Re-examining the end of Mao’s revolution: China’s changing statecraft and Sino-American relations, 1973–1978

Abstract

Synthesizing heretofore available Chinese sources, this article re-examines the long process of the end of China’s continuous revolution from 1973 to 1978, a transitional period insufficiently addressed by scholars. It explores China’s evolving statecraft in the maelstrom of leadership struggles, as Chinese leaders – Mao Zedong, Hua Guofeng, and Deng Xiaoping – continuously redefined China’s foreign and domestic goals, fluctuating between revolution and development. This article concludes that despite predominant scholarly focus on geopolitics, China’s changing perception of its national interests largely determined Sino-American relations from Richard Nixon’s historic trip in 1972 to normalisation of relations in 1979.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Jeremi Suri and Huaiyin Li for their comments on earlier drafts.

Notes

¹ Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [CCP Central Archives and Manuscript Division], ed., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong junshi wengao [Mao Zedong’s Military Manuscripts Since the Founding of People’s Republic of China] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2010), vol. 3, 401.

² Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Deng Xiaoping sixiang nianbian [Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping Theory] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2011), 11–2.

³ Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. XVIII, Doc. 138.

⁴ Memo, Michel Oksenberg to Zbigniew Brzezinski, August 21, 1978, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, Doc. 130.

⁵ The most recent scholarship on Sino-American relations in the 1970s includes: Evelyn Goh, Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From ‘Red Menace’ to ‘Tacit Ally’ (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Yafeng Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy: US-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949–1972 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); William Kirby, Robert Ross, and Li Gong, eds., Normalization of US-China Relations: An International History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007); Chris Tudda, A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969–1972 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 2012). See also the Special Forum entitled “Transforming the Cold War: The United States and China, 1969–1980,” Diplomatic History 33, no. 4 (2009).

⁶ On Sino-American rapprochement, see, for example, John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 74–81; Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), Chap. 28; Robert Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), Chap. 1; Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement,” Cold War History 1, no. 1 (2000): 21–52. On normalisation of relations, see for example, Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 125–7, 139–41; Wang Zhongchu, “The Soviet Factor in Sino-American Normalization, 1969–1979;” in Kirby, Ross, and Gong, Normalization, Chap. 5; Li Danhui, “Vietnam and Chinese Policy Towards the United States;” in ibid., Chap. 6; Enrico Fardella, “The Sino-American Normalization: A Reassessment,” Diplomatic History 33, no. 4 (2009): 545–78;” Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2011), Chap. 9.

⁷ Gong Li, “Chinese Decision Making and the Thawing of US-China Relations,” in Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954 -1973, eds. Robert Ross and Jiang Changbin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), Chap. 11; Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), Chap. 9; Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy, chs 6–8; Yang Kuisong and Xia Yafeng, “Vacillating between Revolution and Détente: Mao’s Changing Psyche and Policy toward the United States, 1969–1976,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 2 (2010): 395–423.

⁸ Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 80–1; James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (New York: Random House, 1998), 56, 61, 68–73; Rosemary Foot, “Prizes Won, Opportunity Lost;” in Kirby, Ross, and Gong, Normalization, 94–5, 96–7. The three principles referred to abolishing the US-Taiwan defence treaty, withdrawing US troops from Taiwan, and severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, October 31, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. XVIII, Doc. 130.

¹⁰ James Naughton, “Ford and Chinese Omit Communique on Peking Talks,” New York Times, December 4, 1975.

¹¹ Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 292–3; Memorandum of Conversation, November 12, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. XVIII, Doc. 58.

¹² Memorandum of Conversation, October 20, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. XVIII, Doc. 122.

¹³ Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 68–71. On Beijing’s failed attempts for rapprochement with Moscow, see Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972 (New York: Brooking Institution Press, 1992), 50, 69, 76; Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 68; Wang, “Soviet Factor,” 165–6.

¹⁴ Memorandum of Conversation, February 17–18, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. XVIII, Doc. 12.

¹⁵ Jin Chongji, Zhou Enlai zhuan [Biography of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2008), vol. 4, 1851–2. On Beijing’s internal justification of the Shanghai Communiqué, see Gong Li, “The Difficult Path to Diplomatic Relations: China’s US Policy, 1972–1978,” in Kirby, Ross, and Gong, Normalization, 116–9.

¹⁶ Hua Huang, Qinli yu jianwen: Huang Hua huiyilu [Personal Experience and Eyewitness Account: Memoirs of Huang Hua] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2008), 167.

