Internationalising the intelligence history of the Prague Spring

ABSTRACT

This article examines how changing collaborations between the Czechoslovakian, Soviet, and East German intelligence services during the 1960s formed the intelligence context of responses to the Prague Spring of 1968. The author uses international history to locate the debates over the uprising among the so-called Warsaw Five throughout 1968 in much longer interplay between local and regional drives for securitisation, centred on intelligence collaborations. This leads us to a reconsideration of the centrality of intelligence collaboration in responses to the crisis and the extent to which actors beyond the borders of Czechoslovakia conditioned these responses.

KEYWORDS:

• StB
• KGB
• Stasi
• Prague Spring
• international history
• intelligence history

Acknowledgments

Thanks must go to the Stasi Records Agency (BStU), Berlin, and the State Security Archive (ABSCR), Prague, for providing me with access to the relevant source materials. Additionally, the support and advice of Professor Glenda Sluga of the Laureate Program for International History at the University of Sydney was invaluable in developing the final manuscript.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ Mark Kramer, “The Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion in Historical Perspective,” in The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, ed. Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner and Peter Ruggenthaler (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010), 53.

² The 20–21 August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia involved a coalition of military units from Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Soviet Union. However, the action was spearheaded and choreographed by Soviet units and for ease of reading is referred to throughout this paper as a ‘Soviet military intervention’. See: Mark Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine,” in 1968: The World Transformed, ed. Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert and Detlef Junker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 155.

³ Helpful discussions of the Slánský Affair can be found in: Jan Gerber, Ein Prozess in Prag: Das Volk gegen Rudolf Slánský und Genossen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, 2016); Jaroslav Vorel, Alena Šimánková and Lukáš Babka, Československá justice v letech 1948–1953 v dokumentech (Prague: Úřad dokumentace a vyšetřování zločinů komunismu PČR, 2003), 290–3; Karel Kaplan, Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, trans. Karel Kovanda (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1990); and Igor Lukes, “Rudolf Slánský: His Trials and Trial,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper 50 (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2006).

⁴ Pavel Záček, “Czechoslovak and Soviet State Security Against The West Before 1968” [Conference Paper] (presented at the Contours of Legitimacy in Central Europe: New Approaches in Graduate Studies conference, St Antony’s College, Oxford, UK, 25 May 2002), 1.

⁵ Philip Muehlenbeck, Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945–1968 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 14.

⁶ Muehlenbeck, Czechoslovakia in Africa, 14.

⁷ Záček, Czechoslovak and Soviet State Security, 3–4.

⁸ Ibid., 2.

⁹ Světlana Ptáčníková, “Aktivity NKVD/KGB a její spolupráce s tajnými službami střední a východní Evropy 1945–1989, II” [conference paper] (Institute of National Memory, Prague, 19–21 November 2008), 19–20.

¹⁰ Záček, Czechoslovak and Soviet State Security, 4.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ The Prague Spring was a period of social and political unrest in Czechoslovakia caused by the Dubček government’s reforms and the Soviet response to those reforms. See: Jaromír Navrátil, ed., The Prague Spring, 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998).

¹⁴ Kieran Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics 1968–1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 219.

¹⁵ Mike Dennis, The Stasi: Myth and Reality (London: Routledge, 2014), 30.

¹⁶ All material sourced from the Stasi Records Agency (BStU) is cited in accordance with the Citation Form of Records standards, https://www.bstu.de/en/archives/inventory-information/#c5858. Similarly, material sourced from the State Security Archive (ABSCR) is cited according to collection, with further details, https://www.abscr.cz/en/guide-to-the-collections/ both sites accessed 15 April 2019.

¹⁷ MfS, Allg. S, Nr. 110/55 – A145, 19 June 1954, 5–6, BStU, Berlin.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Gieseke, Die Stasi, 209–53.

²⁰ MfS, Allg. S, Nr. 110/55 – A145, 19 June 1954, 9–10, BStU.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Jordan Baev and Konstadin Grozev, “Bulgaria,” in A Handbook of the Communist Security Apparatus in East Central Europe, 1944–1989, ed. Krzysztof Persak and Lukesz Kamiński (Warsaw: Institute of National Remembrance, 2005), 49–50; and Gieseke, Die Stasi, 209–53.

