https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5011-2436
![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
This article focuses on the post-2016 military reforms and examines the meaning of civilian oversight and control that these reforms have brought. For almost two decades, the establishment of civilian supremacy over the military has been discussed in terms of democratic control of the armed forces. The article claims that although the post-2016 reforms installed civilian supremacy, they diverge from this approach significantly. Instead, they display the basic characteristics of coup-proofing strategies. The article aims to ignite scholarly interest in and initiate discussions on the conceptual appropriateness of the notion of coup-proofing for capturing Turkey’s civil–military relations since 15 July 2016.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Kutlugün, Satuk Buğra. “Trial of Main Suspects in Turkey’s Coup Attempt Begins.” Anatolia Agency, May 22, 2017, available at https://www.aa.com.tr/en/july-15-coup-bid/trial-of-main-suspects-in-turkeys-coup-attempt-begins/823447.
2 Güney and Karatekelioğlu, “Turkey’s EU Candidacy,” 443–4.
3 Cizre, “The Anatomy,” 153; Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics, 106; Narli, “Concordance and Discordance,” 215; and Haugom, “The Turkish Armed Forces,” 3.
4 Bardakçı, “Coup Plots,” 412, 417.
5 Gürsoy, “The Changing Role,” 736.
6 “İşte Balyoz Davası’nın Bilançosu.” Hürriyet, April 6, 2015.
7 Aydınlı, “A Paradigmatic Shift,” 591.
8 Toktaş and Kurt, “The Turkish Military’s Autonomy,” 401.
9 Heper, “Civil-Military Relations,” 250.
10 Waldman and Caliskan, “Factional and Unprofessional,” 21.
11 Cilliler, “Popular Determinant,” 500. Of course, there have been those who were cautious about these developments. For instance, Özbudun (“Democratization Reforms,” 195) suggested that although the constitutional and legislative reforms of 2001–2003 have eliminated a large part of the privileges and prerogatives granted to the military by the Constitution, the real power of the military was due to historical, sociological, and political factors. Similarly, the critics of the trials that charged military members viewed the investigations as a mere government conspiracy deviced to suppress the opposition. See Polat, “The Anti-Coup Trials,” 213, and Balci and Jacoby, “Debating the Ergenekon,” 139. In the same vein, Gürsoy (“Turkish Public Opinion,” 105) stated that contrary to further democratic consolidation, the social effect of the coup trials was highly negative as they increased polarization.
12 Narli, “Civil-Military Relations in Turkey,” 117–18.
13 Haugom, “Turkey after the Coup Attempt,” 3–4.
14 Esen, “Praetorian Army in Action,” 2.
15 For a comprehensive revision of state of emergency decress see Akça et al. eds., Olağanlaşan Ohal.
16 Article 36 of the DfL No 669.
17 Article 6 of the DfL No 668.
18 Article 9 of the DfL No 671.
19 Article 8 of the DfL No 671.
20 Article 17 of the DfL No 681.
21 Article 21 of the DfL No 681.
22 Article 17 of the DfL No 681.
23 Article 21 of the DfL No 681.
24 Article 45 of the DfL No 669.
25 Article 48 of the DfL No 669.
26 Article 4 of the DfL No 668.
27 Article 46 of the DfL No 669.
28 Article 104 of the DfL No 669.
29 Articles 12 and 52 of the DfL No 681.
30 Articles 5 and 7 of the DfL No 669.
31 Article 78 of the DfL No 669.
32 Haugom, “Turkey after the Coup Attempt,” 5.
33 Şahin, “Turkey’s Play with Its Military,” 47.
34 Article 37 of the Presidential Decree No 1.
35 Article 9 of the Presidential Decree No 3.
36 Article 11 of the Presidential Decree No 3.
37 Article 799 of the Presidential Decree No 4.
38 Cizre, “Problems of Democratic Governance,” and Toktaş and Kurt, “The Turkish Military’s Autonomy,” 388–9.
39 Uluçakar and Çağlar, “An Analysis,” 44, and Roxborough, “The Ghost of Vietnam,” 353.
40 Gözler, “Hiyerarşi İlkesi Açısından”.
41 Haugom, “Turkey after the Coup Attempt,” 6.
42 Gurcan, Metin. “Erdogan’s Ties with Turkish Army Gets Alarmingly Personal.” Al-Monitor, January 10, 2020, available at https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/01/turkey-erdogan-ties-with-army-become-increasingly-personal.html.
43 Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” 214.
44 Şahin, “Turkey’s Play with Its Military,” 38.
45 Sudduth, “Coup Risk, Coup-proofing,” 3.
46 Quinlivan, “Coup-proofing,” 131; Makara, “Coup-Proofing, Military Defection,” 336; andBelkin and Schofer, “Toward a Structural Understanding,” 596.
