Contrasting theoretical approaches to Turkish foreign policy

ABSTRACT

This article introduces a Special Issue dedicated to applying international relations theories to Turkish foreign policy. More specifically, it contrasts structural or neo-realist approaches with ideational or constructivist ones, suggests general strengths and shortcomings in each, and briefly suggests how both might apply to TFP. It also introduces the eight substantive articles in the Special Issue.

KEYWORDS:

• Turkish foreign policy
• neo-realism
• constructivism
• middle power

Turkish foreign policy (TFP) has become a significant topic of interest, evidenced by frequent media coverage, a myriad of policy papers, and numerous more rigorous academic studies. This can be partially explained by Turkey’s centrality on a number of pressing regional and global issues, as well as Turkey’s foreign policy activism and its status as a ‘rising’ or ‘emerging’ power. Most accounts of contemporary TFP also remark on its apparent shift away from its longstanding focus on the West towards one that is both more oriented toward the Middle East and Eurasia and more devoted to advancing a more nationalist, sectarian, or even neo-Ottoman or neo-imperial agenda.¹ This shift cannot be simply explained by or dated to the rise of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in 2002, as there have been notable changes in TFP in the two decades of AKP rule. In particular, an early focus on ‘Zero Problems with Neighbors,’ which featured a push for European Union (EU) membership, multidirectional and multilateral diplomacy, conflict mediation efforts, emphasis on trade and economic policy, democracy promotion, and soft power², has given way, certainly by 2015/2016, to a foreign policy that is, in many respects, more aggressive, unilateral, often openly anti-Western and revisionist, and centered on hard power, strategic autonomy, and security concerns.³ Examples include Turkey’s actions in Syria, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Caucuses, establishment of military bases in the Middle East and Africa, closer ties with Russia, and anti-Western rhetoric from its leaders.

While even casual observers of TFP can all agree that something is different about many of its most recent manifestations, there is no consensus about what is behind this shift. This special issue of Turkish Studies aims to fill this gap, dedicating itself to a theory-informed analysis of recent developments in TFP. More specifically, it examines which one of two⁴ major perspectives in international relations theory—neo-realism or constructivism, or, put differently, structural or ideational perspectives—better explains some of the most important policies and policy shifts under the AKP. Collectively, it presents several empirically-rich papers that develop and test hypotheses and expectations arising from these theories. Whereas each contributor may be more comfortable with or more inclined to emphasize one perspective over the other, we aim to have a balance of perspectives in our analysis of contemporary TFP. If the overall conclusions—TFP has multiple drivers, both structural and ideational perspectives can give one purchase to understand particular phenomena, and these perspectives are often not mutually exclusive and may present similar expectations —do not present a consensus view favoring one paradigm over the other, it is nonetheless our hope that this project will contribute to on-going debates and offer some new insights.

More specifically for this special issue, we wish to interrogate Turkey’s apparent turn away from its longstanding Western and secular (non-sectarian) orientation in foreign policy, what one might label a ‘Kemalist’ approach, to one that finds more room for other identities or geopolitical orientations (e.g. Islamist, Turkist, Neo-Ottomanist, Eurasianist). While such a framing would seemingly privilege the constructivist position insofar as these other foreign policy approaches appear are based on identities that openly challenge the Kemalist or more traditional orientation, we also wish to take into consideration the underlying factors and context that have given more prominence to these new voices and perspectives, including changes in the international or regional power structures, that might open up new possibilities for Turkey. For example, an analysis of Turkey’s recent engagement with Russia or activism in the Middle East might acknowledge ideational factors such as the rise of a pro-Russian ‘Eurasianist’ discourse, the emergence of a Neo-Ottoman orientation, or sectarianism/Islamism as helping to drive or shape TFP, but at the same time be aware of changing global and regional dynamics (e.g. power vacuums caused by Western disengagement, Russia’s centrality to the conflict in Syria, Turkey’s own rising power) that also affect TFP. Sorting out structural and ideational factors may not always be easy, but the aim is to move beyond description and provide a solid analysis of important developments in TFP.

