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ABSTRACT
This study presents a dual approach towards the political economy of corruption under Turkey’s AKP government by differentiating between petty and grand corruption. Findings illustrate that the AKP has been relatively successful in terms of diminishing petty corruption in Turkey which is demonstrated by improved performance in several business indicators, foreign direct investment, income level, and in decreasing rate of corruption-related crimes. However, the AKP failed to move reforms further to regulate the legal framework of political party and electoral campaign finance, which eventually opened the door for cronyism. The concept of state capture helps to explain how corruption is eliminated in some forms (petty) but reproduced in other forms (grand). However, in contrast to insights provided by the state capture literature, this study finds that it is the ruling political party that increased its influence over business groups rather than de novo firms having more control on political elites.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Ziya Öniş, Selim Erdem Aytaç, Tim Dorlach, and Paul Kubicek and two anonymous reviewers for Turkish Studies for their helpful and constructive comments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Fırat Kimya is a PhD candidate in Department of Politics at University of Virginia. He received his BA from Boğaziçi Unıversity (2014) and MA from Koç Unıversity (2017). His research interests include political economy of institutions, comparative institutional analysis, political parties, party finance, corruption, quantitative and qualitative research methodologies.
Notes
1. See Doig, “Asking the Right Questions?”; Adaman, “Is Corruption a Drawback”; Ömürgönülşen and Doig, “Why the Gap?”; and Yılmaz and Soyaltın, “Zooming into the ‘Domestic’ in Europeanization.”
2. Corke et al., “Democracy in Crisis,” 1–4.
3. CitationŞarlak and Bali, “Corruption in Turkey,” 7, and Chene, “Overview,” 4–5.
4. Ömürgönülşen and Öktem, “Is there Any Change,” 1–2.
5. Bedirhanoğlu, “The Neoliberal Discourse,” 1248, and Karadağ, “Neoliberal Restructuring,” 17–19.
6. Gerring, Social Science Methodology, 186.
7. Definition is available at https://www.transparency.org/glossary/term/petty_corruption.
8. For definition of “grand corruption” see https://www.transparency.org/glossary/term/grand_corruption.
9. Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, “Seize the state,”, 756.
10. Ibid., 756.
11. Ibid., 753.
12. Pleines, “Preface,” xx.
13. Esen and Gümüşçü, “Building a Competitive Authoritarian Regime,” 3.
14. Jain, “Power, Politics, and Corruption,” 3.
15. Johnston, “The Definitions Debate,” 17–18.
16. Azfar, Lee, and Swamy, “The Causes,” 45.
17. Adaman, “Is Corruption a Drawback,” 5.
18. See Adaman, “Is Corruption a Drawback”; Sayarı, “Interdisciplinary Approaches”; and Sunar, “Populism and Patronage.”
19. See Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations”; Ömürgönlüşen and Öktem “Is there Any Change?”; and Yılmaz and Soyaltın “Zooming into the ‘Domestic’ in Europeanization.”
20. Baran, “Corruption: The Turkish Challenge,” 131.
21. Mousseau, “Is Turkey democratizing with EU reforms?” 67.
22. European Stability Initiative, “Islamic Calvinists.”
23. Demir, “A Political Economy Analysis.”
24. Ömürgönlüşen and Öktem, “Is there Any Change,” 144.
25. See Baran, “Corruption: The Turkish Challenge”; Bedirhanoğlu, “The Neoliberal Discourse on Corruption”; and Mousseau, “Is Turkey Democratizing?”
26. Chene, “Overview,” 5.
27. Momayezi, “Civil-Military Relations,” 21–3.
28. Pion-Berlin, “Turkish Civil-Military Relations,” 298.
29. Jenkins, “Continuity and Change,” 341.
30. The Declaration is available at http://t24.com.tr/haber/sozcu-trtde-okunan-darbe-bildirisini-erdoganin-basyaveri-dahil-saraydaki-6-subay-yazdi,350716.
31. Doig, “Asking the Right Questions?” 11.
32. The Party promised to fight against 3Ys (Yolsuzluk, Yoksulluk, Yasaklar) namely; corruption, poverty, and restrictions, “2002 Genel Seçimleri, Seçim Beyannamesi, AK Parti” available at https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/dosyalar#!/ak-parti-hukumet-programlari.
