Eurosceptic yet pro-enlargement: the paradoxes of Hungary’s EU policy

Abstract

The present article seeks to explore the main aspects of Hungary’s EU enlargement policy. It reveals a tension between the government’s committed support for EU enlargement and its critical stance towards the EU on several other fronts. However, on the basis of liberal intergovernmentalist theory, this article argues that this is not a real contradiction since enlargement to the Western Balkans serves Hungary’s national interests in spite of its government’s Euroscepticism. At the same time, Hungary’s questioning of the basic values of the EU as a community of liberal democracies has weakened the legitimacy of Hungarian interventions in favour of speeding up EU enlargement. While Hungary has become ever more isolated from the ‘old’ EU member states, more recently, its government managed to increase its leverage in the Western Balkans and central Europe in the context of the migration crisis.

Keywords:

• EU enlargement
• Western Balkans
• Hungary
• migration crisis
• Euroscepticism

Notes

1. Schimmelfennig called the ‘drivers’ those Member States that advocated ‘an early and firm commitment to Eastern enlargement’, whereas other member governments (the ‘brakemen’) were ‘reticent and tried to put off the decision’ (Schimmelfennig 2001, 49).

2. In this article the terms ‘migrants’ and ‘refugees’ are used interchangeably. Following the approach of the BBC, the term migrant refers ‘to all people on the move who have yet to complete the legal process of claiming asylum. This group includes people fleeing war-torn countries such as Syria, who are likely to be granted refugee status, as well as people who are seeking jobs and better lives, who governments are likely to rule are economic migrants’. See: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911.

3. Author’s interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary (MFA). August 22, 2016. Budapest. Around 20 interviews were conducted within the frames of this research in Budapest and Brussels, most of them in confidentiality, therefore the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.

4. Ibid.

5. See Viktor Orbán’s presentation at the 27th Bálványos Summer Open University and Student Camp. 2016. Tusnádfürdő (Băile Tuşnad), July 23. https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-orban-s-presentation-at-the-27 h-balvanyos-summer-open-university-and-student-camp and Thorpe (2016).

6. Especially following the Tavares report of the European Parliament in 2013.

7. Quite recently, the European Commission opened infringement procedures against Hungary concerning the segregation of Roma children and concerning asylum law.

8. See Mr. Orbán’s speech in Băile Tuşnad; The Prime Minister’s website. 2014. A Tavares-jelentés egy baloldali akció. July 5. http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/cikk/a_tavares-jelentes_egy_baloldali_akcio.

9. See Orbán’s speech in Băile Tuşnad.

10. From 2004 to 2015 Hungary received around 3–5 billion euros on a yearly basis from the EU while contributed with around 1 billion annually to the EU budget. Portfolio. 2016. Továbbra is masszívan megéri az EU-tagságunk. August 10. http://www.portfolio.hu/unios_forrasok/gazdasagfejlesztes/tovabbra_is_masszivan_megeri_az_eu-tagsagunk.235879.html.

11. Author’s interview with a former journalist of the weekly liberal newspaper HVG. September 17, 2014. Budapest.

12. In 2010 the Hungarian parliament passed a new media law package, which was heavily criticized for limiting media freedom and pluralism in Hungary. Controversies over the new media law also led to a stand-off with the European Commission during the Hungarian EU presidency in the first half of 2011, as the Commission also raised its concerns related to this new legislation, which as a result was subsequently amended by the Hungarian parliament. Hungary also adopted a new constitution in April 2011, which became another subject of contentions during its EU presidency. Subsequently, the European Commission launched accelerated infringement proceedings against Hungary over new legislation that came into force under the new constitution, related to the independence of the central bank and data protection authorities as well the independence of the judiciary. European Commission, press release, January 17, 2012, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-24_en.htm. The European Commission also expressed its general concerns with respect to the principles of the rule of law, EU law and Council of Europe standards in Hungary. See Viviane Reding. 2013. ‘Hungary and the Rule of Law - Statement of the European Commission in the Plenary Debate of the European Parliament’. April 17. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-324_en.htm.

13. Official election program of Jobbik, available on http://jobbik.hu/sites/default/files/cikkcsatolmany/kimondjukmegoldjuk2014_netre.pdf.

14. Author’s interview. Hungarian Europe Society. June 17, 2014. Budapest.

15. Author’s interview at the Permanent Representation of Hungary to the EU. June 12, 2014. Brussels.

16. Letter of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to President Barroso, Members of the European Council, Jerzy Busek, President of the European Parliament and Baroness Cathrine Ashton, High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. July 1, 2011. Budapest.

17. Ibid.

18. Hungary contributes with 361 troops to KFOR, 49 troops to EUFOR Althea mission, and one policeman to UNMIK. Source: Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Hungary. 2016, September. http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2015/09/11/peacekeeping-contributor-profile-hungary/.