47 Powell, “Leader Survival Strategies,” 29.
48 Escriba-Folch, Böhmelt and Pilster, “Authoritarian Regimes,” 560.
49 Belkin and Schofer, “Coup Risk, Counterbalancing,” 144.
50 Makara, “Coup-Proofing,” 336.
51 Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, “How Dictatorships Work,” 80.
52 Quinlivan, “Coup-proofing,” 141.
53 Belkin and Schofer, “Toward a Structural Understanding,” 596.
54 Quinlivan, “Coup-proofing,” 133.
55 Makara, “Coup-Proofing, Military Defection,” 336.
56 “Bakan Akar Açıkladı: TSK’den Kaç Kişi İhraç Edildi?” Ahval, June 3, 2020, available at https://ahvalnews.com/tr/tsk/bakan-akar-acikladi-tskden-kac-kisi-ihrac-edildi.
57 Gaub, Civil-Military Relations, 31.
58 Taş, “The New Turkey,” 3–4.
59 Escriba-Folch, Böhmelt and Pilster, “Pitfalls of Professionalism?” 1112.
60 Gözler, “Hiyerarşi İlkesi Açısından.”
61 Taş, “The New Turkey,” 5–6.
62 Yılmaz, “Competing Roles,” 146–9.
63 Kars Kaynar, “Withering Constitutional State,” 96.
64 Cabinet Decree No 2018/12009.
65 Presidential Decree No 2844.
66 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü web-site. Accessed May 25, 2021. https://egm.gov.tr/22082020-tarihli-basin-aciklamasi.
67 Uludağ, Alican. “Takviye Hazır Kuvvet Müdürlüğü Kurulması Endişe Yarattı.” 2020. Cumhuriyet, August 23, 2020.
68 Presidential Decree No 3374.
69 Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı and Insan Hakları Derneği. “TSK, MİT ve EGM Arasında Silah Devrine Dair Yönetmelik Değişikliği Hakkında Ortak Açıklama.” Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı web-site. Accessed January 13, 2021. https://tihv.org.tr/basin-aciklamalari/tsk-mit-ve-egm-arasinda-silah-devrine-dair-yonetmelik-degisikligi-hakkinda-ortak-aciklama/.
70 283 out of its 300 members participated to the attempted coup. “Cumhurbaşkanlığı Muhafız Alayı Lağvedilecek.” BBC Türkçe, July 24, 2016, available at https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-36877819.
71 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü web-site. Accessed Janaury 12, 2021. https://www.egm.gov.tr/tccbkoruma/hakkimizda.
72 Article 2 of the Presidential Decree No 27.
73 Quinlivan, “Coup-proofing,” 136.
74 The Law No 4580.
75 Turan, “1944: Savaş kıskacında Türkiye,” 483.
76 Law No 42.
77 Zürcher, A Modern History, 243. William Hale gives even a higher number by stating that between 3rd and 4th of August around 35.000 officers, including generals and admirals, were compulsorily retired. See Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 125.
78 Mat, “Sıkıyönetim Mahkemelerinin,” 349.
79 Aydemir, “İkinci Adam,” 451.
80 Esen, “Praetorian Army in Action,” 11.
81 Caliskan, “Explaining the End,” 100.
82 Kamrava, “Military Professionalization,” 68–9.
83 Sarıgil, “Civil-Military Relations,” 269–70.
84 Akman and Akçalı, “Changing the System,” 578.
85 Akça et al. eds., Olağanlaşan Ohal, 7.
86 “Turkey’s New Presidential System.”
87 “Turkey’s New Presidential System.”
88 Yılmaz, “Erdoğan’s Presidential Regime,” 2.
89 Aras and Yorulmazlar, “State, Institutions and Reform,” 137.
90 Jenkins, “Erdogan’s Generals.”
Additional information
Funding
Notes on contributors
Ayşegül Kars Kaynar
Ayşegül Kars Kaynar completed her M.A. at the City University of London, and received her PhD degree from the Political Science Department of Middle East Technical University. She has been researcher in New School for Social Research and visiting fellow at Hamburg University’s TürkeiEuropaZentrum. Her research interests involve contemporary Turkish politics, legal studies, political jurisprudence, and civil–military relations. In 2015, her dissertation received an award from the Turkish Social Scientists Association in its ‘Young Social Scientists Contest’, and in May 2017, her article titled ‘Law in Neo-liberal Era and an Introduction to Neo-formal Law’ was awarded honorable mention in the Halit Çelenk Law Awards. From 2018 to 2020, she was awarded the Academic Freedom Award of the Einstein Stiftung Berlin. In June 2020, she was received an award from the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung. Currently, she is working in Humboldt University Berlin, Social Science Institute.