Remittances, return, diaspora: framing the debate in the context of Albania and Kosova

Abstract

This paper is an introduction to the special issue and is in five parts. The first part provides a brief overview of post‐1990 migration from Albania as a route out of poverty and a quest for freedom and self‐realization for Albanians. The Kosovan migration has a different history: labour migration in the 1960s and early 1970s, refugee flight in the 1990s. Then the authors outline a theoretical framework for migration’s contribution to development. Third, this framework is applied to the cases of Albania and Kosova, drawing on findings from the papers in this issue and other literature. The fourth section of the paper revisits the migration–development nexus from a policy perspective, examining in turn remittances, return migration and host‐ and home‐country government responsibilities. Finally, we speculate on the global economic crisis that started in mid‐2008 and its impact on the region and its migrants.

Keywords:

• Albania
• Kosova
• migration and development
• remittances
• return migration
• migration policy
• global economic crisis

Introduction

There are few more apposite regions to study the unfolding dynamics of migration and socio‐economic change than Albania and adjacent territories of the western Balkans. Albania has been the setting for Europe’s most dramatic emigration of the past two decades. After four decades during which emigration was virtually impossible, Albanians burst out of their legendary geographical isolation in 1991; 10 years later 800,000 were estimated to be living abroad (Barjaba 2000). More recent figures push this to over 1 million (Government of Albania 2005). The true scale of this exodus becomes apparent when this figure is compared with the total Albanian population residing in the country – 3 million according to the 2001 Census (INSTAT 2002).

Close by to Albania, newly independent Kosova and other states of the former Yugoslavia have been witness to more historically complex phases of migration. They were part of the large‐scale Yugoslavian labour migration to Germany, Switzerland and Austria during the early postwar decades. Recruitment of migrant workers ceased with the oil crisis of 1973–1974, although family reunion prolonged the flows at a reduced rate subsequently. Twenty years after the ‘migration‐stop’, new migrations resulted from the conflicts and ethnic cleansing associated with the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia, including large‐scale refugee flows from Bosnia and Kosova.

The papers in this special issue are a selection of those presented at a conference on ‘Migration and Development in the Western Balkans: Remittances, Return and Diaspora’, held in Durrës, Albania, 26–27 September 2008. ¹ Most of them focus on Albania, one is on Kosova and one compares Albania and Moldova. They have been selected for their quality, originality and variety of perspectives. One of the advantages of area‐studies journals such as Southeast European and Black Sea Studies is openness to a breadth of disciplinary, interdisciplinary and methodological approaches. The set of papers which follows certainly exemplifies this epistemological diversity, ranging from econometrics to ethnography. Several papers draw on data from the Albanian Living Standards Measurement Survey (ALSMS) of 2005, which had a comprehensive module on migration. Others are based on extensive fieldwork.

In this introductory paper, we aim to do several things. First, we set the scene by describing the evolution of migration from Albania since 1990, together with a brief comparative note on Kosova. We also, in this first part of the paper, comment on the scale and impact of migration, encompassing remittances, return and the Albanian ‘diaspora‐in‐the‐making’ (Mai 2005). In the second section of the paper, we outline an ‘optimistic’ economic scenario for migration and development as a ‘virtuous’ relationship. Although this model is presented in abstract form, the links to Albania and Kosova can be easily made, and this is the task of the third part of the paper, which also introduces key insights from the various papers which make up the special issue. Part four of the paper revisits the migration–development debate from a policy perspective. Finally, the fifth part rounds off with a topical theme – the impact of the global economic crisis (that began in mid‐2008) on migration and development in this region. Inevitably, given the recency of the crisis and the paucity of data, our remarks here are speculative.

Migration as a route out of poverty and as a quest for self‐realization

Albania’s contemporary migration has been strongly shaped by the legacy of its communist past. For almost half a century the ‘regime’ in Albania isolated its citizens from the outside world by banning emigration abroad. Anyone trying to escape was severely punished by long imprisonment, and internal exile for the rest of the individual’s family. Within Albania, internal movements of population were highly regulated to fit with the centralized economic strategies of the regime.

All this began to change in June 1990 when Albanians were granted the right, if only theoretically, to apply for passports to travel abroad. This signalled a concession from a regime which was about to collapse. The collapse proved to be messy politically and disastrous economically. Hence, two main reasons account for Albanian emigration: to escape poverty – both a history of an excessively Spartan lifestyle under communism and the sudden uncertainty over livelihood survival during the new neoliberal era – and to achieve personal self‐fulfilment. Within just two years (1991–1992) an estimated 300,000 had left the country, heading in two directions: over the mountainous southern border into Greece or across the sea in overcrowded ships and dinghies to the shores of southern Italy (King 2003).

Much has been written about the economic rationale for Albanian emigration (e.g. King 2005; Zezza, Carletto, and Davis 2005). After 1990 Albanians suddenly had access, via emigration, to economic resources (work at higher wages, some choice in the labour market, purchase of consumption goods, etc.) which they had been denied for half a century. Moreover, the economic chaos which occurred as the country exited from communism – factories closed down, farmland redistributed in an unplanned fashion, infrastructure decommissioned, free‐for‐all privatization – also destroyed most people’s sense of economic and existential security. With the state’s safety‐net of employment and welfare removed, poverty and hunger became widespread, especially in rural and upland areas. ² The following quote from a field interview conducted for the World Bank’s report on Poverty in Albania illustrates the poor conditions of life endured by many rural people in the years after the political transition:

We are poor because we have no possibility to eat meat even once a month … We eat beans, cabbage and onions, no fruit or sweets … We have no furniture and our rooms are always wet … we buy clothes in the market for used clothes … We haven’t paid our electricity bill for years because we cannot … We go outside to get water. (De Soto et al. 2002, 7)

The notion of emigration as a quest for self‐realization was more widespread amongst the better‐educated younger generation, particularly those in the western, coastal and urban areas of the country. This was the broad region where Italian television signals could be received and decoded, albeit clandestinely and against the wishes of the regime. Hence a window on life in the West was opened up. As Mai (2001, 2002) has shown, the effect of TV‐watching was to disembed young Albanians from their moralistic universe of work and duty to ‘the people’, opening up landscapes of leisure, consumption and sexuality which were seductively appealing – and only a short boat ride away.