²⁵ Lubomír Štrougal, Směrnice pro agenturně operativní práci státní bezpečnosti – vydání, 30 June 1962, Archiv Bezpecnostnich Slozek, Prague, 8–11.

²⁶ Holger Kulick, “Stasi-Akten aus und über Prag 1968,” in Dossier Prag 1968 (Berlin: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2018), 52–53; and Christian Domnitz, Kooperation und Kontrolle: Die Arbeit der Stasi-Operativgruppen im sozialistischen Ausland (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, 2016), 144.

²⁷ MfS, Abteilung X, Nr. 2441, 10 April 1967, 45, BStU.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ MfS, Abteilung X, Nr. 2441, November 1967, 113, BStU.

³¹ Ibid, 111.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ In 1967 differences emerged in the policies of the West German CDU/CSU and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) (the ‘grand coalition’) towards East Germany; the former rejected any policy that diplomatically recognised East Germany and the latter sought negotiations over recognition. See: Geoffrey Pridham, Christian Democracy in Western Germany: The CDU/CSU in Government and Opposition, 1945–1976 (London: Routledge, 2015), 175.

³⁵ MfS, Abteilung X, Nr. 2441, November 1967, 111, BStU.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Markus Wolf and Anne McElvoy, ed., Man Without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster (New York: Public Affairs, 1997), 47; and Werner Großmann and Wolfgang Schwanitz, eds., Fragen an das MfS: Auskünkfte über eine Behörde (Berlin: Das Neue Berlin Verlagsgesellschaft GmbH, 2010), 236–7.

³⁹ See n. 35.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² MfS, Abteilung X, Nr. 2441, November 1967, 112, BStU.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ The ‘General Sakharovsky’ referenced in the text is likely to be Soviet General Aleksandr Sakharovsky, head of the KGB First Chief Directorate. See: MfS, Abteilung X, Nr. 2441, November 1967, 112, BStU.

⁴⁷ Josef Houska, Současná problémová analýza čs. rozvědky (I. varianta), 16 April 1968, 42, Archiv Bezpecnostnich Slozek, Prague.

⁴⁸ Houska, Současná problémová analýza čs. rozvědky (I. varianta), 40–3; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (London: Basic Books, 1999), 254; and Jefferson Adams, Strategic Intelligence in the Cold War and Beyond (London: Routledge, 2015), 47.

⁴⁹ In December 1964 Romania expelled Soviet advisors from its intelligence apparatus in response to Soviet insistence on setting Bucharest’s intelligence-gathering priorities. East Germany and Czechoslovakia attempted to follow suit but encountered significant resistance to the proposal. See: Dennis Deletant, Ceausescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965–1989 (London: Routledge, 2017), 54–5.

⁵⁰ John Schmeidel, Stasi: Shield and Sword of the Party (London: Routledge, 2008), 114.

⁵¹ MfS, Abteilung X, Nr. 2441, November 1967, 163, BStU.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 163.

⁵⁵ Domnitz, Kooperation und Kontrolle, 178.

⁵⁶ Guidelines for ‘best practice’ information security were developed by the Stasi throughout the 1970s and are exemplified by two key agreements signed by the Stasi and the KGB: MfS, ZAIG, Nr. 13730, 6 December 1973, BStU, and MfS, BdL/Dok, Nr. 1862, 29 March 1978, BStU. See also: Josef Pavel, Prominutí výkonu kázeňských trestů příslušníkům SNB a SNV, 12 May 1968, 1–2, Archiv Bezpecnostnich Slozek, Prague; and Josef Pavel, Zrušení některých nápravně výchovných ústavů, 21 June 1968, Archiv Bezpecnostnich Slozek, Prague, 1–2.

⁵⁷ The theory of intelligence failure and contagion is beyond the scope of this work. For detailed analyses see: James Wirtz, Understanding Intelligence Failure: Warning, Response, Deterrence (London: Routledge, 2017); and Ofira Seliktar, Politics, Paradigms and Intelligence Failures: Why So Few Predicted the Collapse of the Soviet Union (London: Routledge, 2004).

