Pirates and imperialists: Taiwan and the United States in the Polish communist press, 1953-1955

ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the image of Taiwan (the Republic of China) in the Polish communist press in the mid-1950s. It focuses on the news coverage related to the two Polish cargo ships – the Praca and the Prezydent Gottwald – which were detained by the Taiwanese authorities in 1953 and 1954, respectively. Based on the press narratives and supported by declassified government documents, the paper analyses the impact of the Cold War conflicts and divisions on the detention of Polish ships and its coverage by the Polish communist media.

KEYWORDS:

• China
• communism
• Poland
• the press
• Taiwan
• United States

Introduction

From the end of the Second World War in 1945 and until the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, the Cold War divisions between the East and West fuelled ideological, political and economic conflicts and hostility between the two blocs, led by the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, the Cold War served as a foreign policy framework not only for those two main superpowers, but also for the less powerful and less influential ‘satellite’ states of the two blocs. In this context, the impact of the Cold War on bilateral relations between Poland and Taiwan (the Republic of China, ROC) is a rarely explored, yet intriguing example.

Throughout the Cold War, Poland and Taiwan belonged to two different antagonistic blocs, based on different political, ideological and economic systems. Prior to the Cold War, Poland and the Republic of China had barely had any direct contact; as a consequence, there were no historically motivated reasons for Warsaw and Taipei to be hostile to each other. However, the post-Second World War Poland-Taiwan relations could not be separated from the Cold War context and the global outreach of the two superpowers. In this paper, the detention of sailors who served on two Polish cargo ships – Praca (‘Labor’) in 1953 and Prezydent Gottwald (‘President Gottwald’) in 1954 – is used as a case study to analyse the impact of the Cold War on Poland-Taiwan relations.

The paper focuses on the depiction of Taiwan and its arrest and detention of Polish sailors in the Polish press through the prism of communist newspaper reports published between 1953 and 1955. In addition to reconstructing the image of Taiwan and Taiwanese authorities in the Polish media, the author analyses the links between and among the press narratives, the local political and ideological environment, and the global context of the Cold War. Furthermore, the author examines the real circumstances of the arrest and detention of the Polish sailors in order to determine whether they were manipulated or obscured by the Polish press under the political and ideological instructions from the communist government of Poland. Most importantly, the author analyses the newspapers’ criticism of the alleged support of the United States for Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) of the ROC and the employed maritime blockade, which aimed at isolating China (the People’s Republic of China, PRC) from the international sea routes and world trade.

Research methodology

The author perused a large number of documents and published materials.¹ The main emphasis was on Trybuna Ludu, the official media outlet for the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP). In addition to the reports by Trybuna Ludu, the author supplemented the analysis by a meticulous study of articles circulating in the regional newspaper dailies, such as Dziennik Bałtycki, Dziennik Łódzki, Głos Wielkopolski, Trybuna Robotnicza and Życie Warszawy. The author also integrated a wide range of declassified documents of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Shipping on the political and historical background between 1953 and 1955.

In the course of conducting the research, the author focused not only on the informative content of the press reports but also on their linguistic features that strengthened the ideologically ‘appropriate’ messages to fulfil the requirements of totalitarian narratives. The author is cognisant of the fact that during the Cold War, Polish journalists intentionally used strident and judgemental phrases as well as emotional trigger words that helped them present the discussed topics in either a positive or a negative light. Moreover, the author is mindful of the significance of the placement of articles within particular newspaper editions – in fact, these reports were often placed on the front pages to emphasise the relevance of the issue to the journalists, the editors and the common readers. Furthermore, the author analysed the editorials and other commentaries in the Polish press on the US involvement in the detention of the ships and its implications in the global Cold War context.

It is important to observe that the detention of Praca and Gottwald coincided with the Stalinist period. Even though the Soviet leader died in 1953, the de-Stalinisation process had not been initiated in Poland until 1956. From the global perspective, the Cold War took the form of indirect confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1950s, especially the economic rivalry and proxy wars in various regions of the world. Along with the emergence of the two states in the Korean peninsula, the bifurcation of China into the PRC and ROC in 1949 resulted in one of the most tragic and long-lasting Cold War conflicts. In the late summer of 1954, which brought the first Taiwan Strait crisis – an armed confrontation between the PRC and ROC over the disputed islands of Jinmen (Kinmen), Mazu (Matsu), Dachen (Tachen) and Yijiangshan (Yikiangshan) located near the shore of mainland China – the negotiations on the release of Gottwald’s sailors became even more challenging.

Polish communist press: historical background

The communist transformations in the Polish press system were initiated in 1944 by the communist authorities taking over the printing and paper production and management. Subsequently, all forms of media – including the printing press – were strictly controlled by the government of the Polish People’s Republic (PPR).

The press was one of the main instruments of state power, as it played a crucial role in the political, social, economic and cultural life of communist Poland.² In general, the communist press is characterised by

1. propaganda based on the subordination of the press to ideology, as the involvement of the press in social transformations is prioritised at the expense of its informative role;

2. censorship that results from the imposition of ideology and the lack of freedom of speech; and

3. the centralisation of the press system and control over newspapers’ content by government institutions.

Presumably, the mission of the communist press was most accurately described by Russian leader Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924), who claimed that the press was ‘not only a collective propagandist and collective agitator, but also a collective organizer’.³ From this perspective, journalists had to serve as executors of the will of the communist authorities, observe the ideological line of the party apparatus, and avoid any deviations in their news reports.⁴ In a totalitarian system, journalists are expected to perform on the ideological fronts rather than provide information or act as objective commentators; hence, they are merely communist agents who essentially follow propaganda instructions.⁵

Censorship was one of the key elements of the totalitarian system of propaganda and manipulation, as it strongly influenced the existence, awareness and mentality of Polish citizens.⁶ It controlled all the content intended for dissemination through the media. The censorship process was made up of several stages. It began with the so-called ‘self-censorship’ applied by the authors of articles. Journalists consciously avoided topics that were too sensitive and undesirable from the Communist Party’s point of view and refrained from posting individual comments. Afterwards, articles were screened by the editorial office. At the final stage, they were examined by a local branch of the Main Office for the Control of Press, Publication and Performances (Główny Urząd Kontroli Prasy, Publikacji i Widowisk). If an article’s content raised any political or ideological doubts and reservations, the local branch would send the article to the main office in Warsaw and await feedback.⁷

In January 1945, the Central Bureau for the Control of Press, Publications and Performances (Centralne Biuro Kontroli Prasy, Publikacji i Widowisk) was established and several months later transformed into the previously mentioned Main Office for the Control of Press, Publications and Performances. With the onset of the Stalinist period (1948–56), after the opposition had been eliminated, the Polish press system became centralised, thus imitating the Soviet model. Consequently, the number of press titles decreased significantly. A relative revival of the press could be observed in the period of de-Stalinisation, along with the loosening of the Stalinist ‘corset’; the journalistic milieu stimulated social activity that contributed to the political thaw in October 1956.⁸

One of the key elements of the Polish Cold War discourse was a ‘figure of an enemy’, which also seems to be one of the foundations of the communist or – more broadly – totalitarian propaganda. As Michał Głowiński, one of the most distinguished Polish researchers of history, literature and language, observed⁹

A figure of an enemy is […] the foundation of all communist propaganda … . Without a figure of an enemy, there is no communist propaganda discourse at all, it is unthinkable without it. An enemy determines the vision of the world, ways of thinking and speaking [… .] Not only is the enemy ‘of all kinds’, he also has many names. When there are no real enemies or they do not pose a threat and have no influence on the practice, they must be artificially created, invented. An enemy is always present, because the whole communist world is a world against.¹⁰

The broad category of ‘enemies’ in the communist discourse can be divided into ‘external’ and ‘internal’ ones. Among the so-called ‘external’ enemies, the leading positions were reserved for capitalist states and alliances, mainly the United States and the Western Bloc. Thus, the threat of ‘American imperialism’, also referred to as ‘Anglo-American imperialism’, was one of the key elements of communist propaganda discourse.¹¹

In the research on how information was produced, manipulated and propagated by the Polish authorities during the Cold War, Trybuna Ludu (1948–90) is compulsory reading. Produced out of a merger between two newspapers – Głos Ludu and Robotnik – Trybuna Ludu became the most relevant daily and the state’s main propaganda tube, serving as the official organ of the Central Committee of PUWP.¹² With its nationwide outreach, 1.5 million copies were printed per day at its peak.

