Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party

Abstract

Deviating from the mainstream analyses of the AKP that see the rise of AKP to power as a result of the struggle between “center” and “periphery,” this study is an attempt to analyze and understand the modalities of inclusion and accommodation of Turkish Islamism into the sociopolitical structure of Turkey. Therefore, it specially focuses on three interwoven processes: the articulation of Turkish Islamism with the Turkish Islamic synthesis; permanent enlargement of the religious field; and articulation between neoliberalism and Turkish Islamism. Its main argument is that among others, these processes have not only largely transformed Turkish Islamism but also opened a huge sociopolitical space for the rise of the AKP to power.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Samet Bağce, Helga Rittersberger‐Tılıç, Ceylan Tokluoğlu, and Sabine Strasser for their comments and help on various points. For an earlier version of this article, see Mustafa Şen, “Türk‐İslâmcılığının Neoliberalism ile Kutsal İttifakı,” in Ceyhun Gürkan, Özlem Taştan and Oktar Türel (eds.), Küreselleşmeye Güneyden Tepkiler (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2006), pp. 221–240.

Notes

1. See http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2002/11/04/. The metaphor of revolution for the AKP's rise to power was also used by a foreign observer who was the New York Times bureau chief in Istanbul between 1996 and 2000. See Stephen Kinzer, “The Quite Revolution,” The American Prospect, Vol. 14 (December 2003), pp. 13–15.

2. For a comprehensive analysis of the Virtue Party, see Birol A. Yeşilada, “The Virtue Party,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No.1 (2002), pp. 62–81.

3. For the discourses and ideology of parties founded by Milli Görüş, see Ahmet Yildiz, “Politico‐Religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey: The Parties of National Outlook,” Muslim World, Vol. 93, No. 2 (2003), pp. 187–200.

4. For the main dynamics that led to the division of Milli Görüş and the emergence of the AKP, see Fulya Atacan, “Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP‐SP,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2005), pp. 187–199.

5. For a comprehensive analysis of the 2002 election, see Fethi Açıkel, “Mapping the Turkish Political Landscape through November 2002 Elections,” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2003), pp. 185–203.

6. In the Turkish context, the conceptualization of center and periphery was first used by Şerif Mardin, “Centre‐Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics,” Daedalus, Vol. 102, No. 1 (1973), pp. 169–190.

7. The main tenets of this approach can be found in the following studies on the AKP: Hakan M. Yavuz (ed.), The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the Ak Party (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006); Ümit Cizre (ed.), Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party (London: Routledge, 2008); Ümit Cizre and Menderes Çınar, “Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process,” The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 102, No. 2/3 (2003), pp. 309–332; Menderes Çınar, “Turkey's Transformation under the AKP Rule,” The Muslim World, Vol. 96, No. 3 (2006), pp. 469–486; Ahmet İnsel, “The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey,” The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 102, No. 2/3 (2003), pp. 293–308.

8. For an excellent critical review of literature on the AKP largely framed with the state‐versus‐society approach, see Evren Hoşgör, AKP, State and Capital: A Class‐Theoretical Re‐interpretation of the Conflict Between the “Centre” and “Periphery” in Turkey (Lancaster University, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, 2008), pp. 12–35.

9. Ibid., p. 27.

10. Yael Navaro‐Yashin, Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 136.

11. Ibid., p. 136.

12. Gamze Çavdar, “Islamist New Thinking in Turkey: A Model for Political Learning,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 121, No. 3 (2006), pp. 486–487.

13. During the 1970s, the Islamist National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP) stayed in power more for than four years as a coalition partner in three governments. It was the only party whose term in power was longer than other parties. For more on the MSP, see Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, Türkiye'de Modernleşme, Din ve Parti Politikası “MSP Örnek Olayı” [Modernization, Religion and Party Politics in Turkey: “The Case of the MSP”] (Istanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1985).

14. For more on the religious field, see Pierre Bourdieu, “Genesis and Structure of the Religious Field,” Comparative Social Research, No.13 (1991), pp. 1–44.

