Paramilitary motivation in Ukraine: beyond integration and abolition

Abstract

A common theme in historical and contemporary warfare is the role of militias. Militias, both pro-government and rebel, act beyond their sponsors or else they would be understood as part of the armies that go to war. We think of militias as paramilitaries, approximate but not collocated with the military. Paramilitaries are ordinarily recruited and resourced differently. They are also ordinarily tactically different, playing a role in front line warfare where the intensity may be high, but where the position is fast changing or distributed in local areas. As the conflict literature will show, militias, or paramilitaries, are a common feature of any conflict and thus it is no surprise that we see their use in Ukraine. For the conflict in Ukraine, we use the term paramilitaries to indicate those forces that are fighting at the front line for both the Kyiv government and rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk, with these being considered ‘pro-Russian’ and even include Russian citizens. Relying on the pro-government militias literature, we show how militias on both sides play an important role in the conflict but also pose the biggest threat to a sustainable peace.

Keywords:

• Ukraine
• paramilitaries
• pro-government militias
• Donetsk
• Lugansk

Notes

1. Publications about the pro-Ukrainian battalion ‘Azov’ constitute an exception, but to date, publications mostly focus on discussions about the ideology of the members of this battalion.

2. The term ‘Russian vacationers’ (in Russian – ‘otpuskniki’) appeared and became popular after Putin’s explanation of Russian troops on the territory of Ukraine as troops who spend their vacations there.

3. In 2012, the Ukrainian armed forces consisted of about 150,000 troops, including about 40,000 civilian employees working for the army and cadets.

4. The so-called Ilovaysk pocket is a clear example. Both Russian unofficial and Ukrainian official sources portray the battle over Ilovaysk in very similar way: the main reason for defeat of the Ukrainian joint armed forces was the betrayal of pro-Ukrainian paramilitary battalions who defended the flanks of the Ukrainian joint armed forces (Sputnik I Pogrom 2014; Zerkalo Nedeli, 10.10.2014; Zerkalo Nedeli, 10.10.2015).

5. The concept of ‘hybrid’ war re-appeared on the academic and policy agendas after Russia’s annexation of the Crimea. According to one definition, hybrid warfare is: ‘a conflict involving a combination of conventional military forces and irregular (guerrillas, insurgents and terrorists) which could include both state and non-state actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose. Irregular forces need not be centrally directed, although in many cases they form part of a coherent strategy used to oppose an invader or occupation force. Hybrid warfare also plays out at all levels of war, from the tactical, to the operational, to the strategic’ (Murray and Mansoor 2012, 3).

6. In the first months of the armed conflict, the legal framework for activity of volunteer paramilitary battalions was weak. As a result, the mechanisms of cooperation between the paramilitaries and the regular army were unclear. In September 2014, as a part of the changing governmental policy towards volunteers, almost all paramilitary battalions were formally subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs or Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. Together, all paramilitaries compose four different types of battalions, which are fully engaged in the military operations together with the regular army: battalions of territorial self-defence, battalions of special forces, reserve battalions of the National Guard of Ukraine and voluntary corpus ‘The Right Sector’ which has special status and subordinated directly to Headquarter of ‘anti-terror operation’ (Zerkalo Nedeli, 29.08.2014). However, most battalions deny any subordination and the command hierarchy informally.

7. The Ukrainian command has frequently blamed paramilitary battalions for leaving the battlefield without its permission that led to defeat of the Ukrainian joined forces (the regular army and battalions). For example, battalions of territorial self-defence ‘Krivbas’ and ‘Prikarpatie’ participated in the battles over Illovaysk, but they left the battlefield without permission after slashing attacks of the pro-Russian troops. Tens of pro-Ukrainian combatants were killed or taken as prisoners. The Ukrainian command has blamed battalions for desertion. For its turn, battalions reported the Command’s failure to coordinate sub-units, lack of supply of weapons, ammunition and personnel to the battalion during the fighting (Zerkalo Nedeli, 10.10.2015).

8. For example, battalions ‘Aydar’, ‘Azov’, ‘Volunteer Ukrainian Corp’, ‘Volunteer battalion OUN’ and ‘Right Sector’.

9. Guerrilla troops ‘Ravliki’ is a small group of pro-Ukrainian volunteers, who operate on both rebel and Ukraine controlled territory of Donbas. ‘Ravliki’ attacked pro-Russian paramilitaries, arrested civilians whom they suspected in separatism or collaboration with Russia, and captured property on both rebel- and Ukraine-controlled territory of Donbas. In June 2015, the Ukrainian authority accused ‘Ravliki’ of attacks on the agricultural firm located on Ukraine-controlled territory. Nine members of ‘Ravliki’ were arrested. This case (like the case of Vita Zavyryukha – a female pro-Ukrainian guerrilla fighter, arrested for the murder of a Ukrainian policeman whom she accused of sympathy for Russia) is a manifestation of the gap in the Ukrainian legislation regarding the legal definition of the Ukrainian conflict, including the participation of irregulars and the state of anarchy (Daily Mail 2015), (Inforesist 2015), (Obozrevatel 2015).

