Proxy agents, auxiliary forces, and sovereign defection: assessing the outcomes of using non-state actors in civil conflicts

Abstract

This article interrogates the role of non-state armed actors in the Ukrainian civil conflict. The aim of this article is twofold. First, it seeks to identify the differences between the patterns of military intervention in Crimea (direct, covert intervention), and those in the South-East (mixed direct and indirect – proxy – intervention). It does so by assessing the extent of Russian troop involvement and that of external sponsorship to non-state actors. Second, it puts forward a tentative theoretical framework that allows distinguishing between the different outcomes the two patterns of intervention generate. Here, the focus is on the role of non-state actors in the two interventionist scenarios. The core argument is that the use of non-state actors is aimed at sovereign defection. The article introduces the concept of sovereign defection and defines it as a break-away from an existing state. To capture the differences between the outcomes of the interventions in Crimea and South-East, sovereign defection is classified into two categories: inward and outward. Outward sovereign defection is equated to the territorial seizure of the Crimean Peninsula by Russian Special Forces, aided by existing criminal gangs acting in an auxiliary capacity. Inward sovereign defection refers to the external sponsorship of the secessionist rebels in South-East Ukraine and their use as proxy forces with the purpose of creating a political buffer-zone in the shape of a frozen conflict. To demonstrate these claims, the article analyses the configuration of the dynamics of violence in both regions. It effectively argues that, in pursuing sovereign defection, the auxiliary and proxy forces operate under two competing dynamics of violence, delegative and non-delegative, with distinct implications to the course and future of the conflict.

Keywords:

• Proxy war
• proxy agent
• auxiliary force
• Ukraine
• sovereign defection
• civil war

Notes

1. Sergey Aksyonov is the current Prime Minister of the Republic of Crimea (Shuster 2014b).

2. Correspondence with the Ukrainian Embassy in London (21 July 2015) emphasizes that use of ‘civil war’ is a misnomer. Specifically, the argument stresses that the ongoing situation is not an internal conflict and that Ukraine is engaging Russian regular troops. Similar concerns were raised in reference to the use of ‘rebel groups’. It was noted that the Ukrainian authorities label the pro-Russian separatists as ‘terrorists’. The article admits that ‘civil war’ carries a stigma of chaos and loss of ability to effectively control. However, in the light of the article putting forward an objective, non-biased argument, as well as for the sake of academic consistency, the concept of ‘civil war’ will be used. For these purposes, Kalvays’ definition will be used: ‘armed conflict within the boundaries of a recognised sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of hostilities’ (2006, 17). Moreover, to accurately represent the facts, the article refines the concept by specifically labelling it ‘internationalised civil war’. This represents an intrastate conflict with foreign involvement. Following the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s definition, this is ‘an armed conflict between a government and a non-government party where the government side, the opposing side, or both sides, receive troop support from other governments that actively participate in the conflict’(UCDP 2015).

3. The article returns to this point further one in detail. Despite vehement denials on behalf of Russia, conclusive evidence has been presented by the Ukrainian authorities, NATO and independent sources. Communication with the Ukrainian Embassy in London (21 July 2015) acknowledged and stressed this aspect as a fundamental feature of the conflict (Embassy of Ukraine to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 2015).

4. Putin defended the volunteer thesis and was quoted saying ‘We’re not attacking anyone’ (Greene and Cullinane 2014). Later, Putin stressed similar tone and continued with dismissing claims of Russian troop involvement as ‘nonsense’ (Demirjian 2015).

5. The issues of bias is a significant one, and information from organizations such as Open Russia should be approached cautiously. However, it is worth underlining that the data are corroborated from two human rights groups, Cargo 200 and the regional societies of soldiers’ mothers (Gregory 2015).

6. After being dissolved through Presidential decree on account of force brutality in February 2014, Berkut dismantled and its members have been seen fighting alongside both sides of the conflict (Shelomovskiy 2014)

7. External support has received substantial attention in research. However, in the light of space considerations, the article does not provide a review of the literature, the focus being on its political consequences and the emergence of a strategy of war by proxy (Byman et al. 2005; Cunningham 2010; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood 2014).