We might also note that this debate over competing theoretical frameworks has larger implications. If neo-realist perspectives offer the most explanatory power, it follows that domestic politics or ideologies of the AKP matter far less, and that what was are actually witnessing in contemporary TFP—as opposed to the justifications that might be proffered for said policies—would occur under any Turkish government. While policymakers cannot immediately transform the international balance of power, they could alter regional power alignments—e.g. Western actors could become more involved in security issues in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood and/or work to improve Turkish security—and thereby affect TFP. Conversely, if ideational elements are paramount, we would expect the drivers of change in TFP to be found in the machinations of Turkish politics with the rise of different political actors, identities, and ideologies. In this case, policymakers would want to focus more on the development and implications of different foreign policy approaches or orientations that underlie much of TFP, recognizing that the apparent shift in TFP is not simply situational or a result of cost–benefit calculations but more the result of an identity shift that may have larger implications, particularly with respect to Turkey’s future place in Western institutions.

In this introductory framework paper, we will outline the main features of neo-realism and constructivism and tentatively suggest how they might help us understand TFP, both past and present. At the same time, we will suggest how each may have particular limitations or might work hand-in-hand with other frameworks to provide a fuller explanation of particular features of TFP. We will also briefly introduce each article and note its contributions to the larger project.

Neo-realism and Turkish foreign policy

Neo-realism is one of the most well-used paradigms in the study of world politics and foreign policy. Like its forebear, realism, neo-realism focuses on power, recognizing that maintaining and securing power is a chief aim of states under conditions of anarchy and, subsequently, that power capabilities—chiefly defined in military or economic terms—enable or constrain state behavior. Neo-realism’s chief insight is that the power distribution in the international system among great powers provides an overarching structure to the system and conditions the behavior of states. Kenneth Waltz, usually credited as the founder of neo-realism, suggested that states ‘are free to do any fool thing they care to, but they are likely to be rewarded for behavior that is responsive to structural pressures and be punished for behavior that is not.’⁵

Neo-realism can be viewed, on some level, as a product of the Cold War, as it argued (at least in Waltz’s original formulation) for the stabilizing features of bipolarity in producing a balance of power. Over the past several decades, a neo-realist would thus expect profound and potentially destabilizing changes as the Cold War’s bipolar system gave way to a (brief) period of American hegemony into the early 2000s which in turn as evolved into a more multipolar environment characterized by American disengagement from some of its previous commitments, the emergence of China as a global power, and the rise of numerous other countries (albeit on a more regional level).⁶

Turkey is a regional or middle power, inherently limited by its power (in)capabilities in some aspects of foreign policy.⁷ Simply put, Turkey lacks the means to set unilaterally the regional or global agenda or transform the systemic balance of power, and its foreign policy is thus often reactive and/or predicated on working within particular alliance structures or power arrangements. Nonetheless, neo-realism provides a set of expectations or hypotheses about the behavior of middle powers under various structural conditions. In particular, neo-realism would expect middle powers to be most constrained under conditions of bipolarity, as during the Cold War. ⁸ Indeed, during that time Turkey was ensconced in the Western bloc, a position that limited its ability to fashion a more independent or activist foreign policy. True, Turkey did not always see eye-to-eye with its fellow Western partners, but with some notable exceptions where Turkey had both high interest and decisive power capabilities (e.g. Cyprus), it more or less followed the lead of the United States, the most powerful Western nation. It recognized that joining with the West was the best means to ensure its own security against a Soviet Union that had, at times, threatened Turkey’s sovereignty and interests. In other words, Turkey’s Western orientation had a clear Realpolitik logic and addressed what Karaosmanoğlu identified as its primary longstanding fears—fear of territorial loss and fear of abandonment.⁹ Aydın, likewise adopting a historical perspective, noted that structural factors linked to the Cold War explain the high degree of continuity in TFP.¹⁰