Interestingly, other newspapers and magazines were allowed to express nuanced differences in their analyses provided that they still followed the official political line of the Polish government and the Communist Party. However, it was forbidden to criticise and oppose views and statements by Trybuna Ludu. This unspoken rule, practically enforced in 1948, was officially codified in 1975 by the Main Office for the Control of Press, Publications and Performances. The privileged position of Trybuna Ludu is also demonstrated by the fact that the chief editor positions were always occupied by the most loyal and trusted party members.¹³ Moreover, the content of Trybuna Ludu remained under close surveillance by Moscow, as it was thoroughly analysed in reports prepared by Soviet ambassadors to Poland.¹⁴

Aside from the national Trybuna Ludu, regional newspapers played an equally important role in the communist propaganda machine. Probably the second most influential paper was Trybuna Robotnicza (1945–2004), one of the largest regional newspapers in Poland, published in the densely populated coal-mining region of Silesia. It was the only newspaper in the history of communist Poland whose daily editions occasionally exceeded Trybuna Ludu in its number of copies.

Among other regional newspapers, the most influential dailies were Dziennik Łódzki, the oldest of the sources referred to in this paper, as it has been published since 1884, and Głos Wielkopolski, the first issue of which was published at the end of the Second World War.¹⁵ Dziennik Bałtycki, which has been published since 1945 in the coastal region of Pomerania, is of particular importance owing to its significant engagement – often stimulated by the personal connections of the local residents. This daily tended to provide more details on the detention of the two Polish cargo ships and the activities of the seamen’s families than other newspapers. In addition, this article also contains press reports published by Głos Chłopski, Głos Radomszczański, Głos Robotniczy and Życie Warszawy (a daily published in Poland’s capital), as well as Szpilki (a satirical newspaper that focused on mocking the opponents of the communist system) and Gość Niedzielny (a Catholic-oriented newspaper, which was boycotted by many priests and Catholics in Poland owing to its controversies related to the state authorities’ influence on the choice of the chief editor).

Taiwan in the Polish press, 1949–53

After a meticulous analysis of the press discourse, the author observed that Polish communist newspapers exhibited a considerable interest in the post-Second World War phase of the civil war in China. Thus, Poland’s ideological support for the Chinese communists of Chairman Mao Zedong (1893–1976) against the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) camp under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek seemed unequivocal. Moreover, the Polish press reports always portrayed the US involvement in Asia in the most critical and unambiguously negative manner.

In 1949, for example, the Polish press described Chiang’s evacuation to Taiwan as an ‘escape’ and heralded his imminent downfall⁠.¹⁶ Furthermore, the title of one of the articles published by Głos Chłopski professed: “The United States” desperate tricks in China will not save Chiang-Kai-shek from defeat’.¹⁷ Even though Washington was still reportedly ‘deluded’ that it would be able to retain Formosa (Taiwan), from where it would then keep ‘releasing its imperialist tentacles’, the newspaper expressed satisfaction with China being ‘lost to imperialism’ as a result of the US defeat on the mainland.¹⁸ Another article published by Głos Chłopski indicated that the guerrilla struggle against the KMT, which had been initiated in Taiwan two years earlier, would soon culminate in a communist triumph.¹⁹ It might then be claimed that the comments quoted above were meant to expose the weakness of Chiang’s ruling elites and depreciate them in the eyes of Polish readers.

The strident and judgemental language as well as the uncompromising criticism of Chiang and his government might also be found in many other newspapers⁠. For instance, Głos Robotniczy openly called the KMT members ‘fascists’, whereas Głos Radomszczański reported about the terror introduced by Chiang and observed that the Generalissimo transformed Taiwan into a ‘great concentration camp’, where many citizens got executed in the course of political persecutions.²⁰ Moreover, the newspaper not only commented on the Taiwan government’s alleged atrocities, but also heralded the defeat of the Chiang camp and the upcoming victory of Mao’s communist cohorts. Another edition of Głos Robotniczy stated that ‘the moment of the final defeat of the Kuomintang is approaching’ and highlighted the dramatic and ‘ridiculous’ position of the KMT as the journalists projected that no international organisation or government would be willing to maintain diplomatic relations with the ‘bandits’ who fled to Formosa.²¹

The increased interest of the Polish press on the Taiwan issue, supplemented by the sharp criticism of US foreign policy, could also be observed in the early 1950s. Dziennik Łódzki described that ‘American attempts at [controlling] Taiwan’ were one of the many sins of the US ‘imperial’ policy.²² Fierce attacks on the United States were also undertaken by Trybuna Robotnicza, which warned its readers: ‘After the Chinese people drove out the hated handful of the Kuomintang – the enemies of the people – the American imperialists never abandoned the plans to re-conquer China’.²³

It is worth emphasising that the unambiguous criticism of the United States provides a striking contrast with Polish journalists’ positive assessments of the Soviet policy – especially when the Soviets were striving to push through a resolution at the United Nations Security Council that condemned the ‘US aggression and interference in China’s internal affairs’, as described in Dziennik Łódzki.²⁴ In addition, Głos Wielkopolski elaborated on the ‘illegal occupation of Formosa’, which was believed to be ‘a violation of the UN Charter by the US’. This was far from coincidence as Soviet Representative to the UN Security Council Jakow Malik (1906–80) uttered similar words in his commentary at the United Nations.²⁵

It should not be forgotten that Poland was among the first countries that followed the standpoint of Moscow and recognised the PRC as early as October 1949. Thus, the Polish authorities – and consequently the Polish press – maintained an unequivocal position that Taiwan belonged to the PRC, and therefore was illegally occupied by Chiang’s KMT forces. Even Gość Niedzielny, a conservative Catholic weekly magazine, emphasised that the Taiwan issue was China’s internal affair; thus, any interference by a foreign nation was unfounded.²⁶

Furthermore, a complete reprint of the statement condemning the ‘action of American imperialists’ by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) was published in Dziennik Łódzki, Głos Wielkopolski and Trybuna Robotnicza in response to the declaration by US president Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) on 27 June 1950 that Formosa would remain part of the PRC.²⁷ This press release suggests that expressing support for China’s unity under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was one of the topics prioritised by the Polish press. In addition, by quoting Mao Zedong, the newspapers in Poland tried to prove that Truman’s declaration unmasked Washington’s ‘true imperialist face’.²⁸ In 1954, citing Premier Zhou, the newspapers also declared that ‘the liberation of Taiwan is a historic task of the [Chinese] nation’.²⁹

As reported by the Polish press, the events in Taiwan were believed to reveal the true intentions of the ‘bankrupt clique of the Kuomintang’, which, along with its foreign protector – the United States – had some ‘quarrelsome plans’ against the PRC and ‘liberation movements among Southeast Asian people’.³⁰ It was therefore implied that Washington had developed an extensive imperialist plot against many parts of the globe – not China alone. At the same time, however, all actions aimed at suppressing the ‘liberation movement’ in East Asia were, according to Polish journalists, doomed to fail.³¹