33. Yılmaz and Soyaltın, “Zooming into the ‘Domestic’ in Europeanization.”
34. Pleines, ‘Preface,” xx.
35. For more information on national and international ratifications look at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/home, http://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/home, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/ and http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-efforts-in-combating-corruption.en.mfa.
36. Şarlak and Bali, “Corruption in Turkey,” 10.
37. Yılmaz and Soyaltın, “Zooming into the ‘Domestic’ in Europeanization,” 21.
38. Çarkoğlu and Aytaç, “Individual Giving and Philanthropy in Turkey,” 62–3.
39. Adaman, “Is Corruption a Drawback,” 10.
40. For more detailed information look at Index of Public Integrity, European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building (ERCAS). http://www.integrity-index.org.
41. Ömürgönlüşen and Öktem, “Is there Any Change.”
42. Soyaltın, Europeanisation, Good Governance and Corruption.
43. Ibid., 448.
44. Chene, “Overview,” 6.
45. Ibid, 2.
46. Öniş, “Power, Interests and Coalitions,” 718.
47. Karadag, “Neoliberal Restructuring,” 22.
48. KOM and MASAK reports are available at http://www.masak.gov.tr/tr/content/faaliyet-raporlari/43 and http://www.kom.pol.tr/Sayfalar/Raporlar.aspx (For the period of 2003–2006, number of planned operations and suspects also include organized crimes in addition to corruption-related planned operations and suspects).
49. Detailed information can be found at http://www.masak.gov.tr/tr/content/faaliyet-raporlari/43.
50. Öniş, “Power, Interests and Coalitions,” 718.
51. Bedirhanoğlu “The Neoliberal Discourse,” 1247.
52. Mousseau, “Is Turkey Democratizing?”, 64.
53. European Progression Reports on Turkey are available at http://www.ab.gov.tr/46224.html.
54. 2013 EU Turkey Progression Report, 76–7, http://www.ab.gov.tr/46224.html.
55. Chene, “Overview,” 3.
56. See Pemstein et al., “The V-DEM Measurement Model.”
57. See Norris and Grömping, “The Electoral Integrity Project.”
58. Ibid., 22.
59. Ömürgönlüşen and Doig, “Why the Gap,” 18.
60. Heilbrunn, “Anti-Corruption Commissions,” 13–14.
61. Kuria, “Why do anti-corruption agencies fail?”.
62. Meagher, “Anti-corruption agencies,” 100.
63. World Bank, Enterprise Surveys, the data is available at, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/.
64. See World Bank Enterprise Surveys for more information, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/.
65. Bribe Payer Index, Transparency International, look at https://www.transparency.org/research/bpi/overview.
66. Data on the number of days required for import and export is available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/.
67. Data on Turkey’s performance over various business indicators is available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/.
68. World Bank – Databank, World Development Indicators, Turkey, available at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators&Type=METADATA&preview=on#.
69. A score of 0 in CPI means the country does not have any corruption while a score of 100 indicates full corruption (The scores are reversed for a better interpretation).
70. For more detailed information look at https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016.
71. World Bank – Databank, World Development Indicators, Control on Corruption, Turkey, available at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators&Type=METADATA&preview=on#.
72. See Krueger, “Why Crony Capitalism.”
73. Wei, “Domestic Crony Capitalism,” 16.
74. Johnson and Mitton, “Cronyism and Capital Controls,” 353.
75. Morck et al., “Corporate Governance,” 56.
76. See Enderwick, “What’s Bad about Crony Capitalism?”; Haber, “Introduction”; Johnson and Mitton, “Cronyism and Capital Controls”; Singh and Zammit, “Corporate Governance”; Wei, “Domestic Crony Capitalism”; and Kimya, “Corruption, Democracy, and Growth.”
77. Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann, “Seize the State,” 756.
78. Esen and Gümüşçü, “Building a Competitive Authoritarian Regime,” 6.
79. See Soyaltın, Europeanisation, Good Governance and Corruption.
80. See Gürakar, Politics of Favoritism, 53, and Buğra and Savaşkan, “The Turkish Business,” 35.
81. Soyaltın, “Public Sector Reforms,” 450.
82. See Buğra and Savaşkan, “The Turkish Business”; Chene, “Overview”; and Karadag, “Where does Turkey’s.”
83. See Buğra and Savaşkan, “The Turkish Business,” 42.
84. Gürakar, Politics of Favoritism, 84.
85. Esen and Gümüşçü, “Building a Competitive Authoritarian Regime,” 9.
86. Bozcağa, “In Search of,” 14.