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed Turkey to pursue some of its interests in regions (e.g. Central Asia, the Caucuses) that previously had been effectively ‘off limits’. However, in the first post-Cold War decade, American hegemony defined much of world politics, and Turkish initiatives, particularly in the post-Soviet space, often received the blessings of Washington, as Turkey and the secular, Western-oriented elements of the ‘Turkish model’ were seen as a means to advance the larger Western agenda.¹¹ Furthermore, because Turkey was in no position to challenge US/Western hegemony and faced a more benign security environment, many of its initiatives through the early 2010s had a more ‘liberal’ cast, focusing on positive-sum economic interactions, democracy promotion (particularly in light of the ‘Arab Spring’), international cooperation (e.g. The Alliance of Civilizations initiative), and multilateral institutions such as the EU, UN or G-20. Süsler suggests that much of TFP in the early 2010s corresponded with what a neo-realist might have expected of a ‘middle power’¹²

However, it is worth noting that even during this period, Turkey’s status as a rising power—evidenced both by its growing economy and increasing confidence and activism in global and regional affairs—made it at times critical of the existing international order, perhaps best evidenced by then-Prime Minister Recep T. Erdoğan’s 2013 declaration (later much repeated) that ‘the world is bigger than five’ (referring to the UN Security Council)¹³ and Turkey’s interest in being included among the BRICS (Brazil–Russia-India–China-South Africa), which have been pushing for their own greater say in global affairs. Öniş and Kutlay note that because Turkey’s status is that of an ‘emerging middle power,’ as opposed to an ‘established’ one such as Canada or Australia, it means that it faces a dilemma insofar as it may be ‘both critical of the existing liberal order dominated by the established Western powers and, at the same time, have an incentive to be a part of an international order based on liberal norms.’¹⁴ In this sense, one can assess ‘revisionist’ elements of TFP. Insofar as Turkey seeks to re-align itself or alter existing power structures to allow it to pursue policies more in line with its (perceived) power.¹⁵

This dilemma has become more apparent over time, as the overall global system and regional dynamics in Turkey’s neighborhood have seen profound changes, opening up new opportunities for Turkish policymakers. Oğuzlu dates this shift to the global financial crisis of the late 2000s, which weakened both Western countries and the legitimacy of the Western-created liberal international order.¹⁶ By the 2010s, China’s rise was undeniable, and Russia also (re)emerged as an important actor on several global and regional security issues. Both challenged the West. Multipolarity (or post-unipolarity, in Oğuzlu’s terms) resulted from balancing against US dominance as well as America’s retreat from core elements of its global leadership role under both Presidents Obama and Trump. At the same time, many of Turkey’s more diplomatic or soft power initiatives failed, most clearly in the case of Syria. ‘Zero problems with neighbors’ turned into ‘nothing but problems with neighbors’. This included relations with the West—its EU bid stalled, it was blamed for causing the refugee/migrant crisis of 2015/2016, Western countries offered lukewarm (at best) support for President Erdoğan during and after the July 2016 coup attempt, it was subjected to US economic sanctions, and the US provided political and military support for Kurdish groups in Syria that Ankara considered a fundamental threat to its own security. As a result, TFP has been increasingly ‘securitized’ and Turkey has also embarked upon various ‘soft balancing’ policies vis-à-vis its erstwhile Western partners, particularly by cooperating with Russia.¹⁷ Several of these more recent trends will be analysed in papers in this volume.

Although neo-realism can provide parsimonious explanations of international politics, it has limitations. One is that, with some exceptions (e.g. a military build-up or attack), the international environment does not present unambiguous challenges or opportunities. States often confront a menu of possible responses to a given situation. Yes, a neo-realist would suggest that when constraints are fewer, a middle power such as Turkey will have more opportunities to exercise or augment its power, but global or regional power balances by themselves do not suggest the manner or the guise under which a state pursues its objectives. Put somewhat differently, neo-realism may present, at best, only vague hypotheses about a state’s foreign policy. Waltz himself concedes that states’ actions are not determined by structure, but that structures ‘shape and shove.’¹⁸ In other words, the international structure provides context (constraints and/or opportunities) and may act as a necessary but not sufficient element to explain states’ behavior. In the case of Turkey, for example, one could imagine that in today’s multipolar environment Turkey could theoretically seek greater power and influence by pursuing a range of competing policies in its immediate neighborhood, including those promoting democracy and good governance, cultivating economic relations with its less developed neighbors, bandwagoning with the leading powers to advance its own or multilateral goals, balancing against those same powers to reshape regional dynamics, or even adopting a more unilateral course. It could also rely more (or less) on hard or soft power, although the latter concept would be alien to most working in the neo-realist tradition. Indeed, as is revealed in the articles in this Special Issue, Turkey arguably has pursued all of the above, at various times and with varying degrees of commitment, in the past decade. How much neo-realism, by itself, is able to explain the twists and turns of TFP is unclear.

