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ABSTRACT
The article analyses the international dynamics that affected the Great Lakes Region between 1975 and 1985. In particular, it examines the interactions, convergences, and tensions between France and the United States in Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire.
The evolution of the bipolar confrontation and the leadership changes in both France and the US in this decade enable us to detect continuity and discontinuity in the African policies and Cold War visions of the two Western powers, analysing the underexplored Franco-American alliance in the Region and on the continent from an innovative perspective. The analysis is based on primary sources.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Like all categories, the terms ‘moderate’ and ‘progressive’ suffer from over-simplification, but despite these limitations, they enable us to offer a succint definition of the international orientation of the two countries. Broadly speaking, ‘progressive’ states (like Burundi) maintained relevant military connections with the USSR and its allies and were reluctant to support Western stances in international fora, whereas ‘moderate’ states were more ‘Western-oriented.’ For an overview of ‘moderate’ versus ‘progressive’ states, see Arrigo Pallotti and Mario Zamponi, L’Africa sub-sahariana nella politica internazionale (Milan: Mondadori, 2010), 35–8.
2 See, for example, the research by Götz Bechtolsheimer and Nathaniel K. Powell.
3 The similar geographic and socio-demographic composition and economic organisation of Burundi and Rwanda has led scholars to define them as ‘twins.’ The distinct historical developments and the opposite ethnocracies established in Bujumbura and Kigali after independence (a Tutsi-led and a Hutu-led regime, respectively), however, make them ‘false twins.’
4 The threat by the Minister of Cooperation, Jean Pierre Cot, to bring the TV project in the country to a halt was a good example, although the project was ultimately funded. ‘Transcript of the Joint Franco-Burundian Commission,’ 17 May 1984, 134PO/1/94 MAE-DAM, Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (hereinafter CADN).
5 The Ministry of Cooperation was established in 1961 and from Pompidou’s Presidency it started to enlarge its sphere of competence beyond the former French colonies on the African continent.
6 After the genocide of 1972, when the Tutsi rulers tried to eliminate the Hutu intelligentia, Belgium withdrew its military cooperation and France remained its only Western interlocutor.
7 The overlap of a ‘demographic majority’ (the Hutu represented around 85% of the population) and a ‘political majority’ is also present in Belgian and American documents of the time. See, for example, Dossier no. 17.002, Film no. P2811, Ruelle (Belgian Ambassador to Burundi) – Van Elslande (Minister of Foreign Affairs), ‘Final Mission Report,’ 23 February 1977, Archives des Affaires Étrangères, Commerce Extérieur et Coopération au Développement du Royaume de la Belgique (hereinafter AECCD), Bruxelles. Some French authorities, however, still confuse the two concepts even in recent times. Guy Penne, Mémoires d’Afrique (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 205.
8 Although Rwanda needed basic military equipment, the French gave priority to striking gifts, such as helicopters and airplanes.
9 Franco-Rwandan military cooperation was based on a 1975 Technical Assistance Agreement. It also included limited training of military personnel (between 10 and 20) in France. French Embassy in Kigali, Mission of Military Assistance, ‘Military Assistance to Rwanda,’ 15 November 1984, 318PO/A/44, CADN. For an overview of early French military cooperation with the Habyarimana regime, see Gabriel Périès and David Servenay, Une guerre noire (Paris: La Découverte, 2007).
10 Franco-Burundian military cooperation was based on a 1969 Agreement for the Air Force, which was extended to the ground forces in 1974. It also included limited training of military personnel (between 20 and 30) in France. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Service of Cooperation and Development, General Gilard (Military Mission of Cooperation) ‘French Military Cooperation with Burundi,’ 14 September 1982, 134PO/1/105, CADN.
11 Tel. 1056 US Embassy Kigali – State, 7 May 1979, NARA Online. https://aad.archives.gov/aad/ (accessed June 2017).
12 Dossier no. 17.800, Film no. P2994, Tel. 281 Van Coppenolle (Belgian Embassy in Bujumbura) – Nothomb (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 10 February 1981, AECCD. Washington was less annoyed by the French policy, but it seemed irritated.
