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Articles

Turkey’s security role in the Gulf region: exploring the case of a newcomer

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Pages 809-831 | Received 20 Feb 2022, Accepted 15 Jan 2023, Published online: 01 Mar 2023
 

ABSTRACT

This study explores Turkey as a newcomer to Gulf security. It addresses why Turkish decision-makers want Turkey to play an elevated security role in the Gulf. It offers a holistic yet detailed outlook of Turkey’s potential enhanced security role and develops a systematic argument that assesses Ankara's aspiration, will, and capacity to play such a role. Finally, it adopts a comparative perspective to show how the regional actors (Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and Iran) might perceive an enhanced Turkish security role in the Gulf; and where Turkey stands vis-à-vis the capacity of other extra-regional actors (the U.S., China, India, and Russia) concerning Gulf security.

Acknowledgements

Open Access funding provided by the Qatar National Library.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1 Khan, “The US Policy.”

2 Johnson, “The Persian Gulf,” 124.

3 Personal communication with US official, October 2021.

4 See for example Soubrier, “Gulf Security.”

5 See Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision”; Davutoğlu, “Principles”; and Erdoğan, “Türkiye Builds.”

6 See for example Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik; Erdoğan, “A Fairer World”; and Duvar, “Erdoğan declares.”

7 Yavuz, “The Motives.”

8 Kasapoğlu, “Turkey’s Forward-Basing Posture.”

9 AA Energy, “President Erdogan.”

10 Today’s Zaman, “Motivation Behind.”

11 Finn, “Turkey.”

12 Murdock, “Turkey Opens.”

13 Davutoğlu, “Vision 2023.”

14 Aljazeera, “Arab States.”

15 Aljazeera, “Turkey: Qatar.”

16 Personal Communication with Turkish official No.1, August 2021.

17 Butler,“Turkey Rejects.”

18 Erdogan, “We Don’t.”

19 Daily Sabah “Erdogan: Turkey.”

20 Anadolu Agency, “Turkey Supports.”

21 Bakir, “Cementing.”

22 Gündoğmuş and Beyaz, “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan.”

23 Löfflmann, “Leading from Behind.”

24 Silove, “The Pivot.”

25 Pinto, “Mapping the Obama.”

26 Doran, “Obama's Secret.”

27 Greenberg, “Syria Will.”

28 Seen by the author. Parts of the confidential document were UNCLASSIFIED by US Department of State Case No. F-2014-20439 Doc No. C05787394 Date: 02/29/2016. Document can be found on: https://foia.state.gov/.

29 Kutlay and Önis, “Turkish Foreign,” 1085.

30 See for example Neset et al., “Turkish Foreign Policy” and Aydin, “Foreign Policy.”

31 See for example Bakir, “Mapping.”

32 Reuters, “Special Report.”

33 Akar, “Turkey’s Military.”

34 Erdoğan, “We Have.”

35 Wezeman, Kuimova, and Wezeman, SIPRI Fact Sheet, 6.

36 Demir, “Transformation,” 37.

37 Ibid.

38 Hurriyet Daily News, “Turkey Aims.”

39 Wezeman, Kuimova, and Wezeman, SIPRI Fact Sheet.

40 Oxford GAPS, Turkey – GCC Relations.

41 Ibid., 42.

42 Oman shared the first place with Turkmenistan.

43 Wezeman, Kuimova, and Wezeman, SIPRI Fact Sheet, 2.

44 Bakir, “The Evolution,” 214.

45 Personal communication with Turkish Official No. 2, March 2022. Interview with Turkish Official No. 3, August 2022. Interview with Khaleeji Official No. 1, July 2022. Personal communication with Khaleeji Official No. 2, June 2022.

46 Interview with a Khaleeji Official No. 1, July 2022.

47 Turkish Official No. 3 disagrees with this notion.

48 Personal communication with a Turkish Official No. 2, March 2022. Personal Communication with Khaleeji Official No. 2 June 2022.

49 Ibid.

50 CNN, “Türkiye Ekonomi.”

51 Turkpress, “Aralarında Kara.”

52 Personal communication with Khaleeji Official No. 2, June 2022.

53 Quilliam, “The Role,” 130.

54 Guzansky, “India Looks West.”

55 Kohli, “Indian Migrants,” 115–47.

56 Guzansky, “The Future Job,” 134–41.

57 Reuters, “Putin Signs Syria.”

58 Frolovskiy, “Understanding,” 83.

59 Embassy of Russia, “Russia’s Security Concept,” and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Russia’s Collective Security.”

60 Kozhanov, “Russia-GCC,” 183–203.

61 Issaev and Kozhanov, “Diversifying,” 894.

62 Kuimova, “Russia’s Arm,” 1.

63 Hasbani, “The Geopolitics of Weapons,” 81.

64 Borisov, “Russian Arms,” 42, and Borschevskaya, “The Tactical Side,” 9.

65 AEI, “China Global Investment.”

66 Shanif, “Strategic Maneuvering.”

67 Bakir, “The Emerging,” 127.

68 China.Org, “China’s Arab Policy.”

69 Masterson, “Saudi Arabia Said” and Chaziza, “Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear.”

70 Lubold and Strobel, “Secret Chinese Port.”

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ali Bakir

Dr. Ali Bakir is a Research Assistant Professor at the Ibn Khaldon Center for Humanities and Social Sciences at Qatar University. He is a foreign policy and security analyst with over 15 years of professional experience working with senior officials, decision-makers, and stakeholders for governmental, non-governmental, and private sector institutions. He is also a non-resident Senior Fellow with the “Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative” at the Washington-based Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs. Before joining Qatar University, Dr. Bakir worked as a senior advisor at Qatar’s embassy in Ankara. He writes extensively in English, Arabic, and Turkish platforms on topics related to geopolitics and security in the MENA region with a special focus on Turkey’s foreign and defense policies, Turkey-Arab/Gulf relations, and Gulf security. His education, fieldwork, and work experience span several countries, including Kuwait, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey and Qatar.