Divide and Rule: Israel’s Tactics Regarding the Jerusalem Question and America’s Response, 1949–1950

Abstract

In 1949–1950, an interesting diplomatic affair took place for which details have not yet being disclosed. The Israelis who were unable to reach an agreement with the Jordanians over Jerusalem, advanced solutions in which the latter will pay the major price. However, the US was not interested in forcing a solution on the Jordanians nor to see them internationally isolated. Preventing such a development was far more important for them than promoting the internationalization plan. Thus US acted to sabotage Israelis maneuvers believing that putting the blame of failure on both sides suit best their interests. Therefore, the belief that the Americans took a passive and neutral stand over the Jerusalem question does not conform to reality. Instead, they were engaged vigorously, although mostly behind the scene, undermining the 1949 resolution.

Notes

¹ For detailed discussions of these negotiations see:

Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers (N.J: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 331–4; Alec Kirkbride, From the Wings (London: Frank Cass, 1976), pp. 4–5, 21–2; Golda Meyrson, My Life (Jerusalem: Steimatzky's Agency, 1975), pp. 176–9; Itamar Rabinovich, The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 43–6; Philip Ribins, A History of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 61–5; Eugen L. Rogan, “Jordan and 1948: the Persistence of an Official History”, in Eugen L. Rogan & Avi Shlaim (eds.), The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 103–24; Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).

² Eugene H. Bovis, The Jerusalem Question, 1917–1968 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971); Yossi Feintuch, US. Policy on Jerusalem (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987); Menahem Kaufman, America's Jerusalem Policy, 1947–1948 (Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1985); Donald Neff, “Jerusalem in US Policy”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, (Autumn 1993), pp. 20–45; Shlomo Slonim, Jerusalem in America's Foreign Policy, 1947–1997 (Boston: Klower Law International, 1998).

³ Some of the details can be find in Slonim, Jerusalem in America's Foreign Policy, pp. 152–62.

⁴ Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, pp. 270. For a significant time the British presumed that the partition solution was impractical and, at any rate, there was little chance that the General Assembly would support it. See: T. G. Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine: Theory and Practice (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 155–7, 167.

⁵ Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine, pp. 168–9.

⁶ Sumner Welles, We Need Not Fail (Boston: Houghton Miffin Company, 1948), p. 60. For explanations of the Soviet position see: Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, pp. 260–2.

⁷ For a detailed survey of the issue see: Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, pp. 279–300.

⁸ In his memoirs, President Truman claimed that despite the heavy pressure exerted by the Zionist lobby, his government did not agree to place pressure on wavering countries in order to force them to vote for the proposal. See: Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1956), pp. 158–9. However, other evidence contradicts this claim, see: Victor Kattan, From Coexistance to Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1891–1949 (London: Pluto Press, 2009), p. 153. For evidence of the extraordinary pressure placed on the government in the last days prior to the vote see: Walter Mills (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 346.

⁹ 100,000 Jews, 65,000 Muslims and 40,000 Christians lived in the area designated for corpus separatum—that is in Jerusalem and Bethlehem. See: Nathan Krystall, “The Fall of the New City: 1947–1950”, in Salim Tamari (ed.), Jerusalem 1948: The Arab Neighbourhoods and their Fate in the War (Jerusalem: Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 1999).

¹⁰ On this issue see: Henry Cattan, Jerusalem (London: Croom Helm, 1981), p. 46; Zaki Shalom, David Ben Gurion, Israel and the Arab World (Brighton and Portland: Sussex University Press, 2002).

¹¹ A comprehensive survey of the 'Hagana' operations in Jerusalem and their effects on the Arab population can be found in: Krystall, “The Fall of the New City”.

¹² It is worth noting that the British also preferred this solution. See: Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, pp. 318, 326; Kirkbride, From the Wings, pp. 11–2.

¹³ See note 1 above.

¹⁴ Regarding the motivations behind Abdullah's actions, see: Kimberly Katz, Jordanian Jerusalem: Holy Places and National Spaces (Tampa: University Press of Florida, 2005), pp. 47–50; Kirkbride, From the Wings, pp. 31–2.

¹⁵ Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life (New York: William Marrow and Company, 1976), pp. 129–30.

