The anti-gender movement in Turkey: an analysis of its reciprocal aspects

ABSTRACT

The anti-gender movement has been publicly pursuing its quarrel against the social, academic, and political contexts of gender. Thus, it has also been constituting a basis of activism for fundamentalists, nationalists, and conservatives. In this article, we argue that recent instances show the movement has a reciprocal strategy, which articulates its structural, civil, and political aspects of counter-mobilization. After explaining the fundamentals of these aspects, we focus on the case of Turkey to embody our theoretical discussions. We also attempt to offer a transversal strategy for broad-based coalitions that can challenge the movement by categorizing its recent reflections.

KEYWORDS:

• Anti-gender movement
• counter-mobilization
• reciprocity
• Turkey

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Sosa, “Beyond Gender Equality,” 8.

2 Korolczuk, “The War on Gender,” 51, and Petö, “Anti-Gender Movements,” 297.

3 Butler, “Anti-Gender Ideology,” 959.

4 Than, “Hungary’s Anti-LGBTQ Law.”

5 Paradis, “Romania’s Dangerous Family Referendum.”

6 Giebel and Röhrborn, “Gender/Backlash,” 9.

7 Aguilera-Carnerero, “VOX.”

8 Human Rights Watch, “No Support.”

9 Şeker, “The Istanbul Convention.”

10 For specific cases, see Krizsan and Roggeband, Gendering Democratic Backsliding, and Patternote and Kuhar, “The Anti-Gender Movement.”

11 Corredor, “Unpacking,” 619.

12 Zaremberg, et al., “Feminism(s) and Anti-Gender Backlash,” 529.

13 For the transnational status of the AGM, see Korolczuk, “The War.”

14 Szelewa, “Recurring Ideas,” 6.

15 One of the recent apparatuses regarding the civil aspect of the AGM is public and external financing. According to a report by the European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual and Reproductive Rights, the movement was provided a total of “$707.2 million between 2009 and 2018 by various actors in the USA, Russia, and Europe.” See “Tip of the Iceberg,” 3.

16 For an article that analyzes the role of social media in the AGM, see Righetti, “Anti-Gender Debate.”

17 See Sosa, “Beyond Gender Equality.”

18 Graff and Korolczuk, “Gender, Anti-Gender,” 19.

19 Sanders and Jenkins, “Control, Alt, Delete.”

20 Tekeli, “New Feminist Movement,” 19.

21 See Sirman, “Making of Familial Citizenship,” 147–72; Zihnioğlu, Kadınsız inkılap; and Arat, Patriarchal Paradox.

22 The multi-party period, which began with the general elections in 1946, did not bring a prompt improvement regarding women’s rights and equality until the 1980s, when a new feminist movement emerged in Turkey. The petition (1986) for the implementation of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the March Against Violence (1987) were the first mass actions of this movement, and the following years led to significant achievements like the foundation of the Women’s Library and Information Center, women’s shelters, women’s studies programs in universities, and increasing number of women’s CSOs; growing awareness of gender-based discrimination and sexism; introduction of new concepts such as sexual harassment; creating public awareness and consciousness for women’s human rights; and legal reforms. See Arat, “Women’s Rights and Islam,” 235–51.

23 Kelly, “Who Makes a Nation.”

24 Peterson, “Queering of States/Nations,” 61–3.

25 Kancı, “Citizenship.”

26 Çavdar and Yaşar, Women in Turkey, 187.

27 Öztan, “Domesticity of Neoliberalism,” 174–88; Buğra and Yakut-Çakar, “Structural Change,” 517; and Yazıcı, “Return,” 103.

28 Yazıcı, “Return,” 103.

29 Sabah, “Başbakandan üç çocuk ısrarı.”

30 See Yaman Öztürk and Dedeoğlu, Kapitalizm, and Arslan, “Labour Informality.”

31 See İlkkaracan, “Emek piyasasında”; Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, “Türkiye’de aile.”

32 Toksöz, “Transition,” 77.

33 Öztan, “Domesticity,” 174–88.