Evolution and characteristics of Albanian migration

Although emigration from Albania has been more or less continuous since 1990, three clear peaks can be identified (Barjaba and King 2005; Carletto et al. 2006; see also Azzarri and Carletto, this issue). The first followed the collapse of the regime and its centralized economic system in the early 1990s: as noted above, around 1 in 10 Albanians left the country in these years, the vast majority going to Greece and Italy. The mid‐1990s were years of steady growth and economic stability, sustained largely by swelling inflows of remittances, which underpinned both the macro‐economy and many families’ livelihoods and emergence from poverty (De Soto et al. 2002). However, in the absence of an established formal banking sector, much of this remittance capital was invested in pyramid savings schemes, which offered increasingly spectacular but unsustainable rates of interest. These corrupt savings pyramids, which had reputedly links to the ruling elite, collapsed in late 1996 and early 1997, bankrupting perhaps half of the Albanian population. This sparked Albania’s second mass exodus; in a reprise of the events of 1991, boats were commandeered and sailed to Italy, and hordes of people trudged the steep mountain paths into Greece. The economy was just beginning to recover and stabilize again when the Kosova crisis propelled half a million refugees into northern Albania in 1999. A further rise in emigration from Albania ensued, including some from northern Albania who, passing as Kosovan refugees, sought asylum abroad, chiefly in the UK. The last 10 years have seen flows of emigrants stabilize and diminish; some return migration has taken place (Labrianidis and Hatziprokopiou 2005). At the same time the field of destination countries has spread, from Greece and Italy to other European countries, as well as to North America.

Following Barjaba and King (2005), we can sum up the essential characteristics of the Albanian migration as follows: it is recent and intense; it is largely economically driven by ‘push factors’; it has a high degree of irregularity in the sense of migrants lacking documents to reside and work abroad; and it is dynamic and rapidly evolving. With the passage of time, an increasing share of Albanian emigrants achieves legal status in Italy and Greece as a result of periodic regularization schemes – since 1995 in Italy and 1998 in Greece. ‘Getting papers’ is often an important step to socio‐economic improvement and integration in the host country (see Hatziprokopiou 2003 for Greece; King and Mai 2004 for Italy).

Albanian migration is highly gendered: males have predominated, especially in the early years of emigration; and different migration mechanisms affect men and women. To a large extent, these reflect patriarchal and kinship structures intrinsic to Albanian society (King, Dalipaj, and Mai 2006). Men migrate first and either stay abroad on their own, returning every now and then, perhaps as seasonal migrants, ³ or act as foci for later family reunion or family formation abroad. Data from the 2002 round of the ALSMS revealed that, whilst 9 out of 10 males who emigrated moved for work reasons, only one‐third of females did so; most women migrated to get married to their émigré partners (Carletto et al. 2006).

A note on Kosova

Data and research on emigration from Kosova are relatively scarce compared to the volume of material published on Albania. Undoubtedly this has much to do with Kosova’s changing geopolitical status: part of Yugoslavia; then a contested and subservient fraction of Serbia and Montenegro; now, since February 2008, an independent state recognized by some countries but not by others. Blumi (2003) has subtly exposed the hidden nature of Kosovan emigration during the early postwar decades of ‘guestworker’ migration. For a variety of reasons, Albanian‐speaking Kosovars leaving their home territory at this time either took on, or were allocated by the host society where they settled, a ‘secondary identity’ as Yugoslavs or Turks, not as Albanians or Kosovars.

What we do know about Kosovan emigration is synthesized in an important report published by the Riinvest Institute (Mustafa et al. 2007). According to this report the relative scale of emigration from Kosova is not far short of that from Albania described above. The population of Kosova is just over 2 million, or between 2.4 and 2.5 million including the diaspora. The diaspora is estimated at 315,000 Albanian Kosovars plus 100,000 of Serbian and other ethnicities. About 30% of households have one or more members living abroad. Most Kosovan emigrants are in Germany (39%), Switzerland (23%), Austria and Italy (7% each), Sweden and the UK (5% each), the USA (3.5%) and Croatia, France and Canada (each around 2%). The diaspora consists of multiple historical layers: the so‐called old diaspora (the labour migrants and expellees of the early postwar decades) accounts for 14%, those who left during the brutal conflicts of the 1990s account for 59% and 27% have left since 2000. These percentages seem to us to underestimate the scale of the labour migrations, for the reasons attributed by Blumi above. Mustafa et al. (2007, 7) state that about 5% of the diaspora were born outside of Kosova; our impression is that the proportions of second‐ and third‐generation Kosovars must be much higher, again because of the hidden nature of the earlier‐established communities.

Migration and development: a win–win–win situation?

Here we briefly outline what we call the ‘triple‐win scenario’ of migration and development, whereby migration is said to be ‘good’ for the source country, for the destination country and for migrants themselves. This optimistic interpretation is based on simple, classic economic principles which have been espoused by a range of writers ranging from neoliberal theorists such as Julian Simon to Marxist‐inspired Nigel Harris. Simon’s (1989) ‘let it rip’ philosophy of free market economics sees labour as being essentially free to roam and sell itself wherever capital offers employment opportunities. Harris (1995, 214–28, 2002) rails against the immigration controls that have been set up to stop migrants from going where they want to. According to him, the argument for immigration controls stems from the false belief that richer countries will be ‘flooded’ by a ‘tidal wave’ of immigrants leading to increased unemployment amongst the indigenous population. Harris emphasizes the ‘reality’ – which is certainly evident when studying Albanian migrants in Greece and Italy – that immigrants do the jobs that native workers reject, such as casual work in agriculture or on building sites. He goes on to suggest that all barriers to international migration should be brought down. In this way, immigration both sustains development and prosperity in the developed world, and supports the development of the poor countries of origin via remittances and circular returns. Harris quotes J.K. Galbraith that ‘migration is the oldest action against poverty’ in order to move towards a holy trinity of utopian ideals: ‘the right to work’ and ‘the freedom to move’ will result in ‘the eradication of world poverty’ (Harris 2002, 119).

These are fine words and big ideas. Let us unpack the three elements of the triple‐win scenario and see how the arguments play out in more detail. This framework will then be used as a template against which to assess the Albanian and Kosovan cases, drawing on evidence contained in the papers which follow.

The destination country perspective

There is little doubt that migrants from poor countries have been fundamental to the development of advanced economies. Their labour has been instrumental in fuelling the expansion of industry and services especially (Piore 1979), although not all industrial countries have relied on migrant workers to the same extent or in the same way – Finland and Japan being two examples where high levels of development are combined with relatively low numbers of migrants (Bartram 2005). One interpretation sees the migration of labour from poor to wealthy countries as a kind of development aid in reverse. Castles and Kosack (1985, 428) make this argument because it is the migrants’ country of origin which ‘pays’ the costs of upbringing – feeding, clothing, educating and training him or her up to the moment when the ready‐made human resource is exported ‘free’ to the destination country.

Secondly, migrant labour is cheap and flexible. Given the depressing economic situation in their home country, migrants are generally willing (but they have little choice) to accept low wages (by the standards of the host country) and do the jobs no‐one else wants to do. They pick crops, pack fruit and vegetables, work in slaughterhouses, labour on construction sites, mend roads, dig in mines and quarries, collect rubbish, wash up in hotels and restaurants, clean houses, look after children and old people – the list goes on. Their vulnerability to low wages, insecure working arrangements and abuse by employers is enhanced if they are undocumented. Even so, most are able to earn wages which are many times those which they could realistically expect to get in their home countries – if they could find jobs at all.