⁵⁸ For additional references see subsequent footnotes. See: Czerwinski and Jaroslaw, eds., The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia; and Navrátil, ed., The Prague Spring, 1968.

⁵⁹ It is challenging to encapsulate the politics of Antonín Novotný in a single adjective. Novotný was arguably an ardent Stalinist throughout the early 1950s but, whether for ideological or pragmatic reasons, tempered his approach to political opposition following Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin in 1956. Nevertheless, Novotný pursued a characteristically authoritarian domestic agenda into the late 1960s. See: Galia Golan, “Antonin Novotny: The Sources and Nature of His Power,” Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue Canadienne des Slavistes 14, no. 3 (1972): 429–32; and Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine,” 123.

⁶⁰ Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, “Why did Jan Run Away?” Rudé Právo, Prague, 12 June 1968, 1.

⁶¹ Mary Heimann, Czechoslovakia: The State that Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 229.

⁶² Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine,” 124; and Navrátil, ed., The Prague Spring, 1968, 96–7.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Vitali Nikitchenko, “Специальное сообщение” (Повідомлення про зустріч працівників КДБ із працівниками держбезпеки Чехословаччини, Liberation Movement Research Center, Lviv, 3 May 1968), 1–4; Vitali Nikitchenko, “Информационное сообщение” (Повідомлення про зустріч працівникі держбезпеки УРСР і ЧССР, Liberation Movement Research Center, Lviv, 19 May 1968), 1–6; Vitali Nikitchenko, “Інформаційне повідомлення” (про зустріч керівництва УКДБ при РМ УРСР по Закарпатській обл. з представниками МВС ЧССР, Liberation Movement Research Center, Lviv, 12 June 1968), 1–4; and Vitali Nikitchenko, “Информационное сообщение” (Повідомлення про термінову зустріч начальника УКДБ при РМ УРСР по Закарпатській обл. з представниками МВС ЧССР, Liberation Movement Research Center, Lviv, 1 July 1968), 1–5.

⁶⁵ Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner and Peter Ruggenthaler, eds., The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010), 7–8.

⁶⁶ Navrátil, ed., The Prague Spring, 1968, 32.

⁶⁷ Vitali Nikitchenko, Специальное сообщение. Повідомлення про ситуацію в Чехословацькій соціалістичній республіці (Lviv: Liberation Movement Research Center, 4 April 1968), 1; and Navrátil, ed., The Prague Spring, 1968, 32.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 33.

⁶⁹ Schmeidel, Stasi, 83–4; and Dennis, The Stasi, 30.

⁷⁰ Sheena Greitens, Dictators and their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 278.

⁷¹ Alexander Dubček, Akční program KSČ, published by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 5 April 1968, http://www.sds.cz/view.php?cisloclanku=2008040901 accessed 3 October 2017.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ František Vašek, Informační zpravodaj pracovníků čs. Státní bezpečnosti č. 3, December 1968, 2–4, Archiv Bezpecnostnich Slozek, Prague.

⁷⁴ Mikhail Prozumenshchikov, “Politburo Decision-Making on the Czechoslovak Crisis in 1968,” in The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, ed. Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner and Peter Ruggenthaler (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010), 121.

⁷⁵ Oliver Bange, “The Stasi Confronts Western Strategies for Transformation,” in Secret Intelligence in the European States System, 1918–1989, ed. Jonathan Haslam and Karina Urbach (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 185.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ SNB Praha, Zpráva o vývoji operativní situace a výsledcích agenturně-operativní práce složek Stb KS-SNB v hl. městě Praze v roce 1968, 8 January 1969, 3–4, Archiv Bezpecnostnich Slozek, Prague; and Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 7–8, 333–6.

⁷⁹ Navrátil, ed., The Prague Spring, 1968, 83.

⁸⁰ SNB Praha, Zpráva o současné StB situaci v hl. m. Praha za období od 21. srpna 1968 do 30. září 1968, 3 October 1968, 1–2, Archiv Bezpecnostnich Slozek, Prague.

