Revisiting civil society in Turkey

Abstract

In studies on civil society, there is a tendency to perceive it as an instrument for the transition from an authoritarian system of government to a democratic one. It is not taken as a societal entity in an already consolidated democracy that contributes to the making of public policies. This is also the case when it comes to studies on civil society in Turkey. Assuming that Turkey has a consolidated democracy, this article investigates the extent to which one comes across impediments to, prerequisites of, and the primary characteristics of civil society in this country. It arrives at the conclusion that at least in the Turkish case, one may not talk about the presence or absence of civil society; one may come across only some of its characteristics and not others.

Keywords:

• transition to democracy
• consolidated democracy
• contribution to policy‐making
• civil society
• Turkey

Notes

1. We elaborate each of these characteristics of civil society in the following sections.

2. For this definition, the authors draw on Keyman and Öniş (2007), who in turn have been inspired by Ehrenberg (1999) and Kaldor (2003).

3. For examples of studying civil society in Turkey from the perspective of the problems of democracy (and/or citizenship) rather than those of civil society, see Göle (1994), Özbudun (1997), Sarıbay (1997), and Kadıoğlu (2002).

4. There is one single study of civil society in Turkey, the theoretical perspective of which comes close to the perspective suggested in the present article (Şimşek 2004). Although that study looks at somewhat different versions of two prerequisites (existence of a market economy and horizontal linkages among different spheres of civil society) and different versions of some characteristics of civil society (existence of friendly disagreement, civility, and the importance of the rule of law in state–civil society relationship) taken up in this article, it too takes up the role of civil society in respect to the role it plays concerning the development of democracy.

5. We assume that ethnic nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and closed ideologies would constitute impediments for the flourishing of a vibrant society, because on the whole, those who subscribe to such thought patterns do not choose to interact with others in a respectful manner and, in fact, attempt to impose their preferences on others. It is, of course, possible that those who have adopted such world views may use peaceful means of persuading their detractors, though such cases would be expected to constitute the exception rather than the rule. In any case, the dominant discourse of a civil society in consolidated democracies should be informed by democratic norms. On this issue, see the country studies in Alagappa (2004).

6. Hall (1995) provides historical examples of nobility and churches, both acting as countervailing powers to kings.

7. For the importance of aristocracy as a countervailing power, see Bendix (1978, ch. 7).

8. On the relationship between market economy and democracy, see Dahl (1998, ch. 13).

9. It should also be pointed out that in the absence of such horizontal linkages, the vertical relations between the state, on the one hand, and individuals or the constellations of individuals, whether formally organized or not, on the other, leave societal actors vulnerable to undue control from above.

10. That the civil society is concerned with public rather than private interests is underlined, among others, by Diamond (1994, 6).

11. See, inter alia, Kalaycıoğlu (2001, 64).

12. The NSC comprises the president of the Republic, key cabinet members, and the members of the high command.

13. It is for this reason that, on the whole, the individual holding companies only try to exercise influence upon bureaucrats responsible for the implementation of policies so as to make it beneficial for them (Heper 1991a, 17). We make reference to TÜSİAD in this context, because as already implied above, among all the interest group as well as civil society associations, TÜSİAD is considered as the organization with maximum influence over the Turkish government. We do not consider interest groups as civil society groups, because in our conceptualization of civil society, civil society groups are not supposed to act as the spokespersons of a particular interest; rather, they are expected to promote the common good as they see it and do this while maintaining a harmonious relationship with the state. Consequently, for us, in addition to the ones we have already alluded to, some other examples of civil society organizations in Turkey are the Association of the Environmental Protection and Greening of Turkey (Türkiye Çevre Koruma ve Yeşillendirme Kurumu [TÜRÇEK]), the Association of the Protection of Environment and Cultural Values of Turkey (Çevre ve Kültür Değerlerini Koruma ve Tanıtma Vakfı [ÇEKÜL]), the Foundation for Combatting Soil Erosion, Reforestation, and the Protection of Natural Habitat of Turkey (Türkiye Erozyonla Mücadele, Ağaçlandırma ve Doğal Varlıkları Koruma Vakfı [TEMA]), the Greenpeace of Turkey (Greenpeace Türk), the Purple Roof Women Centre Foundation (‘Mor Çatı’ – Kadına Şiddetle Mücadele Vakfı), and the Water Foundation (Su Vakfı).

14. It must be noted in passing that in Turkey, the absence of intra‐party democracy has been a mixed blessing; in parties such as the Nationalist Action Party and the Justice and Development Party, the leaders prevented the parties from drifting to anti‐system tendencies. This has contributed to the flourishing of civil society.

15. For an elaboration, see Shankland (1999, 28–31).

16. The disagreement among the elites on this issue is a different story, which we take up below.

17. In fact, Alevis do not use the appellation ‘Şi′i’ for themselves (Shankland 1999, 139).