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ABSTRACT
This article surveys the political economy of coups in Turkey, examining both their economic causes and the economic consequences they seem to generate. It reminds that whether coups had a negative causal effect on Turkish economic growth remains to be compellingly shown. It highlights that military intervention attempts tend to follow already troublesome economic times: Before the 1960 and 1980 coups, 1971 and 2007 memoranda, as well as the failed coup attempts in 1962 and 2016, economic growth slowed down compared to a previous five-year period. This is in line with global trends about coups becoming likely following slower economic growth. Furthermore, students of Turkish politics have noticed a more specific economic policy-making pattern centering on currency devaluation during episodes preceding coups. This article discusses whether such a pattern may be taken as a ‘local theory’ of Turkish coups while discussing its limitations.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Deniz Şenol Sert for encouraging him to write the article and Cem Oyvat for providing valuable commentary on an early draft.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Note on contributor
Alper H. Yagci received a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Massachusetts Amherst in 2016 and currently teaches at Özyeğin University, Istanbul. His interests include comparative politics, international relations, political economy and environmental politics. His previous work has appeared in Government and Opposition.
Notes
1 Aydinli, “A Paradigmatic Shift.”
2 Galetovic and Sanhueza, “Citizens, Autocrats” and Powell, “Determinants.”
3 Galetovic and Sanhueza, “Citizens” and Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán, “Breaking Out.”
4 Powell, “Determinants.”
5 Bell, “Coup d’État and Democracy.”
6 Jackman, “The Predictability of Coups”; Rabushka and Shepsle, “Politics in Plural” and Jenkins and Kposowa, “Political Origins.”
7 Finer, Man on Horseback, 84.
8 Gasiorowski, “Macroeconomic Conditions” and Galetovic and Sanhueaza, “Citizens.”
9 Powell, “Determinants”; Hiroi and Omori, “Causes and Triggers” and Lehoucq and Perez-Linan, “Breaking Out.”
10 Londregan and Poole, “Poverty” and Alesina et al., “Political.”
11 Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development.
12 Huntington, Political Order.
13 O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism.
14 Londregan and Poole, “Poverty”; Galetovic and Sanhueza, “Citizens” and Hiroi and Omori, “Causes and Triggers.”
15 Houle, “Why Class Inequality Breeds Coups.”
16 Cheibub et al., “What Makes Democracies Endure?”
17 Delacroix and Ragin, “Structural Blockage” and Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, Transnational Corporations.
18 O’Kane, “Coups D’etat in Africa.”
19 Ibid.; Johnson et al., “Explaining African”; Jenkins and Kposowa, “Explaining” and “Political Origins.”
20 Thyne, “Supporter of Stability.”
21 Jenkins and Kposowa, “Explaining Military Coups.”
22 De Mesquita and Smith, “Leader Survival.”
23 Belkin and Schofer, “Toward a Structural” and Powell, “Determinants.”
24 Jenkins and Kposowa, “Explaining” and Powell, “Determinants.”
25 Huntington, The Third Wave.
26 For a review see Aisen and Vega, “How Does Political.”
27 Londregan and Poole, “Poverty, the Coup Trap.”
28 Alesina et al., “Political Instability.”
29 Meyersson, “Political Man on Horseback.”
30 Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development.
31 Gasiorowski, “Macroeconomic Conditions.”
32 Dube et al., “Coups, Corporations.”
33 Berger et al., “Commercial Imperialism?”
34 Lehoucq and Perez-Linan, “Breaking Out.”
35 As per Przeworski et al.'s (Democracy and Development, 87) calculations, the average level of per capita income in which the probability of a country's being a democracy reaches 0.5 was $4115 (in 1985 purchasing-power parity dollars). This is a level of income attained in Turkey decades after 1950. Based on a predictive model relying on income level and a number of control variables like ethnic fractionalization, Turkey's odds of being a dictatorship (as opposed to democracy) was 87% for the 1983–1990 period, for example, for the 1961–1979 period it was 95%.
36 A meeting between General Fahri Belen and Celal Bayar to that effect is reported in Hale, Turkish Politics, 92.
37 The trend has markedly shifted downwards since, averaging 2.4% for 2003–2016. Author's calculations utilizing the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, available at https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.
38 Tutar and Tansel, “Political Business Cycles.”
39 Özsağır, “Askeri Darbe.”
40 It is not clear, for example, in which currency the GNP is measured, and the graph provided, pointing to more than 50% decrease for the year 1960, does not seem to fit with existing real GNP measurements. Berberoglu, “Analysis of the Effects.”
