https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2736-0404
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ABSTRACT
The 1975 nuclear cooperation agreement between Brazil and West Germany had a considerable impact on the mid-Cold War nuclear non-proliferation regime. This article analyses Bonn’s interests in that agreement, as well as the negotiation process leading to it and third-party pressures on both countries. It also covers the follow-up negotiations with Urenco partners for a safeguards agreement. Based on extensive archival research and secondary literature, the author delineates three main West German interests in concluding the ‘Brazilian Atomic-Deal’: (1) strengthening the ruling socio-liberal coalition; (2) boosting the West German nuclear industry; and (3) making viable the jet-nozzle technology.
Acknowledgements
This article was written using documents and literature I reviewed for my PhD dissertation and my MA thesis. I thank both my supervisors, Prof. Dr Tobias Lenz and Prof. Dr Antonio Lessa, respectively, for their guidance and support. A preliminary version of this article was presented at the 2019 Annual Convention of the Latin American Studies Association (LASA), 24-27 May 2019, in Boston, United States. I thank all participants for their comments and ideas. I also thank James Powell for proofreading the original manuscript, the anonymous reviewers and the editor of the Cold War History for their comments and careful reading. I am also thankful to the staff of the archives in Brazil (particularly the CPDOC-FGV, in Rio de Janeiro) and Germany (mainly the Federal Archives, in Koblenz, and the FES Social Democratic Archive, in Bonn).
Notes
1 John R. Redick, Nuclear Illusions: Argentina and Brazil (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Centre, 1995), 7; Dennis Romberg, “How to Further Develop the Non-Proliferation Regime? West German Nuclear Exports to Brazil and Iran in Context of US Criticism,” The International History Review 40, no. 5 (2018): 1094–114; Barbara Heep, Helmut Schmidt und Amerika (Bonn: Bouvier, 1990), 73.
2 Romberg, How to Further Develop the Non-Proliferation Regime? 3; William Gray, “Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties: The US-German Feud over Brazil, 1975–7,” The International History Review 34, no. 3 (2012): 449–74 (450).
3 Josef Joffe, “A Dim View of West German-Brazil A-Deal,” The Herald Tribune, 2 March 1977. See also Norman Gall, “Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All,” Foreign Policy, no. 23 (1976): 155–201; “Kanzler Schrieb an Präsident Carter. Thema: Kernenergievertrag Mit Brasilien,” Frankfurter Rundschau, 10 March 1977, B136 11375, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Germany (BArch).
4 Heep, Helmut Schmidt und Amerika, 72.
5 Several studies were conducted on the 1975 agreement from the Brazilian perspective. James Cameron, “Technology, Politics, and Development: Domestic Criticism of the 1975 Brazilian-West German Nuclear Agreement,” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 61, no. 2 (2018) : 1–17, analyses the parliamentary reaction to the agreeement. Matias Spektor, “The Evolution of Brazil’s Nuclear Intentions,” Non-Proliferation Review 23, nos 5–6 (2016): 635–52; Leonardo Bandarra, “A Luta contra o Tordesilhas Nuclear: três momentos da política brasileira (1969–1998),” Master’s Thesis, University of Brasília, 2016; and Togzhan Kassenova, Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014) place the agreement in the general context of Brazilian nuclear and foreign policies. The decision-making process was traced by Fernanda Fernandes, “No núcleo do átomo: os usos da energia nuclear e a inserção internacional do Brasil (1946–1985),” PhD Dissertation, University of Brasília, 2015; Alexandra Almeida, “O Programa Nuclear Brasileiro e o Acordo com a Alemanha: da ambição compartilhada aos interesses fragmentados (1975–1978),” PhD Dissertation, University of São Paulo, 2015. The origins of the Agreement and the relationship to global affairs are topics of the following studies: Carlo Patti, “La Scelta Nucleare Come Reazione Brasiliana Allo Shock Petrolifero Del 1973,” Il Politico: Rivista Italiana Di Scienze Politiche, no. LXXVIII (2013): 170–93.