Interestingly, the Polish press occasionally quoted statements from some US specialists, which – at first glance – would suggest that a pluralism of views and perspectives, although limited, did indeed exist. However, it must be stressed that Polish journalists cited their US counterparts or Washington officials only when their words resonated with the voice of the communist government in Warsaw. Hence, it was a form of manipulation and tactical deception. A good example may be found in Głos Wielkopolski, where statements from the New York Herald Tribune and China Weekly Review were quoted in the same article, which dwelled on the terror introduced by Generalissimo Chiang, including the practice of murdering political opponents.³² Nevertheless, the Polish press gave its readers the impression that it was a terror of desperation, as the KMT’s days were already numbered. Among many examples, it was reported to be confirmed by an attempted escape of some 100 KMT officers on a Norwegian ship. The episode was reported by both Głos Wielkopolski and Dziennik Łódzki that unanimously labelled it as proof of Taiwan’s ‘internal decay’.³³

The press coverage on ‘external enemies’

In 1949, Taiwan implemented a naval blockade of mainland China (known as the ‘closure policy’, Guanbi zhengce 關閉政策), allegedly supported by US aircraft.³⁴ Since 26 June, foreign ships were strictly prohibited from entering the Chinese coastline between the Liao River and Min River, with a further extension to Guangdong province the following year. The blockade was intended to prevent the PRC from both receiving and sending food, weapons and other necessary supplies. Temporarily lifted during the Korean War (1950–3), the policy was enforced by the ROC until September 1979.³⁵

As a result, two Polish ships belonging to Chipolbrok (Chinese-Polish Joint Stock Shipping Company) were detained by the Taiwanese authorities. The tanker Praca was detained on 4 October 1953, and the cargo ship President Gottwald was intercepted on 13 May 1954.³⁶ Even though these cargo ships had the opportunity to cruise through the Taiwan Strait, thus shortening the journey, the two vessels were trying to circle away from the eastern coast of Taiwan to avoid potential confrontation with the Taiwanese Navy.

As Ryszard Leszczyński noted, Polish public opinion became ‘galvanised’ by the requisitioning of Polish ships, and the press kept publishing news reports for months.³⁷ According to Leszczyński, regardless of the overdramatised propaganda tones of the communist press, it was indeed an act of ‘piracy’, and the social outrage it caused was justified. However, it must be remembered that the UN Convention on the High Seas (1958) limited ‘piracy’ to the acts ‘committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship’; therefore, in the letters of international law, Taiwan’s actions could not be labelled as such.³⁸

Nonetheless, dozens of tankers and cargo ships from various countries were detained by the Taiwanese Navy. This fact was often stressed by the Polish press. As expounded by Trybuna Ludu, between September 1949 and October 1954, 111 international ships were attacked or detained, including ships from Denmark, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama and the USSR.³⁹ Some were never released. Instead, they got incorporated into the Taiwanese fleet, as proved by the Polish case: Praca was renamed Helan (賀蘭), whereas Gottwald was renamed Tianzhu (天竺).⁴⁰

The Polish government blamed the United States for the Praca incident, submitting a diplomatic complaint to the US Embassy in Warsaw on 12 October 1953. Its content was released by Trybuna Ludu and Dziennik Bałtycki, as well as by Trybuna Robotnicza, which published it with the title ‘A Brazen Attack of Kuomintang on a Polish Merchant Ship’.⁴¹ Soon, the ship case was brought to the United Nations by a Polish representative: diplomatic letters were forwarded to UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld (1905–61) and President of the UN General Assembly Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (1900–90).⁴²

The response from the US Embassy, in which Washington laconically dismissed the allegations of being responsible for the detention of Praca, provoked a frenzied reaction from the Polish press. ‘The US government bears full responsibility for the violation on the Polish ship by Chiang Kai-shek pirates’, claimed Trybuna Robotnicza in its comment on the US note.⁴³ Interestingly, the title of an article published by Trybuna Ludu on the very same day was almost identical: ‘The US Government Bears Full Responsibility for kidnapping of the Polish ship by Chiang Kai-shek Pirates’.⁴⁴ It is a testimony to the fact that Polish newspapers of the Cold War period not only had to follow the appropriate ideological line, but also apply specific, centrally imposed terminology.

Severe criticism of the US response to the Polish government was also expressed by Dziennik Bałtycki, which insisted that US imperialism violated ‘the freedom of the seas’.⁴⁵ It also quoted one Polish shipyard worker, who was believed to have expressed during street protests: ‘The recent pirate attack by Chiang Kai-shek bandits on our Praca ship is new proof that American imperialism and its hired hands cannot stand our achievements in peacebuilding, which every single day become greater and greater’.⁴⁶

Apart from presenting US authorities as the real behind-the-stage masterminds, the Polish press was also equally critical towards the ‘Taiwanese outcasts’, the ‘kingdom of Chiang Kai-shek bandits’ and the ‘brigandish cave’.⁴⁷ It also reported – or at least seemed to have objectively reported – on the reactions of the common Polish people, hence, contributing to the escalation of emotions. ‘The coastal population condemns American corsairs and their Chiang Kai-shek henchmen’, declared Dziennik Bałtycki.⁴⁸ It also quoted several protest speeches by representatives of various professions, which might be seen as an attempt at bolstering national mobilisation and strengthening patriotic unity among Polish readers.⁴⁹ It can be argued that Trybuna Ludu focused on the very same goals, as its numerous articles described protests launched by the staff of shipyards, railways, garment factories and even the famous Wieliczka Salt Mine.⁵⁰ Readers even became acquainted with a peculiar story of how the workers of one train components factory decided to produce more items than their monthly production norm required in order to ‘demonstrate to the imperialists that any provocations find the Polish nation even more united’.⁵¹

It seems that convincing readers about national unity was just as important a task of the propaganda machine as showing international solidarity with the Polish sailors. Trybuna Ludu claimed that the ship case was widely commented on by the press in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland, among others.⁵² Even the workers of the Antwerp shipyard where Praca had been renovated before heading to China issued a protest note against the detention of the Polish ship.⁵³ Equally important was the fact that the Chinese Renmin Ribao (人民日报), the main propaganda tube of the Central Committee of the CCP, condemned the ‘pirate attack of Kuomintang at the Praca ship’, as quoted by Trybuna Ludu.⁵⁴

The statement of the seamen from Praca, in which they elaborated on the circumstances of their detention in the southern port city of Kaohsiung, was published by Dziennik Bałtycki in November 1954.⁵⁵ In the letter, they reported that the Taiwanese authorities had arrested the Chinese members of the crew and informed the Polish sailors that their Chinese co-workers had been executed.⁵⁶ Moreover, the authors of the letter described the interrogation process and claimed that the Taiwanese officers had been trying to encourage them to ‘have fun with women’. They also reported that the Taiwanese agents forced them to watch some US propaganda films and intended to convince them to drink vodka and accept the service of prostitutes. On the other hand, they were threatened that if they had not signed an asylum request, they would have been imprisoned for the rest of their lives.⁵⁷

According to the letter, on 21 March 1954, Polish sailors were transferred from the ship to a hotel.⁵⁸ In total, four hunger strikes had been undertaken by the Polish crew before they were allowed to return to Poland. The seamen also reported that Brunon Skrzypkowski from Gottwald committed suicide by cutting his own throat. Allegedly, he had initially signed an asylum appeal and broke down upon the news that the sailors on Praca were allowed to return to Poland.⁵⁹