41 Beşkaya and Manan, “Ekonomik Özgürlükler.”
42 For details, see Kazgan, Türkiye Ekonomisinde Krizler; Kepenek and Yentürk, Türkiye Ekonomisi; or Krueger, Foreign Trade Regimes.
43 Either comparing the most recent 2 quarters (based on the same data) with the preceding 5-year average of annual GDP growth (data from Ministry of Development), or judging by the 1961 annual growth.
44 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, “Leader Survival, Revolutions.”
45 Darbelerin Ekonomisi, 96.
46 An exception featuring a more nuanced theoretical discussion is Gülalp's “Patterns of Capital Accumulation.”
47 Celasun, “Sources of Industrial Growth”; Hale, Political and Economic Development and Utkulu, “The Turkish Economy,” 6Citation2001.
48 For figures and a discussion see Dumludag, “Analysis of the Determinants.”
49 Kepenek and Yentürk, Türkiye Ekonomisi, 100–1.
50 Most notably, general works on Turkish political economy like Hale, Development; Keyder, State and Class; Hershlag, Contemporary Turkish Economy and more specifically treatments of Turkey's economic crises such as Boratav et al., Krizin Gelişimi; Altan, Darbelerin Ekonomisi; Kazgan, Türkiye Ekonomisinde Krizler; Çelebi, “Türkiye’de Devalüasyon” and Emine Kıray, “Turkish Debts.”
51 For an understanding of balance of payments dynamics, the reader is advised to consult IMF's Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual sixth edition.
52 Indeed, economists have provided econometric evidence on the unsustainability of Turkey's current account deficits and the resulting risk of balance of payments problems during this period. Yücel and Yanar, “Türkiye’de Carı İşlem Açıkları” demonstrate unsustainability for the 1964–2003 period; while studies by Selçuk; Peker; and Göçer demonstrate that the problem continues in a weaker fashion after the late 1980s.
53 See Küçük's popular work Tekeliyet (362–82), where Peker, Çiller, and Ecevit governments are referred to as “overthrown” as a result of the political fallout from the currency devaluation.
54 Dornbusch and Edwards, The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America.
55 Elaborating on the relationship between foreign debt consolidation occurring during Turkey's economic crises and the military coups; Kazgan suggests that “it is difficult to think that Turkey could undertake military action independently of NATO while serving as a military outpost at its border with the USSR during the Cold War” (Türkiye Ekonomisinde Krizler, 22, translation mine).
56 Arguably, this is in line with accounts stressing the autonomy of the Turkish military from social classes such as Keyder, State and Class; Sakallioglu, “The Anatomy”; Harris, “Military Coups” and Ahmad, Making of Modern Turkey.
57 Parla, “Mercantile Militarism in Turkey.”
58 Krueger, Foreign Trade Regimes, 21.
59 Kazgan, Türkiye Ekonomisinde Krizler, 115.
60 Krueger, Foreign Trade Regimes, 22.
61 See Hale, Turkish Politics.
62 Başak, “Aid, Indebtedness.”
63 Krueger, Foreign Trade Regimes, 310.
64 Hale, Turkish Politics, 186.
65 In South Korea, for example, hourly wages were less than half the Turkish level in U.S. Dollar terms. Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 127.
66 Kazgan, Türkiye Ekonomisinde Krizler, 211).
67 Celasun and Rodrik (“Debt, Adjustment, and Growth,” 636) note the steady increase in the investment ratio from 18.1% of GNP in 1973 to 25% in 1977. In the meantime, the domestic savings rate fell from 20.3% to 18%.
68 Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 133.
69 Looking at the highly sketchy data that is available, we observe inequality to follow a steady trend during the mid-1960s, then declining until the late 1970s, and then at higher levels again in the 1980s. Özmucur, Türkiye’de Gelir Dağılımı, 3.
70 Haggard and Kaufman, “Politics of Stabilization,” 215–16.
71 Okur, “Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin.”
72 Tachau and Heper emphasize this point.
73 Londregan and Poole, “Poverty”; Jenkins and Kposowa, “Explaining”; Alesina et al., “Political”; Belkin and Schofer, “Toward” and Hiroi and Omori, “Causes and Triggers.”
74 Bacik and Salur, “Coup-proofing in Turkey.”
75 “Bütçede Emniyet’in payı artıyor,” Al-Jazeera Turk, 17 November 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/al-jazeera-ozel/butcede-emniyetin-payi-artiyor.