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ABSTRACT
This article aims to analyze how history has been used as a political discourse by the current ruling elites of Turkey in the post-2010 period. In doing that, the article first defines what the politicization of history is and locates the Justice and Development Party’'s (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) perception of history within the broader conservative political movements in Turkey. Then, the article focuses on the discourses of some AKP politicians and pro-AKP journalists to show how the AKP has been using history as a discourse to create a binary opposition between the Unionist/CHP mentality and the AKP mentality and to label the latter as the source of all current political troubles of Turkey.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Mustafa Serdar Palabiyik is Associate Professor of History at TOBB University in Ankara. He received a PhD in International Relations from Middle East Technical University in 2005. His works has appeared in journals such as Middle Eastern Studies and Journal of Asian History. He is the author of Turks and Armenians: Understanding Turkish-Armenian Controversy over 1915 (İstanbul: Beta Yayınları, 2015).
Notes
1. President Erdoğan’s “Speech Delivered at the Opening Ceremony of İnegöl Hacı Sevim Yıldız Vocational Education Campus”. 26 October 2016. http://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/55748/inegol-haci-sevim-yildiz-mesleki-egitim-kampusunun-acilis-toreninde-yaptiklari-konusma.html.
2. The National Pact (Misak-ı Milli in Turkish) was a document drafted by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and adopted at the Ottoman Parliament at 28 January 1920. It expressed the determination of the national liberation movement to maintain territorial integrity of the country and to abrogate capitulations for granting full independence to Turkey. See Akşin, Turkey, 146–7.
3. For such a brief analysis, see Erdoğdu, “2000’den Sonra Türkiye’de Tarihçilik,” 277–302.
4. See, for instance, Neyzi, “Giriş,” 1–11; Sancar, Geçmişle Hesaplaşma.
5. Indeed, this condolence message did not only address the Armenians, but also the entire Ottoman citizens ‘who had lost their lives under similar [war] conditions.’ For the full text of this condolence message see http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/_Article/pg_Article.aspx?Id=974ccd3b-fb77-499a-ab6a-7c5d2a1e79c9. Accessed October, 10, 2017. For a recent analysis of ‘coming to terms with the past’ argumentation; see Kaya, “Coming to Terms with the Past,” 681–700; Rosati, The Making of Postsecular Society, 119–74; Tambar, particularly 107–37.
6. For such a critique of early republican reforms from Turkish authors and historians, see Armağan, Türkçe Ezan ve Menderes; Bahadıroğlu, Osmanlı Demokrasisinden Türkiye Cumhuriyetine; Hür, Öteki Tarih; Koçak, Geçmişiniz İtinayla Temizlenir. For a critical account of early republican reforms in non-Turkish literature, see Lewis, The Turkish Language Reform; Çağaptay, Islam, Secularism and Nationalism; Yılmaz, Becoming Turkish.
7. See Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik.
8. The Sykes-Picot Agreement was a secret agreement between British (Sir Mark Sykes) and French (François Georges Picot) representatives concluded in May 1916 in order to determine the French and British-administered areas in the Middle East either in the form of direct or indirect control. Kamrava, The Modern Middle East, 42–4.
9. Particularly see the articles of İbrahim Karagül in pro-AKP Yeni Şafak newspaper. One example is “Kobani ve Sykes-Picot: Bu Sefer Sınırları Kim Çizecek,” Yeni Şafak, 3 November 2014.
10. Unionist (İttihatçı) in Turkish is an adjective denoting those who followed the Committee of Union and Progress, which was first established as a clandestine organization among Military Medical Academy students in 1887 with the aim of overthrowing Sultan Abdülhamid II and reproclaim parliamentary monarchy in the Empire. After overthrowing the Sultan in 1908, the organization turned out to be a political party, which assumed power in 1913 with a coup d’etat. For a detailed analysis of the CUP, see Ahmad, The Young Turks.
11. For a critique of ‘official history’ created in the early Republican era, see Ersanlı, İktidar ve Tarih.
12. The label ‘pro-AKP’ is used to define some historians or journalists, who clearly declare their support towards the AKP in their writings. For a recent critical analysis of media and politics in Turkey see Yavçan and Ongur, “Determinants of Media Criticism,” 2422–41.
13. For the debates on the politicization of history in Australia, see Clark, “Politicians Using History,” 120–31. For the debates on the politicization of history in Europe, see Swoboda and Wiersma, Politics of the Past. For the debates on the politicization of history in Spain, see Torres, “Political Uses of History in Spain,” 95–116.
14. The Kut ‘victory’ refers to the Ottoman siege of the British troops at the town of Kut in Iraq between 7 December 1915 and 29 April 1916, which ended with the surrender of the British troops. This victory has not much been emphasized in popular history until recently, when official celebrations have been organized by the government for a couple of years. For the details of the Kut victory, see Erickson, Ordered to Die, 110–5.
15. For politicization of history in the previous periods, see, for instance, Ersanlı, İktidar ve Tarih; Atasoy, Islam's Marriage with Neoliberalism, particularly 70–106.
16. Mosul was within the borders drawn by the National Pact and the Turkish delegation in Lausanne strived hard to claim Mosul. However, as a result of the British pressure, the issue left unresolved in Lausanne and brought to the judgment of the Permanent International Court of Justice, which at the end decided to leave Mosul to Iraq. The Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean had already been left to Italy with the Treaty of Ouchy in 1912. Some pro-AKP historians, journalists and politicians argued that Ismet Paşa (Inonu) was unsuccessful in Lausanne negotiations, so that he ‘lost’ Mosul and the Aegean islands. For this line of argumentation see Bahadıroğlu, “Lozan Nasıl Kabul Ettirildi?”; Armağan, “Lozan hezimettir de, kaç sıfır? Gelin bunu tartışalım.”