15. Gokhan Cetinsaya, “Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of ‘Turkish‐Islamic Synthesis’ in Modern Turkish Political Thought,” The Muslim World, Vol. 89, No. 3/4 (1999), pp. 350–376; Tarık Zafer Tunaya, İslamcılık Akımı [The Islamist Movement] (Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003).

16. Tanıl Bora, Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakârlık, İslâmcılık [Three Forms of Turkish Right: Nationalism, Conservatism and Islamism] (Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1999).

17. Bozkurt Güvenç, Gencay Şaylan, İlhan Tekeli and Şerafettin Turan, Türk‐İslam Sentezi [Turkish‐Islamic Synthesis] (Istanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1991); Etienne Copeaux, Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931–1993) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk İslam Sentezine [In History Textbooks (1931–1993) From Turkish History Thesis to the Turkish‐Islamic Synthesis] (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998); Çiler Dursun, “Türk‐İslâm Sentezi İdeolojisi ve Öznesi,” [Ideology and Subject of the Turkish‐Islamic Synthesis], Doğu Batı, Vol. 7, No. 25 (2003), pp. 59–82; Binnaz Toprak, “Religion as State Ideology in a Secular Setting: The Turkish‐Islamic Synthesis,” in Malcolm Wagstaff (ed.), Aspects of Religion in Secular Turkey (The University of Durham Occasional Paper Series No. 40, 1990), pp. 10–15; Sami Zubaida, “Turkish Islam and National Identity,” Middle East Report (April–June 1996), pp. 10–15; Erkan Akin and Ömer Karasapan, “The ‘Turkish Islamic Synthesis,’” Middle East Report (July‐August 1988), p.18.

18. Tanıl Bora and Kemal Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergâh: 12 Eylül'den 1990'lara Ülkücü Hareket [State, Hearth and Convent: the Idealist Movement From September 12 to the 1990s] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), pp. 147–189.

19. Güvenç et al., Turkish‐Islamic Synthesis, pp. 55–56.

20. Ibid., pp. 43–44.

21. Copeaux, Tarih Ders Kitaplarında, p. 56.

22. Dursun, “Türk‐İslâm Sentezi İdeolojisi ve Öznesi,” p.61.

23. Ibid.

24. Cetinsaya, “Rethinking Nationalism and Islam.”

25. Bora, Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilik, pp. 130–145; İhsan D. Dağı, Kimlik, Söylem ve Siyaset: Doğu‐Batı Ayrımında Refah Partisi Geleneği [Identity, Discourse and Politics: The Welfare Party Tradition between the East and the West] (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 1998).

26. For Gül's statement, see http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno=257765 (accessed September 1, 2006).

27. M. Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 95.

28. Nuri Yeşilyurt and Atay Akdevelioğlu, “AKP Döneminde Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Politikası” [Turkish Middle East Policy Under the AKP Rule], in İlhan Uzel and Bülent Duru (eds.), AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu [The Book of AKP: Balance Sheet of a Tranformation] (Ankara: Phoenix, 2009), pp. 381–409.

29. Cetinsaya, “Rethinking Nationalism and Islam,” pp. 360–361; Sencer Ayata, “The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and its Institutional Framework,” in A. Eralp, M. Tünay and B. Yeşilada (eds.), The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey (Connecticut and London: Westport, 1993), p. 55.

30. For the concept of ideological state apparatuses, see Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 123–173.

31. Etga Uğur, “Intellectual Roots of ‘Turkish Islam’ and Approaches to the ‘Turkish Model,’” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2004), pp. 327–345.

32. Latif Erdoğan, Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi “Küçük Dünyam” [The Master Fethullah Gülen “My Little World”] (Istanbul: AD Yayıncılık, 1995), pp. 11–15.

