ‘Our most important foreign policy goal in the 1980s is to prevent the recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula, and our most important diplomatic task is to pursue the northern policy successfully which aims at normalising relations with the Soviet Union and China.’

¹⁰ Lee Keun, ‘Roh Tae-woo jeongbu'eui bukbangwoegyo,’ 173.

¹¹ ‘Dispatch of North Korean Military Advisory Group to Zimbabwe, 1981,’ Diplomatic Archive of Republic of Korea, Class Number 725. 1.

¹² Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 169–70.

¹³ ‘Improvement of South Korea and Soviet Relationship, 1981,’ Diplomatic Archive of Republic of Korea, Class Number 722. 2; ‘Improvement of South Korea and Soviet Relationship through Finland, 1981,’ Diplomatic Archive of Republic of Korea, Class Number 722. 2. During this period, the Soviet Union tried to negotiate with South Korea through Finland and the USA was cautious.

¹⁴ Roh Tae-woo, ‘Jeonhwangi'eui daejeonryak [The Grand Strategy during Transition Period],’ Roh Tae-woo Memoir, Vol. 2 (Seoul: Chosun News Press, 2011), 141.

¹⁵ Sergey Radchenko, ‘Inertia and Change: Soviet Policy toward Korea, 1985–1991’, in The Cold War in East Asia, 1945–1991, ed. Hasegawa Tsuyoshi (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2011), 289.

¹⁶ Pyongyang had closer relations with Beijing than Moscow between the late 1960s and late 1970s; however, it promoted diplomacy with the Soviet Union in the early 1980s mainly because of its hostility towards Chinese economic reform. The Russian elites wanted North Korea's support for their competition with the Chinese and hence pledged military and economic aid for Kim Il-sung. As a result of this political agreement, Kim visited Moscow as a ‘dear comrade of the Russians’. For details, see Sergey Radchenko, ‘Inertia and Change’, 289–290.

¹⁷ Roh Tae-woo, ‘Gukga, minjuhwa, naeui unmyung [State, Democratisation, and My Destiny]’, Roh Tae-woo Memoir, Vol. 1 (Seoul: Chosun News Press, 2011), 283–284.

¹⁸ Sergey Radchenko, ‘Inertia and Change’, 296; Richard Pound, Five Rings Over Korea (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), 270. During his meeting with Kim Il-sung in 1986, Gorbachev said that there should be no boycotting of the 1988 Olympics.

¹⁹ Roh Tae-woo, ‘Gukga, minjuhwa, naeui unmyung,’ 450–452.

²⁰ Roh Tae-woo, ‘Jeonhwangi'eui daejeonryak,’ 140–142. For this reason, the Roh government attempted to complete the first phase of Nordpolitik during Roh's tenure.

²¹ Interview with Park Chul-un, Korean minister of state at the time, 7 August 2007. According to Roh and Park, Kim Jong-hui, senior secretary of foreign affairs, orchestrated Nordpolitik through official channels, and Park, the minister of state, worked for Nordpolitik behind the scenes. Negotiations with communist states progressed in secret due to security matters regarding relations with North Korea. Park attempted to contact the Kremlin through the KGB by mobilising the intelligence of the KCIA.

²² Lee Tae-hwan, ‘Bugbangjeongchaeggwa hanjung gwangyeeui byeonhwa [Nordpolitik and the change in the relationship between South Korea and China]’ in Nordpolitik: Origin, Development, and Influence, ed. Ha Yong-chul et al. (Seoul: Seoul University Press, 2003), 115–16.

²³ Lorenz Lüthi, ‘Chinese Foreign Policy, 1960–79’, in The Cold War in East Asia, 1945–1991, ed. Hasegawa Tsuyoshi (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), 153.

²⁴ Lorenz Lüthi, ‘Chinese Foreign Policy, 1960–79’, 160–70.

²⁵ Lee Chae-jin, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1996), 106; Lee Eun-ho, hyeondae gukjejeongchi'eui yhae [Understanding Modern International Politics] (Seoul: Oreum, 2004), 145.

²⁶ Lee Sang-ok, Jeonhwangi'eui Hangukwoegyo: Lee Sang-ok jeon woemujanggwan woegyohoegorok [Korean Diplomacy in the Transition Period: the Diplomatic Memoir of Lee Sang-ok, Former Foreign Minister] (Seoul: Life and Dream, 2002), 118.

²⁷ This 1989 ADB meeting was the first to be held in the PRC.

²⁸ Lee Sang-ok, Jeonhwangi'eui Hangukwoegyo, 121.

²⁹ Deputy prime minister Tian sent his message to Lee Soon-seok, the president of SK, stating that China wanted to talk with South Korea to establish the Trade Office. See Lee Sang-ok, op. cit., 122.

³⁰ Lee Sang-ok, Jeonhwangi'eui Hangukwoegyo, 144.

³¹ Lee Sang-ok, Jeonhwangi'eui Hangukwoegyo, 155.

³² Lee Sang-ok, Jeonhwangi'eui Hangukwoegyo, 159.

³³ Lee Sang-ok, Jeonhwangi'eui Hangukwoegyo, 154.

³⁴ This Chinese proverb means that ‘things will happen while they can.’

³⁵ Lee Sang-ok, Jeonhwangi'eui Hangukwoegyo, 170.