19. There are 14,048 ethnic Hungarians in Croatia and 254,000 in Serbia according to the 2011 censuses. Source: Statistical Office of Croatia, Statistical Office of Serbia.

20. Hungary was the third biggest investor in fYROM and Montenegro in 2014. Data retrieved from the website of the Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency, www.hipa.hu, July 11, 2014.

21. Author’s interview at the MFA. June 4, 2014.

22. Source: Website of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office: www.ksh.hu. For instance, out of the 7 billion euro export surplus Hungary realised from its overall external trade in 2013, 2 billion euros came from trade with the Western Balkans. Data retrieved from the website of the Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency, www.hipa.hu, July 11, 2014.

23. Author’s interview at the MFA. May 13, 2014.

24. Author’s interview at the Permanent Representation of Hungary to the EU. June 10, 2014.

25. Author’s interview at the MFA. June 4, 2014.

26. Author’s interview at the Permanent Representation of Hungary to the EU. June 10, 2014.

27. Author’s interview at the MFA. July 29, 2014.

28. Author’s interview at the Prime Minister’s Office. July 31, 2014. Budapest.

29. Author interview at the MFA. May 13, 2014.

30. Author’s interview at the MFA. June 4, 2014.

31. The EU Policy Website of the Hungarian Government, http://eu.kormany.hu/inter-ministerial-committee-for-european-coordination-icec.

32. Author’s interview at the Permanent Representation of Hungary to the EU. June 10, 2014.

33. Ibid.

34. Author’s interview at the MFA. May 16, 2014.

35. Author’s interview at the MFA. June 4, 2014.

36. There are also other parties in Vojvodina representing ethnic Hungarians beside the AVH, the most influential of which is currently the Hungarian Movement (HM). The HM was launched in 2015 by former members of the AVH who became disillusioned with that party. During the 2016 April general elections in Serbia, the Hungarian Movement managed to attract between 20 and 30% of Hungarian votes in Vojvodina, demonstrating its considerable weight among the Hungarian community. While it won a number of seats in local assemblies and the provincial assembly of Vojvodina, it failed to secure parliamentary mandates, and does not enjoy the support of Budapest. ‘Korhecz: Amit a Magyar Mozgalom elért, az egy csoda.’ 2016. Vajdasagma, April 27. http://www.vajma.info/cikk/vajdasag/20071/Korhecz-Amit-a-Magyar-Mozgalom-elert--az-egy-csoda.html.

37. Vajdaság Portál 2016.

38. Al-Jazeera 2015.

39. Tanjug 2015, September 16.

40. Helsinki Committee estimated their number at around 900–1000 by the end of 2015 (Juhász, Hunyadi, and Zgut 2015, 7).

41. Danas 2015, September 4.

42. BBC News 2015.

43. Not only the fact that Vučić called Orbán ‘his friend’ proves this, but also photos of the two hugging each other indicate strong personal sympathies. See: Blic 2016.

44. Website of the Hungarian government. 2015. Át kell gondolni az EU alapszerződését. November 20. http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/hirek/a-migracio-kozvetlenul-veszelyezteti-az-europaiak-eletet.

45. Website of the Hungarian government. 2015. Magyarország kiáll Macedónia európai integrációja mellett. January 18. http://www.kormany.hu/hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/hirek/magyarorszag-kiall-macedonia-europai-integracioja-mellett.

46. Website of the Hungarian government. 2016. Magyarország támogatja Macedónia euroatlanti integrációját. December 2. http://www.kormany.hu/hu/kulgazdasagi-es-kulugyminiszterium/hirek/magyarorszag-tamogatja-macedonia-euroatlanti-integraciojat.

47. Al Jazeera 2016.

48. 28,973 people applied for asylum in Hungary in 2016, out of which only close to 400 received protected status based on data of UNHCR from early December. (Magyar Narancs 2016).

49. The JHA Council adopted the decision by qualified majority voting in September 2015. Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Romania voted against it, while Finland abstained. See: Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece.

50. The Berlin Process is an intergovernmental diplomatic initiative launched by the German government in 2014, with the aim to reinvigorate the EU integration process of the Western Balkans. It also seeks to strengthen relations between the Western Balkan states and some EU member countries in the area of the economy and infrastructure development. ‘The Western Balkans’ Berlin process: A new impulse for regional cooperation.’ European Parliament Think Tank. 2016, July 4. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)586602.

51. Orbán explicitly said in Tusnádfürdő in the summer of 2014 that in Hungary they were building an illiberal, democratic state. See: http://mno.hu/tusvanyos/orban-viktor-teljes-beszede-1239645?oldal=3.