33. Cennet E. Demir, Ayşe Balcı and Füsun Akkök, “The Role of Turkish Schools in the Educational System and Social Transformation of Central Asian Countries: The Case of Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2000), pp. 141–155; Bayram Balcı, “Fethullah Gülen's Missionary Schools in Central Asia and their Role in the Spreading of Turkism and Islam,” Religion, State & Society, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2003), pp. 151–177.

34. Bora, Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilik, pp. 7–9.

35. For the concepts of practical and discursive consciousness and stock of knowledge, see Antony Giddens, The Construction of the Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984) pp. 4–7.

36. Bora and Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergâh, p. 153.

37. For the MSP policies as coalition partners in these governments, see Sarıbay, Türkiye'de Modernleşme, Din ve Parti Politikası, pp. 187–205.

38. Some leading figures of the Hearth jointed the RP before the 1995 general election. For instance, leading figure of the Hearth Nevzat Yalçıntaş became the deputy of the AKP in the 2002 election. Former deputy chairman of the Hearth Ali Çokşun served as the minister of industry and trade in the AKP government between 2002 and 2007. Cemil Çiçek, who was among the founding members of ANAP and minister in the ANAP governments, has been minister in the AKP governments since the 2002 election. Abdülkadir Aksu, another prominent figure from the ANAP and minister in the ANAP governments served as the minister of interior affairs in the AKP governments between 2002 and 2007.

39. Ji‐Hyang Jang, Taming Political Islamists by Islamist Capital: The Passions and the Interests in Turkish Islamic Society. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 2005, p. 192.

40. For a perfect analysis of the post‐1980 era, see Muammer Tünay, “The Turkish New Right's Attempt at Hegemony,” in A. Eralp, M. Tünay and B. Yesilada (eds.), The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), pp. 11–30; Alev Özkazanç, “Türkiye'de Siyasal İktidar Tarzının Dönüşümü” [The Transformation of the Form of Political Power in Turkey], Mürekkep, No. 10/11 (1998), pp. 14–48.

41. Dursun, Türk‐İslâm Sentezi İdeolojisi ve Öznesi,” p. 61.

42. Andrew Davison, “Turkey, a ‘Secular’ State? The Challenge of Description,” The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 102, No. 2/3 (2003) pp. 333–349; Taha Parla and Andrew Davison, “Secularism and Laicism in Turkey,” in Janet. R. Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini (eds.), Secularisms (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), pp. 58–75.

43. Bahattin Akşit, “Islamic Education in Turkey: Medrese Reform in Late Ottoman Times and Imam‐Hatip Schools in The Republic,” in Richard Tapper (ed.), Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), p. 145.

44. Ibid., p. 47.

45. Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (London: Hurst & Co, 1998), pp. 479–506; İştar B. Gözaydın, “A Religious Administration to Secure Secularism: The Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey,” Malburg Journal of Religion, Vol. 11, No. 1 (2006), pp. 1–8; Davison, “Turkey, A ‘Secular’ State?”; Parla and Davison, “Secularism and Laicism in Turkey.”

46. Ruşen Çakır, İrfan Bozan and Balkan Talu, İmam Hatip Liseleri Efsaneler ve Gerçekler [Imam‐Hatip Schools: Legends and Realities] (Istanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2004), pp. 64; Akşit, “Islamic education in Turkey,” pp. 145–167; Bahattin Akşit, “Imam‐Hatip and Other Secondary Schools in the Context of Political and Cultural Modernization of Turkey,” Journal of Human Sciences, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1986), pp. 25–41.

47. Ruşen Çakır and İrfan Bozan, Sivil, Şeffaf ve Demokratik Bir Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Mümkün Müdür? [Is a Civil, Transparent and Democratic Directory of Religious Affairs Possible?] (Istanbul: Tesev Yayınları, 2005), p. 74.

