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Abstract
The article assesses the added value of cohesion policy for the Greek region of Epirus in the period 2000–2006. The concept of added value is employed in order to identify the impact of the EU‐financed Regional Operational Programme ‘Epirus 2000–2006’ on the economic performance of the region, the substance of regional policy in the area, and the subnational institutions of Epirus, as well as the local politics and policy style. The main message derived from this exercise is that, in the absence of serious domestic institutional reform, EU regional programmes in underdeveloped and centralized (multiregional) countries do not have a strong potential for generating added value.
Acknowledgements
The financial support of the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) within the wider framework of the EU Consent Network of Excellence is gratefully acknowledged. The author would also like to thank the Head and the Deputy Head of the Managing Authority of the Regional Operational Program of Epirus 2000–2006, who have generously given their time to be interviewed.
Notes
1. Hence, in its Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, the Commission ascertained that any reform of cohesion policies should take the opportunity to increase the added value and the visibility of Community policy (EC Citation2001).
2. ‘The partnership principle is a fundamental principle underpinning all aspects of cohesion policy – programming, implementation, monitoring and evaluation – and has now been widely accepted as a key element of good governance. The system of multi‐level governance, based on strategic approach and involving Community, national, regional and local authorities and stakeholders helps to ensure that actions are adapted to circumstances on the ground and that there is a genuine commitment to success’ (EC Citation2007a, 4).
3. Several EU countries have adopted ‘composite systems’ that rely on domestic systems but with additional, SF‐specific elements. A more detailed analysis of SF decision‐making systems is made by Taylor, Bachtler, and Rooney (Citation2001).
4. The pressures of understanding and accommodating a new type of policy in a short space of time allow limited opportunity for adding value in areas such as strategic thinking, integrated programme management, partnership, project selection, monitoring, etc.
5. This concept describes the changing relationships between actors situated at different territorial levels across the EU, highlighting the increasingly blurred distinction between domestic and international politics (Marks Citation1993; Marks et al. Citation1996; Hooghe Citation1996). According to its advocates, multilevel governance is prominent at the implementation stage of cohesion policy.
6. The term ‘Europeanization’ is usually used to describe processes of constitution, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms that are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures and public policies (Radaelli Citation2000, 3).
7. In both accounts, learning is seen to be a feature of change, but has a different meaning in each. The central distinction is between ‘thin’ (or single‐loop) and ‘thick’ (or double‐loop) forms of learning. Thin learning refers to the readjustment of actor strategies to allow them to achieve unchanged goals in a new context, or how to get around an obstacle by using a menu of well‐known responses in various ingenious ways. Thick learning involves a modification of actors’ values, and thus a reshaping of their preferences and goals (Bache Citation2008a, 5).
8. For a discussion of these approaches in the context of cohesion policy, see Andreou Citation2007, 1–2.
9. It must be stressed, anyway, that the conceptual usefulness of the notion of added value does not extend beyond the study of the implementation of cohesion policy.
10. The Ministry of Economy has the first and the last word regarding the yearly allocation of the Public Investment Programme. The latter covers all investment expenditure, including the national co‐financing of EU programmes.
11. Direct aid for tourism is classified under the ‘entrepreneurship’ heading.
12. This ‘division of labour’ brings into the forefront the question of compatibility between the goals of regional and national development; this is surely an issue that merits a more detailed examination when assessing the added value of the ROP 2000–2006.
13. The Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (1985–1992) acted as pilot cases for the continuous stream of obligatory planning frameworks and operational programmes, which stemmed from the post‐1988 revision of Community structural policy. Nevertheless, they were drafted and implemented essentially by the central authorities in a piecemeal manner, and had no impact on regional administrations (Andreou Citation2006, 247).
14. The domestic institutional infrastructure is characterized by: low level of expertise involvement in policy formulation and/or consultation, especially in the form of think‐tanks; a relatively strong resistance to change closely linked to the patterns of interest intermediation; low level of social capital and weakness of civil society, accompanied by the predominance of political parties (the so‐called ‘partitocracy’) and clientelism in the policy process; limited and problematic/not fully institutionalized fora for dialogue and negotiation; low presence of PPPs (Paraskevopoulos and Leonardi Citation2004, 343).
15. In 2000–2006, the ME hosted all central planning, managing, monitoring, and evaluating bodies. It was in charge of the coordination, monitoring, and evaluation of the various OPs; it represented Greece to the Commission; it was solely responsible for the Cohesion Fund, the OP ‘Information Society’ and Interreg III, and managed the Community Initiative ‘Urban II’ in cooperation with the Ministry of the Environment, Physical Planning and Public Works.
16. Their number has varied in each programming period.
17. MOU is a non‐profit institution reporting to the Ministry of Economy that is responsible for the supply of advice, administrative tools, and know‐how to the monitoring authorities and the implementation agencies. It was founded in 1996, following a joint decision by the Greek government and the Commission that was expressed in a Memorandum defining its nature and functions in detail.
18. They have a specific legal status; they are task‐specific; they are staffed by technocrats selected by a central institution; they operate according to ‘Europeanized’ rules, and are accountable to the MEF.
19. The analyses carried out by the Evaluator (based mainly on the Methods for Evaluating Activities of a Structural Nature (MEANS) methodology developed by the European Commission) revealed that the individual measures of the ROP show strong coherence with the strategic goals and objectives of the OP, the operational objectives of the corresponding priorities, the positive and negative factors brought out by the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, (SWOT analysis), the objectives of the horizontal policies of wider European Union interest, the principal objectives and guidelines of the New European Strategy for Employment, the pillars of the National Action Plan for Employment and the goals of the National Action Plan for Social Inclusion, while they also exhibit strong synergy with each other.
20. Characteristically, until 2005, an amount equal to 16.2% of the total public funds allocated to the ROP remained ‘frozen’ because of the immaturity of one single large project (a part of the Western Greece Motorway planned by the Ministry of the Environment and Public Works).
21. Interview with an official of the MA of the ROP Epirus, 11 April 2008.
22. At the beginning of the programming period, annual financial allocations were made to each OP. The amounts available for each OP must then be spent by the end of the second year following the year in which they are allocated.
23. Interview with an official of the MA of the ROP Epirus, 11 April 2008.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. This is essentially a repetition of the proposals of the Sapir report on cohesion policy (Sapir et al. Citation2003, 146–7).