Perhaps the most common critique against neo-realism is that it purposefully overlooks country-level factors (e.g. regime type, domestic political considerations, leadership) that may shape foreign policy. Indeed, neo-realism notoriously assumes that all states, sharing the same goal to amass power in order to survive under conditions of anarchy, are essentially the same. In Waltz’s words, neo-realism ‘abstract[s] from every attribute of states except their capabilities.’¹⁹ However, one can easily imagine that foreign policy often may be shaped by domestic or individual-level factors. Neoclassical realism, an amendment of sorts to neo-realism that attempts to blend together structural factors with intervening variables such as domestic political imperatives, ideologies, perceptions, or even leader-specific features, can be employed to remedy some of these lacunae. In this way, it ‘accounts for state behavior in a way that a more parsimonious systems-level theory is unable to achieve.’²⁰ Indeed, several articles in this Special Issue employ to neoclassical realism to supplement a more straightforward neo-realist or structural account. However, whether systemic and domestic variables can be genuinely disentangled and whether this more comprehensive approach can yield well-defined, useful hypotheses (as opposed to ad hoc explanations) is not clear.²¹

Constructivism and Turkish foreign policy

Constructivism, which has risen to prominence in international relations theory in the twenty-first century, offers more than just a ‘tweak’ or amendments to neo-realism. Rather, it stands as comprehensive challenge to structural approaches.²² Constructivism rests on a number of core claims, most notably that international relations are determined more by identities, shared ideas, and an intersubjective social context than by material forces.²³ Actors develop relations with others through shared norms and practices. Structures by themselves do not have inherent meaning or significance; their meanings are constructed and interpreted by actors, giving them more agency (e.g. Wendt’s famous claim that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’). States’ interests are not a priori givens or as simple as seeking survival or maximizing power. Rather, they derive from identity/ideational factors, and as these factors change, interests can change. In contrast to neo-realism, constructivists emphasize the role of culture, which animates identities. Finally, constructivists also, at least implicitly, devote more attention to domestic politics, as who rules matters significantly in constructing or changing a state’s identity.

Constructivist approaches have been well-utilized in the study of TFP. For example, Turkey’s longstanding orientation toward the West (as well as its relative aloofness for several decades from the Middle East and broader Muslim world) has been explained as a manifestation of the country’s Kemalist identity, which equated modernization with Westernization and predicated Turkey’s joining of the ‘civilized world’ with maintaining strong ties with Western countries. In Bozdağlioğlu’s words

Turkey’s decision to join the West was not simply motivated by a desire for protection, but rather stands as an integral part of the Turkish modernization project … .[This] created a Western identity for the state, which determined the course of Turkish foreign policy.²⁴

However, as Bagdonas notes, Kemalism also has multiple interpretations and points of emphasis (including, in her view, a ‘realist’ element prioritizing survival as well as an anti-imperialist outlook that tempered Turkey’s identification with the West), thereby providing a ‘repertoire’ for decision-makers.²⁵ For example, while Kemalism in many places and circumstances paid respect to multilateralism and international law, it also emphasized the ‘Turkishness’ of the state and Turkey’s concomitant obligation to protect ethnic Turks in Cyprus and the Caucuses.²⁶ Furthermore, Kemalism was not unchallenged within Turkey, and as other actors (most prominently Islamic-oriented ones) achieved some measure of influence, they impinged upon the prevailing Western identity and orientation in TFP.²⁷