6 The 1975 Brazil-West Germany nuclear agreement is usually referred to in German primary documents as the ‘Brazilian Agreement’ or the ‘A-Deal’ (short for Atomic Deal). I use both references interchangeably in this article.
7 Romberg, How to Further Develop the Non-Proliferation Regime?; Gray, Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties; Fabian Hilfrich, “Roots of Animosity: Bonn’s Reaction to US Pressures in Nuclear Proliferation,” The International History Review 36, no. 2 (2014): 277–301. Another noteworthy contribution is Heep, Helmut Schmidt und Amerika, chapter 4.
8 An alternative analysis of the West German domestic divergences on the Brazilian Deal can be found in Stephan Geier, Schwellenmacht. Bonns heimliche Atomdiplomatie von Adenauer bis Schmidt. 1., Aufl. (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2013).
9 Bundesministerium Des Innern (BI) ‚Telegram an: BI von: Volksbund für Frieden und Freiheit e.V. Betr.: Aktionen Gegen Die Atombewaffnung Der Bundeswehr, 15 April 1958, B106 16053, BArch. See also Zenek Cervenka and Barbara Rogers, The Nuclear Axis: Secret Collaboration between West Germany and South Africa (New York: Times Books, 1978), 40.
10 Deutsches Atomforum, 1969, Erklärung Des Deutschen Atomforums Zum Atomwaffensperrvertrag Anläßlich der Reaktortagung 1969, 15–18 April in Frankfurt (Main). N102 103462 Hefter 7, BArch.
11 Hal Brands, “Non-Proliferation and the Dynamics of the Middle Cold War: The Superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT,” Cold War History 7, no. 3 (2007): 389–423 (392). See also Andreas Lutsch, “Problem Solved? The German Nuclear Question and West Germany’s Accession to the NPT (1967–1975),” in Joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Deterrence, Non-Proliferation and the American Alliance, edited by J. Baylis and Y. Iwama, 93–110 (London: Routledge, 2018).
12 BMWi, Verzeichnis Der Anliegenden Unterlagen Zum Atomwaffensperrvertrag, 10 November 1969, B102/103463 Hefter 7, 3, BArch.
13 BMWi, Verzeichnis der Anliegenden Unterlagen, Heft 8, 2.
14 Lars Colschen, Deutsche Außenpolitik (Paderborn: UTB GmbH, 2010).
15 Matthias Küntzel, Bonn and the Bomb: German Politics and the Nuclear Option (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), 70.
16 Künzel, Bonn and the Bomb, 88.
17 BMWi, “Compte Rendu Officiel de La Assemblée de l’Union de l’Europe Occidentale,” 17 October 1968, B102 433984, 71, BArch. The CSU is the Bavarian branch of the Christian Democrats, in which Strauss was one of the main exponents until his death in 1989. See Franz Josef Strauss, Die Erinnerungen (Munich: btb Verlag, 1989).
18 Theodor Knepper, Aufbruch Ins Atomzeitalter: Der ‘Atomplan Der SPD’ Als Ergebinis Innparteilicher Willensbildung Und Seine Umsetzung Im Rahmen Einder Eigenständigen Atompolitik von 1955 Bis 1960. Magisterarbeit, Bielefeld: University of Bielefeld, 1988.
19 Bundestag‚ 5. Sitzung, Angabe Einer Erhörung Der Bundesregierung, Antworte von Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt, 18 October 1969, Bundestag, online depository. dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/06/06005.pdf., 23 (accessed March 28, 2019).