The detention of the other Polish ship, Prezydent Gottwald, provoked another wave of social and media outrage. As described by Dziennik Bałtycki: ‘having heard the radio news about the detention of the ship by Chiang Kai-shek’s thugs, hundreds of thousands of fists clenched in deep indignation against this lawlessness and its perpetrators’.⁶⁰ At the same time, the press clearly aspired to stimulate patriotic sentiments, as it claimed that the incident would not discourage brave Polish seamen from sailing between Poland and China.⁶¹

A broader international context was often invoked: Trybuna Robotnicza listed other ships which were ‘assaulted’ and ‘hijacked’ as part of ‘pirate exploits’ by the ‘Kuomintang gang’.⁶² The report emphasised that in numerous cases, US planes were directly involved.⁶³ In another edition, Trybuna Robotnicza recalled that US fighter jets opened fire at two other Polish vessels, Braterstwo (‘Brotherhood’) and Pokój (‘Peace’), near the island of Hainan.⁶⁴ The incident was reported to have happened on 26 July 1954; interestingly, on 23 July 1954, China shot down a British passenger plane, a Cathay Pacific Douglas DC-4. Accoring to the official narrative - propagated by Trybuna Ludu - Chinese forces, shot the plane down ‘by mistake’, while fighting with the Kuomintang. According to the newspaper, China expressed deep regret and promised to pay compensation. However, on 26 July, two US aircraft carriers, allegedly involved in a rescue operation, approached the island of Hainan. As a result, two Chinese patrol planes were shot down by US fighter jets. According to Trybuna Ludu, it was a ‘pirate escapade’ and a provocation that ‘utterly cynical’. Above all, it was believed to prove that the United States was responsible for the earlier detention of one Soviet and two Polish ships.⁶⁵

On 17 May 1954, Trybuna Ludu published a protest note issued by the Polish government to the US Embassy with the title: ‘On the order of the US, the pirates of Chiang Kai-shek kidnapped another Polish ship’.⁶⁶ The note informed about the circumstances of the hijacking of the Polish ship, and it also stressed that Gottwald was already the second Polish vessel to be detained, as Praca was still held captive. Most importantly, the letter unanimously placed responsibility for the incident on the United States. Similar to the case of Praca, diplomatic notes were also sent through the United Nations to Hammarskjöld and Pandit.⁶⁷

Likewise, the Polish media strived to demonstrate how relevant the second Polish ship case was to the international community, as they referred to foreign press reports on Gottwald’s abduction, published by newspapers in Moscow and Beijing, as well as in Berlin, Geneva and London.⁶⁸ It allowed the Polish press to claim that both the ‘peace camp’ countries (i.e. the communist countries) and capitalist states had reported extensively on the Polish government’s protest notes to the United States and the United Nations.⁶⁹ Furthermore, citing the New China News Agency, Trybuna Robotnicza informed that Beijing had sent a cable to the secretary general of the World Federation of Trade Unions, protesting against the ‘bandit hijacking’ of Gottwald. The cable underlined that the Chiang Kai-shek ‘pirates’ acted under orders from Washington.⁷⁰

It is worth noting that apart from the two blocs of the Cold War, the Polish press also highlighted reactions from the so-called non-aligned countries. One example is provided by Trybuna Ludu, which published a letter sent by the All India Trade Union Congress to the secretary general of the United Nations, objecting to the kidnapping of Gottwald and reminding the United Nations about the case of Praca.⁷¹ In reality, where trade unions served as an instrument of the PUWP, a common Polish reader might have mistakenly presumed that the Polish case was supported by the New Delhi authorities – however, Trybuna Ludu did not clarify that the letter was issued by the oldest Indian trade union federation, which was associated with the anti-government and relatively marginal Communist Party of India.

As reported by Dziennik Bałtycki, the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions made an international appeal for freeing Gottwald sailors together with the seamen from the Soviet ship Tuapse, whose crew was interned in Taiwan at the time.⁷² In light of Poland’s adherence to the Eastern Bloc under Soviet leadership, it seems understandable why the case of the Tuapse was also widely covered by the Polish press. As expected, Polish newspapers put responsibility for the incident on the United States, echoing the Soviet stance and the narrative of the Soviet press.⁷³

To report on social reactions, the Polish press cited a variety of statements, notes and letters issued by public institutions, organisations and individuals. A cable from the relatives of the Gottwald seamen to the presidium of the Women’s International Democratic Federation was published by Dziennik Bałtycki – the authors of the letter stated that the members of their families had been detained by ‘Chiang Kai-shek pirates who acted on the orders of the American imperialists’.⁷⁴ The two-page-long, detailed article described the course of the protests and also incorporated the content of some other speeches and letters⁠ – including the one sent to the World Federation of Trade Unions, which argued that responsibility for this ‘act of lawlessness’ was held by the US government, the sponsor of the ‘Kuomintang clique’.⁷⁵ Moreover, the Polish press indicated that the families of Gottwald sailors addressed their letters to the Swedish Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies.⁷⁶

In December 1954, Dziennik Bałtycki reported on the moral support expressed by the miners from the Gottwald mine (which bore the same name as the detained ship) as a symbol of solidarity with the ‘kidnapped’ sailors and their families.⁷⁷ The Polish seamen serving on other ships were also believed to participate in demonstrations against ‘Chiang Kai-shek’s pirates’.⁷⁸ It is interesting to observe that while, in the case of Praca, physical workers were identified as the dominant group protesting, this time the manifestations of solidarity by academic circles were also highlighted. From Trybuna Ludu one may learn that ‘professors, assistants, students, and administrative cadres’ of the Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin passed a resolution in which they emphasised US responsibility for the violation of international law in the case of both Polish ships.⁷⁹ Moreover, Dziennik Bałtycki quoted some statements from an assembly of the Higher School of Economics in Sopot which rallied against ‘the act of degeneration of American imperialism’, as uttered by the head of the department of seaport economics.⁸⁰ A common belief that the US authorities had a decisive influence on the Polish ships case was also conveyed by a satirical drawing by Jerzy Zaruba in Szpilki, in which US secretary of state John Foster Dulles (1888–1959) tells Chiang Kai-shek: ‘Write down that the US government does not know anything about the detention of the Polish ship Gottwald’.⁸¹

Communist heroes and ‘internal enemies’

As can be deduced from the press reports, the return of the Praca and Gottwald sailors to Poland was a matter of national pride and dignity. The repatriation of 18 seamen from Praca by plane on 15 July 1954 was thoroughly reported by Trybuna Ludu, which even attached a photograph taken during the first meeting of the sailors with their families to the front page article.⁸² In an intensely emotional tone, it described the tears of happiness flowing down on ‘the husbands’ pale faces, marked by punitive experiences from captivity, and on the faces of mothers, sons, wives’.⁸³

The seamen from Gottwald returned by air on 26 May 1955. According to Dziennik Bałtycki, the Gottwald crew was welcomed at the airport in Gdańsk by 80,000 people. The sailors – all mentioned in the newspaper by name – were called ‘the heroes who did not break down under the terror of the Chiang Kai-shekists’.⁸⁴ One of the crew members was reportedly undergoing gastric surgery in Bangkok at the time; however, the daily wrote that his condition was stable and that he would soon be heading back to Poland.