17. See Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy, 100–2.
18. Clark, “Politicians Using History,” 121.
19. Ibid., 120.
20. Sabrow, “The Use of History,” 103.
21. Torres, “Political Uses of History,” 95–7.
22. Nora, “Recent History,” para. 3.
23. Quoted in Wei, “Politicization and De-Politicization of History,” 243.
24. Miller, “The Ruinous Consequences of History Politics,” para. 5.
25. Ibid., para. 6.
26. Hassner, “Beyond History and Politics,” 71.
27. See, for instance, Davutoğlu, Alternative Paradigms; Davutoğlu, Küresel Bunalım; Davutoğlu, Medeniyetler ve Şehirler; Kalın, “Islamophobia and the Limits of Multiculturalism,” 3–20; Kalın, Ben, Öteki ve Ötesi.
28. Alaranta, Contemporary Kemalism, 1.
29. Sarfati, Mobilizing Religion in Middle East Politics, 94.
30. Jupskas, “In the Name of the People!” 265–7.
31. Ibid.
32. Jenkins, “Islamism in Turkey,” 133.
33. Ongur, “Identifying Ottomanisms,” 425–7.
34. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis refers to the post-September 12 coup d’etat state-sponsored fusing of Islam with Turkish nationalism. For a brief analysis of this concept, see Eligür, The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey, especially Chapter 3.
35. Çetinsaya, “Rethinking Nationalism and Islam,” 373.
36. Taşkın, AKP Devri, 24.
37. Ongur, “Identifying Ottomanisms,” 416–32.
38. Taşkın, Anti-Komünizmden Küreselleşme Karşıtlığına, 57–8.
39. Ongur, “Plus Ça Change … ,” 10.
40. Ibid.
41. For the speech of Davutoğlu delivered at Dicle University, Diyarbakır, Turkey on 15 March 2013, entitled ‘The Great Restoration: Our New Thinking of Politics from the Ancient Times to Globalization,’ see the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-davutoglu-diyarbakir-dicle-universitesi-ogrencilerine-hitap-etti.tr.mfa.
42. For a detailed analysis of the concept of restoration, also see Yeşiltaş, “Turkey's Quest for a ‘New International Order,’” 43–76.
43. Milliyet, October 1, 2015.
44. Anatolian Agency, October 13, 2016.
45. For the speech of Erdoğan, see “Milletimizin Binlerce Yıllık Tarihini, Neredeyse 1919 Yılından Başlatan Tarih Anlayışını Reddediyorum,” Turkish Presidency's Official Website, April 29, 2016, http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/43802/milletimizin-binlerce-yillik-tarihini-neredeyse-1919-yilindan-baslatan-tarih-anlayisini-reddediyorum.html.
46. For the speech of Davutoğlu, see “Başbakan Davutoğlu’nun Kut-ül Amare zaferinin 100. yıl programında yaptığı konuşmasının tam metni,” April 29, 2016, https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan-davutoglunun-kut-ul-amare-zaferinin-100.-yil-programinda-yaptigi-k/83812#1.
47. For a detailed analysis of the Ottoman entry into World War I under CUP administration, see Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War.
48. Sözcü, September 22, 2016.
49. Milliyet, October 30, 2015.
50. Yeni Asır, February 1, 2012.
51. Ibid.
52. Yeni Şafak, February 28, 2013.
53. Ünal, “Kanlı Siyaset.”
54. Sözcü, September 22, 2016.
55. BBC Turkish, September 29, 2016.
56. Yavuz Bahadıroğlu clearly declares his support towards the AKP. See Bahadıroğlu, “Neden AK Parti’ye Oy Vereceğim?” Mustafa Armağan is one of the 63 ‘wise men’ chosen by the AKP government to explain the process of reconciliation with the Kurds between 2009 and 2015 officially named as the Project of National Unity and Fraternity. In his social media accounts, he declared his support towards the AKP as well. See, for example, https://twitter.com/mustafarmagan/status/660908680603377664.
57. Bahadıroğlu, “Hilafetin Kaldırılması Kimin İşine Yaradı?”; Armağan, “Hilafetin Kaldırılmasını İngilizler Şart Koşmuştu”; “AK Partili Külünk’ün bu sözleri olay yaratacak,” Haber 7, March 19, 2013.
58. Akşam, April 28, 2016.
59. Bahadıroğlu, “Şapka İnkılâbında Kaç Kişi Asıldı?”; Kaplan, “Dersim Rize’nin Nesi Olur?”
60. Radikal, December 12, 2014.
61. Hürriyet, December 8, 2014.
62. Haberler.com, October 8, 2013.
63. Milliyet, May 8, 2015.
64. T24, April 23, 2014.
65. CNN Türk, April 22, 2015.
66. Radikal, December 9, 2009.
67. Kütahyalı, “Erdoğan ve Ermeni Tabusu.”
68. Kütahyalı, “Bir başka açıdan Ermeni meselesi”; Kütahyalı, “‘1915'te Ermenilere yapılanlar haklıydı’ tezi”; Kütahyalı, “Son tabuyu yıktı.”
69. T24, May 3, 2014.
70. “Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, partisinin Genişletilmiş İl Başkanları Toplantısı'nda yaptığı konuşmada, Dersim olaylarıyla ilgili belgeler açıkladı.” AKP Official Web Site, November 23, 2011. https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/dersim-olaylarini-belgelerle-acikladi/16298#1.
71. Hilal Kaplan, “Dersim’den Atatürk’e giden yol.”