Ergenekon, New Pacts, and the Decline of the Turkish “Inner State”

Abstract

This article looks at both the direct question of the Turkish military's changing role in Turkish politics as specifically reflected in its reaction to the Ergenekon investigation, and more broadly at the recent face of pact-making in Turkey. It explores the nature of current pacts with respect to Turkish civil-military relations, and questions whether these pacts may actually be evidence of a deeper consolidation of Turkish democracy and the emergence of a new Turkish State.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my research assistant and PhD student, Gonca Biltekin, for her invaluable help in preparing this piece, both in collecting data and in discussing the various arguments made.

Notes

Numerous authors have noted that transitions without pacts are more likely to fail, including Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, vol. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1990), pp. 1–21; Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: CUP, 1991); Adam Przeworski, “The Games of Transition” in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993); Josep Colomer, Strategic Transitions: Game Theory and Democratization (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).

Daniel Friedman, “Bringing Society Back into Democratic Transition Theory after 1989: Pact Making and Regime Collapse,” East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1993), pp. 482–512; Alfred Stepan, “Democratic Opposition and Democratization Theory,” Government and Opposition, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1997), pp. 657–78.

Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Philippe C. Schmitter, “Twenty-Five Years, Fifteen Findings,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2010), pp. 17–28.

A divide in the Turkish military between groups we can roughly label as “absolutists” and “gradualists” has long persisted despite the institution's overall hierarchical and unified structure. Moreover, the Turkish military has been the inner core of one-half of a broader duality in the Turkish political system. As in other less than fully democratic countries, a complicated relationship between security and political liberalization resulted in dual-governance structures consisting of an autonomous “state” bureaucracy and a relatively newer, political “government,” which have been referred to respectively as “hard” and “soft” realms. In this article, the focus is on the Turkish military, the inner core of the hard realm. For a comparative study on the question of dual-governance and the hard and soft realms in Turkey and Iran, see Ersel Aydınlı, “Governments vs. States: Decoding Dual Governance in the Developing World,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 5 (2010), pp. 693–707.

For those in the military who wanted to intervene but not in a traditional manner, these external groups were referred to as their “unarmed forces.” Ertuğrul Özkök, Hürriyet, December 20, 1996, “Bu Kez ‘Silahsız Kuvvetler’ Hal Etsin.” Özkök attributed the phrase “unarmed forces” to an unnamed high-ranked officer. This commander was later revealed to have been Commander of the Naval Forces Admiral Güven Erkaya, one of the top architects of the February 28 process.

An international public opinion poll company (IPSOS KMG) in conjunction with Bilgi University in Istanbul, conducted a poll in January 2010, and reported that trust for the military has fallen to 73%. http://www.haber7.com/haber/20100117/Orduya-guven-ankette-yuzde-73e-dustu.php

Sedat Ergin, “Bunların Hepsi Dedikodu,” Hürriyet, May 27, 2003.

Hürriyet, “Astsubaylar tutuklandı,” November 29, 2005; Radikal, “Yargıtay: terör ayrı, askerlik ayrı,” May 17, 2007.

Hürriyet, “Büyükanıt röportajının tam metni,” December 23, 2005.

Akşam, “Büyükanıt sözleriyle yargıyı etkiledi”; Hürriyet, “Komisyondan Büyükanıt'a Şemdinli eleştirisi,” December 13, 2005.

Sabah, “Cumhuriyet'e üçüncü bomba,” May 11, 2006.

Hurriyet, “Danıştay'a saldırı: 1 ölü, dört yaralı,” May 17, 2006.

Hürriyet, “Danıştay üyelerini Vakit'in Manşetinden tanıyordum,” May 22, 2006.