The work and productive effort of migrant workers have further economic benefits for the host country. Potentially, both the growth and the competitiveness of the economy are boosted: firstly because, without migrants jobs would be either unfilled or taken by local workers who would demand higher wages and perhaps work less hard, and so growth would be held back; and secondly because the lower wages paid to migrants enable firms to be more competitive in an international arena. A further economic effect is that the extra population created by migration boosts consumer demand.

Thirdly, in a scenario of falling birth rates and stagnating or even declining populations (the situation in many European countries), the arrival of young migrants reinvigorates the age structure of the population, leading to higher fertility and staving off the likelihood of a shrinking population. Finally, immigration brings cultural and ethnic variety and encourages the development of a multicultural and pluralistic society.

Of course, many of these advantages for the destination country also have their flip side, even if some of the negative interpretations do not stand up to scrutiny. Immigrants are seen as ‘taking our jobs’ and driving down wages. This discourse arises particularly at times of economic stress when migrants are blamed for wider social and economic ills. As we write these words, in late May 2009, British workers are striking against immigrant (EU) workers who have allegedly displaced them in certain industrial plants. Secondly, family migration is seen as a burden on social services – especially health and education – and immigrants are often ‘accused’ of having large families. This again is a specious argument in the context of birth‐rate decline in many Western societies. Migrants are generally healthy (the ‘healthy migrant effect’) and are net tax contributors rather than welfare debtors. Many come as single persons and, if married, may leave their families behind; even if they do have families in the host country, their fertility behaviour generally adjusts to that of the host society over time. Finally, cultural difference may be seen by the host society as a threat to national values – but this is a view generally put forward by reactionary forces.

The source country perspective

Whilst most authorities agree that immigration brings economic benefits for the destination countries, the ‘win’ scenario for the origin countries is more open to debate. The optimistic interpretation runs as follows and is based on three key points. First, emigration removes unemployed and underemployed people and thereby reduces the pressure on any unemployment benefit scheme the sending country may operate (many poor countries do not have a budget for dole payments). By a process of equilibrium redistribution, the removal of ‘excess’ labour raises the well‐being of those who remain; they have more access to land, jobs, housing, etc.

Second, migrants send remittances, which help the national balance of payments, boost economic development if wisely used and improve the general standard of living. Remittances have many other benefits: they are widely distributed and flow into many areas of the country and to social groups that are neglected by other forms of development aid or foreign investment; and they can act countercyclically by increasing at times of need or crisis, such as when a crop fails, an earthquake strikes and hospital or funeral costs have to be paid. The most powerful economic argument for remittances is the simple one that they derive from returns to labour in high‐income countries yet are transferred and spent or invested in low‐cost countries where their ‘real’ value is much greater. Quite apart from this ‘added value’ effect, remittances are generally spent on individual or household private needs (food, clothing, education, improved or new housing, consumer goods for the home, service activities, etc.) which improve the quality of life of those who receive them (usually the immediate families of the migrants, but also in some cases more remote kin). Remittances create ripple effects through the local economy. Harris (2002, 88) quotes Mexican research which demonstrates that every dollar remitted generates a future $3 through expenditure multiplier effects.

Third, returning migrants bring back capital (income they have saved rather than remitted, either by investing in host‐country financial institutions, or by liquidizing assets such as housing or a business), as well as the skills, training and ‘new ideas’ learnt abroad. This enhanced human capital, like remittances and savings, has extra value in the sending country because it is a scarce resource and can be strategically deployed to stimulate development – not just by setting up new businesses or contributing new skills, but also through wider values such as notions of democracy, fairness, tolerance, anti‐racism, environmentalism, etc.

Once again, each of these positive mechanisms has a counter‐interpretation. Emigration may be (in fact generally is) selective, taking away the most ambitious, energetic and highly educated individuals, leading to brain or skill drain. The outflow may develop a momentum of its own, leading to a ‘culture of emigration’ whereby almost all young people expect, or are expected, to leave. This distorts the demographic composition of the source country and produces, in some peripheral regions of high out‐migration, severe depopulation and collapse of economies, societies and ways of life. Regarding remittances, they may be spent on ‘consumption’ rather than on ‘development’. However, straightaway we must note that the distinction between the two is hard to draw and often involves culturally insensitive value‐judgements by ‘Western’ economists who decry what they see as wasteful spending of remittance capital on over‐large houses, lavish ceremonies or luxury goods imported from abroad. Finally, the improved human capital argument of return migration may prove illusory if the migrants have performed only unskilled and degrading manual work abroad (which might indeed have resulted in deskilling rather than up‐skilling), or have learnt skills which are irrelevant for the home economy. Moreover, returning migrants may find it hard to reintegrate, having lived abroad a substantial time.

The migrant perspective

The third leg of our virtuous triangle looks at the benefits of migration for the migrants themselves. Rational choice theorists would affirm that if migration did not bring net benefits, people would not migrate. There is more than a ring of truth in this assertion, but there are also downsides to migration, and much depends on a potential migrant’s ability to correctly foresee the balance between costs and benefits (cf. Sjaastad 1962). Much, however, cannot be foreseen, and so there are elements of choice and luck involved throughout the entire migration process.

Many of the benefits (and disbenefits) for migrants can be deduced from what has already been said above about the sending and receiving countries. Migration allows access to higher and more regular incomes (worth even more in the country of origin because of different costs of living), better job‐opportunities and the chance of learning new skills. Migration offers a chance to ‘see the world’, gain new experiences, learn a new language, develop intercultural understanding and generally broaden one’s outlook. Migrants escape from poverty and unemployment and, in the best‐case scenario, are able to attain their ‘dream’ of a better life, either by staying abroad and integrating into the host society, or by returning home to an improved socio‐economic status through strategic deployment of savings, skills and a wider worldview.

All this comes at a price. The costs may be financial, but above all human and psychological. First, there are the dangers of the trip itself, which may involve a clandestine border crossing and payment of a smuggler. Some migrants pay the ultimate price – their lives. Several drowning tragedies have occurred in the Otranto Strait between Albania and southern Italy – now known as the ‘Channel of Tears’ in Albania. The quest for better wages and working conditions in the destination countries may be compromised by lower than expected wages, terrible working conditions, insecurity of employment and deskilling. Other difficulties of ‘structural integration’ may involve failure to get legalized, to access decent housing or to enjoy welfare benefits such as proper healthcare. On the social side, migrants may fail (or not be permitted) to socially integrate, have extreme difficulty in acquiring the language, be baffled by cultural barriers, and hence suffer painful nostalgia. Migrants may experience racism, discrimination and stigmatization. Both in Greece and in Italy, Albanians have been ruthlessly stereotyped as criminals and undesirables, as rough and violent people who should not be trusted (see King and Mai 2009). Perhaps the most widespread human cost, especially for those who migrate alone and leave their families behind, is the separation from family and loved ones.

What the papers say

In this section, we introduce each of the papers, highlighting some of their key findings and relating them both to the sketch of Albanian and Kosovan migration which we outlined earlier and to the economic framework given immediately above. The nine papers are presented in the same order as they appear in the special issue. This sequence has a logic to it which reflects both their methodological approach (six papers employing quantitative analysis based on large datasets followed by three which are fieldwork‐based and qualitative) and the range of topics covered, starting with three papers on general migration dynamics, moving on to remittances and return, next demography and finally the three ethnographic papers on (non‐)return, remittances and identity.