34 Muehlenhoff, “Neoliberal Governmentality,” 207–9, and Birdal, “Between,”123–39. Note that although sexual orientation and gender identity are included in the Article 4/3 of the Istanbul Convention to prevent discrimination in protecting the rights of victims, it has not been effectively implemented to counter actions of violence and marginalization against the LGBTIQA+ individuals and community.

35 For studies that analyze the networks and arguments against the Istanbul Convention, see Eslen-Ziya, “Establishing Networked Misogyny,” and Bekki, “Türkiye’de İstanbul Sözleşmesi’ne yönelik tepkiler.”

36 See Aile Akademisi Derneği, 10 maddede İstanbul Sözleşmesi.

37 Dilipak, “AKP’nin papatyaları.”

38 For instance, see Muharrem Balcı’s books, İstanbul Sözleşmesi, and İstanbul Sözleşmesinden. For one of the speeches of Aynur Göçmen, see “İstanbul Sözleşmesi ve 6284.”

39 ILKHA, “Aile Meclisi başkanı.”

40 Öztürk, “Eğitimde toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliğine.” Although the School Action Plan was to be carried out for two years, due to such criticisms it was cancelled by the Ministry of National Education in 2019.

41 Maraşlı, “Ayşe askere Ali sofraya.”

42 Kandiyoti, “Locating the Politics of Gender,” 103–18.

43 The killer of Emine Bulut (she was killed by the man she divorced from in 2019) was declared a hero by the head of the Divorced Victim Fathers Association. See T24, “Boşanmış Mağdur Babalar Derneği.”

44 Hacıvelioğlu, “Ailenin korunması,” and Arslan, “Süresiz nafaka.” In Islam, iddet means the period that women are obliged to wait after a divorce for remarriage. Although Islamic theologians have different opinions about how long iddet should be, Article 132 of the Civil Code implements a period of 300 days. See Acar, “İddet.”

45 Arabul, (@arabul_mesut), “evlenmeyin,” Twitter.

46 Özçelik, “İstanbul Sözleşmesi bitti.”

47 Note that the age of marriage in Turkey is 18. However, a person can marry at the age of 17 by taking family’s permission, and 16 with a court decision.

48 For instance, Maraşlı has written many articles on this subject in her blog Çocuk ve aile with titles such as “Young Marriage, Not Sexual Abuse,” “Young Marriage Victimhood,” “Are Those Against Young Marriage Also Against Adultery?” See Maraşlı, “List of Articles.”

49 ILKHA, “Lanzarote Sözleşmesi,” and Gültekin, “Çocuk istismarını hukukileştirmek.”

50 As Bene and Boda argue, abstention from politics makes citizens more prone to the dissemination of populist discourses. Turkey is a recent instance of this correlation, as citizens are more prone to populist tendencies for their low political activity. See “Democratic Efficacy and Populist Attitudes.”

51 Gümrükçü, “Democratic Backsliding in Turkey.”

52 Mutluer, “Intersectionality of Gender, Sexuality, and Religion,” 105.

53 Nas, “Familialization of Women,” 170.

54 Jones, “Turkey: Trying to Impose an Abortion Ban.”

55 Yıldız, “Diyanet İşleri Başkanı Erbaş’tan LGBTİ açıklaması.”

56 Ayaz, “Aile İrşat Merkezi.”

57 Kurtuluş Korkman, “Politics of Intimacy in Turkey,” 116.

58 Yeni Şafak, “6’lı masada İstanbul Sözleşmesi”; Kaos GL, “BBP Başkanı da”; Sabah, “Yeniden Refah Partisi Genel Başkanı”; T24, “HÜDA PAR’dan HDP’ye ‘eşcinsel’ tehdidi.”

59 Scotti, “With a Different Name,” 334. Note that, according to the Council of State (Danıştay) prosecutor, the withdrawal is unconstitutional as Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution specifically authorizes the Parliament for the legal actions regarding international conventions. However, the Council of State has dismissed the class action lawsuit for the nullity of the withdrawal contrary to the prosecutor’s opinion on 19 July 2022. The decision sets a remarkable instance for the parliamentary backsliding in Turkey, in addition to its transnational inspiration for the AGM. See Altan-Olcay and Öder, “Turkey’s Withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention”; Gazete Duvar, “Danıştay savcısından İstanbul Sözleşmesi mütalaası.”