20 Bundestag, 5. Sitzung, Angabe, 23. See also Küntzel, Bonn and the Bomb, 119.
21 Küntzel, Bonn and the Bomb, 119.
22 A key player in the FDP was Walter Schell. He was a strong promoter of the nuclear industry and the construction of new power plants, as a way to keep up the rate of growth of the West German economy. As federal president, he declared in a private telegram that it was ‘important to build new nuclear power plants. […] There are risks associated with nuclear energy, but there are also risks associated with avoiding nuclear energy. For me, the later are bigger and and more important than the former.’ Bundespräsidentenamt‚ Brief von Bundespräsident Walter Schell an Den Minister Für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Verkehr Baden-Wüttemberg. Betr.: Kernkraftwerke Süd (Wyhl), 14 February 1977, B122/16556. BArch (author’s own translation). A similar view was held by members of the SPD – see Volker Hauff, “Kernergie – Herausforderung Für Die SPD,” Neues Forvm, 1977. Archiv der Sozialen Demokratie (ASD-FES), Bonn.
23 Gray, Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties, 452.
24 “Informação Para o Ministro de Estado, de Paulo Nogueira Batista Sobre Enriquecimento de Uranio,” Secreto, Arquivo Pessoal de Paulo Nogueira Batista, April 1971, Contemporary Brazilian History and Documentation Centre in Fundação Getúlio Vargas (CPODOC-FGV), Rio de Janeiro. For an analysis of the 1954 Paris Accords, see Geier, Schwellenmachtand Küntzel, Bonn and the Bomb.
25 The full text of Protocol No III of the Paris Accords is available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/we005.asp, accessed 9 April 2020.
26 For an analysis of the role of reactors in Brazil’s nuclear policy, see Renata Dalaqua, “We Will Not Make the Bomb Because We Do Not Want to Make the Bomb,” The Non-Proliferation Review (2019): 1746–66.
27 Helmut Schmidt, “Die Internationale Verantwortung Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” Neue Gesellschaft Frankfurter Heft, 1976, 397, ASD-FES.
28 Schmidt, Die Internationale Verantwortung, 397. See also Kristina Spohr, The Global Chancellor: Helmut Schmidt and the Reshaping of the International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), for a more detailed analysis of Schmidt’s foreign policy.
29 Relations with non-nuclear-weapon states from the ‘Third World’ were emphasised in the guidelines issued by the 1980 NPT Revision Commission. AA‚ Vermerk. Betr.: Überprüfungskonferenz Zum Nichtverbreitungsvertrag, Hier: Ressortbesprechung Bom, 22 March 1979, B136 1112, BArch.
30 A similar status position with other great powers was at the core of Schmidt’s understanding of ‘world politics’ (Weltpolitik). See Spohr, The Global Chancellor.
31 Bundespräsidentenamt‚ Brief an Dem Bundespräsident, Verf. RD Dr. Schnurr. Betr.: Nutzung Der Kernenergie in Frankreich Und in Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 13 February 1981, B122/16556, BArch.
32 Hilfrich, “Roots of Animosity,” 294.
33 Bundespräsidentenamt, Rede Des Bundesministers Für Wirtschaft Dr. Hans Friedrichs Anlässlich Der Reaktortagung Des Deutschen Atomforums, B122/16556, 10, 1977, BArch (author’s own translation).
34 Secretaria de Comunicação da Presidência (SECOM), Livreto Programa Nuclear Brasileiro: Governo Presta Contas, Secretaria de comunicação social da presidência da república, Arquivo de Paulo Nogueira Batista, 1981, CPDOC-FGV.
35 Bundespräsidentenamt, Rede Des Bundesministers Für Wirtschaft Dr Hans Friedrichs Anlässlich Der Reaktortagung Des Deutschen Atomforums, B122/16556, 1977, BArch.
36 William Burr, “A Scheme of ‘Control’: The United States and the Origins of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, 1974–1976,” The International History Review 36, no. 2 (2014): 252–76 (253).
37 Overcoming the negative effects of the world economic crisis was the priority for Schmidt during the first years of his administration. See Spohr, The Global Chancellor and Heep, Helmut Schmidt und Amerika. The relevance of including nuclear energy in the German energy matrix was highlighted by Friedrichs. See Bundespräsidentenamt, Rede Des Bundesministers, 1977.