48. For the military regime's relation with religion and religious groups, see Ayata, “The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and its Institutional Framework,” pp. 63–64; Sencer Ayata, “Patronage, Party, and State: Politicization of Islam in Turkey,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1996), pp. 40–56; Faruk Birtek and Binnaz Toprak, “The Conflictual Agendas of Neo‐liberal Reconstruction and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Hazards of Rewriting Modernity,” Praxis International, No. 13 (1993), pp. 192–212; Tünay, “The Turkish New Right's Attempt at Hegemony” also for the Gülen community's relations with the military regime, see Ruşen Çakır, Ayet ve Slogan. Türkiye'de İslami Oluşumlar [The Verse and the Slogan: Islamic Formations in Turkey] (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1990), pp. 99–100.

49. Gözaydın, “A Religious Administration to Secure Secularism,” Davison, “Turkey, A ‘Secular’ State?” p. 340.

50. Sam Kaplan, “Din‐u Devlet All Over Again? The Politics of Secularism and Religious Militarism in Turkey Following the 1980 Coup,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2002), pp. 119; Sam Kaplan, “‘Religious Nationalism’: A Textbook Case from Turkey,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2005), pp. 665–676; Parla and Davison, “Secularism and Laicism in Turkey,” p. 65.

51. Akşit, “Islamic Education in Turkey,” pp. 145–167; Akşit, “Imam‐Hatip and Other Secondary Schools in the Context of Political and Cultural Modernization of Turkey,” pp. 25–41.

52. Alevis are a non‐Sunni group. They see Ali as the rightful successor of Muhammad and Hacı Bektaşi Veli, disciple of Hoca Ahmet Yesevi, as their patron saint. The Alevis do not have the namaz, or “five‐times‐a‐day” praying rule; they have no mosques and no officially appointed religious officials. They instead use cemevi as their places of worship and their religious leaders, the dedes, do stem from the holy family Ahl al‐Bayt. They have different fasting periods, and men and women gather together for their religious ceremonies. These are the main differences that separate Alevis from Sunnis and Shi'a. Their practices and beliefs are frequently rejected as heresy by Shi'a as well as Sunni Muslims. Their most important features are to be found in their less rigid practices. Alevis usually emphasize the value of correct behavior. They also have a rich mystical and folklore tradition. Another important aspect is that women are usually not veiled and interact more freely in public space. Women also take an active role in religious ceremonies, and the shrines of holy women play an important part in Alevi culture. There exists no official statistical data on the absolute number of Alevi population. However, estimates range between 20 and 30 percent of the total population of Turkey. For further information, see Aykan Erdemir, Incorporating Alevis: The Transformation of Governance and Faith‐Based Collective Action in Turkey. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 2004; Şehriban Şahin, The Alevi Movement: Transformation from Secret Oral to Public Written Culture in National and Transnational Social Spaces. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, New School for Social Research, 2001; David Shankland, The Alevis in Turkey: The Emergence of a Secular Islamic Tradition (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

53. Çakır and Bozan, Sivil, Şeffaf ve Demokratik Bir Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Mümkün Müdür?, p. 74.

54. Çakır et al., İmam‐Hatip Liseleri Efsaneler ve Gerçekler, p. 67.

55. Çakır and Bozan, Sivil, Şeffaf ve Demokratik Bir Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Mümkün Müdür?, p. 87.

56. Çakır et al., İmam‐Hatip Liseleri Efsaneler ve Gerçekler, p.68.

57. Ministry of National Education, National Education Statistics: Formal Education 2008–2009 (Ankara: Ministry of National Education, 2009), p. 73.

58. http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/tanitim/istatistiksel_tablolar/1_personel/1_1_personel_sayisi.xls (accessed August 15, 2009).

59. http://www.diyanet.gov.tr/turkish/tanitim/istatistiksel_tablolar/6_butce/2009_yili_butce_odenegi.xls (accessed August 15, 2009).

60. Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908–1985 [Economic History of Turkey: 1908–1985] (Istanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1989); Korkut Boratav, 1980'li Yıllarda Türkiye'de Sosyal Sınıf [Social Classes in Turkey in the 1980s] (Istanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2005); Galip L. Yalman, “The Turkish State and Bourgeoisie in Historical Perspective: A Relativist Paradigm or a Panoply of Hegemonic Strategies,” in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds.), The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey (New York: Nove Science Publishers, 2002), pp. 21–54.