¹⁷ Foreign Ministry, Waijiao Tongbao [Diplomatic Report] 12, February 24, 1973, cited in Gong Li, “Tongxiang jianjiao zhi lu de jiannan bashe: 1972–1978 nian de zhongguo duimei zhengce [The difficult road toward diplomatic normalisation: China’s US policy, 1972–1978],” Party Literature 2 (2002), 70.

¹⁸ Zhou’s speech was cited in People’s Daily, September 1, 1973.

¹⁹ See, for example, Mao Zedong, “On Policy,” December 25, 1940, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1964), vol. 2, 444.

²⁰ See Gong, “Difficult Path,” 124.

²¹ Yang and Xia, “Vacillating between Revolution and Détente,” 410, 412.

²² Telegram, David Bruce to Kissinger, June 26, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. XVIII, Doc. 39.

²³ Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Manuscripts of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1994), 600–1.

²⁴ Excerpts from Chinese Address to U.S. Session on Raw Materials, New York Times, April 12, 1974.

²⁵ Yang and Xia, “Vacillating between Revolution and Détente,” 421–2. On the ebb and tide of Mao’s revolutionary foreign policy, they astutely observed that although his foreign policy shifted in accordance with his evaluation of China’s strength, ‘Mao had a constant and consistent goal: China was the model for the “liberation” of all the oppressed nations and peoples of the world’ (ibid., 423).

²⁶ CCP Central Archives and Manuscript Division, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong junshi wengao, vol. 3, 388.

²⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, February 17–18, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. XVIII, Doc. 12.

²⁸ CCP Central Archives and Manuscript Division, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong junshi wengao, vol. 3, 381.

²⁹ Ibid., 397.

³⁰ Ibid., 394.

³¹ Ibid., 396.

³² Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 602–6.

³³ “Record of Conversation between French President Giscard d’Estaing and Vice Premier of the People’s Republic Deng Xiaoping: First Meeting,” May 13, 1975, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, la Courneuve (MAE), Série Asie-Océanie, Soussérie Chine 1973–1980 (AO), 2174. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Martin Albers and included in CWIHP e-Dossier No. 45, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118648 (accessed September 21, 2015).

³⁴ Memorandum of Conversation, October 20, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. XVIII, Doc. 122.

³⁵ Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 76, 84–5.

³⁶ “Conversation between Federal Chancellor Schmidt and the Chairman of the Central Committee and the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, in Beijing,” October 30, 1975, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, ed., Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: 1975. 1. Juli bis 31. Dezember 1975 (München: Oldenbourg, 2006), 1495–1500. Translated by Bernd Schaefer, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119985 (accessed September 21, 2015).

³⁷ Wang, “Soviet Factor,” 157–8.

³⁸ CCP Central Archives and Manuscript Division, Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong junshi wengao, vol. 3, 383.

³⁹ “Renzhen zuohao waibing jiedai gongzuo, xuanchuan Mao zhuxi weida zhanlue sixiang [Diligently perform the work of receiving foreign guests, propagate Chairman Mao’s great strategic thoughts],” October, 1975, B120-3-68-3, Shanghai Municipal Archive.

⁴⁰ Yang and Xia, “Vacillating between Revolution and Détente,” 410–1.

⁴¹ Gao Wenqian, Wannian Zhou Enlai [The Last Years of Zhou Enlai] (Hong Kong: Mirror Books, 2003), 454; Li Jie, “China’s Domestic Politics and the Normalization of Sino-US Relations,” in Kirby, Ross, and Gong, Normalization, 67–8.

⁴² Memorandum of Conversation, November 10, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. XVIII, doc. 55; Gao, Wannian, 464; Li, “China’s Domestic Politics,” 70.

⁴³ Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics during the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972–1976 (Armonk, NY: ME Sharp, 2007), 90–1. See also Gao, Wannian, 466–7; Li, “China’s Domestic Politics,” 66–72; Ma Jisen, The Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry of China (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2004), 359–64; Yafeng Xia, “Myth or Reality?: Factional Politics, US-China Relations, and Mao Zedong’s Mentality in His Sunset Years, 1972–1976,” The Journal of American-East Asian Relations 15 (2008), 113–9, 128.

⁴⁴ Garver, Foreign Relations, 167.

⁴⁵ Radicals’ attempts to attack moderates include the attempted Eleventh Two-Line Struggle in December 1973, the Criticise Lin, Criticise Confucius Campaign throughout 1974, the Fengqing Ship Incident in October 1974, the Anti-Empiricism Campaign in March 1975, and the Criticise Shuihu Campaign in August 1975. In each case, Mao protected moderates from radicals: Li, “China’s Domestic Politics,” 74–6; Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Mao Zedong zhuan [Biography of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2011), vol. 6, 2639–40, 2651–5, 2669–77, 2694–707, 2710–20.