38 Schmidt, “Regierungserklärung Für Die Legislaturperiode,” Bundeskanzleramt, 1976, 24, ASD-FES.
39 Rogers and Cervenka, The Nuclear Axis, 43.
40 Romberg, How to Further Develop the Non-Proliferation Regime? 8.
41 “Kissinger Lehnt Kritik an Bonner Regierung Ab. Kein US-Protest Wegen Des Atomgeschäftes Mit Brasilien – ‘Sonst Springt Paris Ein’,” Stuttgarter Zeitung, 24 June 1975, B136 30554, BArch.
42 For more on Konrad Adenauer’s nuclear policy, see Küntzel, Bonn and The Bomb.
43 Hermann Bachmaier, “Das Deutsch-Brasilianische Nuklear-Abkommen: Zur Notwendigkeit, Die Militärische Nutzung Der Kernenergie Zu Verhindern,” Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst 44, Jahrgang/184 (25 September 1989): 1–6. See also Bundestag, Drucksache 12/6253, Antwort Der Bundesregierung – Drucksache 12/6056 – Deutsch-Brasilianisches Nuklearabkommen, 12 Wahlperiode, 30 November 1993.
44 For critiques see Bundestag‚ Drucksache 12/6253. For an analysis of the Brazilian nuclear programme see Spektor, “The Evolution of Brazil’s Nuclear Intentions.”
45 Frederico Fuellgraf, A bomba pacífica: O Brasil e outros cenários da corrida nuclear (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1988), 44. See also C. Patti, “The Origins of the Brazilian Nuclear Programme, 1951–1955,” Cold War History 15, no. 3 (2015): 353–73.
46 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1983, “Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals: Motives and Constraints: Special National Intelligence Estimate,” Secret, Approved release date: 19 September 2011, US National Archives and CIA online depository. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/0005743962 (accessed February 11, 2015).
47 Strauss, Erinnerungen.
48 Spohr, The Global Chancellor, 55.
49 Gray, Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties, 453.
50 Carsten Schmidt, “Helmut Schmidt: Kontinuität Und Konzentration,” in Das Wort Had Der Herr Bundeskanzler: Eine Analyse Der Großen Regierungserklärungen von Adenauer Bis Schröder, edited by K.-R. Korte, 193–216 (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002).
51 Schmidt, Helmut Schmidt, 193.
52 KTG, 1977, Brief an Der Bundespräsident Walter Schell. von Dem Kerntechnischer Gesellschaft Im Deutschen Atomforum E. V. (Vorsitzer Prof. Dr. Hans Levi), B122/16556, BArch. See also Appendix.
53 Schmidt-Reise, “Große Luftblasen,” Spiegel Online, 16 April 1979. https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-40350275.html (accessed February 11, 2019).
54 KTG, 1977, Brief an Der Bundespräsident Walter Schell.
55 Romberg, How to Further Develop the Nonproliferation Regime? 11.
56 CIA, Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals.
57 Gray, Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties, 452.
58 Schmitz-Wenzel‚Telegramm. Betr.: Konferenz Der Hauptlieferländer Für Zivile Nukleartechnologie, AA, 20 June 1975, B136 30554, 166, BArch.
59 Schmitz-Wenzel, “Telegramm. Betr.: Konferenz Der Hauptlieferländer Für Zivile Nukleartechnologie,” 20 June 1975, B136 30554, 165, BArch.
60 Matthias Küntzel, “Hidden Diplomacy: The German–American Dispute over Iran,”’ American Foreign Policy Interests 36, no. 4 (2014): 225–33 (226).
61 Harald Möller, Waffen für Iran und Irak: deutsche Rüstungsexporte und ihre Querverbindungen zu den ABC-Waffenprogrammen beider Länder; Ursachen, Hintergründe, Folgen (Berlin: Köster, 2006), 52.