The first paper, by Carlo Azzarri and Calogero Carletto, is original because it is the first to unpack the temporal dynamics of post‐1990 Albanian migration. Hitherto, estimates of the scale and regional patterning of Albanian migration have been based on the census (comparing 1989 with 2001) or on host‐country stock records. Azzarri and Carletto use the 2005 ALSMS to explore both the temporal evolution of the flow and its changing characteristics over time. ALSMS returns show that the emigration flow peaked in the early 1990s and after the 1997 pyramid crisis; it tapered off after 2000, although it continues and probably will do so for some time. Regularizations in Italy and Greece have stabilized the Albanian migration populations in those two countries; in recent years more people proportionally than in the past are migrating to other European countries, such as the UK and Germany, as well as to North America. The geography of migrant origins has also changed over time. The Mountain region is the only one experiencing a continuous upward trend in migration; however, in terms of destinations, a lower proportion from this poorest region makes it beyond Greece or (even more) beyond Italy. The flow to more distant countries is still predominantly from Tirana and other main urban centres. The largest proportion of emigrants – about two‐thirds – now comes from rural areas, a higher share than in the past. Recent migrants are on average older than before and less educated. Women make up an increasing share of migrants, reflecting family reunification following regularization. Notable differences characterize ‘permanent’ (i.e. long‐term) from temporary migrants. The former are generally younger, more educated, more sex‐balanced and from the Central and Coast regions, which are more urbanized than the Mountain region. Temporary migration is mainly rural‐origin, to Greece, and almost exclusively male; over time age increases and educational level falls. Return migration is increasing, especially after 2001. The return flow is male‐oriented, since women tend to remain abroad longer or permanently. There is a negative selection on return, which has implications for the theoretical contribution to development noted above. Returnees are increasingly older, less educated individuals going back to poorer households in agricultural areas; white‐collar workers and professionals are the least likely to return. Most returnees are from Greece.

Rising out of the rich detail, several broader generalizations emerge. Emigration is a widespread and ongoing phenomenon in Albania, but the momentum is now slackening. The decision to migrate is neither definitive nor irreversible. Permanent and temporary migrations are substitutable income strategies, and also overlapping categories of mobility. Two clear flows emerge: less educated migrants from rural areas seek a better life in Greece and also to an extent in Italy; more educated urban dwellers increasingly migrate further afield. Finally, in today’s Albania, emigration and return go hand‐in‐hand.

The next paper, by Avdullah Hoti, makes a unique contribution to the study of migration from Kosova, which has hitherto been neglected. After some general remarks on the scale and significance of emigration for this newly independent state – migrants are about one fifth of the population, and remittances account for 13–14% of GDP and household income – Hoti moves on to specify the characteristics of the migration flow, based on quantitative analysis of the Household and Labour Force Survey carried out by Riinvest (see Mustafa et al. 2007). Hoti finds that emigrants are in the majority males (twice the number of females), of working age (61% aged 16–64, compared with 30% non‐migrants), from rural areas and with upper‐secondary schooling. The likelihood of emigration increases with education and household size, and decreases with age and household income. Migration is strongly employment‐motivated: there is a considerable increase in the probability of being employed abroad vis‐à‐vis a comparable person staying in Kosova. This employment differential is greatest for women, even though most women who migrate do so as married women joining their husbands. Brain drain is a key issue in Kosova. An estimated 7.4% of graduates are abroad (this might be an underestimate), the rates varying by profession (13% of engineers and doctors, 6% of economists and 3% of lawyers).

Jessica Hagen‐Zanker, Melissa Siegel and Chris de Neubourg offer a comparative analysis of Albania and Moldova, countries which have similar post‐communist migration profiles. Both have around one‐quarter to one‐third of their labour forces abroad. Remittances account for about 15% of GDP in Albania; twice that in Moldova. The central organizing concept of their paper is the so‐called Welfare Pentagon, which embodies the five central institutions that households can potentially use to satisfy their needs in a given society – family, markets, social networks, institutional memberships and public authorities. This framework enables the authors to offer alternative perspectives on the migration decision, exploring risk management alongside income maximization, as well as consumption‐smoothing behaviour and livelihood strategies. It helps to explain why so many people stay in their country of origin despite the obvious economic benefits to be had by migration; and why some people migrate whereas others, apparently in similar circumstances, do not because of their ties to non‐economic parts of the pentagon. Comparative data are drawn from the 2005 ALSMS and from a household survey sponsored by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Moldova in 2006; both have similar sample sizes. Probability tests for non‐migration are made from these datasets, and comparable results are obtained for the two countries across a range of pentagon‐related variables. For instance, those most likely to stay behind are the youngest and oldest sections of the populations, less educated in Albania and more educated in Moldova. For both countries, migration propensity is low from smaller households, those with less wealth, where the household head is employed, living in urban areas, with few migrant networks and less involved in collective action.

The following paper, by Christos Nikas and Grigoris Baklavas, shifts emphasis to the financial dimension of Albanian migration and examines patterns of remitting and saving amongst various types of migrants. After setting out the theoretical aspects of the remittance–development nexus, the authors use data from the IOM study of remittance behaviour amongst more than a thousand migrant households which was carried out in 2005 (see de Zwager et al. 2005). Nikas and Baklavas find that men remit more than women (partly because women are societally excluded from the remittance process), and married migrants living abroad but with their families in Albania tend to remit much more than those who are accompanied by their families abroad. The size and investment potential of remittances seem to be more closely related to the educational level of the migrants than to the country they have emigrated to. Two broad groups of remitters are identified. The first consists of migrants with some higher level of education – i.e. university or other post‐secondary course. The individuals in this group are full‐time employed, receive reasonable wages abroad, and own a bank account. They have good potential to save and they use their savings to improve their houses in Albania. They mainly use formal remittance channels and are open to the possibility of productive investment in the homeland. However, they are wary of returning, at least in the near future, to settle in Albania. The second group is made up of individuals with lower educational levels who have mainly short‐term employment and low wages abroad. They migrate overwhelmingly to Greece for seasonal and casual work. They do not use banks or money transfer companies but carry the money themselves when they return or send it via trusted friends. Remittances are mainly used to sustain family members in Albania.

With the paper by Etleva Germenji and Lindita Milo we move from remittances to return migration, knowledge on which is rather limited thus far. The authors set out to answer three questions. Do returnees transfer financial and/or human capital when they return? What determines their post‐return position in the Albanian labour market? And what, if any, development stimulus does return make? Data are analysed from a survey of a thousand returnees conducted by the European Training Foundation in 2006. Germenji and Milo find that returnees do indeed transfer financial capital when they return, but less so when it comes to human capital – indeed many migrants experience deskilling when they go abroad. However, some skills transfer takes place when migrants are self‐employed. On the whole, emigration has helped individuals to position themselves as active players in the Albanian labour market upon return. Participation in post‐return employment is positively related to marital status, level of education, length of time in Albania since returning and location in Tirana. Longer duration of migration enables migrants to accumulate more savings, a proportion of which can be used to establish a small business; there is a high preference for self‐employment on the part of returnees. The authors conclude that emigration has been beneficial for most of the survey respondents (and their households); however, the direct development impact on the Albanian economy is judged to be marginal, at least for the time being.

