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ABSTRACT
Moderation theory, within the political party context, has often been applied to European Socialists and Christian Democrats, as well as Islamic revivalists in the Muslim world. This article applies moderation theory to the Kurdish left of Turkey, namely the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). The HDP’s electoral breakthrough in June 2015 elections carried the potential for this party to transform itself into a larger and moderate actor. Nevertheless, the repeat elections of November 2015 weakened the HDP’s prospects as the ruling AKP won enough seats to reconstitute a single-party government. This article puts forth three major explanations for the recent moderation of the Kurdish left: first, the then ongoing peace (resolution) process between the Turkish government and Kurdish actors; second, the ‘Demirtaş factor’, the personality and politics of Selahattin Demirtaş, the HDP’s co-chair; and finally, the HDP’s direct confrontation with President Erdoğan in both electoral and political terms in the 2015 general elections.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Ödül Celep (PhD: State University of New York, Binghamton) is Associate Professor of Political Science in the International Relations Department of Işık University, Istanbul. His research interests include political parties and party systems, political culture and ideology, intra-party democracy, and voting behavior in Turkey and Western Europe. His doctoral dissertation, completed in 2006, was published in both English and Turkish in 2009 (The Extreme Right and Democracy). Celep has recently published on party closures, the 2017 referendum, new political parties, political polarization, and democratization in Turkey.
Notes
1. Grzymała-Busse, Redeeming Communist Past; Warner, “Christian Democracy in Italy”; Gidengil and Karakoç, “Religion or Performance?” 326.
2. Demiralp, “Rise of Islamic Capital,” 315.
3. Lewis, “Why Turkey”; Nasr, “Rise of Muslim Democracy”; Kuru and Stepan, “Democracy Islam Secularism”; Taşkın, “Conservatism without Democrats?”
4. Yeğen, “Kurdish Question in Discourse,” 555.
5. Ibid., 563.
6. Robins, “Overlord State.”
7. Doğan, “Turkish Labor Party,” 316.
8. Celep, “Party Closures in Turkey,” 383–388; Koğacıoğlu, “Progress Unity Democracy,” 443–4.
9. Bourne, “Democratisation and Illegalization,” 1065–66.
10. Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle, “Introduction,” 13.
11. For a discussion on the Kemalist-oriented ‘military democracy’, see Savaş, Militant Democracy.
12. Brocker and Künkler, “Revisiting Inclusion-Moderation,” 177–8.
13. Lipset and Rokkan, Cleavage Structures, 4.
14. Kitschelt, “Divergent Paths.”
15. Ishiyama and Breuning, “Ethnic Party Identity,” 255.
16. Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, 40; Laver and Hunt, Policy and Party Competition.
17. Çakır, “BDP.”
18. Watts, “Allies and Enemies,” 636.
19. Muller, “Elimination of Kurdish Representation,” 187.
20. “Who is Hatip Dicle?” 2014. T24, June 28.
21. Güney, “People’s Democracy Party,” 125.
22. Ibid.
23. “Demirtaş: The Era of Independent Candidates is Over” (Milliyet, February 4, 2015).
24. Ibid.
25. “Demirtaş: A Parliament without the HDP Would be Grey” (Birgün, May 30, 2015).
26. HDP 2015 Election Manifesto: The Great Humanity, We’re All to the Assembly.
27. Grigoriadis, “HDP and 2015 Elections,” 42.
28. Çakır, “BDP,” 8.
29. Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework.
30. Weiss, “From Constructive Engagement,” 569.
31. Kirişci, “Turkish Foreign Policy,” 287.
32. Pusane, “Turkey’s Kurdish Opening,” 83.
33. Jain, “Ataturk to Öcalan,” 12.
37. One most commonly cited specification for political parties’ ultimate purpose is ‘maximization of votes’, a definition in accordance with the spatial/competitive approach to parties and elections. See Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy.
39. “Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ Arrested” (Milliyet, November 4, 2016). “Turkey Arrests Pro-Kurdish Opposition Leaders” (Aljazeera, November 4, 2016) http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/turkey-arrests-pro-kurdish-opposition-leaders-161104141452597.html.
40. David Kenner. 2016. “Kurdish Obama Is Now in Jail.” Foreign Policy, November 4. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/04/turkeys-kurdish-obama-is-now-in-jail/.
42. Fuat Keyman. “The Demirtaş Factor.” Radikal, May 5, 2015, http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/fuat-keyman/demirtas-faktoru-1352575/.
43. Ibid.
44. “A Surprise Name in the List of Well-liked Leaders” (Vatan, September 23, 2014).
46. http://www.diken.com.tr/konda-genel-muduru-agirdir-akp-276nin-da-altina-inebilir-hdp-yuzde-51-gecer/.
47. Çarkoğlu, “Economic Evaluations vs. Ideology.”
48. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/02/turkey-pervasive-political-social-polarisation-160207140647531.html Also see: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-more-polarized-in-socio-political-terms-research-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=94650&NewsCatID=341.
49. Kabasakal, “Factors Influencing Intra-Party Democracy,” 704.
51. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/demirtastan-tarihin-en-kisa-grup-toplantisi-28475253, also see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FwKUBhyny8Y.
52. These groups are the People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG) and the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD), both of which the current AKP government sees as the extensions of the PKK. YPG is a predominantly Kurdish militia group, while PYD is a Kurdish democratic confederalist party in Syria.
53. Çakır “Why Has the HDP Been Deadlocked?” (Medyascope, August 4, 2017) http://medyascope.tv/2017/08/04/hdp-neden-tikandi/.
54. “Police Intervention of HDP’s Members’ Protest Walk in Şırnak” (Radikal, December 21, 2015) http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/sirnakta-hdplilerin-protesto-yuruyusune-polisten-mudahale-1494842/.
55. “Unidentified Killings Made With no Need of Contras” (Evrensel, January 3, 2016). http://www.evrensel.net/haber/269062/faili-mechuller-kontralaraihtiyac-duyulmadan-yapiliyor, “56 Civilians Killed in Cizre, 23 Civilians Killed in Nusaybin, 17 Civilians Killed in Sur” (Sol, December 30, 2015). http://haber.sol.org.tr/turkiye/istesokaga-cikma-yasaginin-bilancosu-cizrede-56-nusaybinde-23-surda-17-sivil-olduruldu.
56. Çakır “Why Has the HDP Been Deadlocked?”