⁴⁶ Zhou Enlai zhuan, vol. 4, 1892, 1902–3, 1918–9.

⁴⁷ Cheng Zhongyuan and Xia Xingzhen, Qianzou: Deng Xiaoping 1975 nian zhengdun [Prelude: Deng Xiaoping’s 1975 Readjustment] (Shijiazhuang, Hebei: Hebei renmin chubanshe, 2009), 6–16. Gao Wenqian, a former Chinese Communist Party historian, argued that Deng was Mao’s – not Zhou’s – political ally since the 1930s, and Mao rehabilitated Deng in early 1973 as part of his attempt to counter Zhou’s political influence. Gao, Wannian, 469–71.

⁴⁸ Ma, Cultural Revolution, 351; Xia, “Myth or Reality?” 119–24; Yang and Xia, “Vacillating between Revolution and Détente,” 417–8.

⁴⁹ Zhou’s work report at the Fourth National People’s Congress in January 1975, cited in People’s Daily, January 21, 1975.

⁵⁰ Major achievements of Deng’s development projects include: 4.6% increase in agricultural production from 1974 despite natural disasters; 15.1% increase in industrial production; $39,200 million investment in construction; and $14,750 million in foreign trade: Cheng and Xia, Qianzou, 269–71.

⁵¹ Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 602–6.

⁵² Luo Yingsheng, Qiao Guanhua zhuan: Hongse waijiaojia de beiai rensheng [Biography of Qiao Guanhua: A Red Diplomat's Sorrowful Life] (Beijing: Wenhua yishu chubanshe, 2012), 291–3. The official Party history, however, emphasised Mao’s unwillingness to cause political turmoil. Mao Zedong zhuan, vol. 6, 2720–9.

⁵³ Cheng and Xia, Qianzou, 303–5.

⁵⁴ Mao’s note to Hua in April 1976, cited in People’s Daily, October 25, 1976.

⁵⁵ Ye Yonglie, Deng Xiaoping gaibian Zhongguo: Cong Hua Guofeng dao Deng Xiaoping [Deng Xiaoping Transforms China: From Hua Guofeng to Deng Xiaoping] (Chengdu, Sichuan: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2014), 68–70.

⁵⁶ In Marxism, the ‘superstructure’ refers to power relations in society, including politics, law, culture, and religion, while ‘production relations’, or the ‘base’, refers to structures of production, such as employer-employee relations, work conditions, and property relations.

⁵⁷ Hua’s speech was covered in People's Daily, May 9, 1977.

⁵⁸ Hua’s speech was covered in People's Daily, March 26, 1978.

⁵⁹ Vogel, Deng Xiaoping, 190.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 185, 190; Ye, Deng Xiaoping, 440–2.

⁶¹ Hua’s speech was cited in People’s Daily, August 23, 1977.

⁶² On US indecision on normalisation of Sino-American relations from 1977 to mid-1978, especially concerning the Taiwan issue, see Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 111–6.

⁶³ Memorandum of Conversation, August 24, 1977, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, Doc. 49.

⁶⁴ Ibid., Doc. 111.

⁶⁵ Deng Xiaoping sixiang nianbian, 73.

⁶⁶ Huang, Qinli yu jianwen, 206–10.

⁶⁷ Deng Xiaoping sixian nianbian, 46.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 107–8.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 110–3.

⁷⁰ Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, ed., Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected Manuscripts of Deng Xiaoping] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1994), vol. 2, 38–9.

⁷¹ Guangming Ribao, May 11, 1978. On the publication process of the article, see Vogel, Deng Xiaoping, 210–3.

⁷² Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, vol. 2, 113–25.

⁷³ Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 98; Qian Jiang, Deng Xiaoping yu ZhongMei jianjiao fengyun [Deng Xiaoping and the Winds and Clouds of Sino-American Normalization] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2005), 63.

⁷⁴ Deng Xiaoping sixiang nianbian, 124–5.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 131–2.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 139–40.

⁷⁷ Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, vol. 2, 111–2.

⁷⁸ Deng Xiaoping sixiang nianbian, 105–6.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 129–30.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 147–8.

⁸¹ On China’s growing concern over Soviet global influence in the late 1970s, see Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 125–8. Deng’s concern over Soviet threat, in fact, might be greater than Mao and Hua’s. While radicals assumed that the Soviet Union would not attack China as long as it was prepared to fight a protracted people’s war, moderates believed that China could best deter Soviet attack by enhancing its economic and technological power through the four modernisations: see Kenneth Lieberthal, Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s: Its Evolution and Implications for the Strategic Triangle (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1978); Garver, Foreign Relations, 311.