62 The connection between both agreements was highlighted in a press conference led by Dr Schmitz-Wenzel on major export agreements of civilian nuclear technology. AA‚ Telegramm von Mr. Dr. Schmitz-Wenzel an Herrn VLR I Oldenkott. Betr.: Konferenz Der Hauptlieferländer Für Zivile Nukleartechnologie, 20 June 1975, B136/30554, BArch.
63 Schmitz-Wenzel, Konferenz Der Hauptlieferlände.
64 Gerhard Flämig, “Die Vorteile Des NV-Vertrags Nutzen! Zur Geplanten Deutsch-Brasilianischen Zusammenarbeit in Der Kernenergie, von Gerhard Flämig, MdB,” SPD-Pressedienst (P/XXX/85), 6 May 1975, ASD-FES.
65 CIA, Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals; Bundestag, 2016, “Ausarbeitung: Das Deutsch-Brasilanische Atomabkommen von 1975 Aus Heutiger Sicht,” WD1 – 3000 – 049/13, Wissenschaftliche Dienst, 6.
66 Bundestag, “Das Deutsch-Brasilanische Atomabkommen,” 6.
67 Gray, Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties, 454.
68 Bandarra, A Luta contra o Tordesilhas Nuclear.
69 E.W. Becker, P. Nogueira Batista, and H. Vöcker, “Uranium Enrichment by the Separation Nozzle Method Within the Framework of German/Brazilian Cooperation,” Nuclear Technology 52, no. 1 (1 January 1981): 105–14 (105).
70 AA‚ Ministerialdirektor Lautenschlager an Botschafter von Staden, Washington, VS-Vertraulich. Fernschreiben Nr 523, 25 Mai 1976‚ Betr.: Gespräch Bundesminister – AM Kissinger Am 23 Mai 1976 in Bonn, 1. Januar bis 30. Juni, 25 May 1976, Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPBD) (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1976) ; “Informação Para o Ministro de Estado, de Paulo Nogueira Batista Sobre Enriquecimento de Uranio,” Secreto, PNB, April 1971, CPODOC-FGV.
71 For a detailed process tracing of the negotiation between West German and South African officials, see Rogers and Cervenka, The Nuclear Axis, chap. 3.
72 Rogers and Cervenka, The Nuclear Axis,xiv.
73 Gray, Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties, 454. This theory proved, nonetheless, flawed after Pretoria successfully converted nozzle technology into nuclear explosives.
74 Brazil and Germany, “Acordo Entre o Governo Da República Federativa Do Brasil e o Governo Da República Federal Da Alemanha Sobre Cooperacão No Campo Dos Usos Pacíficos Da Energia Nuclear,” 1975, Divisão de Atos Internacionais (DAI), MRE. For technical specifications of Angra 2 enrichment capabilities see Federal Register, “Federal Register/Vol. 61, No. 177/Wednesday, 11 September 1996/Notices,” 11 September 1996, https://www.federalregister.gov/ (accessed September 18, 2020).
75 The cooperation with the IAEA was one of the main pre-requisites determined by the Bundestag for approving the agreement. See Bundestag‚ Drucksache 12/6253, Antwort Der Bundesregierung – Drucksache 12/6056 – Deutsch-Brasilianisches Nuklearabkommen, 12 Wahlperiode, 31 November 1993.
76 Diversifying the Brazilian energy matrix was a prioriy under ‘Plano 90ʹ, a development programme presented by President Geisel to sustain high economic growth until the year 1990. See Carlo Patti, “O Programa Nuclear Brasileiro Entre Passado e Futuro,” Boletim Meridiano 47 14, no. 140 (2013): 49–55. A report by the German parliament also highlighted the Brazilian need to ensure a ‘second leg’ for its energy matrix – that is, reduce its dependence on hydropower. See Bundestag, Das deutsch-brasilianische Atomvertrag.