61. For a detailed analysis of these policies and their consequences see Birol Yesilada and Mahir Fisunoglu, “Assessing the January 24, 1980 Economic Stabilization Program in Turkey,” in Henri J. Barkey (ed.), The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 183–212.

62. The Naqshibandi brotherhood is a Sunni Sufi institution with a widespread historical and contemporary influence on the life of many Sunni Muslims. It was founded in Central Asia in the twelfth century and spread throughout Southeast Asia, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Western world. The order is very sensitive to politics and it accommodates local cultural conditions while preserving its main traditions. In Turkey, the Khalidi branch has been the most powerful and influential branch of the Naqshibandi order. Mehmet Zahid Kotku's group is the most important branch of the Khalid branch in Turkey. For further information, see Marc Gaborieau, Alexandre Popovic and Thierry Zarcone (eds.), Naqshibandis, Historical Development and Present Situation of a Muslim Mystical Order (Istanbul: ISIS, 1990). For the Özal family's relations with Naqshibandi brotherhood, see Korkut Özal, “Twenty Years with Mehmed Zahid Kotku: A Personal Story,” in E. Özdalga (ed.), Naqshbandis in Western and Central Asia (Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul: Transactions, 9, 1999), pp. 159–186; also for the Welfare Party's relations with Naksibendi brotherhood, see Birol A. Yeşilada, “The Refah Party Phenomenon in Turkey,” in Birol A. Yeşilada (ed.), Comparative Political Parties and Party Elites (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), pp. 136–139.

63. For Özal's relations with the Intellectuals' Hearth see http://www.tha.com.tr/kitap.html and for Association for the Dissemination of Science see http://ilimyaymavakfi.org/tarihce/Tarihce.asp (accessed September 10, 2006).

64. For ANAP's cultural politics under Özal's leadership, see Betül Yarar, “Türkiye'de 1980'lerde Yeni Sağın Yükselişi” [The Rise of the New Right in Turkey in the 1980s], Mürekkep, No. 10/11 (1998), pp. 49–88.

65. Ayata, “The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and its Institutional Framework,” pp. 62–63; Ayata, “Patronage, Party, and State,” pp. 44–46; Tünay, “The Turkish New Right's Attempt at Hegemony,” p. 21; Yeşilada, “The Virtue Party,” p. 67.

66. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001).

67. Ibid., p. 31.

68. Ibid., p. 3.

69. Ibid., pp. 3–4.

70. Pierre Bourdieu, Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyranny of the Market (New York: The New Press, 1998), pp. 94–105.

71. David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 19.

72. In 1966 Erbakan became the director of Industry Office of the Turkish Union of the Chambers and Stock Exchanges (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birligi) and one year later he held the position of the general secretary at the same organization. In 1969, he won the election for the presidency of the Union of the Chambers through successfully mobilizing Anatolian small merchants and businessmen who were discontent with the economic policies of the center‐right government that supported big business. However, he was removed from office by then Prime Minister Demirel due to strong objections and reactions of big business. Encouraged by his supporters in the AP, he tried to be a candidate for the 1969 general elections on this party's list. After Demirel's veto of his candidacy, Erbakan and his supporters in this party decided to establish the Islamist MNP that was closed in 1971.

73. Ayata, “The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and its Institutional Framework,” p. 58; also Emin Baki Adas, “The Making of Entrepreneurial Islam and the Islamic Spirit of Capitalism,” Journal for Cultural Research, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2006), pp. 113–137; Emin Baki Adas, Profit and the Prophet: Culture and Politics of Islamic Entrepreneurs in Turkey. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana‐Champaign, 2003; Ayşe Buğra, “Class, Culture and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (1998), pp. 521–539; Ayşe Buğra, “Political Islam in Turkey in Historical Context: Strengths and Weakness,” in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds.), The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey (New York: Nove Science Publishers, 2002), pp. 107–144; Ayşe Buğra, “Labour, Capital, and Religion: Harmony and Conflict Among the Constituency of Political Islam in Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2002), pp. 187–204; Ji‐Hyang Jang, Taming Political Islamists by Islamist Capital: The Passions and the Interests in Turkish Islamic Society. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin, 2005.