⁸² Memorandum of Conversation, August 24, 1977, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, Doc. 50.

⁸³ Memorandum of Conversation, May 21, 1978, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, Doc. 110. During normalisation negotiations in late 1978, Washington agreed to the three principles in exchange for Beijing’s tacit tolerance of US arms sales to Taiwan after normalisation of relations. On the last-minute negotiations about Taiwan, see Harding, Fragile Relationship, 78–81; Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 134–8; Mann, About Face, 90–2; Foot, “Prizes Won,” 99–114; Gong, “Difficult Path,” 137–44.

⁸⁴ Harding, Fragile Relationship, 74; Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 103.

⁸⁵ Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 110–1; Mann, About Face, 83; Gong, “Difficult Path,” 135.

⁸⁶ Li, “China’s Domestic Politics,” 87; Qian, Deng Xiaoping, 153-4; Deng Xiaoping Sixiang nianbian, 196.

⁸⁷ Deng Xiaoping sixiang nianbian, 217.

⁸⁸ Li, ‘China’s Domestic Politics,” 82–3.

⁸⁹ Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, vol. 2, 134–9.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 140–53.

⁹¹ Vogel, Deng Xiaoping, 294–7. For the entire process for the Peace and Friendship Treaty, see Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, “A Strategic Quadrangle: The Superpowers and the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1977–1978,” in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, ed., The Cold War in East Asia, 1945–1991 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), Chap. 8.

⁹² Deng Xiaoping sixiang nianbian, 183–5.

⁹³ Even before the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty, a delegation from Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry visited China to conclude a long-term trade agreement in February 1978, which provided China with technology, plants, and machinery worth $10 billion in return for Chinese oil and coal: Hasegawa, “A Strategic Quadrangle,” 230–1.

⁹⁴ The communique was cited in People’s Daily, December 24, 1978.

⁹⁵ Vogel, Deng Xiaoping, 247–8.

⁹⁶ Xia, for example, writes, ‘Sino-American normalization might have been achieved in 1974 if China accepted the US proposal’s “reverse liaison office” option, allowing Washington to keep a liaison office in Taiwan while opening an embassy in Beijing’: Xia, “Myth and Reality,” 130, fn71.

⁹⁷ Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, March 2, 1973, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. XVIII, Doc. 18. The essence of Kissinger’s triangular diplomacy was to race Beijing and Moscow for a better relationship with Washington. He assumed that China’s ‘self-interest’ in the face of the Soviet threat would ‘impel it to cooperate with the United States’, while Sino-American rapprochement would make the Soviet Union ‘more malleable’ in arms control negotiations: Kissinger, Diplomacy, 729, 730.

⁹⁸ Fan Zhonghui and Liu Haifeng, Jiangjun, Waijiaojia, Yishujia: Huang Zhen zhuan (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2007), 563.

⁹⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, October 21, 1975, FRUS, 1969–1976, vol. XVIII, Doc. 124.

¹⁰⁰ For example, Kissinger stated to Ford before his China trip in December 1975 that ‘without Congress, we would have the Soviet–Chinese triangle working again. I think we should tell the Chinese I am going to Moscow. The Soviet angle is what keeps the Chinese under control’ (ibid., Doc. 133).

¹⁰¹ “Chiang Ch’ing’s Speech to Foreign Affairs Cadres” (March 1975), Chinese Law and Government 9 (Spring–Summer 1976), 55; Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 88.

¹⁰² Garver, Foreign Relations, 169; Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 61–4.

¹⁰³ Ross, Negotiating Cooperation, 66.

¹⁰⁴ Xia, “Myth or Reality?,” 130.

¹⁰⁵ Fardella, “The Sino-American Normalization,” 576. See also Foot, “Prizes Won,” 115.

¹⁰⁶ Memo, Oksenberg to Brzezinski, August 11, 1978, FRUS, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, Doc. 128.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., Doc. 153. To assist Deng’s political victory, Washington tried to facilitate Sino-American relations not only by delaying normalisation of relations with Vietnam but also by promoting scientific cooperation with Beijing as decided in Presidential Directive 43, http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pres_directive.phtml (accessed April 5, 2016).

¹⁰⁸ Chen Jian, “The Great Transformation: How China Changed in the Long 1970s,” a public lecture delivered at the London School of Economics and Political Science, January 22, 2009, http://www.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=92 (accessed September 21, 2015).