Next steps on Bosnia‐Herzegovina: key elements to a revised EU strategy

Abstract

2009 and early 2010 saw a revival in international community (IC) interest in Bosnia, notably by the USA. Yet it was also another period of disappointment, with ample evidence that the country remains mired in political stagnation. This article reviews recent developments and suggests some key elements to a revised European Union (EU) strategy for Bosnia. Underlying this strategy is the understanding that Bosnia is not a regular EU enlargement country, nor is it one constitutional reform package (‘Dayton II’) away from being so. Instead, Bosnia is likely to retain its post‐conflict status, and the particular risks associated with it, for the foreseeable future. As a consequence, the enlargement process needs to be sensitively combined with measures to address risks to stability. The policy implications that emerge are, first, that the EU must take decisive steps to enhance its credibility and the membership offer. Second, evidence from recent academic studies suggests that important measures to reduce risks to stability include maintaining an international military deterrent and promoting economic development. Additional measures, including tackling corruption, may further reduce risks to stability. Meeting EU membership requirements is heavily dependent on a pro‐EU consensus amongst governing parties, so that the ballot box is both the barometer and transmission mechanism for successful EU policy‐making. For the two policy tracks identified above, the EU must take further steps to frame its interventions and requirements for a domestic political audience, in order to win over voters still more inclined to trust nationalist political options.

Keywords:

• European Union
• Bosnia‐Herzegovina
• peace‐building
• public opinion
• enlargement

Notes

1. For reasons of stylistic simplicity, the term ‘Bosnia’ is used to refer to Bosnia and Herzegovina more generally.

2. The authors use statistical models to test various factors that are purported to impact on the risk of reversion to conflict, using a data set comprising a sample of 44 post‐conflict countries (see Colloer, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2008). This article is popularized in Collier (2009). Both sources are drawn on interchangeably in the text.

3. It is taken as given that a central political aim of the EU is the preservation of Bosnia’s territorial integrity.

4. The OHR is mandated under Annex 10 of the Dayton Accords to promote compliance with civil aspects of the agreement. Following Dayton, a Peace Implementation Conference was held in December 1995 to mobilize international support for the accords. The conference instituted the PIC. It currently comprises 55 member states and international organizations. The London conference also established a PIC Steering Board, working under the chairmanship of the HR. Steering Board members comprise Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK, USA, the European Commission and Turkey. In practice, the PIC Steering Board provides strategic political guidance and support to the HR.

5. The five conditions are: agreements on the apportionment of state property as well as defence property, completion of the Brcko Final Award, fiscal sustainability and entrenchment of the Rule of Law. The two conditions are signing of the SAA and a ‘positive assessment’ of the situation in Bosnia by the PIC Steering Board (http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=41352).

6. The phrase used by HR Lajčak himself (http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressi/default.asp?content_id=43086).

7. The impact of European integration on stability needs to be more fully understood. While EU countries have not gone to war with each other, intra‐state regions generally enjoy greater visibility in the EU. One can contrast the pro‐European character of, say, Catalonia with the more malign nationalism in parts of the Basque region. Allowing a country still at significant risk of violent conflict to join the EU would be a strategic error, with unpredictable consequences.

8. Spanish Council Presidency Foreign Minister Moratinos has declared 2010 as a key year for the western Balkans. In 2009 and 2008 Olli Rehn did the same. In 2007 it was the turn of Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. For precise references and further examples of this trend see Domm (2009).

9. If the prospect of renewed conflict seems distant to international observers, the perceived threat of war to the Bosnia public appears much higher: 25% respondents in a UNDP (2009) Early Warning Survey answered ‘yes’ to the question: ‘Do you think war might breakout if EUFOR withdraw?’

10. Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2008) demonstrate that France’s ‘over the horizon’ informal security guarantees to Francophone areas of West and Central Africa in the second half of the twentieth century did succeed in reducing the risk of conflict.

11. GDP per capita and growth rate statistics available from the IMF World Economic Outlook database (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/weodata/index.aspx).

12. Unemployment and poverty statistics available from the ILO database of labour statistics (http://laborsta.ilo.org/).

13. In the light of this approach, the debate over the IC presence can be revisited. While the authoritarianism of the OHR may rankle some external observers, for domestic voters the argument over the OHR can also be viewed in terms of effectiveness. That is, despite the impressive powers that have been placed at its disposal, have the OHR’s achievements really met the expectations of Bosnian citizens? For instance, the 2009 Balkan Gallup poll shows that while support for the OHR keeping or increasing its powers runs at 83% in Bosniak‐majority areas, support for the OHR’s political and economic reforms, anti‐corruption and public administration reforms vary between 48% and 71%.

14. Just as in EU states, it is unrealistic to expect that diffuse pro‐EU attitudes will overcome the concrete economic concerns of voters on pensions, social security support etc.