74. Jang, Taming Political Islamists by Islamist Capital, pp. 228–229.

75. Adas, Profit and the Prophet, p. 115.

76. Ibid., pp. 43–44; Buğra, “Class, Culture, and State,” p. 529; Jang, Taming Political Islamists by Islamist Capital, p. 214.

77. Adas, Profit and the Prophet, p. 46; Buğra, “Class, Culture, and State,” p. 529; Jang, Taming Political Islamists by Islamist Capital, p. 214.

78. Adas, Profit and the Prophet, p. 123.

79. Buğra, “Class, Culture, and State,” p. 522.

80. Paul Heelas and Paul Morris (eds.), The Values of the Enterprise Culture: The Moral Debate (London: Routledge, 1992); Russell Keat and Nicholas Abercrombie (eds.), Enterprise Culture (London: Routledge, 1991).

81. Adas, “The Making of Entrepreneurial Islam and the Islamic Spirit of Capitalism,” p. 124.

82. Buğra, “Class, Culture, and State,” p. 522.

83. Ibid., p. 528.

84. Ayata, “The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and its Institutional Framework,” p. 58.

85. Birol A. Yeşilada, “Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East” in A. Eralp, M. Tünay and B. Yeşilada (eds.), The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), pp. 168–188.

86. Jang, Taming Political Islamists by Islamist Capital, pp. 164–165; Adas, Profit and the Prophet, pp. 78–82; Yeşilada, “The Virtue Party,” pp. 77–78.

87. Jang, Taming Political Islamists by Islamist Capital, p. 179.

88. Adas, Profit and the Prophet, pp. 82–84; Jang, Taming Political Islamists by Islamist Capital, p. 200; Yeşilada “The Virtue Party,” p. 78.

89. Uğur Akinci, “The Welfare Party's Municipal Track Record: Evaluating Islamists Municipal Activism in Turkey,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 53, No. 1 (1999), pp. 75–94; Jang, Taming Political Islamists by Islamist Capital, pp. 228–229.

90. Jang, Taming Political Islamists by Islamist Capital, pp. 231–232.

91. Yeşilada, “The Refah Party Phenomenon in Turkey,” pp. 131–132; Binnaz Toprak, “Islam and Democracy in Turkey,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2005), p. 182; Menderes Çınar, Siyasal Bir Sorun Olarak İslâmcılık [Islamism as a Political Problem] (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2005), pp. 137–170.

92. Adas, “The Making of Entrepreneurial Islam and the Islamic Spirit of Capitalism,” pp. 131–134; Buğra, “Political Islam in Turkey in Historical Context,” pp. 134–135; Çınar, Siyasal Bir Sorun Olarak İslâmcılık, p. 141.

93. Adas, “The Making of Entrepreneurial Islam and the Islamic Spirit of Capitalism,” p. 133.

94. Buğra, “Labor, Capital and Religion in Turkey,” p. 194.

95. Adas, “The Making of Entrepreneurial Islam and the Islamic Spirit of Capitalism”; Çınar, Siyasal Bir Sorun Olarak İslâmcılık, pp. 140–142; Buğra, “Class, Culture, and State,” p. 531.

96. Adas, “The Making of Entrepreneurial Islam and the Islamic Spirit of Capitalism,” p. 116.

97. Ibid., p. 127; Buğra, “Class, Culture, and State,” p. 529.

98. Prime Minister Erdoğan several times declared that “I am charged with marketing my country” (Ülkemi adeta pazarlamakla mükellefim), see “http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=167116.” In a similar vein, former Minister of Finance Unakıtan said that “I will sell all public enterprises with a great proud” (Babalar gibi satarım), see http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2003/04/13/274279.asp (both accessed July 15, 2009).

