Making Turkey’s Transformation Possible: Claiming ‘Security‐ speak’—not Desecuritization!

Abstract

There is an emerging consensus in the literature that considers Turkey’s post‐1999 transformation a consequence of AKP‐led efforts directed at challenging the ‘securityness’ of issues. The present article argues that change became possible not through ‘desecuritization’, but owing to some societal actors claiming ‘security‐speak’ to frame other issues as ‘threats to Turkey’s future’, and pointing to Turkey’s accession to the European Union as a solution that would help stabilize its foreign relations as well as the economy and provide an anchor for reform.

Notes

[1] Reform efforts in Turkey are increasingly labelled as a ‘transformation’. See, for example, Sofos 2001; Derviş et al 2004; Kirişçi 2004.

[2] The website of Turkey’s Secreteriat General for EU Affairs documents the reform efforts; see http://www.abgs.gov.tr/indextr.html.

[3] Here, ‘state establishment’ refers to the bearers of the hegemonic ideology of the state (Kemalism). They can be found in military and civilian bureaucracy, academia and civil societal institutions.

[4] I use the terms ‘civil society’ and ‘civil societal actor’ rather loosely, the former with reference to a space and the latter with reference to collectives of individuals and institutions that meet a common purpose and/or value.

[5] ‘National security project’ refers to the set of ideas and institutions that help build and secure a (nation) state. Depending on the context, the adjective ‘national’ may also cloak the regime security concerns of an elite, a social class, tribe or clan.

[6] Defining ‘progressive change’ is not unproblematic. For the purposes of this article, I take progressive change to mean those changes EU conditionality comprises. It is beyond the scope of this paper to question the extent to which EU contributes to ‘progressive change’ in current or prospective member states.

[7] Wæver (1995) introduced the concepts of securitization and desecuritization. On the Security Studies debate, see Buzan et al. 1998; Bilgin et al. 1998; Wyn‐Jones 1999; Williams 2003; Huysmans 2006). The literature on Turkey does not explicitly draw upon ‘securitization theory’, but nevertheless rests on assumptions of ‘universal desecuritization’.

[8] This is not to underestimate the ways in which Turkey’s transformation has been allowed by the convergence of a variety of domestic and international dynamics, including (in no particular order): the delayed effects of the end of the Cold War, which called for an adaptation effort; globalization of world politics, which revealed state institutions’ weaknesses while opening up new opportunities for both state and societal actors’ agency; the 1996 Susurluk incident, which unearthed previously unacknowledged links between aspects of state institutions and the underground world (the so‐called ‘deep state’) on the one hand, and transnational crime on the other, thereby exposing the ‘consequentialist ethics’ at work in aspects of Turkey’s security policies; the 1999 earthquake, which revealed the weaknesses of the government and the military in providing basic security to its citizens, while making people aware of their own agency as societal actors; the 1999 decision of the EU to grant candidate country status and the rapprochement in Turco–Greek relations, which provided a future perspective to those seek to bring about ‘progressive change’; the 2001 economic crisis, which eroded citizens’ confidence in the state and political elite’s ability to steer the economy in a globalizing world; the capture, trial and subsequent sentencing of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, which not only slowed down the terrorist campaign in southeastern Turkey but also created a socio‐political environment that allowed for self‐doubt and critique regarding the Kurdish issues; the September 11 attacks and other al‐Qaeda‐linked bombings around the world, which indicated the fragility of existing security institutions and the futility of focusing purely on the military instrument.

[9] The term ‘Copenhagen School’ was first used in McSweeney 1996.

[10] The exceptions to such uses of security as a ‘technique of governance’ by the state establishment (Foucault 1984) are those occasions when resorting to extraordinary measures is intersubjectively considered to be necessary—as in the case of ‘enemy’ troops crossing the border in an ‘aggressive’ manner (Wæver 1995). What renders the latter a ‘threat’ and requires taking it outside ‘normal’ politics is the intersubjective character of the agreement that the troops crossing the border are ‘enemy’ (as opposed to ‘neighbour’) and that their manner is ‘aggressive’ (as opposed to, say, a ‘peaceful’ military manoeuvre). Such exceptions aside, maintains Wæver, security functions as a ‘conservative mechanism’ utilized by the state establishment to discipline the citizens.

[11] Reference to BAAS party (Arab Socialist Resurrection Party) in Syria and Iraq.

[12] This is not to deny the significant last‐minute efforts made by the previous government to prepare the ‘National Program’ and jump‐start the reform process in the summer of 2002. It is the AKP government, nonetheless, that is credited in the literature for attempts to ‘desecuritize’ various issues including the Cyprus problem.

[13] Duru and Hoşder (1994) provide an account of the micro‐mechanisms of national security policy‐making without touching upon the political aspects discussed here.

[14] This is not to suggest that the military’s threat perceptions are unfounded. On the contrary, the broadening of Turkey’s security agenda took place at a time when globalized insecurity made itself felt, namely: challenges to the state’s monopoly on legitimate use of violence internally (in the form of the PKK using violence to achieve its aims) and externally (as with the EU’s call for a ‘political’ and not ‘military’ solution to the Kurdish problem); the emergence and strengthening of non‐state actors who increasingly escaped government ‘control’; the revolution in information technology and media presence (which meant that the struggle against the PKK had to be conducted under the gaze of international media). See Bilgin 2005 for further discussion.

[15] See, inter alia, Booth 1991, 1997, 2005; Wyn‐Jones 1999.

[16] ‘Defence minister says no problem with national security’, BBC Monitoring International Reports, available at: http://wwwb.business.reuters.com

[17] ‘Turkish General Staff issues statement on “National Security Concept”’, BBC Monitoring International Reports, available at: http://wwwb.business.reuters.com.

[18] ‘Avrupa Birliği Türkiye’den ne İstiyor?’ [What Does the European Union Want from Turkey?], available at: http://www.turkis.org.tr/AB%20RAPORU.doc.

[19] ‘Reactions to General Staff statement’, Turkish Daily News, available at: www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/08_09_01/dom.htm#d4.

[20] ‘TÜSİAD gives cautious backing to Yılmaz’, Turkish Daily News, available at: www.turkishdailynews.com/old_editions/08_08_01/dom.htm#d4.

[21] See, for example, Murat Yetkin, ‘Yılmaz’dan Önemli İtiraflar’ [Significant confessions from Yılmaz], Radikal, 5 August 2001; Taha Akyol, ‘Ulusal Güvenlik Tartışması’ [The Debate on National Security], Milliyet, 7 August 2001.

[22] ‘TÜSİAD’ın çıkışı istifa getirdi’ [TÜSİAD’s outburst was followed by a resignation], Zaman, available at: http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2003/03/30/ekonomi/h1.htm.

[23] The military maintained its neutrality on yet another crucial ‘security’ issue during this period: the 2003 vote on Turkey’s participation in the US war on Iraq. Discussing the military’s motives behind its decided neutrality on these two issues goes beyond the limits of this paper. Unmistakably, what kept the military from speaking out was not desecuritization.

[24] In what follows, I focus on key writings by the two authors. However, their influence cannot be reduced to these texts. They contribute to the debates by frequent media appearances and writing weekly columns for magazines and newspapers.

[25] ‘Sivil toplum Avrupa dedi’ [Civil Society says Europe], Radikal, 6 June 2002.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Pınar Bilgin

Earlier versions of this article were presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montreal, Canada, March 2004, and the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK, July 2004. This article is a part of the broader research project the author worked on during her fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2006–2007).