This last point has expanded into a veritable cottage industry since the rise of the AKP, as its self-declared goal of constructing a ‘New Turkey’ represents a challenge to the longstanding identities in both Turkish domestic politics and TFP. The largest strand in this vast (and ever-expanding) literature emphasizes the AKP’s Islamic orientation and subsequent turn away from the West and toward the Middle East and broader Muslim world, a development most associated with the reconceptualization of TFP’s fundamental tenets by Foreign Minister (2009-2014) (later Prime Minister [2014-2016]) Ahmet Davutoğlu. Davutoğlu emphasized history and geography in identifying both TFP’s priorities and strengths, but fundamentally this was a geo-cultural argument, resting on cultural ties (Islam and Ottoman heritage) and the subsequent potential to exercise ‘soft power’.²⁸ What this meant in practice, however, has arguably changed over time. Some writers identified TFP’s normative aspects that rested on its (former) status as a ‘Muslim democracy’ or a moralist discourse (most evident in the initial years of the Syrian conflict) centered in part on Islamic solidarity.²⁹ Some noted how the (re)imagination of the Ottoman period was invoked in a benign, multicultural manner to foster inter-civilizational dialogue (e.g. the ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ initiative),³⁰ whereas others (typically writing more recently) see the rise of Turkey’s Islamic identity as empowering nativist authoritarians and legitimizing civilizational competition, eventually reducing any previously affective dimension of relations with the West to transactionalism.³¹ Still others view TFP as more of an epiphenomenon, focusing on how debates over and shifts in foreign policy are driven by domestic political disputes, utilized to legitimize a particular domestic agenda or to take the battle over Turkish identity ‘outside’ into the foreign policy arena ³² It is worth noting as well that whereas ‘Islamic’ or ‘Neo-Ottoman’ are the most frequently invoked identities in the AKP era—and contributors in this special issue will explore both—there are other cultural (Eurasianist, pan-Turkist) and political (populist) identities that have been embraced by Turkish political actors and have arguably exercised some influence over TFP.³³

It is worth mentioning, however, that while constructivist and ideational perspectives offering more contextually-contingent explanations and address some of the problems associated with structural approaches, they are not without their own shortcomings. Often, they de-emphasize critical questions about why particular ideas/identities/discourses take hold at a particular time—to which a neo-realist might retort (to employ Marxist terms) that the constructivist ‘super-structure’ is merely a reflection of the material (power) base. In this respect, one might argue that constructivism might be more a method or approach than a full-blown causal theory, capable of describing and even analysing processes but harder-pressed to isolate variables and develop testable hypotheses.³⁴

Plan of the special issue

This special issue contains both broader, thematic explorations of TFP as well as more focussed studies of TFP directed to different countries and/or regions.

Hakan Yavuz considers the question of neo-Ottomanism, a phenomenon that has received extensive scholarly and popular attention. His far-reaching article places the development of neo-Ottomanism in historical context and documents how it has evolved during the AKP period. While neo-Ottomanism is commonly understood as grounded in ideational or cultural terms, Yavuz notes that it dovetails with a more ‘realist’ push for strategic autonomy in TFP. In this sense, he finds that neo-Ottomanism also responds to more ‘realist’ or structural imperatives, thus providing an option for TFP in a dynamic strategic environment. Yavuz, however, remains sceptical that Turkey’s movement away from the West on both ideational and strategic grounds will yield many positive outcomes.

Mehmet Arısan’s article is the most explicitly constructivist or ideational, as it traces the development and impact of what he identifies as a conservative populist discourse in Turkey. He argues that such a discourse has been politically relevant since the 1950s, employed by Islamic-oriented actors against the secular, Westernized Kemalist establishment. The AKP has taken this discourse to a new level, and in foreign policy it is manifested not only in civilizational discourse regarding Turkey’s role in the Islamic world, but also in a sense of victimhood. Arısan suggests this also feeds into conspiracy thinking, particularly in regards to Western countries, which has become more pronounced after the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey.

