![Sample our Humanities journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5939/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Humanities.jpg"})
Abstract
When the United States and mainland China attempted to reach out to each other in the late 1960s, the Soviet Union and Taiwan had already been cooperating with each other against China. Starting in 1963, the Soviet Union and Taiwan interacted through different channels, with the culmination being the arrival of Victor Louis in Taipei. By 1971 Chiang Kai-shek decided that the Soviet Union was no longer an option as a negotiating partner. The authors, based on rare archival resources, try to restore details of the talks and interpret how they failed to accomplish a strategic partnership as the US and mainland China had done.
Acknowledgements
The authors are greatly indebted to David Holloway, Gordon Chang, Thomas Fingar, Alice Miller, and Carol Leadenham at Stanford University, Jonathan Hunt at RAND Corporation, as well as the two anonymous reviewers for their invaluable support, comment and advice. Special thanks to the Chiang family for granting approval to explore this subject through quoting the Chiang Kai-shek diaries.
Notes
1 Harry G. Gelber, The Dragon and the Foreign Devils (New York: Walker & Company, 2007), 368.
2 David Patterson, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1998), 703.
3 Gelber, Dragon and the Foreign Devils, 367.
4 Ibid., 370.
5 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Gross & Dunlap, 1978), 545.
6 Richard Nixon, 1 - Inaugural Address January 20, 1969, site map available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=1941 [accessed 8 March 2013].
7 Warren Cohen, America's Response to China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 217.
8 Ibid., 217.
9 Ibid., 215.
10 Chiang Kai-shek Diaries, Hoover Institution, 18 April 1963, Box 70, Folder 3.
11 Chiang, 18 April 1963.
12 Ibid.
13 Chiang, 10 May 1963 and weekly refection after 11 May 1963, Box 70, Folder 4.
14 The United States Department of State, The Department of State Bulletin, vol. 50, issue 2 (Washington DC: Office of Public Communication, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1964), 934.
15 Ibid.
16 Cohen, 213. Also see Lynden Johnson, State of the Union Address, 1967, site map available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=28338 [accessed 21 October 8 2014].
17 Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo's Son: Chiang Ching-Kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 287.
18 Ibid., 288.
19 Ibid., 289.
20 Michael Share, “From Ideological Foe to Uncertain Friend: Soviet Relations with Taiwan, 1943-1982”, Cold War History, vol.3 (2003): 22.
21 Ibid., 22.
22 Ibid., 23.
23 Paul, H. Tai, “The Russia Option”, Hoover Digest, no. 3 (2010), at http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/36146, [accessed on 25 November 2013].
24 Tai, “The Russia Option”.
25 George C. X. Wei, China-Taiwan Relations in a Global Context: Taiwan's Foreign Policy and Relations (New York: Routledge, 2012), 169.
26 Wei Jingmeng. “The Wang Ping Files”, Cold War International History Studies, Issue 5 (2008), 12 October 1968.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Chiang, 21 December 1962, Box 69, Folder 18.
31 Chiang, 1-2 July 1963, Box 70, Folder 6.
32 Chiang, 1 July 1963.
33 Chiang, weekly reflection after 6 July 1963.
34 Chiang 24 July 1963.
35 Chiang 23, July 1963.
36 Chiang, 25 July 1963.
37 Chiang, 20 August 1963, Box 70, Folder 7.
38 On 6 September 1963, the Soviets complained to the US, arguing that the gang of Chiang could not represent China, and TASS simultaneously announced that there was only one China in the world, the PRC. See Chiang, 7 September 1963, Box 70, Folder 8.
Based on Chiang's diary entries on 19 and 20 August 1963, the US had hoped that Taiwan would sign on behalf of China, possibly because the Partial Test Ban Treaty drew fierce resistance from the PRC. Enhancing the status of the ROC as a sovereign state in the international community certainly persuaded Chiang to sign the treaty. In addition, an underlying reason for this decision was Chiang's motivation to test whether the Soviet policy toward Taiwan had changed. If the Soviets failed to disapprove, this would suggest a favourable Soviet policy turn toward Taiwan; even if the Soviets raised opposition, Taiwan had nothing to lose.