³⁶ President Roh made a state visit to China from 27–30 September.

³⁷ Joint Statement for the Establishment of ROK-PRC Diplomatic Relations, August 24, 1992. Diplomatic Archive of Republic of Korea, http://diplomaticarchives.mofa.go.kr/show/picture/picture.do?boardNo=11&searchCon=not&searchStr=&cmd=cv

³⁸ Lee Sang-ok, Jeonhwangi'eui Hangukwoegyo, 249.

³⁹ Lee Sang-ok, Jeonhwangi'eui Hangukwoegyo, 237.

⁴⁰ Lee Sang-ok, Jeonhwangi'eui Hangukwoegyo, 175.

⁴¹ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas – Contemporary History, (Seoul: The JoongAng Ilbo, 1998), 234–7.

⁴² These two countries recognised Taiwan as the sole legitimate government that was representative of all of China.

⁴³ Lee Sang-ok, Jeonhwangi'eui Hangukwoegyo, 186.

⁴⁴ Lee Sang-ok, Jeonhwangi'eui Hangukwoegyo, 187.

⁴⁵ Lee Sang-ok, Jeonhwangi'eui Hangukwoegyo, 218.

⁴⁶ Lee Sang-ok, Jeonhwangi'eui Hangukwoegyo, 227.

⁴⁷ Pyongyang and Washington were in contact with each other at least 30 times between 1988 and 1992.

⁴⁸ Lee Sang-ok, Jeonhwangi'eui Hangukwoegyo, 130–132.

⁴⁹ Roh Tae-woo, ‘Jeonhwangi'eui daejeonryak.’ 260–261.

⁵⁰ Jeon Je-seong, ‘bukbangjeongchaekeui pyeongga,’ 207–208.

⁵¹ Kwon Byeong-hyun, then South Korean ambassador to China, was deeply involved in the process of normalisation, and has argued that the normalisation was to be considered as part of the restoration of East Asia and the Korean Peninsula in terms of the history of civilisation. Interview with Kwon, Moonhwa Ilbo, 17 August 2012.

⁵² The normalisation with South Korea involved the coordination of China's policy toward the Korean Peninsula for peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Zhang Tingyan, the former Chinese ambassador to South Korea, ‘Retrospect of Building Sino-South Korean Diplomatic Relations’, 24 July 2012.

⁵³ After the Tiananmen Massacre in June 1989, Chinese relations with Western countries became worse; thus, it attempted to strengthen its relations with neighbours in Asia. China established relations with Saudi Arabia and Singapore in July 1990, with Brunei in September, and normalised its relations with Indonesia in August. In January 1992 it also established relations with Israel.

⁵⁴ Roh Tae-woo, ‘Jeonhwangi'eui daejeonryak,’ 432.

⁵⁵ Jeon Je-seong, ‘bukbangjeongchaekeui pyeongga,’ 215–216.

⁵⁶ Roh Tae-woo, ‘Jeonhwangi'eui daejeonryak,’ 432.

⁵⁷ Jeon Je-seong, ‘bukbangjeongchaekeui pyeongga,’ 201–236.

⁵⁸ ‘Nordpolitik,’ http:www.uniedu.go.kr/.

⁵⁹ Interview with Park Chul-un, the then Korean minister of state.

⁶⁰ Sergey Radchenko, ‘Inertia and Change’, 310.

⁶¹ Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 234–7.

⁶² South Korean research works on South Korea-China relations in the last five years are as follows: first, journal articles by Park Byung-gwang, ‘Han·jung'gwangye 15 nyeon'eui pyeonggawa gwaje: woegyo·anbojeok cheukmyung'eul jungsimeuro [The Evaluation and tasks for 15 years of South Korea-China relations],’ Defence Policy Study (Fall 2007); second, a book by Jeon Seong-heung and Lee Jong-hwa, ‘junguk'eui busang: dongasia mit hajunggwangye hameui [The Rise of China: The Implications for East Asia and South Korea-China Relations], (Seoul: O'reum, 2008).

⁶³ ROK Embassy in China, ‘China's Relations with South Korea.’, http://chn.mofa.go.kr/korean/as/chn/policy/relation/index.jsp

⁶⁴ Regarding the Chinese government's view in identifying new ways for the development of the relationship between the two countries, see Xu Bu, the vice-chairman of the Chinese Foreign Office in South Korea, Promotion of the Development of Sino-South Korean Strategic Cooperative Partnership, Fudan University, 24 August, 2012).

⁶⁵ ROK Embassy in China, ‘China's Relations with South Korea.’, http://chn.mofa.go.kr/korean/as/chn/policy/relation/index.jsp

⁶⁶ Jae-ho Hwang, ‘The ROK's China Policy under Park Geun-hye,’ International Journal of Korean Unification Studies 23, no. 1 (2014): 107–110.

⁶⁷ After their inauguration, South Korea's presidents normally visit Japan following the USA.

⁶⁸Yonhap News, ‘Full text of ROK- PRC Joint Statement adopted by President Park and Premier Xi’, www.yonhapnews.co.kr/…/0501000000AKR20140703143800001.HTM

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ For example, there is little likelihood that China is going to back a Korean unification plan that does not seem more beneficial to China in terms of national security than the status quo.

⁷¹ Hwang, ‘The ROK's China Policy under Park Geun-hye’, 120.