Erdi Oztürk’s and Bahar Baser’s article focuses on the role religion plays in TFP, including an analysis of both historical and contemporary cases. They emphasize that the place of religion in TFP is multifaceted, involves both state and non-state actors, and has been more prominent under the AKP. While consideration of religion is far more in line with a constructivist approach that emphasizes culture, history, and identity, they find that the effectiveness of Turkish policy across different regions is affected by several considerations, including power relations between Turkey and the target state or region.

Hakki Taş, in the first of five regional/country-specific case studies, considers TFP in the Middle East, in particular Ankara’s relations with various affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Given both the AKP’s and the MB’s Islamic-oriented approach to politics, one might expect that relations between the two would illustrate a more ideational or constructivist orientation in TFP. Taş, however, argues that what mattered more was how the MB was able, for a time, to help advance Turkey’s material interests in the region, and that structural factors (e.g. multipolarity on the regional level) created spaces for Turkey’s activism. Notably, as the MB has been weakened and Turkey also found itself in a more challenging environment, it has tried to distance itself from the MB.

Oya Dursun-Özkanca’s contribution examines Turkish-EU relations, in particular their deterioration since the 2016 coup attempt. She finds that structural explanations rooted in balancing behavior are persuasive, but she supplements this with aspects of neoclassical realism that consider domestic or state-level factors as intervening variables. She highlights both Turkey’s relative power position and its desire to pursue a more autonomous foreign policy as well as how Turkey and the EU have opposing interests on topics such as Cyprus, the Eastern Mediterranean, Syria, and Libya. In the end, she notes that Turkish-EU relations have become far more transactional in nature, as Turkey’s pro-Western orientation has given way to a more nationalist-oriented one.

Lenore Martin’s article explores Turkish-US relations, focussing on various crisis that have manifested themselves since 2016 and led to increased tensions and suspicions between the two sides. These include US support for the Syrian Kurds and American refusal to extradite Fethullah Gülen, both of which raised ire in Ankara, and Turkish energy exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean and purchase of an air defense system from Russia, both of which have been harshly criticized by the US and other NATO members. She employs both neo-realism and constructivism to examine these phenomena, but she finds both wanting. Instead, she suggests how a more holistic, integrated neoclassical realist approach, which integrates structural factors with domestic-level variables, may offer better explanations of TFP.

Paul Kubicek explores Turkey’s relations with Russia, a long-term adversary with whom Turkey has recently established more friendly and cooperative relations despite the two countries being on opposite sides of conflicts in Syria, Libya, and the Caucuses. He finds that structural explanations, rooted in Turkey’s own rising power, disengagement by the West in parts of Tureky’s neighborhood, and the functional need to cooperate with Russia on vital issues help explain Turkey’s apparent turn to Russia. As for ideational factors, he emphasizes the two countries’ shared grievances against the West over the oft-mentioned rise of an ‘Eurasianist’ ideology or bloc in Turkey. He notes, however, that the 2022 war in Ukraine may reconfigure regional and global politics, creating perhaps a more bipolar situation and thus making Turkey ‘choose’ between Russia and the West.

Finally, Ioannis Grigoriadis investigates Turkish-Greek relations, which he notes (as with relations with US and Europe overall) have become more conflictual in recent years. He suggests that the lack of prospects for Turkish EU membership have worked against reconciliation between these long-time rivals. Furthermore, he notes that both neo-realist (e.g. regional competition in the region and the rise of powers more hostile to Turkey) as well as constructivist explanations (e.g. the development of the ‘Blue Homeland’ (Mavi Vatan) doctrine that envisions Turkey as a maritime power) shed light on how Turkish-Greek relations have evolved.

While the papers, as a whole, do not argue for one approach over the other—some authors see merit in both, some do favor a particular paradigm, and some are keen to point to weaknesses in different theoretical approaches—our hope is that they do illustrate how international relations theories can shed some light on aspects of TFP while at the same time suggesting that some issues remain unresolved or contentious and thus spur future research.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Paul Kubicek

Paul Kubicek is Professor of Political Science and Director of International Studies at Oakland University. He has published widely on Russian and Turkish politics and has taught at Koç University, Boğaziçi University, and Antalya Bilim University in Turkey. He is the editor of Turkish Studies.