13 The so called pré carré africain is made up of the 16 French ex-colonies on the continent.
14 French Embassy in Kigali, ‘Economic Relations with France,’ November 1984, 134PO/1/101, CADN.
15 Concerning Belgian resitance, see, for instance, French Embassy in Kigali, ‘Belgium and Rwanda: Political Relations,’ May 1979, 318PO/A/43, CADN; Cultural resistance led Burundi and Rwanda to maintain a certain distance from Paris. Interview, Johan Swinnen, Attaché at the Belgian Embassy in Bujumbura from 1978 to 1982, Ambassador to Rwanda from 1990 to 1994, Brussels, 23 June 2015.
16 The literature on the role of ‘la Francophonie’ in French foreign policy is vast. See, for example, Xavier Deniau, La Francophonie (Paris: Presse Universitaire de France, 2003); Michel Guillou and Arnaud Littardi, La francophonie s’eveille (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1988); Pierre Fabien Nkot and Joseph Paré, La francophonie en Afrique subsaharienne (Quebec: CIDEF/AFI, 2001); and Michel Tetu, La francophonie: histoire, problématiques et perspectives (Montreal: Guerin Universitaire, 1992).
17 Jacques Adda and Marie-Claude Smouts, La France face au sud: le miroir brisé (Paris: Kartala, 1989), 71.
18 Larzul (Military Advisor at the French Embassy in Kinshasa) – Chief of Staff no. 339/zai/fa/cd, 7 November 1979, GR12S618, Service Historique de la Defense (hereinafter SHD), Vincennes.
19 For further detail on Franco-Burundian and Franco-Rwandan relations in this period, see Gaia Lott, ‘On the Margins of the Françafrique: Franco-Burundian and Franco-Rwandan Bonds from an Historical Perspective,’ African Affairs 117, no. 468 (2018): 347–69.
20 Ministry of Defense, ‘Military Defense of Burundi,’ 14 September 1982, 134PO/1/105, CADN.
21 In 1967, the Rwandan President Kaybanda refused the establishment of a US military base in Bugesera. André Guichaoua, ‘Les “nouvelles’ politiques africaines de la France et des États-Unis vis-à-vis de l’Afrique centrale et orientale’ (Intervention at the International Conference ‘L’Afrique, les États-Unis et la France,’ Bordeaux, 22–24 May 1997). Text given by Professor Guichaoua to the author.
22 Breton (French Embassy in Kigali) – Cheysson (Minister of Foreign Relations), ‘Project for an American Air Base in Rwanda,’ 10 August 1983, 347QO/15, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (hereinafter AMAE), La Courneuve.
23 Tel. 695 Mark (US Ambassador to Burundi) – State 6 November 1974, NARA Online.
24 Bernard (French Ambassador to Burundi) – Sauvagnargues (Minister of Foreign Affairs) ‘Questionnaire USSR-Africa,’ 7 July 1976, 134PO/1/173, CADN.
25 Breton – Cheysson ‘USSR – Rwanda,’ 14 October 1983, 347QO/27, AMAE.
26 Tel. 920, Crigler (US Ambassador to Rwanda) – State 18 April 1979, NARA Online.
27 Tel. no. 153 Dejumne (French Embassy in Bujumbura) – MAE-DAM, 21 June 1984, 134PO/1/66, CADN. The French, however, described the Burundian authorities as ‘ill-at-ease’ on this occasion. Owing to the same fears, the Burundian authorities refused to allow the Peace Corps to be dispatched to their country.
28 Tel. 343 Mark – State 31 March 1977, NARA Online.
29 ‘Note for the Minister of Foreign Affairs,’ 20 July 1972, AG/5(F)/2179, Archives Nationales de France (hereinafter ANF).
30 Moose (African Bureau, State) – the Secretary ‘Briefing Memo,’ 23 January 1978, RG59-UD12D-14-60, National Archives and Records Administration (hereinafter NARA), College Park, MD.
31 French support for the Katangan mercenaries in the 1960s and its relations inside the African and Malagasy Union (OCAM) were the most controversial points. de la Boissière (French Ambassador to Rwanda) – Schumann (Minister of Foreign Affairs ‘Final Mission Report,’ 10 April 1972), AG/5(F)/2189, ANF.
32 The two Shaba crises resulted from the attack of the Front National pour la Libération du Congo (FNLC), a group of Katangan rebels, who crossed the border into Shaba from Angola. In the first Shaba operation (April 1977), Paris airlifted around 1,300 Moroccan troops to Zaire to support President Mobutu. In the second operation (May 1978), France intervened directly in the country. For more information on the two Shaba crises and French involvement, see Nathaniel Powell, ‘The “Cuba of the West”? France’s Cold War in Zaïre, 1977–1978,’ Journal of Cold War Studies 18, no. 2 (2016): 64–96.
