Russia and South Ossetia: conferring statehood or creeping annexation?

Abstract

Events in Ukraine have distracted international attention from the ongoing Russian involvement in the unresolved conflicts of the South Caucasus. This article explores the intensification of relations between South Ossetia and Moscow, focusing on the extent to which South Ossetia exists as a functioning state entity. Are the authorities in Tskhinvali able to provide vital services such as defence and control over ‘state’ borders and territory without Russian involvement? What has been happening in South Ossetia is important, despite being overshadowed by events in Ukraine, as it is indicative of what may well occur in eastern Ukraine: a simmering separatist conflict that is far more than a domestic territorial dispute, with both regional and international implications.

Keywords:

• Russia
• South Ossetia
• Abkhazia
• separatist territories
• quasi-states

Notes

1. Gamsakhurdia openly promoted the cleansing of Ossetians from the country with the aim of driving them back to North Ossetia and his election triggered a sharp deterioration of relations between the Georgian government and ethnic minorities, who began to view independence as the only way to retain their cultural rights and autonomy. Following attempts by Tbilisi in August 1989 to make Georgian the country’s sole official language, the authorities in South Ossetia (where reportedly only 14% of Ossetians spoke Georgian) ruled that Ossetian was to be the region’s sole language. On 19 January 1991 South Ossetia held a referendum in which reportedly over 90% of the population voted to become part of Russia, although the results were never recognized by Georgia. See Cornell, 162–169. For an in-depth analysis of the conflict itself see Birch (1995).

2. Writing in 2003 Dov Lynch surmised that ‘the separatist regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh have survived isolation and blockades for a decade, and look set to survive another ten more years’ (Lynch 2003).

3. Infuriated by Western support for an independent Kosovo in 2008, the Kremlin warned that it would retaliate by formally recognizing Georgia’s separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow was also angered by the declaration at NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008 that Georgia and Ukraine were likely to become members of the military alliance at some unspecified point in the future and the Kremlin subsequently increased its cooperation with the two separatist territories.

4. This was to be expected. In July 2004 the Russian authorities had warned that Moscow ‘will not remain indifferent towards the fate of its citizens, which comprise the absolute majority of South Ossetia’, a stance affirmed in 2005 by Andrei Kokoshin, head of the Duma committee on CIS affairs, who said that Russia ‘will not stay aloof’ if Georgia resorts to force, stating that: ‘Many residents of South Ossetia are citizens of Russia and Russia has the right to defend the life, freedom, property and health of its citizens using all means available to a state in modern circumstances.’ Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. ‘V svyazi s obostreniem situatsii vokrug Yuzhnoi Osetii’. July 9, 2004. www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/3C8799FB6DC16167C3256ECC0045352E. Again, in September 2007, there was a similar warning that ‘in the case of aggravation of the situation around South Ossetia Russia will take all the necessary steps determined by its peacekeeping and mediation mission and by its responsibility for the security of Russian citizens.’ Statement by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs On the Situation in the Georgian-Ossetian Zone of Conflict. September 14, 2007. www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/fd30396df64db2c9c3257356005ad343?OpenDocument.

5. Only a few states other than Russia recognized it as an independent state: Nicaragua, Venezuela and Tuvalu, although it subsequently withdrew its recognition in 2014.

6. This approach caused some problems in September 2015, after an official delegation, which was returning from events in Tiraspol marking the 25th anniversary of Transdnistr’s ‘independence’, were detained at Chisinau airport and banned from entering Moldova for 10 years. ‘Zayavlenie ministerstva innostrannyikh del respubliki Yuzhnoi Ossetii’, Res News Agency, September 8, 2015. http://cominf.org/node/1166506076 (accessed September 22, 2015).

7. The base has a military camp in Russia, which enables the number of personnel to be varied according to requirement. Itar-Tass news agency, Moscow, 1036GMT, February 25, 2010, BBC Monitoring.

8. Kokoity has previously stated his belief that the Georgian resorts of Borjomi and Bakuriani are a part of South Ossetia.

9. The study also estimated that the pipeline will lower the level of unemployment by over 30% and contribute to a rise in GDP. Georgia has the right to take up to 5% of the annual gas flow through the SCP in lieu of a tariff. If it does not take this it will be obligated to pay a fee. In monetary terms, this quantity is equivalent to around US$17m per year. It can also purchase a further 0.5 billion cubic metres of gas a year at a discounted price.

10. JTEC is designed to assist Georgia with the reform, modernization and strengthening of its security and defence sector, as well as enhance the interoperability of Georgian forces and contribute to regional stability in the Black Sea and Caucasus region. NATO, Fact Sheet: NATO-Georgian Joint Training and Evaluation Centre (JTEC), 27 August, 2015. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20150827_150827-jtec-georgia.pdf (accessed September 19, 2015).

11. See http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/252874 (accessed October 2, 2015).

12. Following the ratification of the treaty, there have been indications that Moscow is seeking to strengthen its control over Abkhazia, after a retired Russian general, Anatoly Khrulev, was appointed as the republic’s minister of defence. Although the appointment, announced last month (May 2015), was ostensibly made by Abkhazia’s de facto president Raul Khadjimba, the timing of the decision coincided with his return from a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, suggesting that the choice was not Khadjimba’s alone. The background of the appointee was also instructive: Khrulev commanded Russia’s 58th Army until his retirement in 2010 and was wounded in South Ossetia during the 2008 war.