99. N. İlter Ertuğrul, “AKP ve Özelleştirme”, [AKP and Privatization] in İhan Uzel and Bülent Duru (eds.) AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu, [The Book of AKP: Balance Sheet of a Transformation] (Ankara: Phoenix, 2009), pp. 522–555; Benan Eres and Seçil Kaya Bahçe, “Sermaye Birikimi ve Siyasal Dönüşüm: AKP”, [Capital Accumulation and Political Transformation: AKP] in İlhan Uzel and Bülent Duru (eds.) AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu, [The Book of AKP: Balance Sheet of a Transformation] (Ankara: Phoenix, 2009), pp. 510–521.

100. At this point, one should recall Nikolas Rose's analysis of neoliberal governmentality. Rose defines governmentality as “the deliberations, strategies, tactics and devices employed by authorities for making up and acting upon a population and its constituents to ensure good and avert ill.” See Nikolas Rose, “The Death of the Social? Re‐figuring the Territory of Government,” Economy and Society, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1996), p. 328; also see Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (London: Sage Publications, 1999).

101. Rose, “The Death of the Social,” p. 331.

102. Ibid., p. 334.

103. Ibid., p. 335.

104. Ibid., p. 335.

105. For an excellent analysis of articulation between religious brotherhoods and neoliberalism during the post‐coup era, see Birtek and Toprak, “The Conflictual Agendas of Neo‐liberal Reconstruction and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey,” pp. 192–212 and also see Ayata, “The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism and its Institutional Framework.”

106. Bourdieu, Acts of Resistance, p. 2.

107. Onur Hamzaoğlu and Cavit Işık Yavuz, “Sağlıkta AKP'li Dönemin Bilançosu Üzerine”, [On the Balance Sheet of Health Sector Under the AKP Rule] in İlhan Uzel and Bülent Duru (eds.) AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu, [The Book of AKP: Balance Sheet of a Transformation] (Ankara: Phoenix, 2009), pp. 633–659; Seyhan Erdoğdu, “Sosyal Politikada Değişim ve Sosyal Güvenlik Reformu”, [The Change in Social Policy and Social Security Reform] in İlhan Uzel and Bülent Duru (eds.) AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu, [The Book of AKP: Balance Sheet of a Transformation] (Ankara: Phoenix: Ankara, 2009), pp. 660–689.

108. Rose, “The Death of the Social,” pp. 327–356.

109. Kemal İnal, “AKP'nin Neoliberal ve Muhafazkâr Eğitim Anlayışı”, [AKP's Neoliberal and Conservative Perspective on Education] in İlhan Uzel and Bülent Duru (eds.) AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu, [The Book of AKP: Balance Sheet of a Transformation] (Ankara: Phoenix, 2009) pp. 689–719.

110. For a comprehensive analysis of the policies of the AKP government, see Hoşgör, AKP, State and Capital, pp. 273–333.

111. Ibid., p. 308.

112. For field research, based on more than 400 in‐depth interviews that demonstrates the growth of “community pressure” on such groups as Alevis, Kurds, and social democrats, see Binnaz Toprak, Türkiye'de Farklı Olmak: Din ve Muhafazakarlık Ekseninde Ötekileştirilenler [Being Different in Turkey: Those who are Othered on the Axis of Religion and Conservatism] (Istanbul: Metis, 2009). Also see İrfan Bozan and Ruşen Çakır, Mahalle Baskısı Var Mı Yok Mu? [Is There Neighborhood Pressure or Not?] (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2009).

113. Ruşen Çakır, Mahalle Baskısı: Prof. Dr. Şerif Mardin'in Tezlerinden Hareketle Türkiye'de İslam, Cumhuriyet, Laiklik ve Demokrasi [Neighborhood Pressure: Professor Şerif Mardin's Views on Islam, the Republic, Secularism, and Democracy] (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2008).