77 Bundestag, 1993, Drucksache 12/6253, 4.
78 Paulo Nogueira Batista, “Notas tomadas por Paulo Nogueira Batista em reunião com o ministro Ueki,” Handwritten notes, 11 June 1975, PN/N, CPDOC-FGV, MRE (author’s own translation).
79 In the 1971 bidding process to construct Angra 1, Westinghouse offered the lowest cost per KWh of energy produced – 0,0523 Cr$/KWh – compared with the 0.0592 Cr$/KWh of TPNG, the second cheapest. Besides that, Washington supported the agreement by providing funding through Eximbank. See Senado Federal, “A Questão Nuclear: Relatório da Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito do Senado Federal, Resolução No 69–78. Relator: Senador Milton Cabral,” 17 August 1982, 171, Senado Federal, https://www2.senado.leg.br/bdsf/handle/id/194590 (accessed September 18, 2020).
80 CIA, Brazil’s Changing Nuclear Goals.
81 See Appendix.
82 Hilfrich, “Roots of Animosity,” 281.
83 “Kissinger Lehnt Kritik,” Stuttgarter Zeitung.
84 Burr, “A Scheme of Control,” 269.
85 Memorandum from the Senior Department of Defence Attaché in France (Walters) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Paris. US National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, box 1, no date (probably from 1968). Department of State, 116, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d116 (accessed February 11, 2019).
86 Matias Spektor, Kissinger e o Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2009).
87 Hilfrich, “Roots of Animosity,” 290.
88 AA, Telegram Aus Teheran and Bonn, Betr.: Zusammenarbeit-Iran-Bundesrepublik Im Bereich Der Kernenergie, 8 August 1974, B136 11011, BArch; AA, Telegram Aus Tehrean an Bonn‚ Betr.: Zusammenarbeit-Iran-Bundesrepublik Im Bereich Der Kernenergie, 9 August 1974, Hier: Besuch Etemads in Bundesrepublik and Manuscript Notes from on Brazil and Iran, B136 11011, BArch.
89 AA, 8 August 1974, Telegram Aus Teheran and Bonn.
90 Bundespräsidentenamt, 1975, Drucksache 7/3606 07.05.1975 – Antwort Der Bundesregierung to the Bundestag Über Des Baus Eines Kernkraftwerkes in Wyhl, BArch.
91 Jans-Hendrik Meyer, “Where Do We Go from Wyhl?: Transnational Anti-Nuclear Protest Targeting European and International Organizations in the 1970s,” Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung 39, no. 1 (147) (2014): 212–35.
92 Gray, Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties, 78.
93 Congresso Nacional, Relatório No 13, “Comissão Mista de Inquérito Destinada a Apurar o Programa Autônomo de Energia Nuclear, Também Conhecido Como ‘Programa Paralelo’,” Relatório Final, 1990. Relator: Senador Severo Gomes. Testimony of Admiral Othon Luiz da Silva, https://www2.senado.leg.br/bdsf/handle/id/194598 (accessed September 18, 2020).
94 Schmitz-Wenzel, Telegram. Betr.: Konferenz Der Hauptlieferländer Für Zivile Nukleartechnologie, 20 June 1975, B136 30554, BArch.
95 “Memorandum, Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira, Information for the President of Brazil, ‘Uranium Enrichment’,” 2 April 1974, PNB ad 1973.10.05, 100–8, CPDOC-FGV. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116875 (acccessed March 04, 2016).
96 CDU Deputy Kurt Birrenbach declared: ‘We cannot […] export reactors if we cannot deliver to our trade partners like Brazil or Argentina enriched fuel or uranium. We have no uranium resources of our own and no enrichment plant. We […] do not accept a position of inferiority within the European realm, which would deadly endanger the unification process on our continent and [the] Atlantic partnership.’ Kurt Birrenbach, Letter to Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, 22 May 1980, B196 40227, BArch.