33 Ross (French Ambassador to Zaire) – de Guiringaud (Minister of Foreign Affairs) no. 2/DAM, 3 January 1978, 322PO/1/13, CADN.
34 The move of the location of the 1981 Franco-African summit from Kinshasa to Paris, the fact that President Mitterrand did not visit the country in 1982, and certain statements by the Minister of Cooperation Cot and the French Socialist Party upset President Mobutu particularly. Kientz (French Embassy in Kinshasa) – Cheysson no. 139/DAM, 6 March 1982, 122PO/D/175, CADN.
35 President Mobutu asked for stronger French engagement in Chad and was very upset by his exclusion from Franco-Libyan negotiations in 1983–1984. Incoming FOIAs Collection, BOX 8 Tel. 286868 State – American Embassy Kinshasa September 1984, National Security Archives (hereinafter ‘NSA’), Washington, DC.
36 The move of the location of the 1981 Franco-African summit from Kinshasa to Paris, the fact that President Mitterrand did not visit the country in 1982, and certain statements by the Minister of Cooperation Cot and the French Socialist Party upset President Mobutu particularly. Kientz (French Embassy in Kinshasa) – Cheysson no. 139/DAM, 6 March 1982, 122PO/D/175, CADN; President Mobutu asked for stronger French engagement in Chad and was very upset by his exclusion from Franco-Libyan negotiations in 1983–1984. Incoming FOIAs Collection, BOX 8 Tel. 286868 State – American Embassy Kinshasa September 1984, National Security Archives (hereinafter ‘NSA’), Washington, DC.
37 Airgram A-45 Cutler (US Ambassador to Zaire) – State 23 April 1979, RG59-63, NARA. The most outstanding examples of spectacular self-serving French cooperation in this period were the ‘Voix du Zaire’ Broadcasting Complex, the World Trade Skyscraper, the satellite communications network, and the M’Banza N’Gungu Military School.
38 CIA Directorate of Intelligence ‘Mobutu’s Challenges Ahead,’ 18 October 1985, CREST, French military assistance was based on a Technical Assistance Treaty signed in May 1974, and also included limited training of military personnel (around 30) in France.
39 Belgian political parties were divided between those that wished to maintain a special relationship with the country (the Christelijke Volkspartij [CVP] and the Francophone liberals) and those that pushed for normalisation (the Flemish faction of the Socialist Party). For further detail on the evolution of Belgo-Zairian relations, see Gauthier De Villers, De Mobutu à Mobutu: trente ans de relations Belgique-Zaire (Brussels: De Boeck, 1995).
40 Pile et face: Bilan de la coopération belgo-zaïroise (Brussels: CNCD, 1989), 123.
41 Thabault (French Ambassador to Zaire) – Poncet (Minister of Foreign Affairs), no. 419/DAM.3, 17 August 1979, 322PO/1/3 CADN. The debt issue became the core of Zairian external relations in the 1980s: France’s strong position in this field contributed to its political leverage in the country.
42 Tel. 1314 Hartman (US Ambassador to France) – State 12 January 1979, NARA Online.
43 Airgram A-45 Cutler – State 23 April 1979, RG59-63, NARA.
44 Tel. 32858 Rush (US Ambassador to France) – State 16 December 1975, NARA Online.
45 See, for example, Epervier (French Ambassador to Zaire) – Dumas no. 682/DAM 23 December 1986, 2210INVA/614, AMAE.
46 Tel. 526-28 Huré (French Ambassador to Belgium) – MAE-DAM, 23 May 1979, 122PO/D/177, CADN.
47 Tel. 683-686 Huré – MAE, 3 July 1978, 357QONT/38, AMAE.
48 The fact that issues relating to Burundi and Rwanda (but not to Zaire) were basically managed by bureau staff on a business-as-usual basis (and rarely by the Secretary of State or the Bureau of Political Affairs) contributed to this continuity.