Despite the worsening ties between mainland China and the Soviet Union in 1963, the Soviet Union desired to topple Mao instead of the CCP government. The Soviet policy on China at this time had essentially not changed and, as a result, the Soviet Union's complaint was inevitable.
39 Chiang, 3 September 1963, Box 70, Folder 8.
40 Chiang, 9 December 1963, Box 70, Folder 11.
41 Chiang, 3 October 1964, Box 71, Folder 4.
42 Ibid.
43 Chiang, weekly reflection after 17 October 1964.
44 Chiang, annual reflection of 1964, Folder 6, Box 71.
45 Lorenz M. Luthi, Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 292.
46 Chiang, weekly reflection after 27 February 1965, Box 71, Folder 9.
47 Chiang, 11 October 1966, Box 72, Folder 16.
48 Ibid.
49 Chiang, 3, 18, 20, 24 January 1967, and the January 1967 monthly reflection, Box 73, Folder 3.
50 Chiang, 11 July 1967, Box 73, Folder 9.
51 Chiang, 14 October 1968, Box 74, Folder 12. Zhu Xinmin's identity was not mentioned in the Chiang Kai-shek diaries. According to the author's interview with the Executive Yuan of Taiwan on 13 May 2013 and information provided by the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Taiwan on 23 May 2013, Zhu served as the deputy chief of the Government Information Office between 1954 and 1961, and then the information secretary of Taiwan's embassy to Argentina, Mexico, and Austria respectively between 1961 and 1967, 1967 and 1969, and 1969 and 1970. Zhu's earliest appearance in the Chiang diaries was 2 September 1968, by this point he should be have been transferred from Argentine to Mexico.
52 Presidential Papers of Chiang Ching-kuo, Academia Historica, Taipei, Qingbao—Zhonggong jiujie yizhong quanhui zhi zhengqing fenxi ji gongjun junli xianzhuangdeng [Intelligence Reports—Analysis on the Political Situation since the First Plenary Session of the CCP's 9th National Party Congress and on the Military Strength of the CCP Armies], Identification Number 005000000994A.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Chiang, 2 September 1968, Box 74, Folder 11.
59 Ibid.
60 Chiang, 7 September 1968.
61 Chiang, weekly reflection after 7 September 1968.
62 Chiang, 11, 28, 29 September 1968.
63 Chiang, 2 October 1968, Box 74, Folder 12.
64 Chiang, 5 October 1968.
65 Chiang, weekly reflection after 5 October 1968.
66 Chiang, 9-10 October 1968. Victor Louis approached Taiwanese diplomats on 11 October, requesting a visa to Taiwan. Therefore, Louis's visit to Taiwan was very likely a product of Zhu Xinmin's efforts since July 1968.
67 Chiang, 12 October 1968.
68 Chiang, 13 October 1968.
69 Chiang, 14 October 1968.
70 Ibid.
71 Wei, 15 October 1968.
72 Chiang, 16 October 1968.
73 Zhai Qiang, The Dragon, the Lion & the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1958 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1994), 165.
74 Chiang, 17 October 1968.
75 Chiang, weekly reflection after 19 October 1968.
76 Wei, 22 October 1968.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Wei, 23 October 1968.
81 Ibid.
82 Wei, 24 October 1968.
83 Ibid.
84 Chiang, weekly reflection after 26 October 1968.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Wei, 29 October 1968.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Chiang, weekly reflection after 2 November 1968, Box 74, Folder 13.
93 Wei, 4 November 1968.
94 Wei, 5 November 1968.
95 Ibid.
96 Michael Share, “From Ideological Foe to Uncertain Friend: Soviet Relations with Taiwan, 1943-1982”, Cold War History, vol.3 (2003): 22.
