Abstract
In this article, I use the cases of Croatia and Poland to explore the role of long-time human rights activists as advocates in the field of transitional justice. I argue that while core human rights organizations from the non-democratic period may play an important role in bringing attention to rights violations in non-democracies, they are severely handicapped with respect to transitional justice in the early transition period as a result of the very nature of the past regime, which prompts formation of elite organizations dependent on outside donors and isolated, or even distrusted, by their natural constituents at home. By contrast, organizations for which human rights is only one sub-theme, such as victims? organizations, may be more insulated from these defects and hence have a better shot at influencing the public justice debate.
Notes
1. The few polls concerning retributive justice for communist-era human rights violators paint a rather confusing picture. In one 1994 poll, only 10% of respondents supported a recent court decision to acquit Generals Ciaston and Platek, accused of ordering the murder of Popieluszka (OBOP 09/1994). Moreover, while 41% blamed the verdict on insufficient evidence (there was no follow-up about who or what was to blame for this), more than one-third (35%) felt that the generals were protected by political forces. We might conclude from this poll that Poles support the prosecution of those responsible for grave human rights violations but are skeptical in regard to institutions charged with ensuring justice. The results of a 1998 poll over the fate of General Jaruzelski, charged with ordering the military to fire on protesters in 1970, produce a much different picture, however. Polish society was split, with 47% demanding Jaruzelski be brought to court and 41% saying that no trial should be held ‘after almost 30 years’ (CBOS 08/1998). From this isolated poll, it appears that Poles were torn by the issue of accountability.