49 Schaufele – Acting Secretary, ‘Dealing with Zaire’s Financial Problems,’ 10 June 1976, RG59-455-92C, NARA.
50 Kissinger assigned responsibility for the limited US engagement to the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and Congress. Memo of conversation between Kissinger and Mobutu in Kinshasa, 30 April 1976, NSA. Despite these constraints, the US and Belgium were Kinshasa’s most important military partners in the mid-1970s.
51 A personal misunderstanding with the US Ambassador also played a role in the allegations. Reid (UK Embassy in Kinshasa) – Southworth (EAD, FCO), 24 June 1975, FCO 31/1863, NA.
52 The US only sent US$15 million worth of non-lethal equipment, did not raise the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to the country, and continued to stress that America needed to avoid being in the front line of any international effort, thereby leaving the French in the forefront. Lake (Political Bureau, state) – the Secretary ‘Zaire Policy,’ 5 April 1977, RG59-P9-17, NARA.
53 Moose – Newsom ‘Briefing memo’ 15 September 1978, RG59-94, NARA.
54 In 1978, Carter stated his determination as President to maintain it at this level, bypassing a Congressional block. Bazin (French Embassy in Kinshasa) – MAE no. 14/DA/DAM, 2 April 1979, 322PO/1/10, CADN.
55 If one considers the FMS alone, it dropped to US$8 and US$6 million respectively in 1979 and 1980. Thabault – Poncet 89/DAM.3, 19 February 1981, 322PO/1/5, CADN.
56 Several studies have shown how this reading of Carter’s foreign policy should be overcome. As far as the African continent is concerned, see Nancy Mitchell, Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2016).
57 Schaufele – Secretary of State ‘US Assistance to Zaire,’ 6 April 1977, RG59-UD-12D19-65, NARA. Schaufele was generally critical of the limited support to Zaire, but his positions on mercenaries were also repeated in Anthony Lake’s documents.
58 See, for example, Tel. 52222 Vance – US Embassy in Paris, 3 March 1979, NARA Online.
59 Tel. 81725 Vance – US Embassy in Canberra, 12 April 1977, NARA Online. These reactions were mostly tied to the American response to the first Shaba operation, but they were also valid for Carter’s prudent military policy on the continent.
60 Schaufele – Secretary of State ‘Sitrep Zaire,’ 12 April 1977, RG59-UD-12D-1-79, NARA. In 1981, President Mobutu was still telling President Reagan that during the Carter years Zaire ‘had suffered greatly in moral terms.’ Mobutu was certainly trying to flatter the new President, but his annoyance towards the previous administration was sincere. Memorandum of Conversation Mobutu – Reagan, Washington, DC, 1 December 1981, NSA.
61 PREM 19/1407, Tel. 3701 Henderson (UK Ambassador to the US) – FCO 7 December 1981, The National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey.
62 With regard to military aid alone, Congress only approved US$7 of the US$12 million proposed by the Department of State in 1982 and US$4 of the $US16 million in 1983. In 1982, the disastrous visit to Zaire by a delegation led by Senator Howard Wolpe resulted in grave tensions between the two States. Kientz – Cheysson n.232/DAM.3, 30 April 1982, 322PO/1/122 CADN.
63 Dossier 18.893/XIII Belgian Embassy in Kinshasa ‘Belgian-Zairian Relations in 1983,’ AECCD.
64 Tel. 5029 Constable (US Embassy Dar es Salaam) – State 30 March 1984, NSA.
65 Kientz – Dumas n.107/DAM, 10 February 1985, 322PO/1/122, CADN.
66 By ‘Cold War dynamics’ the article refers to a narrow concept of ‘Cold War’: the American and Soviet political, economic, and military presence (and the one of their allies) on the continent and the repercussions of this presence on the world politics. In a broader sense, as opposition of political and economic models, cold war dynamics evidently permeated the Great Lakes and the continent more extensively.
67 Picquet (French Ambassador to Rwanda) – MAE-DAM ‘Rwanda-USSR,’ 13 July 1976, 318PO/A/35. CADN.
68 See, for example, Bernard – Secretary of State for Cooperation 195/SCO 11 September 1973, 134PO/1/169 CADN.
69 Mark – State ‘Annual US Policy Assessment for Burundi,’ 11 February 1976, RG59-455-47D, NARA.
70 Tel. 282 Moreau – de Guiringaud 14 December 1976, 315QONT/8, AMAE.
71 The USSR’s allies in Burundi were principally Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Cuba. In this period, Pyongyang also gained temporary space in the country, thanks especially to the actions of UPRONA’s General Secretary Yanda. Of these countries, however, only the USSR and Czechoslovakia had consistent military relations with Burundi. Tel. 631 Swinnen (Belgian Embassy to Burundi) – Simonet (Minister of Foreign Affairs), 5 April 1979, Dossier no. 17.514, Film no. P2922, AECCD. China’s influence over Burundi also increased, but unlike at the beginning of the 1970s, its actions were not viewed as a problem by the Western allies. Moreau – MAE-DAM, ‘Relations with China and North Korea,’ 22 March 1979, 318PO/A/61, CADN.