10. Security community discusses three major definitions of the Ukrainian conflict: civil war, Russian military occupation and terrorism. The position of officials in Kyiv on this subject is very confusing. Kyiv has always denied civil war in Donbas, claiming instead for Russian military occupation. At the same time, the adopted Ukrainian legislation defines the conflict as the act of terrorism conducted by self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and ‘Lugansk People’s Republic’. In the Ukrainian legislation ‘anti-terror operation’ presupposes particular set of measures of public policy (e.g. precluding the deployment of armed forces). This confusion and unclearness has led to massive violations of international law of armed conflict and human rights both regarding civilians, paramilitaries and soldiers of the regular army.

11. In his proposals to the change of the Ukrainian constitution, the president of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko proposes to postpone the ratification of Rome statute for 3 years, in fact to the end of his presidential term (Draft of Law of Ukraine ‘On changes of the Constitution of Ukraine (regarding justice)', n 3524 from 25.11.2015).

12. For example, problems of the legal definition of military occupation, in particular, when the occupying state has not announced or confirmed its military occupation directly, are broadly discussed. The international character of occupation and direct rule of the occupying country via military or civilian administrations are set in the norms and laws around territorial integrity and national sovereignty. The legal definitions of territories occupied are problematic, for example, if the occupying state exercises its authority indirectly via proxies. It is even more difficult if the territory is captured by a non-state actor such as paramilitary group or mercenaries.

13. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reported a number of war crimes conducted by paramilitaries in the course of the 2014 campaign; for example, ‘Ukraine must stop ongoing abuses and war crimes by pro-Ukrainian volunteer forces’ (Amnesty International 2014). In the meantime, the Ukrainian government itself discloses information about criminal activity of pro-Ukrainian paramilitaries.

14. Official statements, confirming sources of funding for pro-Ukrainian paramilitary battalions appeared after the arrest of Gennadiy Korban, head of ‘Fund for Defence of Ukraine’, affiliated with the oligarch Igor Kolomoysky and current mayor of Dnipropetrovsk Boris Filatov. The Service of Security of Ukraine accused the ‘Fund for the Defence of Ukraine’ of funding private armies, kidnapping and theft. (TSN, 31.10.2015). Further declarations of commanders and ex-commanders of pro-Ukrainian paramilitaries confirmed this information (Gordon, 23 March 2015), (Manko 2015). In his interview for ‘Gordon’, the ex-commander of pro-Ukrainian battalion ‘Aydar’ Sergiy Melnichuk affirms that all of the battalions that are mobilized from policemen or ex-policemen receive funding from Igor Kolomoysky. In his press conference, the ex-commander of pro-Ukrainian battalion ‘Dnipro-1’ Valentin Manko affirms that the ‘Fund for the Defence of Ukraine’ was an umbrella for criminal activity where patriotism was a cover for crimes in the zone of armed conflict.

15. For example, the base of pro-Ukrainian battalion ‘Right Sector’ near Dnipropetrovsk was surrounded by the UNA on in April 2015 (Lb.ua 2015), the base of pro-Ukrainian battalion ‘Tornado’ near Lysychansk was surrounded by the UNA in June 2015 (Podrobnosti 2015), and troops of ‘Right Sector’ in Mukachevo were surrounded by the UNA in July 2015. All of the claims of the Ukrainian government concerned organized criminal activity of the armed paramilitaries. Ukrainian command demanded paramilitaries to disarm and to be surrendered to the Ukrainian military prosecutor office. Events in Mukachevo led to causalities among soldiers and paramilitaries (Korrespondent 2015).

16. This Decree contains points on ‘prevention of gangsterism, activity of illegal armed groups, illegal circulation of weapon, ammunition … the disclosure of channels for smuggling of weapon, ammunition throughout the territory of Ukraine’.

17. Soldiers of the regular Ukrainian army are also engaged in criminal activity in the zone of anti-terror operation. For example, in September 2015 military prosecutor of Ukraine arrested a number of senior officers of 28th armoured brigade for organization of illegal trade with and smuggling to/from the occupied territories. The military prosecutor contended that almost all brigade from its commander to soldiers were engaged in criminal activity. That is why before arresting, the brigade was called off from the ATO zone to ‘continental’ Ukraine and disarmed (TSN, 22 September 2015).

18. To date, almost every volunteer paramilitary battalion is accused of participation in criminal activity. Based on open sources of data, such as reports of international human rights organizations, the military prosecutor of Ukraine and parliamentary commissions, we can give the following (incomplete) list of examples: battalion ‘Dnipro’ was accused of raiding; battalion ‘Tornado’ was accused of sexual crimes, torture, kidnapping, contract murders and marauding; battalion ‘Right Sector’ was accused of the organization of a number of armed hold-ups; battalion ‘Aydar’ was accused of war crimes, kidnapping, marauding, contract murders; battalion ‘Azov’ was accused of a number of armed hold-ups; and finally battalion ‘Slobozhanshina’ was accused of contract murders of the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Arsen Avakov and members of parliament. In total, according to declarations of the pro-Ukrainian paramilitaries, more than 1500 of the ex-members of the pro-Ukrainian paramilitary battalions are in detention for their criminal and/or political activity (Politnavigator 2015).