Notes

1 Early works that picked up on this trend include Öniş, ‘Multiple faces’; Sözen, ‘A Paradigm Shift’; and Başer, ‘Shift-of-axis.’

2 Notable contributions that focus on these features of TFP in the late 2000s-early 2010s include Kirişçi, ‘The transformation’: Kacar and Lesage, ‘Turkey’s Profile’; and Falk and Farer, ‘Turkey’s New Multilateralism’.

3 Book length works that document these developments include Cagaptay, Erdogan’s Empire and Candar, Turkey’s Neo-Ottomanist Moment.

4 A third ‘major school,’ liberal-internationalism, we would contend, offers much less explanatory power for TFP circa 2020 than neo-realism and constructivism, although it can be invoked to explain the aforementioned emphasis on multilateralism, international institutions, and soft power in the early 2010s.

5 Waltz, ‘Evaluating Theories,’ 915. The locus classicus for neo-realism remains Waltz, Theory of International Politics.

6 The most prominent articulation of this position, in particular the dangers of the rise of China, is John Mearsheimer. See Mearsheimer, The Tragedy.

7 For extended discussion of Turkey’s status as a ‘middle power,’ see Öniş and Kutlay, ‘The dynamics’; Dal, Middle Powers; and Süsler, ‘Turkey: An Emerging Middle Power.’

8 Holbraad, Middle Powers.

9 Karaosmanoğlu, ‘The Evolution,’ 202.

10 Aydın, ‘Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy.’

11 Bal, ‘’Turkish Model’’.

12 Süsler, ‘Turkey: An Emerging Middle Power.’

13 This has even been labeled a ‘campaign’ and invoked by Erdogan as injustice. See ‘‘Dünya 5’ten Büyüktür’ kampanya oldu,’ Hürriyet, September 26, 2014.

14 Öniş and Kutlay, ‘The dynamics,’

15 This point is developed at length by Candar, Turkey’s Neo-Ottomanist Moment.

16 Oğuzlu, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy.’

17 Dursun-Özkanca, Turkey-West Relations, utilizes elements of neorealism to analyze these developments.

18 Waltz, ‘Evaluating Theories,’ 915.

19 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 99.

20 Foulon, ‘Neoclassical Realist Analyses.’

21 For an explicitly neoclassical realist account of TFP, see Şahin, ‘Theorizing the Change.’

22 The title of a seminal constructivist text, Alexander Wendt’s, Social Theory of International Politics, is a clear rejoinder to Waltz.

23 There are, to be sure, various strands of constructivism and debates over the advantages and limitations of a constructivist approach. In addition to Wendt, see Hopf, ‘The Promise’; Checkel, ‘The Constructivist Turn’; Bertucci, Hayes, and James, Constructivism Reconsidered; and Kubálková et al, International Relations.

24 Bozdağlioğlu, ‘Modernity,’ p. 71. See also Bozdağlioğlu, Turkish Foreign Policy

25 Bagdonas, ‘A Post-Structuralist Approach,’ p. 45.

26 Uzer, Identity and Turkish Foreign Policy.

27 Bozdağlioğlu, ‘Modernity.’

28 The best-known source is Davutoğlu, Stratejik Dernlik,

29 Dal, ‘Assessing Turkey’s “Normative Power”,’ and Bagdonas, ‘Reading Turkey’s Foreign Policy.’

30 Yanık, ‘Constructing Turkish ‘Exceptionalism’.’

31 Çınar, ‘Turkey’s “Western” or “Muslim” Identity,’ and Bashirov and Yilmaz, ‘The Rise of Transactionalism.’

32 Özpek and Yaşar, ‘Populism and foreign policy,’ Coşkun, Doğan, and Demir, ‘Foreign Policy as Legitimation Strategy’ and Hintz, Identity Politics.

33 Aktürk, ‘The Fourth Style of Politics,’ and Köstem, ‘When Can Idea Entrepreneurs.’

34 Checkel, ‘The Constructivist Turn.’