Milliyet Online News, “Ankara'da miting olaysız sona erdi,” April 14, 2007. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/04/14/son/sontur07.asp

“Cumhuriyet Mitingine yüzbinler akın etti.” http://www.haberx.com/n/1011229/cumhuriyet-mitingine-yuzbinler-akin-etti.htm

“Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri bu tartışmalarda taraftır ve laikliğin kesin savunucusudur. Ayrıca, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri yapılmakta olan tartışmaların ve olumsuz yöndeki yorumların kesin olarak karşısındadır, gerektiğinde tavrını ve davranışlarını açık ve net bir şekilde ortaya koyacaktır. Bundan kimsenin şüphesinin olmaması gerekir.” http://www.tsk.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_Basin_Aciklamalari/2007/BA_08.html

See fn. 4.

E.g. Ömer Taşpınar, “The E-Coup and Washington,” Today's Zaman, June 4, 2007.

Murat Yetkin, “Büyükanıt konuşunca,” Radikal, August 1, 2007.

Fikret Bila, “Büyükanıt’ın tebrik ziyaretindeki mesajlar,” Milliyet, September 11, 2007.

For more detailed analysis of the profiles of three critical Chiefs of Staff—Özkök, Büyükanıt and Başbuğ see Ersel Aydinli (2009), “A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals and an End to the Coup Era in Turkey,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 63, No. 4, pp. 581–96.

“Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt’ın Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı 2007–2008 Eğitim ve Öğretim Yılı Açılış Töreni Konuşması.” http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2007/gnkur_bsk_harpak_acilis_konusmasi_01102007.htm

Nokta, March 29, 2007. The full text of the diaries was reprinted in the Istanbul daily Taraf, on July 6, 2008.

“Askeri Günlük Muamması,” Milliyet, March 14, 2007.

“‘Darbe günlükleri’ belgelendi,” NTVMSNBC News Portal. http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/440513.asp

Zaman, “Eruygur'un üçüncü darbe planı ‘Eldiven' deşifre oldu,” July 8, 2008.

Hürriyet, “Ümraniye'de ilginç izler,” December 15, 2007; Milliyet, “Fitili ateşleyen bombalar,” July 20, 2008; Radikal, “Ergenekon'da çok önemli gelişme,” March 26, 2008.

Gareth Jenkins, Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey's Ergenekon Investigation, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute (SAIS: Washington, DC, 2009) p. 40.

Milliyet, “Fikret Emek: Bombaları görevde kullanacaktım,” July 28, 2008.

Milliyet, “Büyük Operasyon,” January 23, 2008.

Milliyet, “Ergenekon Soruşturması Üniversiteye Uzandı,” February 23, 2008.

Milliyet, “Türkiye'yi sarsan gözaltılar,” March 22, 2008.

Milliyet, “Şener Eruygur ve Hurşit Tolon tutuklandı,” July 6, 2008.

Milliyet, “Ergenekon iddianamesi açıklanıyor… İddianamede ne var, ne yok?” July 14, 2008.

“Ergenekon Indictment,” pp. 985–6. The full text of the first indictment available at: http://i.milliyet.com.tr/Ergenekon/iddianame.aspx

New York Times, “30 arrested as coup case widens in Turkey,” February 2, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/world/europe/22iht-turkey.4.19605439.html?_r=1

Milliyet, “Genelkurmay Başkanlığı: sekiz askeri personele gözaltı,” December 26, 2009.

Radikal, “Kozmik oda dün de arandı/ TSK: Tamamen yasal çerçevede,” December 30, 2009.

Code of Criminal Procedure no. 5271, Article 125.

Zaman, “Genelkurmay'da ‘kozmik oda' zirvesi,” January 8, 2010.

Taraf, “İki yüzbin kişiye tutuklama,” January 21, 2010.

CNN Turk News Portal, “Paslaşmanın perde arkasında neler var?” February 1, 2010.

Space limitations prohibit giving full attention to the many significant problems that have been pointed out in the conducting of the investigations, e.g. holding people under custody for long periods without starting court proceedings, holding people without informing them of the charges against them, and starting investigations against people solely on the basis of anonymously provided information. Though not discussed in detail here, these faults run the serious risk of delegitimizing the entire case regarding a coup potential in Turkey.