The return of the ‘Gottwalders’ was also covered by Trybuna Robotnicza, which in a vivid, over-emotional tone described the reactions of the sailors’ families, who welcomed their relatives with flower bouquets and tears of happiness.⁸⁵ Similar to Dziennik Bałtycki, Trybuna Robotnicza mentioned all the sailors by name, including the one who fell ill and stayed in a hospital in Bangkok, as well as another sailor, Jerzy Ruszkowski (misspelled, as it should be ‘Ruszowski’), who was believed to have lost his life because of meningitis. Moreover, Zygmunt Skrzypiński and Brunon Skrzypkowski were reported to have died after they had signed an appeal for political asylum.⁸⁶

Less than a fortnight after the seamen’s return to Poland, the ashes of the two deceased sailors⁠ – Ruszowski and Skrzypkowski – were buried. Dziennik Bałtycki described the ceremony, yet again trying to stir up negative emotions towards Taiwanese authorities among Polish readers: ‘And fists clench in a silent protest against the crimes of those who cynically violate all international laws, regulations, and conventions’.⁸⁷

The homecoming of the Polish sailors provided the propaganda machine with an opportunity to praise the communist government for the successful repatriation process, as well as to bolster national unity by glorifying the bravery of the ones who resisted Taiwanese terror.⁸⁸ However, it is important to remember that not all of the sailors returned to Poland. Polish journalists and editors faced a substantial challenge in terms of maintaining the ‘correct’ ideological propaganda line, as their major concern was how to handle the fact that some crew members of Praca and Gottwald applied for political asylum and emigrated to the United States.⁸⁹

Considering the unreliability of the communist press, which tended to deliver manipulated, incomplete or even contradictory information, reconstruction of what happened to the Polish sailors who died in Taiwan is rather arduous, if not entirely unachievable. The Gottwald sailors, interviewed on their way back to Poland, claimed that Skrzypkowski died of meningitis; however, one year earlier the Praca sailors reported in their letter that their colleague from the other Polish ship signed an asylum request and, upon hearing about the Praca seamen’s planned return to Poland, committed suicide.⁹⁰ As disclosed by Trybuna Ludu on 26 May 1955, the ‘Gottwalders’ told the press that it was Ruszowski who had had a nervous breakdown and committed suicide, hanging himself with his own belt.⁹¹ However, only one day later, on 27 May 1955, Trybuna Robotnicza asserted that Jerzy Ruszowski was the one who died of meningitis.

It seems that the Polish journalists did not actually intend to clarify contradictions on those two deaths, which suggests that from the propaganda point of view, it was believed to be a highly controversial matter, not meant to be investigated or thoroughly recounted. Nevertheless, a story-like interview with four Gottwald sailors divulged that not only Ruszowski had a mental breakdown: apparently, two other seamen cut their veins in an attempted suicide. Nonetheless, in the end, the would-be suicides did return to Poland.⁹²

Interestingly, the interviewees evinced that the mental health crisis the two sailors went through was caused by those who ‘built their hopes on human imperfections and weaknesses, on the desire for money and luxury, on the wish of pleasure, on betrayal and denial’.⁹³ The last words imply that some ‘traitors’ among the crew tried to convince others to apply for political asylum and therefore they should be, to some extent, held responsible for Ruszowski’s death. In fact, the circumstances of his demise remain unclear; some have even advocated that Ruszowski was murdered – perhaps by his two fellow seamen.⁹⁴ However, this scenario has never been explored by the Polish press.

The fact that some sailors applied for political asylum undermined the unity among the Polish crew and posed a threat to the propaganda-created image of their bravery and patriotism. As a result, the Polish press depicted the deserters’ decision as an act of treason. ‘Some of the [Praca] crew succumbed to the terror and blackmail of American mercenaries and betrayed the motherland, arousing feelings of contempt in the nation’, commented Trybuna Robotnicza.⁹⁵ To some extent, however, it seems that it tried to balance between condemning the ‘betrayal’ and noticing the fact that the sailors were subjected to tremendous pressure.

Almost one year later, the same newspaper made a parallel comment about sailors from Gottwald who had ‘entered the service of the imperialists’ by asking for political asylum.⁹⁶ The case of ‘betrayal’ was also reflected in the diplomatic correspondence⁠. According to one of the letters addressed by the Polish government to the US Embassy in Warsaw, it was Washington that induced a group of Polish sailors with ‘pressure and terror’ to emigrate to the United States, where they were exploited for ‘anti-Polish propaganda’.⁹⁷

The sabotage actions, aimed at weakening the sailors’ resistance, were characterised in detail by Dziennik Bałtycki. It disclosed how the ‘traitors’ from Praca purportedly visited the seamen from Gottwald when both crews were held captive in Taiwan. The newspaper explained:

They appeared friendly and offered us vodka and girls. But, under the guise of providing some entertainment, they just wanted to identify the weak, the drunks and lechers. Once man’s will was at its weakest, they would give you the political asylum request to sign.⁹⁸

It openly called one of the ‘traitors’, Grzegorz Romanow, ‘a man devoid of any moral principles’, a drunkard and the main provocateur.

Ironically, these revelations were not manufactured by Polish journalists themselves. A de-classified document reveals that Polish authorities ordered the collection of compromising information about the deserters. When Praca was being renovated in a shipyard in Antwerp in the second quarter of 1953, Leonard Wąsowski, Józef Tynfowicz and Grzegorz Romanow were frequently spotted drinking alcohol and dating women as part of their ‘spree lifestyle’.⁹⁹ Reportedly, they forged some documents and defrauded the ship renovation funds. Furthermore, the declassified document suggests that the troublemaking trio applied for political asylum as they wanted to avoid the legal consequences of crimes they had committed in Antwerp.¹⁰⁰ As a result, they were believed to have actively participated in ‘sabotage’ actions, aimed at lowering the morale of their colleagues.

Even though the communist press did not explore all of these accusations, it can be assumed that the Polish authorities purposefully shared at least some of the compromising information with the journalists in order to help them present the ‘traitorous’ behaviour of the deserters as most reprehensible.¹⁰¹ Without a doubt, such reports intended to emphasise the ‘individual corruption’ of the deserters who succumbed to US propaganda.

To provide further evidence for their moral decay, Dziennik Bałtycki stressed that the ‘traitors’ abandoned their wives and children.¹⁰² Moreover, not without satisfaction, the journalists described the story of how the former captain of Praca, Leonard Wąsowski, was promised a highly paid job, and even his own ship, but allegedly ended up working at a petrol station.¹⁰³ Undoubtedly, this story was meant to serve not only as proof of corruption and the low moral standards of the captain himself, but also as a warning against what was believed to be US manipulation and hypocrisy.

It is also worth observing that three Gottwald sailors, who had originally submitted the asylum applications, decided to return from the United States to Poland.¹⁰⁴ Even though the Polish press had initially called them ‘traitors’, now it had to properly portray their homecoming. Thus, the press reports provided rather laconic explanations of how those three deserters got deceived and manipulated as they were ‘forced to sign an asylum request’ while in captivity.¹⁰⁵ In the United States, they were reported to have been employed as ‘unskilled workers’, until they requested the Embassy of Poland in Washington to assist with the repatriation process.

Concluding remarks

Owing to geopolitical ambience, Poland was one of the first countries in the world to recognise the government in Beijing as the sole representative of China, thus terminating official relations with the ROC authorities. As a result, Taiwan became – by definition – a political and ideological enemy. However, the detention of two Polish ships was more than just a piece of the Cold War jigsaw – it was a matter of defending national pride and honour, and a cause for collective trauma. Therefore, it seems comprehensible and logical that Polish newspapers published these extensive reports on the ship issue, often locating them on the front pages. Pretending to maintain ideological objectivity, these press reports cited both ‘communist’ as well as ‘capitalist’ sources; they also consisted of various notes and letters issued by the Polish government and quoted ‘ordinary citizens’ who allegedly manifested their objection to the ‘hijacking’ of the Polish ships. It can be argued that it was meant to demonstrate the scale of common people’s involvement and the national, patriotic character of the cause.