¹⁶ Israel and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1956), p. 131.

¹⁷ Abba Eban, An Autobiography (New York: Random House, 1977), p. 141.

¹⁸ Ben Gurion Diary, entry of 16 December 1949, Ben Gurion Archive (BGA).

¹⁹ On this affair see: Uri Bialer, “The Road to the Capital”, Studies on Zionism Vol. 5, No. 2 (1984), pp. 273–96; Zaki Shalom, “Israel’s Struggle to thwart UN Resolutions on the Internationalization of Jerusalem in the 1950s”, Iyunim Bitkumat Yisrael Vol. 3 (1993) pp. 75–97.

²⁰ In his diary, Ben Gurion categorically stated the danger of opposing the UN decision: “In the last three years I have more than once faced bitter and difficult, even fateful, decisions. I don't know if I have ever faced a more difficult decision: to disobey the UN resolution, to oppose the Catholic Church, the Soviets and the Arabs”. See Ben Gurion Diary, entry of 14 December 1949, BGA.

²¹ Ben Gurion Diary, entry of 14 December 1949, BGA. However Ben Gurion was convinced that the implementation of the decision to internationalize Jerusalem would be a disaster for the State of Israel: it would remove 100,000 citizens from the country and increase the pressure on Israel to accept the return of the refugees.

²² On the Israeli interest in a peace agreement with Jordan, see: Rabinovitch, The Road Not Taken, pp. 116–7; Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, pp. 433–4, 513–4.

²³ See Sharett's explanation of this matter: Stenograms of the Knesset’s Committee on Foreign and Security Affairs, Knesset [Kn], 7 March 1950.

²⁴ See: Rabinovitch, The Road Not Taken, pp. 58–9; Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, 449–53.

²⁵ On Israel’s change of position see: Rabinovitch, The Road Not Taken, p. 114.

²⁶ Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, pp. 517–8. Consultation for negotiation with Jordan, 26 November 1949, Foreign Ministry (FM), File 64/2, Israel State Archive (ISA); Ben Gurion diary, 26 November 1949, BGA.

²⁷ Regarding the round of talks between Israel and Jordan conducted between November 1949 and March 1950 see: Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 200–5.

²⁸ Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, pp. 527–30.

²⁹ Rabinovitch, The Road Not Taken, p. 130; Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, p. 534.

³⁰ Chargé in Jordan to the Secretary of State, 25 January 1950, FRUS, Vol. V, pp. 703–4. On this stage of the Jordanian-Israeli negotiations see: Ben Gurion Diary, entries of 25 January 1950; 29 January 1950; 31 January 1950; and 3 February 1950, BGA.

³¹ See: Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, 20 December 1949, FRUS, Vol. VI, pp. 1551–3.

³² Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, pp. 515–6. For an analysis of how the Americans viewed the strategic importance of the Middle East see: George McGhee, Envoy to the Middle East (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), pp. 20–3, 84–6.

³³ See for example: ‘Report by the National Security Council on Provision of a Police Force for Jerusalem,’ 16 November 1948, FRUS, Vol. 5, pp. 1591–4. See also: Slonim, Jerusalem in America's Foreign Policy, pp. 33–5.

³⁴ For the French viewpoint on the issue see: M. Serres à M. Schuman, 29 December 1949, DDF, Vol. 14, tome II, doc. 245, pp. 688–96.

³⁵ Troutman (Geneva) to the Secretary of State, 31 January 1950, 350/1–3050, National Archives and Record Administration (NARA).

³⁶ See the debate on the mandate of the TC: Sixth session of the Trusteeship Council, 14th meeting, 6 February 1950; and16th meeting 8 February 1950.

³⁷ Yediot Aharonot, 6 January 1950.

³⁸ For Moshe Sharett's views on the dangers of a special session of this nature, see: ‘Foreign Ministry Consultations on Jerusalem,’ 6 January 1950, Foreign Ministry (FM), File 2443/5, ISA.

³⁹ Eban to Sharett, 29 December 1949, FM, File 1814/3, ISA.

⁴⁰ In early January, Cardinal Spellman informed Ralph Bunch, a UN mediator, that the UN resolution was no more than a dead letter and that a compromise must be found. See: Ben Gurion Diary, entry of 8 January 1950, BGA.