72 Airgram no. A-41 Mark – State, 26 November 1976, RG59-455-186A, NARA.
73 Written interview with Emile Mworoha, 23 September 2015.
74 Moreau (French Ambassador to Burundi) – MAE-DAM no. 15 DA/DAM, 5 May 1978, 134PO/1/173, CADN. According to the French, as in most of the other ‘progressive’ states, it was Moscow’s limited generosity and some ideological resistance that prevented stronger Soviet-Burundian relations.
75 Tel. 177707 Hartman – State, 4 June 1978, NARA Online. By the end of 1976, France established a coordination between its Secret Services and the Iranian, Saudi, Moroccan, and Egyptian ones to monitor the Soviet activities on the continent, the Safari Club. Roger Faligot and Pascal Krop, La piscine (Paris: Seuil, 1985), 256.
76 Henderson – Owen (FCO) no. 177/78 23 June 1978, FCO 45/2204, NA.
77 Tel. 275-284 Moreau – MAE-DAM, 6 July 1978, 134PO/1/173, CADN.
78 Tel. 83987 Cooper (State) – Secretary, 1 April 1978, NARA Online. Western diplomats agreed that Burundian rearmament was a result of internal concerns, and not regional ambitions.
79 Tel. 1053 Crigler – State 30 June 1978, NARA Online.
80 Rey-Coquais – Dumas, 10 December 1985, 134PO/1/173, CADN.
81 Libyan influence had been growing since the mid-1970s, but at the beginning of the 1980s Tripoli’s regional involvement (in Uganda, the Central African Republic, and Congo) made it particularly worrying. Libya could not be compared with the USSR, but it shared come common aims with Moscow on the continent. ‘Libyan strategies in Africa,’ 27–29 January 1988, 318PO/A/48 MAE-DAM, CADN.
82 ‘Libya and Rwanda’ 1987, 318PO/A/11 MAE-DAM, CADN.
83 Rey-Coquais – Cheysson no. 79/DAM 14 February 1983, 134PO/1/155, CADN.
84 Interview René Lemarchand, Historian of the Great Lakes Region, International Symposium on Burundi, 15 October 2015.
85 The literature on the limited role of the African continent in US foreign policy is extensive. See, for example, the works of Cristopher Clapham, Cristopher Coker, Henri F. Jackson, Marc Aicardi de Saint Paul, Zaiki Laidi, Munene G. Macharia, Pieter Schraeder, Stephen Smith, and Jennifer Whitaker.
86 Journiac indirectly confirmed these allegations in 1978, stating that it was not in the Western interest to force Mobutu to stop supporting UNITA. Tel. 11490 Brewster (US Embassy in London) – State 20 July 1978, NARA Online.
87 Tel. 21097 Gammon (US Embassy in Paris) – State 14 August 1975, NARA Online.
88 Zairian and US cooperation in the Angolan civil war is expressly referenced in American documents of the time; see, for example, NSC Working Group on Angola, 20 February 1976, NSA. For a detailed analysis of these dynamics, see Odd. A. Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies (New York: Norton & Company, 1984).
89 FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, Rockwell (Chief of the U.S. Military Technical Advisory Team) – Mulcahy (Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs) ‘Memo,’ 7 March 1975.
90 The ideological division between Vance and Brzezinski should not be overestimated. In the case of Zaire, for example, Brezinski seemed to share the regionalist approach. NSC ‘Memo for the Secretary of State,’ 8 June 1978, NSA.
91 See, for example, Prime Minister, SGDN no. 190-191/CER/B/CD 13 June 1977 for internal developments (confirmed by the Ambassadors’ dispatches), SHD.
92 Mansfield – James 10 May 1977 and The President’s News Conference 24 March 1977, FCO 31/2074, NA. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=7229&st=carter&st1= (accessed August 28, 2018).