97 Hilfrich, “Roots of Anymosity,” 290.
98 AA, Deutsch-Niederländisches Regierungsgespräch, 014-StS-041/77 VS-Vertraulich, 13 January 1977, 5, AAPBD
99 Letter from Dutch Prime Minister J.M. Den Uyl to Federal Minister Helmut Schmidt, 2 December 1976, B136/16532, BArch.
100 Letter from Dutch Prime Minister, 5.
101 AA‚ Referat 312 Betr.: TROIKA-Zusammenarbeit. Hier.: Gespräch Zwischen Bundeskanzler – MP van Agt, n.d. B136 16532, BArch.
102 AA, Gespräch Des Herrn Bundeskanzlers Am Rande Des Europäischen Rats Am 5, Und 6 12 1977, Über Die Gasultrazentrifugenzusammenarbeit (Troika), 29 November 1977, B136 16532, 2, BArch.
103 “Memorandum from Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira to President Geisel on Jimmy Carter’s ‘Radical’ Nuclear Stance,” 31 January 1977, Azeredo da Silveira Archive, CPDOC-FGV. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115216 (accessed November 02, 2015).
104 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, “Briefwisseling tussen de Regering van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de Regering van de Federatieve Republiek Brazilië inzake de levering van verrijkt uranium aan Brazilië,” Verdrag, https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBV0003796/1978-09-01, accessed 10 April 2019.
105 AA, “Note. Text Für Eine Plutoniumlagerung Nach XIII A 5,” 6 January 1978, B136 16532, BArch.
106 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, “Briefwisseling tussen de Regering van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de Regering van de Federatieve Republiek Brazilië inzake de levering van verrijkt uranium aan Brazilië,” Verdrag, https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBV0003796/1978-09-01, accessed 10 April 2019.
107 AA, Gespräch Des Herrn Bundeskanzlers, 3 (author’s own translation).
108 AA, telegramm aus Washington an Bonn. Betr.: Nukleare Zusammenarbeit Mit Brasilien. Hier: Debatte Im Kongress Am 03.06.1975, 7 June 1975, B136 30554, BArch.
109 AA, Telegramm aus Washington an Bonn. Betr.: Nukleare Zusammenarbeit Mit Brasilien.
110 AA‚ Telegramm Aus Washington an Bonn Aa. Betr.: Deutsch-Brasilianisches Abkommen Über Die Zusammenarbeit Bei Der Friedlichen Nutzung Der Kernenergie. (VS), 18 June 1975, B136 30554, 146, BArch (author’s own translation).
111 Gray, Commercial Liberties and Nuclear Anxieties, 462.
112 Department of State, “US Embassy Cable, Brazilian Public Reaction to US Nuclear Policies,” 19 November 1976. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115212.pdf?v=f11b64a169a897b35db8391411217d19 (accessed April 02, 2016).
113 AA, Telegramm Aus Washington an Bonn AA. Betr.: Deutsch-Brasilianisches Abkommen Über Die Zusammenarbeit Bei Der Friedlichen Nutzung Der Kernenergie, (VS), 18 June 1975, B136 30554, 146, BArch.
114 AA, “Vermerk Über Die Beratungen Des Downing-Street-Gipfels Am 7. Mai 1977 Nachmittags. VS,” 18 May 1977, B136 128350, BArch.
115 AA, “Vermerk Über Die Beratungen Des Downing-Street-Gipfels Am 7. Mai 1977 Nachmittags. VS,” 1977, B136 128350, BArch.
116 AA, Vermerk Über Die Beratungen Des Downing-Street-Gipfels, 4.
117 “Brazilian Embassy Cable, Brazilian Ambassador to Bonn Reports on Soviet Pressure on West Germany,” 21 March 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Azeredo da Silveira Archive, CPDOC-FGV, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115218, acessed 10 October 2019.
118 “Brazilian Embassy Cable, Brazilian Ambassador to Bonn Reports on Soviet Pressure on West Germany.”