⁴¹ Ward (Geneva) to the Secretary of State, 7 February 1950, 350/2–750, NARA. Garreau told the press that while the Vatican “had not objected to but neither endorsed the plan”, the Anglican, Greek, and Armenian churches, together with the World Council of Churches, supported it. See: Yediot Aharonot, 26 January 1950.

⁴² Department of State to US Delegation in Geneva, 3 February 1950, 350/1–3150, NARA.

⁴³ See for example: Ben Gurion diary, entry of 16 December 1949, BGA.

⁴⁴ Stenograms of Government Meetings, 3 January 1950, Prime Minister's Office (PMO), ISA, 0002eeb, meeting 19.

⁴⁵ In his diary, Ben Gurion makes clear the value of Jordanian cooperation in fighting internationalization. See: Ben Gurion Diary, entry of 14 Dec 1949, BGA. There were other reasons for Ben-Gurion's stance. He thought that if Israel accepted UN territorial control over any part of ​​Jerusalem it would lead to continuous foreign involvement in Israel's internal affairs, to the point of endangering the country. He also feared that the enclave would be enlarged to include a significant swathe of New Jerusalem. See: Rafael to Eban, Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel (DFPI), Vol V., doc. 27, January 15, 1950, pp. 31–3.

⁴⁶ Eban to Sharett, 5 January 1950, FM, File 1814/3, ISA.

⁴⁷ Eban, Stenograms of Government Meetings, 2 February 1950, PMO, ISA, 0002eeb, meeting 26.

⁴⁸ Fisher to Avner, 1 January 1960, FM, File 175/1, ISA; Elisha to Kumai, 4 January 1950, File 5954/4, ISA.

⁴⁹ For example, Dr. Leo Cohen and Yitzhak Herzog. See: ‘Foreign Ministry consultations concerning Jerusalem,’ 6 January 1960, FM, File 2443/5, ISA.

⁵⁰ Rafael to Eban, DFPI, Vol. V, doc. 27, January 15, 1950, pp. 31–3.

⁵¹ Sharett to Eban, 19 February 1950, DFPI, Vol. V, doc. 101, p. 136.

⁵² Transcript of telephone conversation between Sharett and Eban, 16 February 1950, FM, File 2015/9, ISA.

⁵³ Sharett's words, Stenograms of the Knesset's Committee on Foreign and Security Affairs, 21 February 1950, Knesset [Kn].

⁵⁴ Sharett to Eban, 16 February 1950, FM, File 2015/9, ISA.

⁵⁵ Avner to Fisher, 19 February 1950, FM, File 175/10, ISA.

⁵⁶ See, for example, “State Department document on the strategic importance of Jordan”, Decimal Files 1950–54, box 2652, NARA.

⁵⁷ Some Israeli diplomats suspected that America's opposition to the Garreau plan was driven first and foremost by a wish to protect Abdullah. See: Abel to Sharett, 18 January 1950, FM, File 1814/3, ISA; Eban's remarks at a meeting with the UN delegation, 13 January 1950, FM, File 347/20, ISA; Raphael to Eytan, 31 January 31, File 2015/9, ISA.

⁵⁸ Reports to the Cabinet, Stenograms of Government Meetings, 9 March 1950, PMO, ISA.

⁵⁹ Sixth session of the Trusteeship Council, 18th meeting, 10 February 1950; and 19th meeting, 13 February 1950

⁶⁰ Sixth session of the Trusteeship Council, 40th meeting, 13 March 1950. Eban, An Autobiography, p. 143.

⁶¹ See: Sixth session of the Trusteeship Council, 44th meeting, 16 March 1950; 45th meeting, 16 March 1950; and 46th meeting, 20 March 1950.

⁶² Slonim, Jerusalem in America's Foreign Policy, p. 157.

⁶³ See: Eban to Sharett, 3 March 1950, FM, file 2015/9, ISA; Eban to Elath, 21 March 1950, FM, file 347/20, ISA.

⁶⁴ On this episode see: Rabinovitch, The Road Not Taken, pp. 135–42; Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, pp. 340–9.