93 Between 1977 and 1982, the number of French military advisors increased by 40% and French direct aid grew from 37 million Francs in 1970 to 294 million Francs in 1978 (military interventions played a significant role in this growth). ‘Military Cooperation’ 1979, AG/5(3)/1191 MAE-DAM, ANF.
94 Lake – the Secretary ‘France between the Superpowers,’ 7 August 1978, RG59-P9-4, NARA. This is an interesting reversal of the traditional French approach to the bilateral confrontation: detente had always been viewed as the best opportunity for France to pursue its own independent policy. To deepen French interpretations and strategies in the Cold War, see Maurice Vaïsse, La Puissance ou l’influence. La politique étrangère de la France depuis 1958 (Paris: Fayard, 2009).
95 The literature on the role of Africa in French foreign policy is extensive. See, for example, the works of Jean François Bayart, Pierre Biarnes, Daniel Bourmaud, Tony Chafer, John Chipman, Samy Cohen, Jean Daniel, and Jean François Médard.
96 Ross – Poncet no. 153/DAM.3, 17 March 1979, 322PO/1/14, CADN.
97 Tanzania and Nigeria proved particularly critical, while the Franco-African summit of Dakar stated its approval of French policy. French Embassy in Lagos – MAE no. 755/DA/DAM 17 July 1978, 1089INVA/620, AMAE.
98 Since Mobutu was perceived as an American puppet, the Gaullist Party accused Giscard of betraying the traditional independence of the French African policy by associating it with the American Agenda. Tel. 476 Henderson – FCO, 9 June 1978, FCO 33/3459, NA.
99 Tel. 141376 Vance – USdel UN New York, 5 June 1978, NARA Online.
100 US Department of State ‘Background Paper,’ 2 June 1978, NSA.
101 Tel. 21494 Hartman – State, 4 July 1978, NARA Online.
102 Director of Central Intelligence, Stansfield Turner (Admiral, US Navy) NI M 77-006 17, March 1977, CREST.
103 Lake – the Secretary ‘African Talking Points (Gromyko Meeting),’ 23 May 1978, RG59-P9-3, NARA. President Carter’s declaration on Cuban involvement derived from certain CIA reports, the reliability of which was later questioned. Gleijeses’s research demonstrated Havana’s non-involvement.
104 Moose – the Secretary ‘NSC Meeting on Africa,’ 5 October 1978, RG59-P9-4, NARA.
105 Tel. 369 Thabault – French Embassy in Kinshasa, 25 November 1981, 122PO/D/175, CADN.
106 4 December 1981, 122PO/D/175 MAE-DAM no. 540/DAM.3, CADN.
107 According to the US ‘Kaddafi is Determined to Topple President Mobutu,’ NSC ‘Background paper,’ 6 October 1986, NSA.
108 The Reagan Administration started giving growing political and military support to UNITA, and Zaire became newly strategic for conveying American aid to Savimbi (the Kamina station played a crucial role in this sense). Tel. 270, French Military Mission in Kinshasa – Ministry of Defense, 25 October 1985, 2210INVA/607, AMAE.
109 Even if France had serious friction with Libya on the continent, the Chad war is emblematic in this sense, and the French never used the harsh tone of the Reagan’s administration against Qaddafi. See, for example, Tel. 159-1599 Cabouat (French Ambassador to Libya) – MAE, 2 November 1977, 1089INVA/633, AMAE.
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Gaia Lott
Gaia Lott holds a PhD in History of International Relations from the University of Florence (2016). She became a postdoctoral research fellow at the Fondazione Luigi Einaudi (Torino) and a visiting fellow at the Wilson Center (Washington, DC).
Her research interests include History of International Relations, History of Development, and African history. She is particularly interested in the international dynamics affecting the Great Lakes Region of Africa (specifically Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire) during the Cold War period. She has research experience in the Belgian, French, British, and American archives and has conducted several interviews with academics and politicians. She has presented her research in numerous international conferences and published articles in international journals such as African Affairs, Revue Internationale d’etude de developpement, and Afriche e Orienti. Dr Lott has also served as a teaching assistant at the University of Florence for the BA and MA course in African History. Her contacts are: [email protected]; [email protected]; https://www.linkedin.com/in/gaia-lott-5353b4118/?originalSubdomain=it