Beyond the media dimension, the memoirs of the Praca and Gottwald sailors have been published in the form of books. These include the travel journal of Zbigniew Krogulski, one of the crew members of Praca; interviews with Praca sailors collected in the spa town and ski resort of Karpacz, where Polish authorities sent the seamen and their families on holidays in August 1954; and memoirs of Praca’s deputy captain Adam Lewandowski.¹⁰⁶ The goal of all of these publications was to demonstrate the courage and patriotism of the Polish sailors, revealing the moral decay of US ‘imperialists’, and proving that Taiwan was the ‘regime of poverty, famine, and terror’.¹⁰⁷ To make his description of the food shortage in Taiwan more shocking, Lewandowski noticed that even a ‘rotten, stinky sausage, which was supposed to be thrown overboard’, was confiscated and eaten by the KMT officers after they had detained the Polish ship.¹⁰⁸

Moreover, a collection of short stories, based loosely on the events in Taiwan, was written by Janusz Meissner (1901–78), a well-known Polish author of marine and aviation literature.¹⁰⁹ Nonetheless, whatever the source was, it must be remembered that all the reports, interviews and stories which were made public were obliged to fulfil the requirements of communist propaganda, whose imperative was to create a desirable and ideologically correct reality – not to convey the truth. For that reason, the message ought to be simple and clear, leaving no space for potentially ‘erroneous’ interpretations. Above all, the glorification of the communist heroes seemed as important as the condemnation of the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ enemies.

The members of Chiang’s KMT ‘clique’ were known as ‘imperialists’ and ‘fascists’, as well as ‘pirates’ and ‘bandits’. However, to an even larger extent than on the KMT and its leader, Polish newspapers focused on US involvement. This narrative corresponds with the founding principles of the Polish communist press discourse, which portrayed the United States and ‘American imperialism’ as the main external enemy. In other words, there was a clear-cut hierarchy among the ‘enemies’: whereas the US enemy was the superior one, Chiang’s officials served as his ‘bandits’ and ‘hired hands’.

It is important to highlight that the references to ‘Taiwan’ can hardly be found in the Polish press of the 1950s. If found at all, the term was used only as a name of an island, not as a political entity. The ‘Republic of China’ was never mentioned; instead, phrases like the ‘Chiang Kai-shek clique’ were applied. Arguably, the Polish journalists not only made an unequivocally negative assessment of the ROC, but they also deliberately reduced the Taiwanese authorities to bandits and pirates. Thus, the Polish press refused to recognize Taiwan's statehood, convincing readers that it had been merely a ‘renegade province’ of China. To paraphrase Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), this illustrates how the limits of communist propaganda language were supposed to mean the limits of the Polish citizen’s world.¹¹⁰

The detention of the two Polish ships may be labelled as the most serious incident in the Poland-Taiwan relations of the 1950s, if not throughout the entire Cold War period. However, it seems justified to claim that the Taiwanese authorities did not really intend to affect relations with Poland per se: their primary goal was to isolate China, cutting it off from sea trade routes, regardless of which country Beijing tried to cooperate with. Hence, the ROC navy had decided to detain two Polish ships (whereas two others were fired at), as it would have affected Sino-Polish trade relations. Conceivably, the Taiwanese officials could have also expected to extract some classified information on Chipolbrok from the crew.¹¹¹ In the case of the Praca tanker, it was believed to have transported aviation fuel, which could have been used by China in its air confrontations with the ROC.¹¹² Nevertheless, it seems that the disturbance of the Sino-Polish sea trade was much less exposed by the communist media narratives than the corsair modus operandi of the Chiang Kai-shek ‘clique’, allegedly supported by US ‘imperialists’.

In sum, it was the Cold War framework that determined the nature of relations (or, rather, the lack of relations) between Poland and Taiwan⁠ – two countries which had not been destined to be hostile to one another, yet became the victims of Cold War divisions and antagonisms. Poland-Taiwan cooperation did not develop until the democratic transformations were initiated in both countries in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Nonetheless, democratic Poland has continued to recognise Beijing as the sole legal representative of China.

Acknowledgements

This paper is an outcome of research carried out in Poland, Taiwan and the United States. The project was sponsored by the Taiwan Fellowship, awarded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan in 2020, and the Excellence Initiative at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland, in 2021. Partial results of the research were presented during the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies Convention in New Orleans in 2021.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

Taiwan Fellowship, awarded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), for the ‘Taiwan in the Polish Communist Discourse (1949–1989) in the Global Cold War Context and Its Implications for Taiwan-Poland Relations’ project. Strategic Programme Excellence Initiative at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, for the ‘Poland-Taiwan Relations during the Cold War: The Case Study of Praca and Prezydent Gottwald’ project.

Notes

¹ This paper is the result of research conducted in Poland, Taiwan and the United States. In 2020, the author received the Taiwan Fellowship, awarded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), for the ‘Taiwan in the Polish Communist Discourse (1949–1989) in the Global Cold War Context and Its Implications for Taiwan-Poland Relations’ project. This work was also funded by the Strategic Programme Excellence Initiative at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, which supported the ‘Poland-Taiwan Relations during the Cold War: The Case Study of Praca and Prezydent Gottwald’ project.

² See: Wojciech Roszkowski, Najnowsza historia Polski 1914–1945 (Warsaw: Świat Książki, 2003), 236–40, 678–80, 700–1.

³ Quoted by: Leo Gruliow, ‘The Soviet Press: “Propagandist, Agitator, Organizer”’, Journal of International Affairs 10, no. 2 (1956): 153.

⁴ Hanna Karp, ‘Dziennikarz w systemie mediów totalitarnych Polski Ludowej’, Media, Kultura, Społeczeństwo 9–10 (2014–15): 53.

⁵ Łukasz Kamiński, ‘Struktury propagandy w PRL’, in Propaganda PRL, ed. Piotr Semków (Gdańsk: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2004), 11–12.

⁶ Grzegorz Łęcicki, ‘Cenzura w Polsce Ludowej: propaganda, manipulacja, destrukcja’, Kwartalnik Nauk o Mediach, November 30, 2015, http://knm.uksw.edu.pl/cenzura-w-polsce-ludowej-propaganda-manipulacja-destrukcja/ (accessed 12 March 2021).

⁷ Absurdy cenzury w okresie PRL-u, Archiwum Narodowe w Krakowie, https://ank.gov.pl/wystawy/absurdy-cenzury-w-okresie-prl-u/#_ftnref1 (accessed 1 March 2021).

⁸ Paweł Sasanka, ‘Historia walki na dwa fronty. Władza – prasa – dziennikarze 1953–1955/1956’, Polska 1944/45–1989. Studia i Materiały no. 16 (2018): 86. https://apcz.umk.pl/PL1944/article/view/Polska.2018.03. For the ‘Polish October’, see also: Michał Lubina, ‘“China Fever” in Post-October Poland and Its Impact on Polish Sinology’, in Sinology During the Cold War, ed. Antonina Łuszczykiewicz and Michael C. Brose (London: Routledge, 2022), 98–126.

⁹ Unless stated otherwise, all quotations were translated by the author of this paper.:

¹⁰ Michał Głowiński, Zła mowa. Jak nie dać się propagandzie (Warsaw: Wielka Litera, 2016), 222.

¹¹ Jacek Wojsław, ‘Figura wroga w ideologii i propagandzie XX-wiecznych totalitaryzmów – przyczynek do dyskusji’, Media-Biznes-Kultura: Dziennikarstwo i komunikacja społeczna 1, no. 2 (2017): 58.

¹² Adrian Konefał, ‘Wizerunek I sekretarza Edwarda Gierka kreowany przez propagandę reżimu komunistycznego na łamach dziennika “Trybuna Ludu”’, Świat Idei i Polityki 19 (2020): 303.