The paper by Mathias Lerch is another highly original perspective on the Albanian migration–development relationship, this time through the prism of demography, and specifically migration’s contribution to fertility decline in a country which had, until the later communist years, a very high natural increase by European standards. Basing himself on analyses of data from the 1989 and 2001 censuses and the 2002 ALSMS, Lerch reaches three key conclusions: migration made a contribution to fertility transition during the 1990s; migration and fertility transition together may create favourable demographic conditions for development in the future; however, fertility decline combined with emigration have resulted in a contraction of the labour force and severe depopulation in some peripheral regions. More detailed analysis of fertility histories of non‐migrated females finds that those resident in migrant‐sending households have an earlier first birth but fewer births overall, on average, compared with females not exposed to migration in this way. Economic constraints in non‐sending households lead to a postponement of family formation, whereas these constraints are alleviated in migrant households. Changing nuptiality patterns are observed, with a re‐widening of the gender‐age gap at marriage, especially in the northern regions, due to out‐migration of males and reassertion of patriarchal norms.

The paper by Domna Michail examines a broad range of economic aspects of Albanian migration, but from the micro‐scale perspective of a small town in northern Greece, close to the Albanian border. Because of legal barriers to the purchase of property in border areas, Albanian migrants in Argos Orestiko can only invest in consumer goods and bank deposits locally. They invest in real estate in Albania in order to maintain ties with the homeland and keep open the option to return. For first‐generation migrants in Greece, this is a strategy that reduces the feelings of insecurity which are created both by the Greek rule on border areas and by bureaucratic obstacles in relation to regularization procedures; it also allows them to send remittances and keep in touch with their elderly parents, whom they feel a strong sense of duty to support. However, second‐generation youngsters do not want to return to Albania. They see their future in Greece and feel estranged from Albania despite its geographical closeness; many can hardly speak Albanian. First‐generation return may be postponed until retirement, although the return orientation is gendered: women prefer to stay in Greece and keep in touch with friends and relatives transnationally, rather than return to a harsher life and more patriarchal attitudes in their home villages.

Erin Smith’s paper breaks new ground by ethnographically investigating the gendering of Albanian transnational migration and remittance behaviour. The research is based on multi‐sited fieldwork in Fier, coastal south‐western Albania, and in Italy and Greece. The question posed in the title of her paper concerns the extent to which transnational female solidarity amongst migrant and non‐migrant kin, for instance female‐to‐female remittances, is breaking down the male‐dominated clan system; or is it, rather, just filling a gap created by the exclusion of women from migration and remittance decision‐making by dominant male structures. Smith finds elements of both. Only very slight modifications of the distribution of gendered economic roles are found within migration‐affected households, although women do exercise more agency than is immediately apparent since much is hidden from male surveillance. Remittances sent by married daughters to their mothers (normally such remittances would be channelled to the husband’s parents, King, Dalipaj, and Mai 2006) are regarded as non‐obligatory and therefore as ‘presents’; they are sent at irregular intervals and are only acceptable up to a certain point without shame being incurred by the recipient. The perceived weakening of clan solidarity in favour of the nuclear family is widely seen as a shameful retreat from traditional values, and a direct consequence of the combined effects of emigration and ‘every‐man‐for‐himself’ capitalist development. The general habit of attributing blame for this to women (even by women themselves) is ironic in that it exemplifies the persistence of internalization of predominant gendered hierarchies by both sexes.

In the final paper, Andreas Hemming takes us on a walk one evening in high summer through Rrëshen, the small‐town site of his fieldwork in north‐central Albania, in order to open up a dialogue on migration, return, status and identity. We observe the xhiro, the ritual evening stroll up and down the town’s main drag. The xhiro is both a community‐building exercise and an opportunity for visiting migrants to display their social status and meet up with people they have not seen for a year. Using the concept of the ‘status paradox of migration’, he argues that Albanian emigrants abroad endure a life at the very bottom of the status ladder in order to gain status and prestige back in Albania. Family and friends’ expectations of money and gifts, and images of migrants’ lives abroad as ‘enviable’, are met by ‘lies’ and ‘half‐truths’ about ‘success’ by the migrants themselves who are loath to reveal the true challenges of their lives abroad. In this way Hemming provides a cynical critique of the optimistic scenario of migration as beneficial to all. He hypothesizes that the charade is maintained out of politeness and not wanting to embarrass unknowing elders who want to believe in the ‘success’ of their migrant children, and out of the migrants’ own internalization (but unwillingness to admit, either to themselves or to others) of migration as a failure and of their failure to beat the system. Hence ‘the status paradox of self‐deception’ – ‘it’s all a great lie’.

Revisiting the migration and development debate: policy perspectives

How has policy in Albania and Kosova responded to the need to manage the contribution of migration to home‐country development? Undoubtedly, effective policies have been lacking. Here, we will mainly comment on the Albanian case, given Kosova’s very recent achievement of independent statehood. A tongue‐in‐cheek remark on the lack of migration policy was published in the Albanian daily Koha Jonë (Our Times) in July 1999. It suggested that Albania had resolved its employment question by ensuring that the motor‐boats in Vlorë (used to smuggle migrants to Italy) were working to full capacity, whilst cooperation between Albanian and Greek employers ensured that even more Albanian emigrants were able to set off to work in Greece (de Waal 2005, 16; Tahiraj 2007, 108). Until recently, the Albanian government has had what can best be described as a complacent position towards emigration, regarding it as a laissez‐faire means of exporting unemployment and importing wealth. Measures have always run several steps behind what was actually happening on the ground. For instance, amendments to the constitution in 1993 guaranteed that Albanians were now free to move abroad as well as within the country; yet the mass exodus to Greece and Italy as well as the chaotic rural‐urban internal migration had already started three years earlier.

In fact, it was only in 2004 that the government adopted the first National Strategy on Migration (NSM) and its accompanying National Action Plan (NAP) on Migration (Government of Albania 2005). ‘Development through remittances’ was one of the key themes addressed in these documents, resulting in the NAP on Remittances, approved by the Council of Ministers in November 2007. However, evaluation of the NSM and the NAP on Migration shows that their implementation has been feeble; there have been major problems with the coordination of activities (Onorato, Keta, and Totozani 2007). Policy outcomes have been particularly affected by the conflictual nature of Albanian politics, and the lack of continuity and stability amongst civil servants at every level (Tahiraj 2007). Furthermore, the government does not feel it has ownership of these various strategies, given the strong influence exerted by international actors, such as the Greek and Italian governments, the EU and the IOM on the conceptualization and structuring of migration policy since 2001 (Geiger 2007). These non‐Albanian actors have seen Albanian migration since the early 1990s as increasingly problematic and so joint policy has been aimed at curbing irregular migration, including readmission agreements.