⁸¹ Dubček, Akční program KSČ; Ivan Berend, Central and Eastern Europe, 1944–1993: Detour from periphery to periphery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 144–5; and Excerpts of the Bratislava Declaration are available at: Stanford University, The Bratislava Meeting: extract from Keesing’s Record of World Events (formerly Keesing’s Contemporary Archive) vol. 14 August 1968, published 2011, http://web.stanford.edu/group/tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/0346-1968-08-KS-b-EYJ.pdf accessed 3 October 2017.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ The Brezhnev Doctrine advocated that the Soviet Union retained the absolute right to use military force to support and maintain the rule of communist parties in socialist states. See: Thomas Crump, Brezhnev and the Decline of the Soviet Union (London: Routledge, 2014); and Matthew Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

⁸⁵ Heimann, Czechoslovakia, 252.

⁸⁶ František Koudelka, Státní bezpečnost 1954–1968: Základní údaje (Prague: Ústav pro Soudobé Dějiny AV ČR, 1993), 29–36; and Kieran Williams, “Civil Resistance in Czechoslovakia: From Soviet Invasion to ‘Velvet Revolution’, 1968–89,” in Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present, ed. Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 122.

⁸⁷ Debate around the role of the StB and the KGB in the invasion of and occupation of Czechoslovakia primarily focuses on whether the StB or the KGB was the primary instigator of the violent suppression of dissenters and the extent to which the KGB exacerbated anti-Soviet protests to create a pretext for a longstanding occupation. See: Nikita Petrov, “The KGB and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968: Preconditions for Soviet Invasion and Occupation of Czechoslovakia,” in The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, ed. Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner and Peter Ruggenthaler (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010), 145–64; and Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 326–41.

⁸⁸ Houska, Současná problémová analýza čs. rozvědky (I. varianta), 36; and Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, 211–21.

⁸⁹ Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, 265.

⁹⁰ See n. 79.

⁹¹ Ibid., 96.

⁹² Petrov, “The KGB and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968,” 153.

⁹³ The Czechoslovak People’s Militia was the armed wing of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party rather than the regular police (Veřejná bezpečnost/Public Security) or the Czechoslovak People’s Army. See: Navrátil, ed., The Prague Spring, 1968, 497.

⁹⁴ Mark Kramer, “The Dialectics of Empire: Soviet Leaders and the Challenge of Civil Resistance in East-Central Europe, 1968–91,” in Civil Resistance and Power Politics, ed. Adam Roberts and Timothy Ash (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 91–109.

⁹⁵ Ladislav Bittman, The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare (Syracuse: Syracuse University Research Corp, 1972); and Ladislav Bittman, Špionážní oprátky: Pohledy do zákulisí československé zpravodajské služby (Prague: Mladá fronta, 1992).

⁹⁶ Vasili Mitrokhin, ed., KGB Lexicon: The Soviet Intelligence Officer’s Handbook (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 2002), 251; and MfS, ZAIG, Nr. 13730, 6 December 1973, 5–6, BStU.

⁹⁷ For interview transcript see: Pavel Žáček, “Defector in the Free World,” Behind the Iron Curtain: Review of the Institute of for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes, Czech Republic 3, no. 1 (2014): 116.

⁹⁸ Jens Gieseke, “Ulbricht’s Secret Police: the Ministry of State Security,” in The Workers’ and Peasants’ State: Communism and Society in East Germany under Ulbricht, 1945–71, ed. Patrick Major and Jonathan Osmond and trans. Mary Forszt and Patrick Major (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 52; and Dennis, The Stasi, 30.

⁹⁹ Jan Pauer, “Der Prager Frühling 1968 und die Deutschen,” in Dossier Prag 1968 (Berlin: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2018), 40–51; and John Koehler, Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police (Oxford: Westview Press, 1999), 130. Note: John Koehler’s methodology of relying heavily on interviews with former members of the Stasi over documentary evidence from the Stasi Records Agency has been subject to scholarly criticism in recent years. In recognition of this criticism, I use Koehler’s work sparingly and corroborate his claims.