¹³ See: Mirosław Szumiło, ‘Działalność redakcji “Trybuny Ludu” w 1955 roku w świetle raportu ambasadora sowieckiego w Warszawie’, Res Historica 36 (2013): 301–2.

¹⁴ Konefał, ‘Wizerunek I sekretarza’.

¹⁵ Eugeniusz Cofta, ‘Pierwszy polski dziennik w wolnym Poznaniu’, in Trud pierwszych dni. Poznań 1945: Wspomnienia poznaniaków, ed. Tadeusz Świtała (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1970), 36–9.

¹⁶ Express Ilustrowany, 1 February 1949, 1.

¹⁷ Głos Chłopski, 12 January 1949, 1.

¹⁸ Ibid; and Głos Chłopski, 14 May 1949, 1.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Głos Robotniczy, 7 December 1949, 1; and Głos Radomszczański, May 5, 1949, 1.

²¹ Głos Robotniczy, 18 October 1949, 2.

²² Dziennik Łódzki, 4 September 1949, 2.

²³ Trybuna Robotnicza, 1 December 1950, 1.

²⁴ Dziennik Łódzki, 20 September 1950, 1.

²⁵ Głos Wielkopolski, 1 September 1950, 1.

²⁶ Gość Niedzielny, 13 March 1955, 5.

²⁷ Dziennik Łódzki, 30 June 1950, 1; Głos Wielkopolski, July 1, 1950, 1–2; and Trybuna Robotnicza, August 26, 1950, 2.

²⁸ Głos Wielkopolski, 16 September 1950, 3.

²⁹ Trybuna Robotnicza, 16 August 1954, 2.

³⁰ Głos Wielkopolski, 5 January 1950, 3.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Głos Wielkopolski, August 13, 1950, 5.

³³ Głos Wielkopolski, May 20, 1950, 1; and Dziennik Łódzki, May 20, 1950, 1.

³⁴ Bruce A. Elleman, ‘Taiwan’s Offshore Islands, Pathway or Barrier?’, Naval War College Newport Papers no. 44 (2019): 6–7, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1042&context=usnwc-newport-papers (accessed 17 June 2022).

³⁵ ‘Fengsuo gongqu’, Archival Resources for Teaching, https://art.archives.gov.tw/Theme.aspx?MenuID=552 (accessed 27 September 2022).

³⁶ Established on 15 June 1951, it was the first Sino-foreign joint venture in the PRC. See: Miao Huashou, ‘Sixty-Five Years of Sino-Poland Relations – Past, Present and Future’, in Poland–China: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, ed. Bogdan Góralczyk and Miao Huashou (Toruń: WAM, 2014), 13. Photographs of Praca were published by Dziennik Bałtycki, October 21, 1953, 2, and Trybuna Robotnicza, October 17–18, 1953, 1. It was named after Czechoslovakian president Klement Gottwald (1896–1953) and was usually referred to simply as Gottwald. Gottwald was the first Polish cargo ship which sailed on the Poland-PRC route (Dziennik Bałtycki, May 18, 1954, 2). Its photograph can be found in Trybuna Robotnicza, May 19, 1954, 1.

³⁷ Ryszard Leszczyński, Ginące frachtowce (Gdańsk: WDG Drukarnia w Gdyni, 2007), 1: 81.

³⁸ Article 15 of the Convention on the High Seas Done at Geneva on 29 April 1958 (United Nations: 2005), 5, https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b4abc-1/pdf/ (accessed 18 June 2022).

³⁹ Trybuna Ludu, 15 October 1954, 2.

⁴⁰ Zhang Yujun, ‘Qian tan gong jun fei zhanzheng junshi xingdong jian lun shewai renwu zhixing gaikuang’, Haijun xueshu shuangyuekan 52, no. 5 (2018): 112, https://navy.mnd.gov.tw/Files/Paper/8-%E6%B7%BA%E8%AB%87%E5%85%B1%E8%BB%8D%E9%9D%9E%E6%88%B0%E7%88%AD.pdf (accessed 17 June 2022); Mao Zhengqi, ‘Haijun junguan ying zhi de Taiwan dongbei jiao haiyu’, Haijun xueshu shuangyuekan 51, no. 1 (2017): 136, https://navy.mnd.gov.tw/Files/Paper/9-%E6%B5%B7%E8%BB%8D%E8%BB%8D%E5%AE%98%E6%87%89%E7%9F%A5%E7%9A%84%E8%87%BA%E7%81%A3.pdf (accessed 17 June 2022).

⁴¹ Trybuna Ludu, 14 October 1953, 1; Dziennik Bałtycki, October 14, 1953, 1; and Trybuna Robotnicza, October 14, 1953, 1.

⁴² Dziennik Bałtycki, 15 October 1953, 1.

⁴³ Trybuna Robotnicza, 28 October 1953, 1.

⁴⁴ Trybuna Ludu, 28 October 1953, 2.

⁴⁵ Dziennik Bałtycki, 30 October 1953, 1.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 2.

⁴⁷ Trybuna Robotnicza, 14-15 November 1953, 1; and Trybuna Ludu, October 29, 1953, 2.

⁴⁸ Dziennik Bałtycki, 31 October 1953, 1.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 1–2.

⁵⁰ Trybuna Ludu, 31 October 1953, 1; and Trybuna Ludu, 2 November 1953, 1.

⁵¹ Trybuna Ludu, 1 November 1953, 1.

⁵² Trybuna Ludu, 17 December 1953, 1.

⁵³ Trybuna Ludu, 26 March 1954, 2.

⁵⁴ Trybuna Ludu, 12 December 1953, 2.

⁵⁵ Dziennik Bałtycki, 21-22 November 1954, 1.

⁵⁶ Dziennik Bałtycki, 21-22 November 1954, 3. However, it was not true. In a statement delivered to Polish authorities, Deputy Captain Adam Lewandowski claimed that there were three occasions when he met some members of the Chinese crew after they had been arrested. Adam Lewandowski, Notatka dotycząca członków załogi statku ‘Praca’ pochodzenia chińskiego, 1–2, file III 1024/23, Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw.

⁵⁷ According to their statement, the Polish sailors experienced psychological terror. They were threatened with repressions, imprisonment and even death. They were also told that the Third World War would break out shortly, implying that Poland would soon be liberated from communism. Moreover, they were misinformed that people in Poland were starving because of an economic crisis. Finally, they were warned that if they had returned to Poland, they would have been treated by the Polish government as criminals or at least ‘suspicious’ elements. However, the statement did not mention anything about physical violence. Marynarze, którzy wrócili do kraju z tankowca „Praca” informują, 1–2, file III 1024/23, Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw.

⁵⁸ Dziennik Bałtycki, 21-22 November 1954, 3. According to Deputy Captain Adam Lewandowski, after 10 days spent in a hotel, the sailors were transferred to a school gym somewhere in the countryside. See: Adam Lewandowski, Dziewięć miesięcy na Tajwanie (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Iskry, 1954), 59.

⁵⁹ Dziennik Bałtycki, 21-22 November 1954, 3.

⁶⁰ Dziennik Bałtycki, 18 May 1954, 1.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Trybuna Robotnicza, 17 August 1954, 2.

⁶³ Trybuna Robotnicza, 28 May 1954, 2.

⁶⁴ Trybuna Ludu, 29 July 1954, 2; Trybuna Robotnicza, 2 August 1954, 1. The protest note of the Polish government to the Embassy of the United States in Warsaw was published by Trybuna Ludu, 1 August 1954, 1.

⁶⁵ Trybuna Robotnicza, 2 August 1954, 1.

⁶⁶ Trybuna Ludu, 17 May 1954, 1.