Beyond these general considerations, migration policy and its coordination with development can be seen to break down into four areas: remittances, return, diaspora involvement and home‐ and host‐country measures. A paragraph or so on each of these follows, including reference to other papers in the special issue that deal with these matters.

Remittances

Remittances have been flowing into Albania for nearly two decades now; throughout this period they have played a crucial role as a means of survival for many individuals and households. However, therein lies one of their main policy challenges, and potential ironies: the lack of effective policy for increasing the beneficial impact of remittances on development and poverty reduction has perpetuated the country’s dependence on this foreign‐earned capital. Azzarri and Carletto in this issue, as well as several other authors (e.g. de Zwager et al. 2005; Nikas and King 2005), argue that policy‐makers have an important role to play in recognizing and capitalizing upon the enormous potential of remittances to alleviate poverty. Tracing the relatively new emigration flows from the Mountain region (the country’s poorest area), Azzarri and Carletto suggest that the positive impact of the resulting remittances can be seen in the significant reduction in poverty in these areas in recent years. However, two problems loom on the horizon. First, the lack of comprehensive intervention through appropriate policy tools may mean that the short‐term benefits produced by remittances will not be sustained in the long term, leading to re‐emigration in the future. And second, emigration may become so widespread that the entire demographic, social and economic fabric of sending areas falls apart, making any development initiatives even more difficult, if not impossible.

As a strategy for poverty alleviation, remittances are not available to all, however. As Hagen‐Zanker et al. point out in their paper, individuals with very limited education, social networks or labour market experience may be stuck in a kind of poverty trap which actually bars their access to mobility. Lacking the strategic resources necessary, they cannot advance at home, nor abroad. Government intervention ‘could strengthen those institutions that allow people to make a free choice between the two’, i.e. doing better at home and migrating abroad.

Nikas and Baklavas identify specific tools for policy‐makers to deploy to ensure the effectiveness of remittances and cushion the effects of their inevitable eventual decline. They suggest that development in Albania will be enhanced if a remittance strategy targets the better educated migrants who could potentially ‘operate as catalysts for the development of an investment and entrepreneurship environment in their country of origin’. Some groundwork needs to be carried out for this strategy to succeed. This implies, according to Nikas and Baklavas, ‘necessary information on investment opportunities, incentives to invest and confidence on the viability of investment in Albania’. Michail’s interviewees in Greece also had clear ideas about what Albanian policy‐makers needed to do to make investment there an attractive and realistic option – positive encouragement of migrants’ deposits by the banks, ensure reliability in public services, limit bureaucratic barriers and sort out land properties through a proper registration and regulatory framework.

The future of remittances is expected to be bleak in Albania for several reasons, most of which have to do with the natural cyclical nature of migration and the way that it tends to develop over time – from a male‐led labour migration to a family‐based diaspora. As male migrants have been able to regularize their status, they have increasingly been joined by their wives and children. Other children have been born abroad and other family members, including sometimes the migrants’ parents, have been able to join them too, via legal or irregular channels. All this means that, increasingly, there is no one left behind to remit to. The ALSMS data analysed by Azzarri and Carletto in their paper confirm that the recent migration streams are increasingly constituted by women and older individuals who have lower earning potential abroad and hence remittances from them are expected to be lower. De Zwager et al. (2005, viii) made firm predictions in 2005 that remittances, thought to be then at their peak, would decline substantially. Subsequent annual data from the Bank of Albania showed that the pace of increase, which had been fast throughout the 1990s (except for the ‘pyramid’ year of 1997), started to decelerate in the mid‐2000s, decreasing for the first time in a decade in 2008. ⁴

A final critical issue regarding remittances and development policy, more generally, is the gender dimension. The ‘big debate’ on remittances and their crucial role in the development process for poor, high‐emigration countries, such as Albania (and Kosova and Moldova), is nearly always seen in purely economic terms – how to maximize the remittance flow and how to manage its ‘investment’ in growth‐stimulating activities. The lack of a gendered perspective is notable, and alarming; this is also reflected in the NSM and the NAPs on Migration and Remittances where there is a complete absence of any discussion on gender and differential policy implications for men and women (Nixon 2006). Of course, this merely reflects, and reinforces, the strongly patriarchal character of Albanian society. Smith’s ethnographic evidence, in her paper in this issue, demonstrates that women do participate, albeit secretly, in the remitting process. The recognition of this contribution, and of the gendering of remittance and development processes generally, at local, regional and national levels, is a crucial step towards a more inclusive and just policy. However, in including women in development planning, care should be taken to avoid their potential ‘instrumentalization’, by simply increasing their ‘duties’ and responsibilities, unless wider spaces are provided for their participation and for their voices to be heard (see Vullnetari and King 2009).

Return

The patriarchal nature of Albanian society (and of Balkan societies in general) and the limited economic and cultural opportunities for women to advance personally and professionally also impact on the potential for return migration of women, as noted in Michail’s paper. Yet the gender axis is rarely acknowledged in the few existing studies of Albanian return migration. De Zwager et al. (2005, 56–60), for instance, cross‐tabulate migrants’ orientation to return by age, education and country of migration, but not by gender. Other sample studies of return are also male‐biased: that carried out by Labrianidis and his colleagues questionnaired 300 male and only 24 female returnees (Labrianidis and Hatziprokopiou 2005; Labrianidis and Kazazi 2006; Labrianidis and Lyberaki 2004). Likewise in the dataset used by Germenji and Milo in their paper in this special issue, only 11% of nearly 1000 returnees surveyed were female.

There is probably more uncertainty and speculation over the scale and likely future trends of return migration than over any other aspect of the Albanian migratory phenomenon. There are no official statistics on return. A process of independent return migration had started to emerge in the mid‐1990s, but that was cut off by the pyramid crisis. In 2005, de Zwager et al. wrote that ‘at the present time, there is very little independent return migration to Albania’, and they went on to point out that those who do return are either temporary, short‐term migrants to Greece, coming and going on a repeat basis, or forced returnees repatriated by the host‐country authorities because of their ‘illegal’ status (p. 57). Nevertheless, there is some evidence of independent return beginning to take place in more recent years. ⁵

Picking up the more explicit policy angles on return, Germenji and Milo state that ‘facilitating the development of new businesses with training, credit and a much‐improved infrastructure could provide the impetus for more emigrants to return to, and invest in, Albania in the future’. These authors found that forced returnees were the least economically successful and reintegrated group: they had the highest unemployment rate upon return, were significantly less likely to set up businesses and were more oriented towards re‐emigration. The policy implication of this is that forced return is increasing the unemployment burden in Albania, yet this also means higher potential for future emigration – exactly what the EU wants to avoid! Germenji and Milo suggest a redirection of EU funds from border enforcement and return migration towards promoting development initiatives in Albania. Azzarri and Carletto also support the idea that development policy directed towards productive and long‐term goals will be an effective strategy to reduce the scale of re‐emigration of returnees. Particularly in recent years, migrants are returning to poorer households and bringing back less financial and human capital to enable them to secure and sustain a decent living in Albania. This situation is compounded at a macro‐level as the 2005 ALSMS data suggest that the more educated migrants – especially the most highly educated – seem to be the least likely to return. The ‘implications in terms of brain drain, and lost brain gain, are obvious and potentially very damaging to future development’, Azzarri and Carletto conclude.