97 Wei, 6 November 1968.
98 Stanley Karnow, “Russians Angle to ‘Contain’ Red China”, The Washington Post, (17 November 1968).
99 Karnow, 17 November 1968.
100 Taylor, The Generalissimo's Son, 289.
101 Presidential Papers of Chiang Ching-kuo, Zhonge guanxi[Sino-Russian Relations], Identification Number 005000000083A.
102 Chiang, 20 November 1968, Box 74, Folder 13.
103 Chiang, annual reflection, 1968, Box 74, Folder 15.
104 Chiang, 13 April 1969, Box 75, Folder 2.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid. Chiang's preconditions were developed and recorded in Wei's diaries on 6 May 1969 as the five principles:
First, the existence of Mao's regime on the mainland has harmed the fundamental interests of both parties (A: the ROC, B: the Soviet Union). Should [we] allow its continual development, more severe consequences would take place. This point is the basis for cooperation between both parties.
Second, concerning the cooperation approaches, the prerequisite is how both sides could overthrow the Mao regime jointly, as well as policies that both parties should adopt after the overthrow. Therefore, prior to discussing approaches, policies should first be identified.
Third, cooperation between both parties to overthrow the Mao regime would win understanding from the people in or out of the ROC government, as well as from people of the mainland. Hence [we] must not take on what has failed in history and created a great scourge to both parties, which is the so-called KMT-CCP cooperation policy. Any call in the name of the CCP would encounter not only fear and hatred from the Chinese people, but also resistance from the anti-Mao elements in the CCP. Absolutely, this harms rather than benefits the Soviet Union. Should the Soviet Union have honoured the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and supported the nationalist government led by Generalissimo Chiang in attaining unification, the common disaster today would not have taken shape.
Fourth, the ROC upholds a policy to recruit anti-Mao elements across various divisions of the Mao regime. Politically, under its leadership, the ROC seeks an anti-Mao salvation united front, and would use [anti-Mao elements within the CCP] as one of the country's parties in joining the anti-Mao salvation war.
Fifth, fundamental issues such as the border, economy, and diplomacy should be the main topics to discuss in the future.
107 Chiang, 14 April 1969.
108 Chiang, 23 April 1969
109 Wei, 1 May 1969.
110 Presidential Papers of Chiang Ching-kuo. Sue dangzheng renshi ji mou jiangqiang gongdang lianhe fandi douzheng [The Soviet Partisan and Political Personnel Matters and Attempts to Strengthen Anti-Imperialist Struggle among the Communist Parties], Identification Number 005000000996A. Shelepin served as the chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB) between 1958 and 1961, and Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions between 1967 and 1975. Notably, when Louis was carrying out his mission to Taiwan, Shelepin was no longer the head of the KGB.
The report was provided by an operative of the Taiwanese intelligence system, who was coded as Guo Xiansheng. According to the note attached to this document, Guo Xiansheng once served a major within the Soviet Red Army. Captured by Germany during the Second World War, he stayed in West Germany and was engaged in anti-communist missions. He once worked for the Broadcasting Corporation of China in Taiwan for a few years. Guo Xiansheng attained all the information from a friend who was stationed in Moscow and spent Christmas in Western Europe in 1968.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid. Arvīds Pelše served as chairman of the Party Control Committee of the Central Committee between 1966 and 1983. Both Pelše and Shelepin were members of the politburo when Louis's contact with Taiwan was taking place.
113 Wei, 14 May 1969. Chiang had issued instructions to inform the Soviets of five reasons for Taiwan not to collaborate with the new CCP, while Taiwan was not opposed to collaborate with the Soviet Union. See Chiang, 22 April 1969.