¹⁰⁰ MfS, SdM, Nr. 1437, June 14, 1968, 32–3, BStU; BStU, ed., MfS Handbuch: Hauptverwaltung A (HVA) Aufgaben – Strukturen – Quellen (BStU: Berlin, 2013), 74; and Schmeidel, Stasi, 117.

¹⁰¹ MfS, SdM, Nr. 1437, 14 June 1968, 32–3, BStU; and Monika Tantzscher, “Maßnahme ‘Donau’ und Einsatz ‘Genesung’: Die Niederschlagung des Prager Frühlings 1968/69 im Spiegel der MfS-Akten,” Analysen und Berichte – Reihe B, no. 1 (1998): 5 and 32.

¹⁰² Jan Pauer, Prag 1968: Der Einmarsch des Warschauer Paktes (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1995), 84; and Schmeidel, Stasi, 83–4.

¹⁰³ Ivan Volgyes and Zoltan Barany, “Hungary: The Evolution of the Hungarian People’s Army,” in Warsaw Pact and the Balkans: Moscow’s Southern Flank, ed. Jonathan Eyal (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), 13–66.

¹⁰⁴ Jonas Hagmann, (In-) Security and the Production of International Relations: The Politics of Securitisation in Europe (London: Routledge, 2015), 74–86.

¹⁰⁵ František Vašek, Informační zpravodaj pracovníků čs. Státní bezpečnosti č. 2, November 1968, 1–5, Archiv Bezpecnostnich Slozek, Prague; and Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, 223–6.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Radko Kaska and Yuri Andropov, Družstevní dohoda, 10 February 1972, 1–2, Archiv Bezpecnostnich Slozek, Prague.

¹⁰⁸ Robert Bideleux and Ian Jefferies, A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change (London: Routledge, 1998), 549.

¹⁰⁹ MfS, Abteilung X, Nr. 2442, 29 January 29, 1970, 26–7, BStU.

¹¹⁰ Williams, The Prague Spring and its Aftermath, 223–5; and MfS, Abteilung X, Nr. 2442, 29 January 1970, 26–7, BStU.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Der Spiegel, “RÜCKSPIEGEL: Verfassungsschutz – Toter Mann,” Der Spiegel, no. 14 (1971), 222.

¹¹³ MfS, Abteilung X, Nr. 2442, 29 January 1970, 26–7, BStU.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ The BfV (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) was the West German internal security service. See: Holger Afflerbach, “The West German Secret Services during the Cold War,” in Secret Intelligence in the European States System, 1918–1989, ed. Jonathan Haslam and Karina Urbach (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 209–30.

¹²² MfS, Abteilung X, Nr. 2442, 26 May 26/12 June 11970, 26–7, BStU.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Thomas Friis et al., “Introduction: East German Foreign Intelligence as History,” in East German Foreign Intelligence: Myth, Reality and Controversy, ed. Thomas Friis et al. (London: Routledge, 2010), 7.

¹²⁸ Jaroslav Hrbáček, Zpráva o výsledku jednání, 3 December 1975, Archiv Bezpečnostních Složek, Prague, 2; Miroslav Vaniček, Protokol o spolupráci mezi vyšetřovacími orgány Státní bezpečnosti, 20 May 1977, Archiv Bezpečnostních Složek, Prague, 6; and Miroslav Vaniček, Zpráva o Jednáni s delegaci Hlavniho, 13 January 1978, 1–4, Archiv Bezpečnostních Složek, Prague.

¹²⁹ Kramer, “The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine,” 124.

¹³⁰ Nadya Nedelsky, “Czechoslovakia, and the Czech and Slovak Republics,” in Transitional Justice in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: Reckoning with the Communist Past, ed. Lavinia Stan (London: Routledge, 2009), 40–1.

¹³¹ Williams, “Civil Resistance in Czechoslovakia,” 110–12.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Simon Graham

Simon Graham is a postdoctoral researcher associated with the Department of History at the University of Sydney. He writes at the intersection of intelligence history and international history on East Germany, the Soviet Union, and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War period.