A further note on Kosova: mobilizing the diaspora

Similar concerns to those outlined above are raised by Hoti in his analysis of the migratory situation in Kosova. He concludes that the social costs of the brain drain, namely the public spending on education which is then ‘lost’ and the absence of positive externalities to society at large from an educated workforce, might not be compensated by the remittances sent home by the educated elite. Although influenced by rather different historical factors than in Albania, migration in Kosova similarly presents formidable policy challenges. One of these is the war which erupted in 1999 and which drew significant inflows of remittances from both the historical and recent diasporas around Europe and North America. Following the stabilization of the political situation and the completion of postwar reconstruction, emigration and therefore remittances could well decline. On the other hand, poor employment prospects (unemployment in Kosova is around 40%) mean that temporary emigration must remain a short‐term strategy for gaining access to work and wages for some time yet (Mustafa et al. 2007, 9).

Although much of the discourse in Kosova regarding migration’s contribution to development is similar to that in Albania (mobilizing and maximizing remittances, encouraging ‘productive’ return, coping with the brain drain, improving infrastructure, etc.), there are some notable differences. The key difference seems to be one which involves both terminology and an alternative policy thrust. In Kosova there is much talk of the Kosovan diaspora; as noted earlier in this paper, the long and multi‐layered history of Kosovan labour migration and refugee movements has given rise to a widely scattered émigré population involving now up to three generations, yet with a continuing and often profound (and politically charged) orientation to the homeland – in other words a diaspora. ⁶ According to the Riinvest survey of the Kosovan diaspora and its role in development, members of the diaspora are keenly interested in the development and modernization of their homeland: 4% have businesses there, one in five has other investments there (mainly in construction), and frequent visits (‘diaspora tourism’) help them keep in touch and also contribute to the economy. Nevertheless the diaspora are highly critical of corruption and bureaucracy within the Kosovan administration. They feel that the government does little to help them resolve the problems they encounter as migrants and refugees, yet expects them to send remittances, make investments and generate new jobs (Mustafa et al. 2007, 8–9). Amongst measures recommended to facilitate the developmental mobilization of the diaspora are: establishment of direct information channels to the diaspora about investment opportunities in Kosova; networking between diaspora and local businesses; creating a database on the diaspora’s intellectual potential with a view to capitalizing on this not just for return migration (which in many cases will be unrealistic and unlikely) but for the shorter‐term engagement of key diaspora professionals in ministries and universities; mobilization and professionalization of visits for diaspora members (especially young people) for educational and cultural purposes, e.g. via summer schools; reduction of bureaucracy for the diaspora’s engagement with the homeland; avoid political fragmentation and conflict in dealings with the diaspora; engage with EU countries in order to reach agreements for temporary migration; and ensure dual citizenship for the diaspora population (Mustafa et al. 2007, 11–12).

The role of governments

Whether in Albania, Kosova or Moldova on the one hand, or in Italy, Greece and the other host countries on the other, many of the authors in this special issue argue for a more active role to be played by governments in defending the rights of migrants and in promoting their capacity to contribute to development. Domestic shocks and national and international crises have triggered much of the large‐scale migrations of the last decades. Thus, more stable and manageable migration flows could be achieved by avoiding such crisis situations in the future, in order to ensure a more stable political and economic environment. As Hemming argues in the concluding paper to the set, the political elites should take responsibility and start acting to move their countries beyond just being stagnant places where men and women are desperate to leave. At the risk of sounding pious, they should administer the country, the people and its assets in such a way that not only are more opportunities provided domestically, but that hope is also nurtured for the future. Maroukis (2005) argues that Albania is one of the clearest cases where economic development can only succeed if it goes hand‐in‐hand with the creation of a stable and secure political environment. Albanians need to have their trust in political institutions restored – and their trust in each other. Migrants and returnees can contribute to this restoration of political and civic trust.

Moreover, home‐country governments should also take measures to ensure that migrants’ rights are protected abroad, through active and effective cooperation agreements with host‐country governments. Thus far when such agreements have been entered into, the main policy target has been the control of ‘unwanted’ migration. The host‐country governments also have obligations, which are a long way from being fulfilled. Michail, expressing the opinions of her Albanian interviewees in Greece, argues that migrants’ lives could be greatly improved if the Greek government would put in place legislation and procedures that would allow migrants to move freely across the frontier in order to retain family cohesion across borders. This means making procedures less bureaucratic, less costly and less discretionary. The Greek, Italian and other EU governments have a civil and moral responsibility as democratic states to uphold and defend human rights of migrants, in order that they may enjoy a dignified life. A first step is to acknowledge more explicitly the significant contributions that migrants make to host societies – economically, demographically, socially and culturally.

Credit crunch to remittance crunch

We conclude this introductory overview paper with some thoughts, inevitably speculative but supported by data where possible, about the impact of the economic crisis on migration and development in the region. Paraphrasing Robert Zoellick, President of the World Bank, what started as a financial crisis in the US sub‐prime mortgage market, rapidly became an economic crisis spread around the most important economies and financial centres of the world, and is now becoming an unemployment crisis. Zoellick goes on to ask: to what degree does it become a human and social crisis as well? (quoted in Rogers, Anderson, and Clark 2009, 5). At the time of writing this paper (May 2009), it seems that the downturn is set to continue, with ramifications round all parts of the world. The early hope that only those economies that were heavily dependent on the banking and finance industry would be affected was soon thwarted as a lack of liquidity hit manufacturing and export economies such as Germany, Japan, China and India. Russia and Latin America were not spared either.

Although the Albanian government continues to be in denial that the economic crisis is having any impact on the country (and whilst some wags claim that Albania already had its credit crunch in 1997 when the pyramids collapsed), the IMF forecasts zero or at best very minimal economic growth for Albania in 2009, compared to a buoyant 6% the previous year (Koçi 2009). True, the economy is less prone to impact as it is largely cash‐based (ironically, a feature much criticized by various international economic experts); however, because of its dependence on remittances and construction it is bound to suffer to some degree. INSTAT figures for the first quarter of 2009 suggest a fall of exports by 13% over the same period in 2008. Almost half of Albania’s exports are manufactured goods, such as clothes and footwear, processed in Greek‐ or Italian‐owned factories and destined for EU markets (Shahollari 2009). This decline will translate into loss of jobs as factories are in danger of downsizing or closure.