⁶⁵ Eban to Sharett, 21 March 1950, FM, File 5954/4, ISA; Sharett's comments at the cabinet meeting, Stenograms of Government Meetings, 29 March 1950, PMO, ISA.

⁶⁶ Headings of the participants' speeches , 11–12 April 1950, FM, File 2443/7, ISA.

⁶⁷ Eban to Sharett, 14 April 1950, FM, File 1814/4, ISA.

⁶⁸ Prime Minister's Secretary to the Foreign Office, 17 April 1950,,FM, File 2443/7, ISA. On the resistance within the Foreign Ministry, see: Kohn to Eytan, 9 May 1950, FM, File 2443/7, ISA.

⁶⁹ See: Ben Gurion diary, entry of 30 May 1950, BGA.

⁷⁰ Eban to Garreau, DFPI, Vol. V, doc. 257, May 26, 1950, pp. 351–2.

⁷¹ According to Eban’s testimony some years later: “The US supported the principle of the Israeli plan. At every stage of its formulation and elaboration, I was encouraged by the State Department to put it forward and assured of American support”. See: ISA, FM, file 116/9, August 2, 1953, memorandum (Eban).

⁷² On internal Jordanian politics see: Robert B. Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

⁷³ Secretary of State, 19 April 1950, FRUS, Vol. V, pp. 862–3, Memorandum of Conversation.

⁷⁴ Position Paper prepared by the Department of State, 19 May 1950, FRUS, Vol. V, p. 902.

⁷⁵ New York Times, “The Holy Places”, 30 May 1950; “Jerusalem and the UN”, Ibid.,15 June 1950; The Washington Post, “Jerusalem”, May 30, 1950.

⁷⁶ Eban to Eytan, 21 April 1950, FM, 2443/7, ISA.

⁷⁷ Eban to Sharett, 18 May 1950, FM, File 1814/4, ISA.

⁷⁸ Eban to Eytan, 1 June 1950,,FM, File 1814/4, ISA.

⁷⁹ Webb to the US Delegation in Geneva, 24 May 1950, 350/5–1950, NARA.

⁸⁰ Israel responded quickly and positively to his proposal and promptly invited him to visit Israel. See Ginosar to Sharett, 16 April 1950, FM, File 2443/7, ISA; Avner to Fisher, 20 April 1950, FM, File 175/10, ISA.

⁸¹ Transcript of Garreau's speech, 2 June 1950, FM, File 1814/4, ISA; See also: McDonald, My Mission in Israel, p. 210.

⁸² See: Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Rosaz, 5 June 1950, 784A.00/6–550, NARA.

⁸³ Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Rifai, 5 June 1950, 784A.00/6–550, NARA. In an effort to persuade the Netherlands not to sponsor the Dutch-Swedish proposal of the previous year once again in the upcoming GA session, the Department of State revealed that: “We had made informal suggestions to Jordan to the effect that it would be most helpful from Jordan’s point of view if that country could come forward with some suggestions at the next session of the General Assembly”. See: Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Quarles van Ufford, 27 July 1950, 784A.00/7–2750, NARA.

⁸⁴ Letter from Mr. Furlong (Head of F.O. Eastern Department) to Mr. Burrows (Counsellor at H.M. Embassy in Washington), 29 March 1950, DBPO, series 2, Vol. 2, pp. 29–32.

⁸⁵ The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 6 June 1950, 350/6–550, NARA; Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State, 8 June 1950, 350/6–850, NARA.

⁸⁶ Keren to Eban, 7 June 1950, FM, File 347/20, ISA.

⁸⁷ Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Maffitt, Advisor to the United States Mission at the UN, 13 June 1950, FRUS, Vol. V, pp. 927–8.

⁸⁸ See: Sharett's comments at the cabinet meeting, Stenograms of Government Meetings, 14 September 1950, PMO, ISA.

⁸⁹ Eban to Ross, 23 June 1950, FM, File 2443/8, ISA.

⁹⁰ Position Paper by the Department of State, 10 October 1950, FRUS, Vol. V, p. 1030.

⁹¹ Eban to Eytan, 25 October 1950, FM, File 1814/4, ISA.