19. 70.5 per cent of residents of Donbas considered ‘the Euromaidan revolution’ as a coup d’atat (Zerkalo nedeli, Proekt Voyna 2014).

20. According to the census results of 2001, the ethnic structure in the Donetsk oblast was as follows: Ukrainians constituted about 56% and Russians were 38.2%. Ukrainians formed 58% of Lugansk oblast population with Russians at 39%. The overwhelming majority of the population of both oblasts is Russian-speaking (All-Ukraine population census 2001). This unique ethnic structure and common history led to the creation of a special regional (so-called ‘Donetsk’) identity. The regional identity dominated above national Ukrainian identity with 56% of residents in Donetsk and Lugansk who identify themselves primarily as residents of hometown and his/her region against 32% identifying themselves primarily as residents of Ukraine (Public opinion polls 2011). Polls from the same organization between 31 May and 18 June 2007 also indicated that some 24.2% of people considered regional differences in Ukraine as a serious ground for separation of the country compared to 26.1% in the southern Ukraine, 14.3% in the central Ukraine and 10.9% in the western regions. A different poll carried out between 8 and 18 February 2014, finds 33% in Donetsk and 24% in Luhansk in favour of unification of Ukraine with Russia compared to 41% in Crimea, 24% in Odessa, 6% in Kyiv and virtually no support in the western regions (Paniotto 2014).

21. Igor Girkin (Strelkov) for many times confirmed cooperation of battalions ‘Vostok’ and ‘Oplot’ with Ukrainian authorities and local oligarchs. For example, he wrote: ‘They have prepared to capitulate in Donetsk. Life in Donetsk was luxurious, everyone was drinking coffee in the café, swimming, sporting. Nobody wanted fighting’ (Kotich ‘Voennie svodki s Yugo-Zapadnogo Fronta’. Forum-antikvariat.ru. Posted in 20 June 2014). Before Igor Strelkov entered Donetsk, all institutions of the Ukrainian state functioned in their ordinary regime, including local councils, the national bank, postal services, railways and tax administrations: ‘When we entered Donetsk, the Ukrainian side was completely embarrassed. They had already prescribed a scenario of capitulation. When we entered Donetsk, everything was fine – there was a mayor of the city and other authorities subordinated to Kyiv. We were defending Donetsk for almost 40 days before the Russian vacationers came’ (Kotich ‘Voennie svodki s Yugo-Zapadnogo Fronta’. Forum-antikvariat.ru. Posted in 6 July, 2014).

22. ^xxiii Russian mercenary Colonel Igor Girkin (aka Strelkov) admitted his crucial role in the escalation of the conflict: ‘I was a trigger of war in Donbas. If my troops did not cross the Russia-Ukraine border, protest in Donbas would come to its end alike it was in Kharkov or Odessa … From the very beginning we have been fighting seriously … We were the first troops, who started killing Ukrainian diversion groups’ (BBC, November 20, 2014).

23. Field research included in-depth semi-structured interviews with both pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian paramilitaries, Ukrainian military officers and key leaders of pro-Russian rebels, which were conducted in Ukraine- and rebel-controlled Donbas in the period between June and September 2014 (interviews with key leaders) and between June and September 2015 (interviews with ordinary paramilitaries and volunteers). Subjects for interview included questions on socio-economic status of combatants, individual and group motivation to join para-military battalions, individual explanation of causes for conflict and conflict escalation, vision of their future in Ukraine or People’s Republics, experience of conducting violent actions and others. Field research also included process-tracing, case studies and deep embedded observation.

24. For example, Aleksandr Khodakovsky, commander of battalion ‘Vostok’, which enrolled ex-members of Ukrainian anti-terror troops ‘Alfa’ claimed the political solution of the conflict with Kyiv in June 2014 (autonomy for the Donbas). Khodakovsky was in conflict with Russian mercenary Strelkov in July 2014. Khodakovsy insisted on negotiations with Kyiv whereas Strelkov insisted on the escalation of war against Ukraine. As a result, ‘Vostok’ left Donetsk. In October 2015, ‘Vostok’ was disarmed and joined ‘regular’ armed forces of Donetsk People’s Republic. (Ria 2014), (DNR-news 2015).

25. After Minsk-I, a number of famous and influential pro-Russian warlords were killed by republican forces on the territory of self-declared Lugansk People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s Republic (Aleksandr Bednov, aka-Betman was killed on 1 January 2015, Evgeniy Ishenko, the ‘people’s mayor’ of Pervomaysk city, Lugansk People’s Republic was killed on 23 January 2015, Aleksey Mozgovoy, commander of ‘Prizrak’ battalion was killed on 23 May 2015). Many influential leaders of the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic were formally or informally deported from the republics (Igor Girkin, aka Strelkov, Aleksandr Boroday, Pavel Gubarev, Nikolay Kozitsin and others).