⁶⁷ Trybuna Ludu, 18 May 1954, 1; and Trybuna Robotnicza, 19 May 1954, 1.

⁶⁸ The Polish press propaganda differed slightly from the narratives prepared by the Polish authorities for the international audience. As the Polish government was collecting documents for a white paper, the Ministry of Shipping sent some remarks to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, advising them to include more materials which would ‘reaffirm the thesis that Chang Kai-shek gangs are dangerous to all countries wishing to maintain trade relations with the People’s Republic of China’. The document also suggested adding more copies of the letters from the sailors and their families, as well as photographs and other documents which would ‘interest the Western reader and, above all, speak deeply to his humanitarian feelings’. In addition, it advised them to attach photographs of the families’ houses to counterbalance the ‘enemy propaganda’, according to which Polish sailors were eager to ask for political asylum, as they hoped to escape from the poverty back at home. Finally, the Ministry of Shipping advocated for including some statements by ‘prominent activists and statesmen of capitalist countries regarding the pirate activities of the Chiang-Kai-shek clique, Taiwan’s subjugation to the United States, etc.’ See: an untitled note with remarks on the content of a white paper, 3886/tjn/54, file 237/V-16/-85, Zakład Historii Partii przy KC PZPR, Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw.

⁶⁹ Trybuna Robotnicza, 22-23 May 1954, 1.

⁷⁰ Trybuna Robotnicza, 25 May 1954, 2.

⁷¹ Trybuna Ludu, 16 August 1954, 2.

⁷² Tuapse was a Soviet cargo ship detained by Taiwanese authorities on 23 June 1954. This case was widely covered by the Polish press; see for example the protest notes from the USSR to the United States published by Polish newspapers: Trybuna Ludu, 4 July 1954, 1; Trybuna Ludu, 6 August 1954, 2. Dziennik Bałtycki, 16 December 1954, 1.

⁷³ Trybuna Ludu, 7 July 1954, 2. An article published originally in Pravda, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on breaking the freedom of navigation by the United States, was reprinted by Trybuna Ludu, 9 July 1954, 2.

⁷⁴ Dziennik Bałtycki, 27 November 1954, 2.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Trybuna Robotnicza, 19 January 1955, 1; and Trybuna Robotnicza, September 29, 1954,1.

⁷⁷ Dziennik Bałtycki, 8 December 1954, 2.

⁷⁸ Dziennik Bałtycki, 27 November 1954, 1.

⁷⁹ Trybuna Ludu, 22 May 1954, 1.

⁸⁰ Dziennik Bałtycki, 18 May 1954, 1.

⁸¹ Szpilki, 6 June 1954, 23/673, 1.

⁸² Trybuna Ludu, 16 July 1954, 1.

⁸³ Trybuna Robotnicza, 16 July 1954, 1.

⁸⁴ Dziennik Bałtycki, 27 May 1955, 1.

⁸⁵ Trybuna Robotnicza, 27 May 1955, 1.

⁸⁶ This error circulated widely among the Polish media (see also: Życie Warszawy, 27 May 1955, 2). In fact, Skrzypiński moved to the United States and settled in New Britain, Connecticut. See: ‘Memorandum of Information from Immigration and Naturalisation Service Files Re Zygmunt Skrzypinski, Beneficiary of H. R. 3981’, in Calendar No. 2073, Report No. 2050, The United States Congress (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 54–5. See more in the section: Press Coverage on ‘Internal Enemies’.

⁸⁷ Dziennik Bałtycki, 9 June 1955, 1.

⁸⁸ The Gottwald sailors received state orders, as reported by Trybuna Robotnicza, 30 May 1955, 1.

⁸⁹ Thanks to the support of Congressman Alfred Dennis Sieminski of Polish descent, 22 sailors from Praca and Gottwald were admitted to the United States for six months under the waiver of documents regulations. In the end, 19 Polish seamen were granted permanent residence in the United States (three seamen decided to return to Poland instead). According to memoranda of information prepared by the commissioner of immigration and naturalisation, Polish sailors declared they had belonged to communist organisations in Poland, but also stressed that the membership was automatic and obligatory, otherwise their employment could be jeopardised. The agencies of the US government in charge of protecting national security certified that Polish seamen were ‘thoroughly screened and that admission to the United States would be in the public interest’. Letter from the Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalisation Service, Washington, D.C., 23 November 1955, in Calendar No. 2073, Report No. 2050, United States Congress (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 48. The memoranda on Polish seamen from Praca and Gottwald were included in: United States Congress, Calendar No. 2073, Report No. 2050 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 50–65.

⁹⁰ Trybuna Ludu, 26 May 1955, 1; and Dziennik Bałtycki, November 21–22, 1954, 3.

⁹¹ Trybuna Ludu, 26 May 1955.

⁹² Trybuna Ludu, 29 May 1955, 3.

⁹³ However, Ruszowski was not mentioned in the list of deserters, which was in possession of the Ministry of Shipping on July 30, 1954. Wykaz dezerterów m/s Prezydent Gottwald, an attachment to 448/tjn/54, file III 1024/23, Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw.

⁹⁴ See more: Janusz Wróbel, Chipolbrok: Z dziejów polsko–chińskiego sojuszu morskiego 1950–1957 (Łódź: IPN, 2016), 400.

⁹⁵ Trybuna Robotnicza, 16 July 1954, 1.

⁹⁶ Trybuna Robotnicza, 27 May 1955, 1.

⁹⁷ Trybuna Robotnicza, 14 November 1955, 2.

⁹⁸ Dziennik Bałtycki, 3 June 1955, 1.

⁹⁹ Notatka służbowa dla Obywatela Ministra Żeglugi w sprawie dezercji na statku ‘Praca’ na ‘Taiwanie’, 1, file III 1024/23, Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warsaw.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 2.

¹⁰¹ Janusz Wróbel claims that the US authorities had not guaranteed asylum for Polish sailors, even though the Polish crew was encouraged to apply for it by Taiwanese officers. Those who decided to seek asylum had to go through long and complicated immigration procedures; moreover, their living conditions were far below what they had been initially promised. See: Wróbel, Chipolbrok, 454–5.

¹⁰² Dziennik Bałtycki, 3 June 1955, 1.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 2.

¹⁰⁴ According to the letter of the commissioner of immigration and naturalisation, four days after the fact the US officials learned that three Polish sailors had ‘quietly departed from the United States by plane, destined to Poland’. Before, the seamen were allegedly visited by a representative of the Polish Embassy in New York, who passed letters from their relatives which indicated they would be granted complete amnesty by the communist government of Poland. See more: Letter from J. M. Swing, commissioner, to Hon. Emanuel Celler, chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., in Calendar No. 2073, Report No. 2050, The United States Congress (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 49.

¹⁰⁵ Trybuna Robotnicza, 28 October 1955, 1.

¹⁰⁶ Zbigniew Krogulski, W niewoli u Czang Kai-szeka. Dziennik marynarza statku ‘Praca’ (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1954). Some copies of the book were mistakenly attributed to Tadeusz Grabowski; Na pirackiej wyspie. Wspomnienia marynarzy ze statku “Praca” zebrał i spisał Bronisław Wiernik (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1954); and Lewandowski, Dziewięć miesięcy na Taiwanie.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 53.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 12.

¹⁰⁹ Janusz Meissner, Tajfun z południo-wschodu (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Iskry, 1955).

¹¹⁰ See: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), 149.

¹¹¹ Wróbel, Chipolbrok, 345–6.

¹¹² Leszczyński, Ginące frachtowce, 88. Allegedly, sailors from Praca were informed by a Taiwanese officer that their ship had been followed since the Strait of Malacca, or even Suez Canal. Ibid., 92.