Between partition and pluralism: the Bosnian jigsaw and an ‘ambivalent peace’

Abstract

This article argues that the attempted creation of a liberal state in Bosnia and Herzegovina by various international actors has failed to generate legitimacy among the local population. While the Dayton agreements institutionalized ethnic divisions, the post‐Dayton reconstruction process was dominated by Western liberal discourses that have tended to marginalize local voices. Thereby, a conservative version of the liberal peace has been institutionalized, based on top‐down mechanisms that mobilized public support only when war elites could co‐opt the international agendas. Instead of creating inclusive structures within society, international authorities have become central mechanisms of governance in Bosnia without being accountable to the population. Alongside further fragmentation of society, this has undermined the development of democratic structures and a true engagement with the historical and societal context in which peace‐building programmes are deployed. Both civil society development and economic liberalization have been externally driven, hence provoking local resistance and undermining a sustainable peace process. The authors argue that such an approach is not conducive to an emancipatory version of the liberal peace, which would be based on local consent and would genuinely engage with people’s welfare.

Keywords:

• Bosnia and Herzegovina
• liberal peace‐building
• civil society
• democratization
• the liberal peace

Acknowledgements

This article is part of a broader research project, run by the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of St. Andrews, which critically examines ‘liberal peace transitions’ in a number of different peace‐building contexts. It is funded by the Carnegie Trust, to whom we are grateful. See www.st-andrews.ac.uk/intrel/ for more details. We would like to thank a number of individuals who contributed or helped during the research necessary for this article, including our interviewees and assistants in Kosovo, as well as Stefanie Kappler. This essay represents our own views, and any errors are our responsibility.

Notes

1. Bosnia is correctly termed Bosnia and Herzegovina or BiH, but will be referred to in this paper as Bosnia or BiH.

2. Personal interview with Tim Cartwright, Special Representative, Council of Europe, Sarajevo, 1 February 2007.

3. Personal interview with confidential source, Centre for Human Rights, Sarajevo, 30 January 2007.

4. Many of our interviewees expressed this view.

5. For the composition of the Parliamentary Assembly, see OHR 1995.

6. For a history of Bosnia, see Malcolm 2002.

7. Estimate of the UN Special Humanitarian Operation in the former Yugoslavia: Jesse 1996, 1.

8. The Federal Office of Statistics Bosnia and Herzegovina estimates that the rate of unemployment in Bosnia has decreased from 31.1% in 2006 to 29.0% in 2007 (see Federal Office of Statistics Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007, 30); yet it is difficult to estimate the actual rate of unemployment, given that the grey economy does not appear in the official data.

9. Diplomatic source, OHR, Sarajevo, 29 January 2007.

10. Diplomatic source, OHR, Sarajevo, 29 January 2007.

11. Personal interview with confidential source, LDS Party, Sarajevo, 30 January 2007.

12. www.ohr.int/. The Mandate of the OHR is broadly outlined in the Annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Article II of Annex 10. (OHR 1995).

13. An example of this sweeping power was in November 1999, when the high representative dismissed 22 popularly elected Bosnian public officials – nine Serb, seven Muslim, and six Croat – from their posts. See Bose 2002, 92.

14. The estimated Human Poverty Index (HPI) in 2004 was 13.88 (13.88% of BiH’s population is poor); the poverty line is considered to be approximately €3/day (United Nations Development Program 2007, 33–43).

15. See Richmond and Franks 2007, 2008a, 2008b.

16. Personal interview with Deputy SRSG – Bosnia, Sarajevo, 29 January 2007.

17. Personal interview with confidential source, ACIPS, Sarajevo, 29 January 2007.

18. Personal interview with confidential source, PDP representative, Sarajevo, 1 February 2007.

19. Personal interview with confidential source, HDZ representative, Mostar, 2 February 2007.

20. It was explained that the international community in Bosnia were attempting to ‘eliminate diversity’ (personal interview with confidential source, PDP representative, Sarajevo, 1 February 2007).

21. Personal interview with confidential source, LDS representative, Sarajevo, 30 January 2007.

22. Personal interview with confidential source, LDS representative, Sarajevo, 30 January 2007.

23. Personal interview with confidential source, OSCE, Sarajevo, 1 February 2007.

24. Personal interview with Srdjan Dizdarevic – President Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Sarajevo, 31 January 2007.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Some Bosnians we spoke to explained that mixed families had split up, with parents (and children) leaving Bosnia for their respective ethnic homelands such as Serbia and Croatia.

29. Personal interview with Srdjan Dizdarevic.

30. Personal interview with confidential source, Centre for Human Rights, Sarajevo, 30 January 2007.

31. See Talentino 2004.

32. This was particularly noticeable in Mostar on either side of the bridge

33. Personal interview with confidential source, Centre for Human Rights, Sarajevo, 30 January 2007.

34. Personal interview with Srdjan Dizdarevic, Sarajevo, 31 January 2007.

35. See Richmond and Franks 2007, 2008a, 2008b.

36. See Fagan 2005.

37. Personal interview with confidential source, Centre for Human Rights, Sarajevo, 30 January 2007.

38. Ibid.

39. Personal interview with confidential source, Nansen Dialogue Centre, Mostar, 2 February 2007. This is something that we have observed ourselves during the various case studies for this project, particularly in the case of local peace‐building, conflict resolution, and related NGOs. In an area where one would expect local analysts to understand their situation and how best to develop areas of cooperation, international models take precedence, with generally poor results.

40. Personal interview with confidential source, Nansen Dialogue Centre, Mostar, 2 February 2007.

41. Personal interview with confidential source, SIDA, Sarajevo, 1 February 2007.

42. Personal interview with confidential source, Council of Europe, Sarajevo, 1 February 2007.

43. Ibid.

44. Personal interviews with Deputy SRSG, Sarajevo, 29 January 2007 and Ambassador Davidson, OSCE, Sarajevo, 1 February 2007.

45. Personal interview with confidential source, Centre for Human Rights, Sarajevo, 30 January 2007.

46. Personal interview with confidential source, World Bank, Sarajevo, 27 January 2007.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Personal interview with confidential source, Independent Economic Advisor, Sarajevo, 30 January 2007.

50. Personal interview with confidential source, World Bank, Sarajevo, 27 January 2007.

51. Personal interview with confidential source, Independent Economic Advisor, Sarajevo, 30 January 2007.

52. Ibid.