60 There has recently been a legislative process for the limitation of alimony in terms of time and amount. See Oktay et al., “Boşanma davalarında yeni bir usul.”

61 Gago, Feminist International, 204–15.

62 Yuval-Davis, “What is Transversal Politics,” 94–8.

63 Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere,” 56–64.

64 Note that the LGBTIQA+ movement should not be considered as a homogeneous movement. For instance, the AK-LGBTI prioritizes a masculine, patriotic, nationalist, statist and conservative gay identity, and the prefix AK symbolizes their sympathy for the AKP. See Bora, “Intersectional Analysis of Critical Queer Subjectivities”; Selici, “Conservative LGBTI+ Groups in Turkey.”

65 Öz, “Hangi Feminizm.” For the developments in the LGBTIQA+ movement after Gezi Protests, see Muehlenhoff, “Neoliberal Governmentality.”

66 For instance, Hebun, a Kurdish LGBTIQA+ organization, provided legal training titled “Our Rights” in KAMER (Women's Center), one of the prominent CSOs of the Kurdish women’s movement. Kaos GL, “HEBUN LGBTİ’den haklarımız eğitimi.” Also note that the Kurdish women’s movement tends to interpret sexuality mainly in the context of violence, thus differing from the LGBTIQA+ movement, and, at times, causing interruptions in their alliances. See Bor et al., From Converging Roads, 38–9.

67 The platform has recently faced a closure case for its alleged actions against “codes and public morality” by the Office of Chief Public Prosecutor in İstanbul. For the platform’s public statement regarding the case, see Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu, “Kadın Cinayetlerini.”

68 See Sözcü, “İstanbul Sözleşmesi”; Evrensel, “İstanbul Sözleşmesi’nin”; and Cumhuriyet, “İzmir.”

69 Sönmez, “İstanbul Sözleşmesi.”

70 Euronews, “Kadın örgütleri.” See also Gazete Duvar, “Muhafazakar” and Ekinci, “Sözleşmeye kadar.”

71 BirGün, “77 barodan.”

72 See Birgün, “Danıştay savcısı.”

73 Diken Haber, “TÜSİAD’dan İstanbul.”

74 Akyol and Turgut, “Kadınlar.”

75 Yetkin, “Erdoğan’dan.”

76 See Bianet, “KADEM,” and Euronews, “Kadın örgütleri.” Not only conservative women’s organizations took a different stance regarding the Istanbul Convention. For example, the Republican Women’s Organization (Cumhuriyet Kadınları Derneği, CKD) can be noted among the women’s organizations which earlier asked for reservations regarding the Convention and welcomed the withdrawal. See Cumhuriyet Kadınları Derneği, “Kamuoyuna duyuru.”

77 Şeker, “Türkiye’de 8 Mart.”

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Tuba Kancı

Tuba Kancı is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Kocaeli University. She received her Ph.D. from Sabancı University. She was a postdoctoral researcher and lecturer at Koç University, worked as an assistant professor of Political Science at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, and was a visiting researcher at Center for the Study of Democracy at University of California Irvine. Her main research areas are citizenship studies, gender studies, civil society, social movements, education, political theory, political ideologies. Her research has appeared in several edited books both in English and Turkish and in peer-reviewed international journals such as Gender and Education, Nations and Nationalism, and Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism.

Buşra Çelik

Buşra Çelik earned her B.A., and M.A. from Kocaeli University. She is currently a Ph.D. candidate of Political Science and Public Administration at Kocaeli University. Her primary research interests include women and gender studies, Islamic feminisms, and social movements.

Yavuz Bülent Bekki

Yavuz Bülent Bekki earned his B.A. from Gazi University and his M.A. from Kocaeli University. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate of Political Science and Public Administration at Kocaeli University. His primary research interests include gender studies, methodology studies, and new media research.

Umutcan Tarcan

Umutcan Tarcan earned his LL.M. degree from Bahcesehir University and his M.A. degree from Kocaeli University. He is currently a lawyer and a Ph.D. candidate of Political Science and Public Administration at Kocaeli University. His research interests include political philosophy, epistemology, human rights, Marxism, and gender studies.