According to Rogers, Anderson, and Clark (2009, 5, 36) what distinguishes this global downturn is that this is the first time there has been a combination of high international migration with a recession which is global and simultaneous. There is growing concern about the impacts of the still unfolding recession upon migrants and their origin countries. The most obvious impact is on migrants’ jobs, according to the adage ‘last hired, first fired’. The less‐skilled and undocumented migrants might be seen as the most vulnerable, promoting return migration and a rise in unemployment in the origin countries. This is what economic theory would predict according to the ‘reserve army of labour’ hypothesis (cf. Kindleberger 1967). However, as Castles and Kosack pointed out (1985, 487) in their review of the effects on migration of the first oil‐crisis in 1973, most migrants in north‐west Europe did not return to their home countries but stayed on, regrouping with their families to ride out the crisis in the countries of immigration. Rogers, Anderson, and Clark (2009, 28) advance another argument which may be particularly relevant to the case of low‐skill migrants in Greece and Italy with their large informal economies: this is that, under conditions of declining profitability and a competitive squeeze, employers may turn even more to the ‘advantages’ of cheap, flexible migrant workers to stay in business.

In the job‐loss scenario, migrants would experience even more precarious conditions and increased levels of poverty and marginalization. Remittances would be likely to decline as unemployment rose and incomes fell amongst migrants. Lower remittances would cause serious hardship in those countries where they are a lifeline for many families and for the economy as a whole. Ratha and Mohapatra (2009) expect remittances to fall globally by between 5% and 8% in 2009. However, not all migration‐origin countries will be equally affected, and there are special features relating to the social organization of remittances which give them a different behavioural character from other economic flows. Remittances are thought to be more resilient than other types of capital flows such as foreign direct investment or foreign aid. Past experience has shown that remittances can have a counter‐cyclical effect, rising at times of crisis in the homeland; however, since the crisis is global, the effects may be different. Another factor is that remittances constitute a relatively small and potentially variable share of migrants’ income, and so may be maintained when earnings shrink. Furthermore, remittances may come from more settled migrants, who are more secure in the labour market, than the recent arrivals. Finally, host‐country governments may adopt fiscal stimulus packages which are ultimately favourable for migrants. For instance, Greece has just announced (April 2009) a package of measures to boost the construction sector, which is the main sector of employment for male Albanian migrants.

What is the evolving picture for Albania and Kosova? According to Ratha and Mohapatra (2009) the decline in remittances over 2008–2009 will be less – around 5% – for middle‐income countries such as these. However, local sources suggest higher scales of decline. For instance, the Kosova Central Bank announced a drop of 10% in remittances for the first two months of 2009 compared with the same period in 2008. Meanwhile, the international charity World Vision (2009) operating in Kosova stated that remittances in Kosova were decreasing at a rapid rate and in some communities had halved. A parallel situation is observed in Albania where already in 2008 remittances were 16% down on 2007 according to the Bank of Albania. In 2008 remittances still accounted for 9% of GDP and 33% of the trade deficit (compared, however, with 12% of GDP and 44% of the trade deficit in 2007 and 13% and 55% in 2006 – see Uruçi 2008, 4). Other media sources reported an even greater decline in remittances for Albania – 27% (Koçi 2009).

However, we should also consider that other factors might simultaneously be acting to drive down remittances, such as the process of maturing of migration in the case of Albania, or the end of the war and attainment of independence in Kosova. In either case, whether due to ‘normal’ migratory evolution or the global recession, the situation makes the focus on reducing the dependency on remittances a prime concern for policy‐makers.

The scenarios outlined above will vary according to geography, the types of migrants and the sectors they are employed in. Many sectors employing Albanian and Kosovan migrants, such as manufacturing, construction, hotels and retailing, have been badly hit by the recession. Others less so. For instance, agriculture – which employs many Albanians especially in Greece – may prove more resilient due to relatively inelastic demand, rising food prices and the fact that Greeks and Italians are unlikely to go back to farm labour themselves. A similar situation probably applies to Albanian migrant women and the domestic and care services sector. It is hard to imagine that these jobs will suddenly contract and be taken on by Greek and Italian women; what is more likely to happen in a context of recession is downward pressure on hours and pay.

Papademetriou, Sumption, and Somerville (2009) suggest that, more than the strict economic impact, it may be the social and political consequences of the recession that will pose the greatest challenges to policy‐makers and civil society. At times of economic insecurity, immigrants tend to become scapegoats and perceived to be ‘taking away our jobs’, although there is no convincing evidence to support this view. Albanians, especially, have an established history of being stereotyped, victimized and criminalized in both Greece and Italy (King and Mai 2002), so further hostility might be expected at a time of economic downturn. Governments may respond to such popular discontent by tightening immigration restrictions, cutting immigration quotas and increasing controls and deportations in an effort to demonstrate to the electorate that they are taking measures to address their concerns.

As we write, the economic downturn is still unfolding and it is difficult to draw firm conclusions. Above all, it is not clear how long the global recession will continue. However, the current situation brings into sharp focus important policy concerns both for host governments and those of Albania and Kosova. Regarding the latter countries, policy‐makers should take measures to steer the economies away from dependency on remittances and towards more sectorally balanced growth and a more efficient economic and political management structure.

Notes

1. The conference was organized by Russell King and Ilir Gedeshi within the framework of the IMISCOE Network of Excellence on ‘International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe’, funded under EU FP6, and specifically under a twinning arrangement between the Sussex Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex, and the Centre for Economic and Social Studies, Tirana. This conference was the main academic event of this IMISCOE‐Albania initiative. Thanks to Rinus Penninx, the coordinator of IMISCOE, for setting up the IMISCOE‐Albania link, to Jenny Money and Nalu Binaisa for organizational support to the conference and to Matloob Piracha for academic input to this special issue.

2. Of course, poor living standards and limited food rations had also been widespread in earlier times, but these conditions were to some extent assuaged by guaranteed work, a measure of economic security through welfare and pensions, and the regime’s propaganda of a communist utopia. See Hall (1994) and Vickers (1995) for accounts of Albanian life under communism.

3. However, for migrants with undocumented status, regular return migration is hardly possible because of the difficulties, and expense, of re‐entry into their chosen destination country.

4. Annual remittances estimated by the Bank of Albania, including money sent through both formal and channels, rose from $275 million in 1993 to $500 million in 1996, dropped to $267 million in 1997, but then climbed to $530 million in 2000 and to more than $1 billion in 2004. In 2007 the figure approached $1.3 billion, but then the global financial crisis struck in the following year.

5. Personal communication, Ilir Gedeshi, Centre for Economic and Social Studies, Tirana, who is conducting survey research into return migration in various parts of the country. See also Vullnetari (2008).

6. This is not the place to enter into a prolonged debate about the nature and definition of what is or is not a diaspora. Suffice to say two things: first, that the meaning of what constitutes a diaspora has generally been widened and diversified over time (see Brubaker 2005; Cohen 1997); and second, that the Kosovan case does satisfy most if not all the usually cited criteria for recognition as a diaspora, even if it has been little studied, for reasons noted earlier (cf. Blumi 2003).