Shift-of-axis in Turkish Foreign Policy: Turkish National Role Conceptions Before and During AKP Rule

Abstract

This article examines Turkish national role conceptions in 1992–2012, identified based on leading Turkish foreign policy-makers’ statements. It contends that the notion that “shift of axis” arguments proliferated in the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) era is misleading. The pattern of Turkish foreign policy roles expressed by the political elite in the period under examination suggests a gradual change toward an ambitious attitude rather than a shift of axis. A plausible explanation would be that the foreign policy roles under any government heavily reflect objective national interests and capabilities, thus a shifting of axis is unlikely to occur without a significant change in these variables.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Çağlayan Çetin, Anuj Gurung, Steven Hook, Mustafa Oğuz, Gregory Stone, Güneş Murat Tezcür, and the anonymous referee for thoughtful comments and insights. Participants in the 2013 ISA and APSA Annual Meetings also provided valuable comments. Any remaining errors remain my responsibility.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on Contributor

Ekrem T. Başer is a PhD student in the Department of Political Science at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He holds an MA in Russian and East European Studies from Georgetown University, and an MA in Political Science from Kent State University.

ORCID

Ekrem T. Başer http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4483-4395

Notes

1. Cohen, “Washington Concerned”; Cook, “How to Say Frenemy”; Çağaptay, “Is Turkey Leaving”; Jenkins, Political Islam in Turkey.

2. Aras and Görener, “National Role Conceptions”; Grossman, “Role Theory”; Holsti, “National Role Conceptions.”

3. Tezcür and Grigorescu, “Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy,” 1.

4. Çandar, “Post-Modern Darbe.”

5. The World Bank, World Development Indicators.

6. Mutlu, “The Economic Cost,” 74.

7. Çağaptay, “Is Turkey Leaving”; Güner, “Religion and Preferences”; Yıldız, “Problematizing the Intellectual.”

8. Davutoğlu, “Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision.”

9. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, 144–5.

10. Cohen, “Washington Concerned”; Güner, “Religion and Preferences”; Taşpınar, “The Three Strategic Visions”; Yıldız, “Problematizing the Intellectual.” For Davutoğlu and pan-Islamism, see Özkan, “Turkey, Davutoğlu.”

11. Kennedy and Dickenson, “Turkish Foreign Policy,” 171–6.

12. Cohen, “Washington Concerned”; Cook, “How Do You Say Frenemy”; Çağaptay, “Is Turkey Leaving”; Jenkins, Political Islam in Turkey.

13. Tür and Han, “Changing Turkish Foreign Policy.”

14. Altunışık, “Worldviews and Turkish Foreign Policy.”

15. See note 11 above.

16. Kirişçi, “The Transformation”; Tezcür and Grigorescu, “Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy.”

17. Oğuzlu, “Middle Easternization”; Taşpınar, “The Three Strategic Visions.”

18. Biddle and Thomas, Role Theory.

19. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions.”

20. Ibid., 239–41.

21. Ibid., 245–6.

22. Ibid., 244.

23. Walker, Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis.

24. Le Prestre, Role Quests, 8.

25. Adigbuo, “Beyond IR Theories”; Grossman. “Role Theory.”

26. Aggestam, “Role Identity and the Europeanisation”; Catalinac, “Identity Theory and Foreign Policy”; Cronin, “The Paradox of Hegemony”; Ghose and James, “Third-party Intervention”; Harnisch, “Post-Unification German Foreign Policy”; Thies and Breuning, “Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis”; Trondl, “Social Constructivist–institutionalist Divide?”

27. Thies and Breuning, “Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis.”

28. Chafetz, “The Struggle for a National Identity,” 664.

29. Abramson, Chafetz, and Grillot, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy”; Grossman, “Role Theory”; Hermann, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy Dynamics”; Holsti, “National Role Conceptions”; Levesque and Thibault, “The Soviet Union/Russia.”

30. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions.”

31. Grossman, “Role Theory”; Levesque and Thibault, “The Soviet Union/Russia.”

32. Abramson, Chafetz, and Grillot, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy.”

33. From Holsti. See note 19 above.

34. Ibid.

35. From Abramson, Cafetz and Grillot. See note 30 above.

36. See note 19 above.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. From Grossman, “Role Theory.”

42. Davutoğlu, “Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy.”

43. Kut, “The Contours of Turkish Foreign Policy.”

44. DYP and SHP stand for Doğru Yol Partisi (Righteous Path Party) and Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi (Social Democratic People's Party), respectively.

45. RP stands for Refah Partisi (Welfare Party).

46. ANAP, DSP, and DTP stand for Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party), Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party), and Demokrat Turkiye Partisi (Democratic Turkey Party), respectively.

47. MHP stands for Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party).

48. See note 19 above.

49. See note 16 above.

50. Kut, “The Contours of Turkish Foreign Policy.”

51. Makovsky, “The New Activism.”

52. Cem, “Turkey in the New Century.”

53. White = 0, light gray = 1, gray = 2, and black = 3.

54. Tezcür and Grigorescu, “Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy.”

55. Ibid., 11.