114 Wei, 15 May 1969.
115 Wei, 14 May 1969.
116 Wei, 15 May 1969.
117 Ibid.
118 Wei, 25 May 1969.
119 Chiang, 27 May 1969, Box 75, Folder 3.
120 Ibid.
121 Chiang, 25 May 1969.
122 Chiang, monthly reflection, May 1969.
123 Chiang, 24 May 1969.
124 Ibid.
125 Chiang, 15 July 1969, Box 75, Folder 5.
126 Chiang, weekly reflection after 30 August 1969, Box 75, Folder 6.
127 Chiang, 15 August 1969.
128 Chiang, 17 August 1969.
129 Chiang, 6 September 1969, Box 75, Folder 7.
130 “Russian Hints at Attack on China”, The Washington Times (17 September 1969).
131 Chiang, monthly reflection, September 1969, 1 October 1969.
132 Chiang, 6, 15, 23 and monthly reflection, September 1969. Resolution 255 adopted by the UN Security Council in 1968 encouraged nuclear states to provide ‘immediate assistance’ to a non-nuclear NPT signatory threatened by nuclear weapons. Therefore, ratification of NPT would not render the Soviets technically bound to protect Taiwan.
133 Jiang Changbin and Robert Ross, eds., 1955-1971 nian de zhongmei guanxi [China-US Relations between 1955 and 1971] (Beijing: Shiji zhishi chubanshe/World Affairs Press, 1998), 202.
134 Chiang, 16 September 1969.
135 Wei, 20 September 1969.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Chiang, monthly reflection, September 1969.
139 Wei, 2, 4, 5, 6 October 1969.
140 Wei, 9 October 1969.
141 Ibid.
142 Chiang, weekly reflection after 11 October 1969, Box 75, Folder 8.
143 Wei, 9-10 October 1969; Chiang, 10 October 1969.
144 Chiang, 10 October 1969.
145 Ibid.
146 Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [History Research Centre of China Communist Party Central Committee], eds., Zhonggong dangshi ziliao [Sources of the CCP Party History], Vol. 42 (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe/China Communist Party History Publishing House, 1992), 91.
147 Chiang, 19 October 1969, monthly reflection.
148 Chiang, 25 October 1969.
149 Ibid.
150 Chiang, 19 November 1969, Box 75, Folder 9.
151 Ibid. Six days before, on 13 November 1969, Chiang already concluded in his diary that Nixon's design to compromise with the mainland and to betray Taiwan had ‘shown its true colours’. In response, Chiang decided to make a concerted attempt ‘to break through the darkness and to reach a bright future to recover the mainland’.
152 Chiang, 24 January 1970, Box 75, Folder 12.
153 Chiang, 2 July 1970, Box 75, Folder 18.
154 Chiang, monthly reflection, August 1970, Box 76, Folder 1.
155 Wei, 18 October 1970.
156 Ibid.
157 Wei, 30 October 1970.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
160 Wei, 6 November 1970.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
163 Chiang, 8 November 1970, Box 76, Folder 4.
164 Chiang, General 1971, Box 76, Folder 6.
165 Ibid.
166 Chiang, 25 October 1971, Box 76, Folder 16.
167 Ibid.
168 Chiang, 17 November 1971, Box 76, Folder 17.
169 Chiang, 30 March 1972, Box 76, Folder 22; 21 April 1972, Box 76, Folder 23.
170 News Dispatches, “U.S. Support Firm, Agnew Tells Chiang: Agnew Tells Chiang U.S. Behind Him”, The Washington Post, (3 January 1970).
171 Ibid.
172 Associated Press, “Carl Albert, on Taiwan Visit, Assures Nationalists”, The New York Times, (15 August 1971).
173 Chiang, 15 July 1969, Box 75, Folder 5.
174 Chiang, 7 August 1970, Box 76, Folder 1.
175 Wei, 20 September 1969.
Additional information
Funding
Notes on contributors
Xiang Zhai
Xiang Zhai is a graduate student at the Centre for East Asian Studies at Stanford University. He also serves as the research assistant on China at the Hoover Institution. Email: [email protected]
Ruping Xiao
The co-author, Ruping Xiao is an associate professor in the Department of History at Zhejiang University.